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HARVARD STUDIES

IN

CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

*EDITED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE CLASSICAL
INSTRUCTORS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY*

VOLUME VII

LANE VOLUME



1896

W. D. KELSEY,
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PREFATORY NOTE.



THESE Studies are published by authority of Harvard University, and are contributed chiefly by its instructors and graduates, although contributions from other sources are not excluded. The publication is supported by a fund of \$6000, generously subscribed by the class of 1856.

The articles in the present volume are contributed by former pupils or present colleagues of George Martin Lane, Pope Professor of Latin Emeritus, in commemoration of the happy completion of fifty years since he received his first degree in Arts from Harvard College.

JAMES B. GREENOUGH,	} EDITORIAL COMMITTEE.
CLEMENT L. SMITH,	
MORRIS H. MORGAN,	

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GEORGIO · MARTINO · LANE

GRATVLANTES

S · P · D

DISCIPVLI · CONLEGAE · AMICI

Decimum iam lustrum condis ex quo anno baca ut aiunt laureatus academia nostra excessisti, mox felicissimo auspicio rediturus. Quo postquam rediisti, varia auctus et undique hausta doctrina, dum ad hunc diem usque litteras Latinas apud nos profiteris, numquam desiisti institutione Tua adulescentes, provectiones exemplo et hortationibus ad optima studia incitare. Ac vitae quidem rationem ita instituisse videris, ut spreta illa proclivi et paene vulgari ambitione multa de multis scriptitandi et in publicum edendi — vellemus hercle chartis calamoque minus pepercisses — plurimam in docendo operam navares. At hoc munus, di boni, quanta cum fide, quam admirabili sollertia, qua scientiae copia sustinuisti! Quippe nemo ex paucis horum mysteriorum *βάκχοις*, quos patria nostra possidet, plures ad *ναρθηκοφορίαν* instituit. Nam cui umquam contigit Te Plautum, Tacitum, Lucretium illo ingenio illo lepore interpretantem audire quin aliquid certe amoris bonarum litterarum animo conceperit, et postea recollectione illius temporis magis se senserit ad diligentem earum tractationem inpelli? Neque discipulis solum profuit ista quasi

penus eruditionis; consulentibus ianua Tua semper patuit patetque; propensa benignitate aliorum studia adiuuare consuesti, et multorum scripta Tua ope ornatiora prodire. Atque illud quoque non minimum Tuo exemplo didicimus, severa studia cum pallore umbraticae vitae non semper coniungi, falsamque esse illam Adimanti vocem, qui doctrinam longius persequantur neque τοῦ πεπαιδευθαι ἕνεκα tetigerint, hos scilicet ἀλλοκότους fieri et ἀχρήστους ταῖς πόλεσιν.

Itaque cum vellemus hoc festo tempore amorem nostrum observantiamque significare, hoc volumen, suo ordine editum, Tibi extra ordinem grato animo dedicavimus. Vale et perge nos amare.

D. sollemnibus academicis a. d. VIII K. Quinctilis a.
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ΕΓΚΤΑΙΟΝ · LICET · HAEC · ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑΝ · SCRIPTA · VOCARI
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ON THE EXTENT OF THE DELIBERATIVE CONSTRUCTION IN RELATIVE CLAUSES IN GREEK.

BY WILLIAM W. GOODWIN.

A VIGOROUS discussion has been carried on of late concerning the nature of certain relative clauses with the subjunctive and optative in Attic Greek, which seem to lie in the borderland between indirect deliberative questions and final relative clauses. The question meets us full in the face, somewhat to our mortification, when we attempt to explain Xen. *Anab.* i. 7, 7, οὐ τοῦτο δέδοικα μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι δῶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν φίλων, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ἱκανοὺς οἷς δῶ, and schoolboys beginning the *Anabasis* may smile when they find their masters at loggerheads so soon as this. Nearly all are agreed that ὃ τι δῶ is an indirect deliberative question. But what are we to do with ἱκανοὺς οἷς δῶ, where we have a relative with its antecedent? Can we explain ὃ τι δῶ and οἷς δῶ on different principles without violence to the sense; and can we explain them on the same principle without violence to the principle? As I have expressed myself on these constructions several times during the last thirty-five years, not always consistently and never with a full consideration of all the facts bearing on the case as I now understand them, I may be pardoned if I enter the discussion at this late hour, rather with the object of reviewing the results of the discussion than with the hope of establishing any new conclusions. One important result of the recent discussion has been the collection of a sufficient number of examples to show the full extent of the construction in question.¹

¹ To the paucity of examples we must ascribe the unsatisfactory treatment of this subject by Krüger and Madvig, and I trust I may hope for consideration on the same ground. I make no attempt here to discuss all the views which

It is well known that the Homeric language could express purpose by a relative clause with the subjunctive or optative (the subjunctive clause regularly having *κέ*); as *ἡγεμόν' ὅπασσον, ὃς κέ με κείω' ἀγάγη*, *Od.* xv. 310, and *ἄγγελον ἦκαν, ὃς ἀγγείλειε γυναικί*, *Od.* xv. 458. Homer has also the deliberative subjunctive in indirect questions; as *μάρνασθ', ὅπποτέρουσι . . . ὀρέξῃ*, *Il.* v. 33 (with *κέ*, *Il.* xxii. 130), and the corresponding optative after past tenses, as *κλήρους πάλλον, ὅπποτερος πρόσθεν ἀφείη ἔγχος*, *Il.* iii. 316. Both of these constructions appear in Latin. In Attic Greek the indirect deliberative question is retained in essentially the same form as in Homer; as in *ἄπορῶ ταύτην ὅπως ἐκδῶ*, *Dem.* xxvii. 66, and *ἡπόρει ὃ τι χρῆσαιτο τῷ πράγματι*, *Xen. Hellen.* vii. 4, 39. On the other hand, the final relative clause with the subjunctive and optative is replaced in Attic by an equivalent relative clause with the future indicative, which is regularly retained after past tenses. Thus we have in Attic *πρεσβείαν πέμπειν, ἣτις ταῦτ' ἐρεῖ*, *Dem.* i. 2, corresponding to Homeric *ἦ κε ταῦτ' εἴπῃ*, and *ναυτικὸν παρεσκεύαζον, ὃ τι πέμψουσιν ἐς τὴν Δέσβον*, *Thuc.* iii. 16, corresponding to Homeric *ὃ τι πέμψαιεν*. While now it is admitted that we could not have *ἣτις ταῦτ' εἴπῃ* (much less *ἦ ἂν ταῦτ' εἴπῃ*) in Attic for *ἣτις ταῦτ' ἐρεῖ* above, there is much dispute about the nature of such sentences as the following:—

ἔχειν ἐφ' οἷς φιλοτιμηθῶσιν, *Isoc.* iv. 44.

οὐκ ἔχω σόφισμ' ὅτῳ ἀπαλλαγῶ, *Aesch. Prom.* 470.

οὐδένα εἶχον, ὅστις ἐπιστολὰς πέμψει, *Eur. I. T.* 588.

For reasons which will appear later, I shall discuss the subjunctive and the optative in these constructions separately.

have been presented in this discussion, still less to reply to all the arguments which are opposed to my own views. I refer, once for all, to the papers in the *Classical Review* by Mr. Arthur Sidgwick (April, 1891), by Professor Tarbell (July, 1891), by Dr. Mortimer L. Earle (March, 1892, and later), and to Professor W. G. Hale's satisfactory paper on "*Extended*" and "*Remote*" *Deliberatives in Greek*, in the *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, xxiv. pp. 156–205, in which Professor Hale supports many of the views which I have several times expressed since 1865, by arguments which have given me much new light on the whole question.

I. SUBJUNCTIVE.

It is agreed on all hands that subjunctives of this class depending on ἀπορῶ, βουλευόμαι, οὐκ οἶδα, and other expressions which naturally introduce indirect questions, are interrogative and deliberative; as in Dem. xxvii. 66 and Xen. *Hellen.* vii. 4, 39, quoted above. It is generally admitted, further, that the same deliberative interrogative may follow οὐκ ἔχω in the sense of ἀπορῶ, as in οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι εἶπω, *I have nothing to say*; where, however, the English translation is misleading, the literal meaning being *I have not* (i.e. *I am at a loss*) *what I shall say*. That ὃ τι is really interrogative here is plain from cases like οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, *I have nothing to say*, Dem. ix. 54; οὐκ ἔχω τί φῶ, Aesch. *Cho.* 91, and οὐκ ἔχω ἐπὶ τίνα μηλοθύταν πορευθῶ, Eur. *Alc.* 120; and this appears in the Latin *non habeo quid* (or *quod*) *dicam*. The first serious question arises when an affirmative ἔχω is followed by a similar subjunctive in a relative clause, as in ἔχειν ἐφ' οἷς φιλοτιμηθῶσιν, *to have something to glory in*, Isoc. iv. 44, where the uninstructed mind would see no trace of an indirect question, but rather an approach to a final force.¹ Other similar cases are ἐὰν μόνον ἔχη ὅψι διαλέγεται, Plat. *Symp.* 194 D, and ἔξειν ὃ τι εισφέρωσιν, Xen. *Oec.* vii. 20: see also [Lys.] vi. 42 and Plat. *Phaedr.* 255 E, where λέγη for λέγει in both is Bekker's necessary emendation. My suspicion of the final character of these forms was first aroused by Krüger's remark (*Spr.* § 54, 7, A. 2), that the construction with the subjunctive is "nicht statthaft in der Regel, wenn ἔχω keine Negation bei sich hat oder der Satz nicht wenigstens eine Negation involvirt," after which he quotes εὐπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς, Plat. *Ion.* 536 B, in brackets with a (?). But in this most instructive passage we find καθεύδεις τε

¹ In the first edition (1860) of my *Greek Moods and Tenses*, § 65, 1, n. 3, my "uninstructed mind" took this for a survival of the Homeric subjunctive in final relative sentences; and in 1863 I gave the same explanation in a note on the passage in the revised edition of Felton's *Panegyricus*. But my misgivings compelled me to retract this error to a great extent in an Appendix to that edition (p. 135); and in the second edition of the *Moods and Tenses* (1865) and subsequently I have expressed at least a near approach to my present opinion. I am naturally sorry to see my old note of 1863 brought up in judgment against me at full length by Dr. Earle, especially as it meets his approval.

καὶ ἀπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς, followed by εὐθὺς ἐγρήγορας . . . καὶ εὐπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς. As nobody doubts that ἀπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς, *you know not what to say*, has a deliberative question of the most common form, can there be any doubt that the antithetical εὐπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς, *you have plenty to say*, is to be explained on the same principle, even though the deliberative question is here much obscured? And if εὐπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς is deliberative and not final, can we avoid explaining ἔχεις ὃ τι λέγῃς in the same way? As the analogy of ἀπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς carried the deliberative form into εὐπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς, so the analogy of οὐκ ἔχεις (= ἀπορεῖς) ὃ τι λέγῃς carried it into ἔχεις ὃ τι λέγῃς, in each case beyond the strict limits of the deliberative interrogative.

Another more serious step is taken when ἔχω has an object which is the antecedent of the relative introducing the dependent subjunctive, as in οὐδὲν ἔχω ὃ τι εἶπω. This shows that ὃ τι is a true relative, and that its force as an indirect interrogative, which was obscured in ἔχεις ὃ τι εἶπῃς, is now entirely lost. And yet the analogy which we have hitherto followed can carry us still further, so as to include this case. Here again we fortunately have a single sentence with two constructions which explain each other. In Xen. *Anab.* i. 7, 7, already quoted (page 1), we have μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι δῶ followed immediately by μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ἱκανοὺς οἷς δῶ. Although ὃ τι δῶ is an interrogative sentence and οἷς δῶ is a relative sentence, it seems obvious that the force of δῶ is the same in both. If we had οὐδὲν ἔχω ὃ τι δῶ in the former clause, would the nature of δῶ as a subjunctive be changed? Likewise, οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω, Soph. *Phil.* 938, cannot reasonably be separated from such a sentence as οὐ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ λέγω, so far as the force of the subjunctive is concerned, though the latter would be interrogative while the former is relative.

We have thus come, through a simple process of evolution, to a form of expression in which a pure relative with an expressed antecedent introduces a subjunctive which derives all its modal force from the deliberative subjunctive, an interrogative form. We admit that the construction in this form may contain more or less final force; but this comes naturally from the intimate relation between the deliberative and the hortatory subjunctive, — ἐλθωμεν; *shall we go?* being the interrogative corresponding to ἐλθωμεν, *let us go*; and

μὴ ἔλθωμεν; *shall we not go?* corresponding to μὴ ἔλθωμεν, *let us not go*. I have always attempted to distinguish cases in which there is a true indirect question, like οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι εἶπω, from those in which the interrogative has become more or less a relative, by saying that the latter are formed "on the analogy" of the former, explaining, for example, ἔχω ὅ τι εἶπω, *I have something to say*, by the analogy of οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι (or τί) εἶπω, *I have nothing to say*, and οὐδὲν ἔχω ὅ τι εἶπω as another step following the same analogy in a different direction. The great variety of examples which must be brought under the principle we are considering calls for some stronger term than "analogy." A new expression has been proposed by Mr. Arthur Sidgwick in the *Classical Review* for 1891, p. 148, where he calls the various steps of the development by which οὐδὲν ἔχω ὅ τι εἶπω is evolved from ἀπορῶ ὅ τι εἶπω "an extension of the deliberative construction." The process of "extension" is thus excellently described by Mr. Sidgwick:—

"The fact I believe to be that the deliberative construction is subtly modified, and three stages may be traced as follows:—first stage, truly interrogative and deliberative; second stage, where the interrogative character is sliding into the relative; third stage, where the relative character of ὅστις is established." For Mr. Sidgwick's examples, which are all of the optative, I should give the following:—first stage ἀπορῶ (οὐκ οἶδα or οὐκ ἔχω) ὅ τι εἶπω, second stage ἔχω ὅ τι εἶπω, third stage οὐδὲν ἔχω ὅ τι εἶπω. From this term "extension," the name "extended deliberatives" has been given by Mr. Hale and others to the various classes of subjunctives (and the corresponding optatives) which spring from the deliberative question but are yet no longer interrogative.

We have still to notice briefly other examples of the "extended deliberative" which have been quoted in this discussion. The two cases in Xen. *Anab.* ii. 4, 19, οὐδὲ ἔχοιμεν ἂν ὅποι σωθῶμεν and οὐχ ἔξουσιν ὅποι φύγωσιν are simply interrogative and need no remarks. In Aesch. *Prom.* 470, οὐκ ἔχω σόφισμ' ὅτῃ πημονῆς ἀπαλλαγῶ, though "extension" has produced a relative sentence, the original deliberative subjunctive is still obvious. The sense is, *I have no plan* (i.e. *I know not how*) *to escape*, and we might have had οὐκ ἔχω (or οὐκ οἶδα) ὅτῃ σοφίσματι ἀπαλλαγῶ. But we may call ὅτῃ ἀπαλλαγῶ simply

an indirect question, depending on the preceding words, which have the sense of *I cannot see*. So in Isoc. xxi. 1, οὐ προφάσεως ἀπορῶ, δι' ἣντινα λέγω, the meaning is *I am at no loss for a reason why I shall speak*, and we have a simple indirect question, as Professor Tarbell has well explained it (*Classical Review* for 1891, p. 302). Again, in Eur. *Orest.* 722, κούκέτ' εἰσὶν ἐλπίδες, ὅποι τραπόμενος θάνατον φύγω, the obvious sense is *I am now hopeless* (as to the question) *whither I shall turn and escape death*. When ἐστί with a possessive dative is equivalent to ἔχω, the deliberative construction may follow, with the same "extension" as after ἔχω. We have Soph. *Aj.* 514, ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐκέτ' ἐστὶν εἰς ὃ τι βλέπω, which is equivalent (so far as the subjunctive is concerned) to οὐκ ἔχω εἰς ὃ τι βλέπω, and Eur. *H. F.* 1245, γέμω κακῶν δῆ, κούκέτ' ἔσθ' ὅπου τεθῆ, where ποῦ τεθῆ; is involved. We have also Andoc. iii. 16, εἰ μήτε δι' ὃ τι μήτε ὅτοις μῆτε ἀφ' ὅτου πολεμήσωμεν ἔστι (sc. ἡμῶν), which might have been εἰ μήτε ἔχομεν κτλ. In most of the cases quoted in this paragraph the relation of the construction to the deliberative has been doubted. In a single case which remains, Ar. *Eq.* 1320, τίς ἔχων φήμην ἀγαθὴν ἦκεις, ἐφ' ὅτῳ κνισῶμεν ἀγνιάς; the construction has seemed more doubtful. It seems to me by far most natural to take the dependant clause as an indirect question, representing ἐπὶ τίνι (*for what* or *in whose honor*) κνισῶμεν ἀγνιάς; depending on the idea *what have you to report to us?* or *can you tell us?*

If these passages have been rightly interpreted, we see that all the examples of the subjunctive which have been quoted in recent discussions to show the final character of the construction in question are easily explained as "extended deliberatives"; and it would be difficult to draw a line between any two of these examples and call one deliberative and the other final. It is, moreover, never to be overlooked, that there is no instance of an Attic subjunctive in such an undoubted final relative clause as the Homeric ἡγεμόν' ὅπασσον, ὃ κέ με κείσ' ἀγάγη (see page 2).

II. OPTATIVE.

It remains to be considered how far the optative in this class of sentences follows the same principles and is subject to the same

restrictions as the subjunctive. In five of the passages quoted by Mr. Hale (*Trans. Amer. Philol. Assoc.* xxiv. pp. 158-160) the optative can easily be explained by the extension of the deliberative construction which is assumed for the subjunctive. These are the following:—

οὐκ ἔχων βάσιν, οὐδέ τιν' ἐγχώρων κακογείτονα, παρ' ᾧ . . . ἀποκλαύσειεν, Soph. *Phil.* 692.

οὐδένα εἶχον ὅστις . . . τὰς ἐμὰς ἐπιστολὰς πέμψειε, Eur. *I. T.* 588.

πρότερον οὐκ ἔχων πρόφασιν ἐφ' ἧς τοῦ βίου λόγον δοίην, Lys. xxiv. 1.

οὐκ εἶχομεν ὅτου ἐπιλαβοίμεθα οὐδ' ὅτου κρατοίμεν, Dem. xxxv. 25.

οὐδὲ μὲν ἀνθρώπων τις ἔην . . . ὄντιν' ἐροίμην, Theoc. xxv. 218.

In all these we could have corresponding forms with the subjunctive similar to those already discussed. To these we may add Xen. *Hellen.* i. 3, 21, οὐδὲν ἔχοντες ὃ τι ποιήσαιεν, and i. 4, 15, οὐκ εἶχεν ὅπως ὠφελοίη, which need no comment.

We find a very different problem when we come to a case like Soph. *Trach.* 903, κρύψας' ἑαυτὴν ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι, where we cannot suppose a corresponding Attic construction with the subjunctive like κρύπτει ἑαυτὴν ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδῃ, for here we should certainly find ἔνθα μή τις εἰσάφεται. In Soph. *Aj.* 658 we actually have κρύψω τὸδ' ἔγχος . . . ἔνθα μή τις ὄψεται. The Attic form with the optative strictly corresponding to the latter would be ἔκρυψα ἔγχος ἔνθα μή τις ὄψοιτο, which we find in *Oed. Tyr.* 796, ἔφευγον ἔνθα μή ποτ' ὀψοίμην ὀνειδῇ (so Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3, 11, and Isaeus ii. 10). But this future optative is a rare exception, the future indicative being the regular form even after past tenses. It is obvious that we have in ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι in *Trach.* 903 a form of expression which has no exact parallel after a present or future tense; and it is further plain that we are here beyond the utmost limits to which it was necessary to "extend" the deliberative construction in order to explain the cases of both subjunctive and optative which have hitherto been discussed. Shall we then suppose another extension of the deliberative construction to cover this new case, or shall we look on ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι as a survival of the Homeric optative in similar sentences which corresponded to the more common Homeric subjunctive (see page 2)? Fortunately we have in Ar. *Ran.* 96 and 98 two

relative clauses which illustrate this point most clearly. The verses are : —

ΔΙΟΝ. γόνιμον δὲ ποιητὴν ἂν οὐχ εὖροις ἔτι
ζητῶν ἂν, ὅστις ῥῆμα γενναῖον λάκοι.

‘ΗΡ. πῶς γόνιμον;

ΔΙΟΝ. ὦδὶ γόνιμον, ὅστις φθέγγεται
τοιουτονί τι παρακεκινδυνευμένον.

Here *ὅστις* *λάκοι* clearly expresses purpose; there is no deliberative force apparent, and we cannot think of substituting *ὅστις* *λάκη* for it: it is therefore no case of assimilation. But in the next verse we have the true Attic form for such a relative clause in *ὅστις* *φθέγγεται*, which would regularly have been retained in the preceding verse or possibly changed to *ὅστις* *φθέγγετο*. The exceptional *ὅστις* *λάκοι* is like *ἐνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι* in *Trach.* 903, and must be explained on the same principle. The repetition of *ὅστις* *λάκοι* by *ὅστις* *φθέγγεται*, when this suits the verse, indicates that both forms were felt to express purpose; and the comparison of *εἰσίδοι* in *Trach.* 903 with *ᾔσεται* in *Aj.* 658 and *ᾔσοίμην* in *Oed. Tyr.* 796 points in the same direction. Such optatives as those we are discussing are rare; and it is significant that we never find such a sentence in Attic as the Homeric *ἄγγελον ἦκαν, ὃς ἀγγείλει γυναικί*, as Mr. Sidgwick rightly remarks. It seems to me, on the whole, more natural to suppose that the process of extension, by which we naturally derive *οὐδένα* *εἶχον* *ὅστις πέμψει* from *ἠπόρουν* *ὅστις πέμψει* (based on *τίς πέμψη*);, went a step further in the optative than in the subjunctive and gave us a few such expressions as *ἐνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι* and *ὅστις* *λάκοι*. Three circumstances may have facilitated this step in the optative which were wanting in the subjunctive. First, the optative in *οὐδένα* *εἶχον* *ὅστις πέμψει* is much further removed from the original ancestor *τίς πέμψη*; than is the subjunctive in *οὐδένα* *ἔχω* *ὅστις πέμψη*, so that there would be less deliberative force remaining to prevent the optative from taking the further step out of all reach of the deliberative idea. Secondly, the Homeric final relative clause with the optative, which was familiar to all Athenians, did not differ in its form from the Attic clauses we are considering, while the Homeric clause with the subjunctive regularly had *κέ*: this would facilitate the Attic opta-

tive in its extension in the Homeric direction, and retard the Attic subjunctive. Thirdly, the Attic relative clause of purpose with the future indicative, which superseded the Homeric subjunctive with *κέ*, had no distinct optative form in common use after past tenses, the future optative being exceptional; so that there was really a much greater need of the present or aorist optative here than there was of the subjunctive.

To the examples of the optative must be added Plat. *Rep.* 398 B, αὐτοὶ δ' ἂν τῷ αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ ἀηδιστέρῳ ποιήτῃ χροῦμεθα καὶ μυθολόγῳ ὠφελείας ἕνεκα, ὃς ἡμῖν τὴν τοῦ ἐπικικοῦς λέξιν μιμοῖτο καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα λέγοι κτλ., where ὃς μιμοῖτο καὶ λέγοι following ὠφελείας ἕνεκα is clearly final: if it were not final, it would be potential without ἂν. I have no hesitation in adding *Rep.* 578 E, εἴ τις θεῶν ἄνδρα ἓνα . . . θείῃ εἰς ἐρημίαν, . . . ὅπου αὐτῷ μηδεὶς τῶν ἐλευθέρων μέλλοι βοηθήσειν. Here, if we had ἔθηκεν εἰς ἐρημίαν, ὅπου μηδεὶς μέλλοι βοηθήσειν, the parallel to κρύφας' ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι would be complete. After a present tense the relative clause would naturally take the form τίθημί σε εἰς ἐρημίαν, ὅπου μηδεὶς βοηθήσει, not ὅπου μηδεὶς βοηθήσῃ (or ὅπου μέλλῃ βοηθήσειν): and after a leading optative we have μέλλοι βοηθήσειν, where we might have had βοηθήσοι. So in *Oed. Tyr.* 796, if ἔφενγον were εἰ φεύγοιμι, we might still have ἔνθα μήποτ' ὀψοίμην, in the sense *if I should fly to a place where I might never see*, etc., though μέλλοιμι ὀψεσθαι would be quite as natural. The optative in such relative clauses, so far as they are final, corresponds to no Attic construction with the subjunctive. But I believe that ὅπου μηδεὶς μέλλοι βοηθήσειν contains also a distinct conditional force, and in this sense it corresponds to the regular subjunctive with ἂν. The mere supposition might have been made in this form: εἰάν τις ἄνδρα θῇ εἰς ἐρημίαν, ὅπου ἂν μηδεὶς μέλλῃ βοηθήσειν, i.e. *if we suppose one to place a man in a desert, where there shall be no one likely to help him*, if this had suited the general form of the sentence; only in this form the final force would disappear and the conditional form alone would remain. Indeed, the very words of Plato might be used to express a pure condition with no final force, if the idea were simply this, *supposing a man should be put into a desert and there should be nobody there likely to help him*. How would this differ from Xen. *Mem.* ii. 3, 12, εἰ βοῦλοιο τῶν φίλων τινὰ προτρέψασθαι, ὁπότε ἀποδημοίης, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν

σῶν, or *Cyr.* i. 6, 3, ὅστις μὴ, ὅποτε ἐν ἀπóροις εἴη, τότε κολακεύει, so far as the conditional force of the optative is concerned? But, in the sentence as it stands in Plato, ὅπου μηδεὶς μέλλοι βοηθήσειν not only expresses the purpose of putting the man into a desert, but is also a part of the condition supposed, being for this reason put into the optative rather than the future indicative, which would express only the finality.¹

¹ In my suggestion of the possible conditional nature of this sentence (*M. and T.* § 573) Dr. Earle sees "a good example of the mental bias" which has led me "to drag in a 'condition' at every turn," to the great detriment of my work. I hope I have justified myself, in this case at least, in the text. But I see that he "drags in" precisely the same condition which he deplores in my explanation, when he says that "the optative is merely an ordinary instance of attraction of mood." There is no possible case in which an indefinite relative clause like this can be attracted (or *assimilated*) into the optative by a leading conditional sentence (like *εἰ τις θεῖη* here) unless it is itself conditional or final. As Dr. Earle rejects the final force here, he has only the conditional left. I think he will also fall into the same "bias of mind" which he sees in me, and will be grateful for it, if he will consider carefully Gildersleeve's wise and acute remarks in his review of Weber (*Am. Jour. of Philol.* iv. pp. 421, 422) on the combined final and conditional force in ὥς ἄν (κέ) and ὅπως ἄν with the subjunctive, where the only rational explanation of the use of ἄν and κέ with relative final particles and of their total absence with the pure final *ἵνα* is suggested, and also Gildersleeve's formula, ὅπως ἄν = ἥν πως, which, rightly understood, is a powerful solvent of many difficulties.

I regret that I have not made myself clear to Professor Sonnenschein on the two-fold relation which (in common with most scholars) I admit in certain clauses with *ἕως*, *until*, etc., and the subjunctive. I have never called these "purpose clauses" simply; and I agree perfectly with Professor Sonnenschein that μένω ἕως ἄν ἔλθῃ and ἔμενον ἕως ἔλθοι are "not equivalent to 'I am (was) waiting in order that he may (might) come.'" (*Class. Rev.* 1894, p. 28.) What I did say was this: "A conditional clause may refer to an object which is aimed at in the action of the leading verb; as Πάτροκλον ἔφησε ἵππους, εἰ κέν μιν ἔλῃς, *turn your horses on Patroclus, if haply you may take him*, i.e. *that you may take him (if haply you may)*. In like manner a conditional relative clause with *until* is very apt to refer to an object aimed at, and thus to become at once final, relative, and conditional: thus in *Il.* iii. 291 (μαχήσσομαι ἄθι μένων, ἕως κε τέλος πολέμοιο κίχλω) it is distinctly implied that *the end of the war* is a condition which is to limit the time of fighting and also an object at which the fighting aims." (*M. and T.* § 612.) The final character involved in many of these clauses is unmistakable when a subjunctive is used instead of the optative after a past tense, by the principle of *oratio obliqua*.

The "mental bias" which will enable us to see the various combinations of

One passage remains to be considered, the discussion of which opened the whole question now before us. This is *Soph. Phil.* 279-282:—

ὄρωντα (past) μὲν ναῦς, ἃς ἔχων ἐναυστόλουν,
πάσας βεβώσας, ἄνδρα δ' οὐδέν' ἐντοπον,
οὐχ ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, οὐδ' ὅστις νόσου
κάμνοντι συλλάβοιτο.

In discussing Professor Jebb's treatment of ἀρκέσειεν and συλλάβοιτο here as indirect deliberatives—representing direct questions τίς ἀρκέσῃ; and τίς συλλάβηται;—Mr. Sidgwick proposes his term “extension” for such cases. Thirty-five years ago I called these optatives final, and classed them with ἔχειν ἐφ' οἷς φιλοτιμηθῶσιν, *Isoc.* iv. 44, as relics of the Homeric final relative construction; and I have still allowed this to stand, though I have since explained the subjunctive as deliberative. But after considering the cases of “extended” deliberative optatives which have been discussed, especially *Soph. Phil.* 692, I can now see no good reason for excluding these from the class. The decisive test, I conceive, must be the possibility of referring the optative to a similar subjunctive which would be allowed in Attic Greek. The difference between ὄρων οὐδένα ὅστις ἀρκέσῃ and ἔχων οὐδένα ὅστις ἀρκέσῃ is surely not generic; and in our passage it is perhaps more correct to understand ὄντα with ἐντοπον, corresponding to βεβώσας, and so come to οὐδεὶς ἐντοπός ἐστιν ὅστις ἀρκέσῃ (cf. *Soph. Aj.* 514). I think, however, that this represents the utmost tension to which the deliberative construction can fairly be subjected, and that the optatives in question are very far removed from εἰσίδει and λάκοι in *Trach.* 903 and *Ran.* 97.

Closely related to the optatives we have considered is the optative in a consecutive relative clause, *Dem.* vi. 8: τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει οὐδὲν ἂν ἐνδείξαιτο οὐδὲ ποιήσειεν, ὥφ' οὗ πεισθέντες τινὰς Ἑλλήνων ἐκείνῳ προεῖσθε. This is parallel to κρύψας' ἐαντὴν ἐνθα μή τις εἰσίδει, in so far as there is no corresponding Attic construction with the subjunctive. The Attic uses the future indicative here, as in relative final clauses:

conditional, final, consecutive, and relative forces, often joined with *oratio obliqua*, in the same verbal form, is a most valuable acquisition for a student of Greek Syntax.

thus τοιαῦτα ζητήσεις λέγειν ἐξ ὧν μὴ χείρων εἶναι δόξεις (see Isoc. xi. 49) is merely more explicit in its form of statement than τοιαῦτα ὥστε μὴ δοκεῖν would have been, as δόξεις is a more definite form than δοκεῖν. This future indicative occasionally appears (like that in final relative clauses) as a future optative after another optative, as in Plat. *Rep.* 416 C, τοιαύτην ἥτις μήτε . . . πάνσοι, κακουργεῖν τε μὴ ἐπαροῦ. The aorist optative in Dem. vi. 8 seems to come from a tendency to use an optative after the preceding optative and an objection to using the future. In Plat. *Rep.* 360 B we have a potential optative in the same consecutive sense, which is perfectly natural. But this passage is very peculiar: οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὥς δόξειεν, οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος, ὃς ἂν μένειεν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειεν κτλ. The omission of ἂν with δόξειεν, which is clearly potential, is very strange, and is not satisfactorily accounted for by the ἂν on either side of it with another verb; still less by my "law of assimilation," to which Campbell refers it in the new Oxford edition (II. p. 174), for this assimilation is confined to conditional relative clauses and it would have presupposed ὥς ἂν δόξη as a possible alternative. Dr. Henry Jackson, in the Cambridge *Journal of Philology* (iv. p. 147), thinks that ἂν has been accidentally transferred from δόξειεν to μένειεν, with which it is not needed, and he would make μένειεν (without ἂν) parallel to προεῖσθε in Dem. vi. 8. We should thus have ὃς μένειεν = ὥστε μέναι, as ὑφ' οὗ πεισθέντες προεῖσθε = ὥστε ὑμᾶς πεισθέντας προεῖσθαι.

It is sometimes hard to distinguish relative consecutive from relative final clauses, as the consecutive and the final force may be combined even in a clause with ὥστε: thus, in Plat. *Gorg.* 479 C, πᾶν ποιοῦσιν, ὥστε δίκην μὴ δίδοναι includes with its consecutive force the final notion which (by itself) ἵνα μὴ διδῶσι would express more explicitly. This is another case of the union of different conceptions under one verbal construction, which is a striking characteristic of the Greek language. (See foot-note on p. 10.)

SOME FEATURES OF THE CONTRARY TO FACT CONSTRUCTION.

BY J. B. GREENOUGH.

THE construction of 'the condition contrary to fact' with its conclusion has a peculiar interest from the fact that its fundamental idea lies very deep in the natural forms of human thought. So the development of the construction has been essentially the same in many different languages. The genesis of the construction is generally understood and needs no discussion, but in order to make clear some particular features which I wish to discuss it seems necessary to give a *résumé* of the method of development by which this construction has come into being. It comes of course from the transfer to past time of the ideal (future, less vivid) condition. Most languages have some means of representing an ideal condition in the future with its natural conclusion. Then by the natural shunting processes belonging to the given language, this future condition comes to be transferred to the past. The prospective condition is referred back from the *present* future, to the *past* future. When the condition is thus thrown back, usually by a change of tense, the implication almost necessarily arises that the condition has not in the particular case happened to come true and so is not at present the actual state of things; in other words, is unreal or contrary to the fact. For ordinarily in the opposite case, *i.e.* if it has come true, there is no need of a condition at all. Hence in very many languages a past tense (with a modal sense, of course) which looks toward the future has come to have this contrary to fact implication. This tendency is strikingly shown by the accompanying use of adverbs. *Then* (or its equivalent) continues or emphasizes the unreal supposition, while *now* is used to refer to the real state of things as contrasted with the supposition. To give an example, *si habeam dem, if I should have* (by and by) *I would give*, becomes, when referred to

past time by change of tense, *si haberem darem*. This should properly mean, *if I was* (yesterday) *going to have*, *I was* (yesterday) *going to give*. But the future time supposed in the expression is, rather loosely perhaps, assumed to coincide with the actual present. So the fact that the idea remains a conditional one shows that it is not now true. Hence the expression comes to mean, *if I had* (now) (which I have not), *I would give*. With the use of adverbs we have *si haberem, tum darem, at nunc, etc.*, *if I had, then I should give, but now (as it is), etc.* Sometimes, however, the future of the past is supposed to fall short of the present moment and the implication is that the supposition is contrary to past fact (though still future to the past of the supposition). The meaning then is, *if I had had, I should have given*. It is from this variation that there comes in Latin for instance a wavering of the imperfect subjunctive in this construction between present and past time. The genesis of the regular contrary to fact construction in past time is the same. One can say, *si habuerim dederim*, because many languages like to represent a future action as completed. When this is thrown back, becoming *si habuisssem dedissem*, the represented completion of the action makes the moment of the condition regularly fall short of the present moment, and we have a contrary to fact construction in past time.

Though the usual means by which the change to past time is effected is a change of tense, yet other devices are sometimes used to accomplish the same purpose. An interesting example of such an effect is found in *Aen.* i. 58. Here Virgil is describing the functions of Aeolus and wishes to indicate the result of the god's neglect in case he should happen to omit these functions. The story is in the main conceived in the past, though the historical present is used in this particular passage. The natural way to express the idea would be *ni fecisset* or at least *ni faceret*, either of which constructions would imply the unreality of the condition which is in the poet's mind. But instead of using either of these he jumps back without change of tense, and by a kind of *repraesentatio* puts himself at the imagined moment. He simply says *ni faciat*, *if he should not do so*, giving the condition as it would appear at the past time referred to. The description may also be a present condition of things. If so, this case would be undistinguishable from the next.

Not very different from this is the regular archaic construction in which the present subjunctive is used instead of the imperfect where the condition is obviously unreal in present time, as in *si hic sis aliter sentias*. But here the writer instead of going back to past time in a manner brings the past time up to himself and makes the time of the condition present. An instructive example of this is in Plaut. *Miles* 764, *otium si sit possum expromere*, *if there were time for it I could set forth*. Here the use of the present *possum* (see below p. 15) shows clearly that we have to do not with a survival of the contrary to fact idea in the old optative, *sit*, but with a future condition not 'shunted' as is usually the case. We may compare Cic. *Cat. Mai.* xvi. 55, *possum persequi multa oblectamenta rerum rusticarum*, *I could, etc.*

Another step in the process of development of this curious construction appears in the substitution in the apodosis of a future condition of any verb or phrase which (as in the last two examples above) has a future outlook of its own and so does not need any modal or temporal indication of futurity. From this substitution we get various forms of present tenses in the conclusion, such as those of verbs of *necessity*, *propriety*, and *possibility*, e.g. *possum si velim*, *I can if I will*; *alius finis constituendus est, si . . . prius . . . dixero*. Even a past tense rhetorically conceived may be used in the same manner, e.g. *si eundem (animum) habueritis, vicimus*. We may compare *si non alium iactaret odorem, laurus erat* (*Georg.* ii. 133); so, *pons sublicius iter paene hostibus dedit, ni unus vir fuisset*, Liv. ii. 10. (For explanation of tense see below.)

Now, in these cases, when by the change of tense from present to past the point of view is changed to past time, as above set forth, there is naturally no subjunctive in the apodosis but a past indicative instead. The same implication of unreality, however, arises as in the other cases, and we have the contrary to fact construction with past tenses of the indicative. It is some features of this special case that I wish to discuss, but it is necessary to keep the whole genesis in mind in order to understand the relations.


In the ordinary case of imperfect indicative contrary to fact where a protasis occurs and so the condition is stated, there is no difficulty. The analysis is simple. We may make, for example, an expression like: *Pompeius et si absit eligendus est*, *P. must be chosen, even if he*

should not be there (or, as we say, *is not there*). Throw this back, and it becomes, speaking loosely, *P. had got to be choosen* (erat), *even if he was not going to be there*. Usually this ultimately means: *We ought to choose him, even if he were not there* (which he now proves to be).


In a few cases this implication of unreality does not arise, but these will be discussed below. In a few other cases, which may be important as we proceed, there is a logical dislocation between condition and conclusion. Thus, *The man intended to make a will if he hadn't died*. Here there is no strict connection between his intention and the fact of his death, but we jump over the slight gap and treat the two as properly connected. All these are plain enough.

But the real difficulty comes in those cases of the contrary to fact construction in which there is no condition expressed and in which ordinarily none in fact can be exactly formulated. In these cases we have a form of words which is precisely the same, both in Greek and in Latin, with the form that has no idea of the contrary to fact. Occasionally the context will show which is the meaning, especially by fixing the time really referred to as present. Then the past tense is seen to be out of place, unless there is such an implication. But it is not necessarily so, and it seems absurd that Demosthenes or Cicero should have had no means of letting us know whether *ἔχρην γὰρ ἡμᾶς*, or *nam nos decebat* (equivalent expressions, see Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* i. 48, 115, translating Euripides) meant: *We ought to* (or *to have*), and did, or *we ought to* (or *to have*), and do not. If, as said above, the expressions are shown by the context to refer to present time, we see that they can only mean "but *do not*." Still in the absence of the context they may mean the other. That these orators did have a means of distinguishing the two I am satisfied. My attention was called to the possible difference one day when I changed my subject just before a lecture and announced to my class, "I *intended* to give you to-day the *cum* constructions." Of course they at once knew that I was not actually going to do so, and we soon discovered that the inflexion on *intended* was markedly different in this case from what it would have been if I had been going to do as I had intended. The emphasis (as the word is ordinarily used) was the same, but the tones through which the word ran were not at all the same. Afterwards, with the

assistance of a friend having a better ear than I, I secured a graphic representation on coördinate paper of the rise and fall of the tones, wherein each line represents half a tone. This scheme for the two meanings is here given. (See diagram.)



I meant to go to town to-day (and went, or am going).



I meant to go to town to-day (but have not gone, or am not going).

NOTE. The heavy lines represent the tone of the emphatic word.

We have very little information as to the tone-inflexions of Greek or Latin speech, but we may be sure that they were not less in extent and variety than those of our own. Without concluding at all that the difference between the two forms of speech was the same in those languages as in our own, it seems to me almost certain that they were similar and served precisely the same purpose. So we may well write in our grammars, under the two statements of the meaning of

ἄχρη and the like, "no doubt with a different voice-inflexion, which distinguished the two to the ear though not to the eye."

A corollary which seems to follow from this is not so certain, but at least deserves consideration. The question has often been mooted whether in the cases of this construction where no condition was expressed, any was implied. The question has latterly been decided in the negative, and the grammars in general state that view. But it may not be so sure as it has been regarded. If there was a difference in inflexion in the two cases above mentioned, we can hardly suppose it to have been without logical significance. Inflexions never are. What then could be the logical difference between these two inflexions? It certainly could not lie in the words themselves, and therefore would seem to imply something to be supplied. To see what that implication is we must, remembering the genesis of the construction, look at the corresponding forms in the present tense. Let us suppose then that one starting from his house in the morning says, "I *intend* to come home to lunch," he may say it with no suggestion of an ellipsis, but if he uses the inflexion marked A above any one would be conscious of an ellipsis. I think I am not mistaken in supposing that this ellipsis is of some hindering condition either precisely defined or more commonly vaguely conceived. Such an ellipsis would be: "unless Brown invites me to the club," or, "if nothing happens." Another example more nearly approaching the kind of phrases in question is this: If one had asked a lawyer as to the income tax, he might say, "Well, the *law is* that you shall file an inventory," etc., using the same inflexion A spoken of above. In such a case there is obviously an ellipsis of a condition like: 'If you want to follow that,' or, 'If that makes any difference.' In each of these cases there is to my mind an evident ellipsis indicated by the inflexion and the slight pause after the significant word or phrase. But each of these expressions thrown back into past time by change of tense with the same inflexion gives precisely the logical force of the necessity, propriety, and possibility contrary to fact construction: "I *intended* to come to lunch (but I did n't)," "The *law was* to do so and so (but you have n't done it)." It seems inconceivable that if the condition exists, though not definitely formulated, in the present use, it should vanish entirely when the tense is changed, and the contrary to fact implication arises.

This condition, though extremely vague and often defying formulation, must therefore be essentially implied in the past tense as well as in the present, and these expressions really depend for their well-known logical force precisely on this ellipsis as indicated by the peculiar inflexion and pause.

I said above that in the transfers of the future condition to past time the implication of unreality almost necessarily arises. That it does not always arise, I think, will appear from a few unmistakable examples. The most striking one is in Hor. *Sat.* i. 3. 4 ff.

Caesar qui cogere posset
Si peteret per amicitiam patris atque suam non
Quicquam proficeret ; si collibisset ab ovo
Usque ad mala citaret, etc.

In this case any idea of the condition being contrary to fact seems to be excluded by the alternative form of the two conditions. One might be contrary to fact, but hardly both. In fact, to add "which he did not" makes nonsense of the whole. They must be future conditions, as we can see by changing the time of the whole statement. If Horace were describing a man then living he would say *C. qui possit, si petat . . . proficiat, [at] si collibuerit . . . citet*. Here we should have a general future supposition: *He is a man whom if Caesar should beg, etc., it would be useless ; but if he should take a fancy, he would shout, etc.* The only difference between this and Horace's real words is that the man is now dead, and his character is described as a thing of the past. To produce this effect the tenses are changed to past ; but it seems certain that no implication of unreality has arisen, because you cannot add 'as he did not' or its equivalent in any form whatever. Another example where the indefinite relative takes the place of the conditional particle, as often, is in Cic. *ad Fam.* 7. 1, *reliquas vero partes diei tu consumebas eis delectationibus quas tibi ipse ad arbitrium comparabas, nobis autem erant ea perpetiunda quae Sp. Maecius probavisset, whereas I had to put up with whatever had been approved by Sp. Maecius*. If Cicero had been speaking before the games, he would have said *perpetiunda sunt quae . . . probaverit, must put up with whatever Sp. M. shall (have) approved*, and we should have had the ordinary future condition.

But he speaks of the games as now over, and so puts the same words into past time. There is, however, no implication of the contrary to fact idea, nor can there be. Somewhat less clear, but, I think, essentially of the same kind, is an example in *Caes. B. G.* iii. 44: *Pompeius neque a mari . . . discedere volebat, quod omnem apparatus belli . . . ibi collocaverat, frumentumque exercitui . . . subportabat, neque munitiones Caesaris prohibere poterat nisi proelio decertare vellet, quod eo tempore statuerat non esse faciendum.* Here, though there is a statement of the contrary of the supposition at the end, yet the balance of the clauses *volebat*, *poterat*, and the whole tenor of the statement show that an actual situation is described (*did not wish, was not able*), and that the last clause, beginning with *quod*, is an afterthought. A statement of a present situation would be *neque volt . . . neque potest nisi velit*. This situation is merely thrown back into past time; and though a contrary to fact idea is possible, yet it seems less natural, all things considered, than the simple future condition like the other cases. Another case is found in *Liv. xxii. 24*: *tumulus apparuit ad quem capiendum si luce palam iretur hostis . . . praeventurus erat, if they should go openly by daylight, the enemy would anticipate them.* This has an appearance of indirect discourse; but if the whole is changed to present time, as in the last case, the semblance of indirect discourse at once vanishes.

With these passages may be compared one in *Verr. Act. Sec. v. 168*: *adservasses hominem . . . clausum habuisses dum Panhormo Raecius veniret. Cognosceret hominem aliquid de summo supplicio remitteres. Si ignoraret tum . . . hoc in omnis constitueres.* Here, however, the whole passage is clearly colored by the contrary to fact suggestion in *adservasses*, so that *cognosceret* and *ignoraret* may be regarded as partaking of the general unreal character of the whole situation. Still they present a good example of the relation between the future protasis and its representative in past time.

It thus appears that the implication of unreality is not in all cases a necessary one. Whether, however, any particular class of conditions — and, if so, what class — excludes the implication, I have not been able to determine.

STUDIES IN THE TEXT OF LUCRETIVS.

BY WILLIAM EVERETT.

PROFESSOR Robinson Ellis, in his review of Mr. Postgate's new *Corpus Poetarum*, in the July number of the *Classical Review*, makes some timely and true remarks on the text of Lucretius, and the serious mistake into which English scholars will fall if they accept Munro's text as a finality. I would ask all scholars who do me the honor of reading these "studies" to go back and read Professor Ellis's words, which would only be injured by abridgment.

The fascination of attempting to do something towards recovering the true text of Lucretius is very great. It is not merely that its peculiarities positively invite every student who is not under bibliopolic restrictions to try his hand at emendation. This would be true of Plautus or Catullus. But within the last fifty years the two editions of Lachmann and Munro,

‘ the intellectual race
Of giants set, like Titans, face to face,’

have left the student no excuse for neglecting the text of an author who offers so many attractions by reason of his poetry and philosophy. They have told the story of his manuscripts, their connection and interdependence, and the work of previous editors, in a manner as interesting as it is clear and scientific. This is true even of Lachmann's austere Latin, — doubly true of Munro's racy English.

Surely this is the true way to edit a classic. There can be no object in making one's diplomatic discussions a mass of genealogical symbols, which may help fix the relationship of manuscripts when once studied, but repel all but the veriest specialist. Many really learned and acute editions of difficult authors are harder than the authors themselves, bristling in a notation which resembles the

Integral Calculus.¹ Not so did Lucretius touch everything with Musaeus charm, smearing with honey the cup of repulsive but sanatory wormwood.

It is worth while, for any one who has never done so, to consult one of the fifteenth century editions of Lucretius, and see how much the labors of four centuries have gained. I have at hand a copy of Ragazzoni's Venice edition, published on the 4th of September, 1495. There is not a page of it which is not spotted with corruptions of every kind, from the most patent misprints to such transformations of one word into another as do not correct themselves, but require serious critical skill to reproduce what can really stand as a manuscript reading. The page which begins book ii, line 652, contains in thirty lines twenty-three mistakes of the press or otherwise; and is, if anything, purer than the average.

In one respect these early and very corrupt editions are useful, as giving the *capitula*, which later editors seem bound to omit. We can hardly suppose them to have come from the pen of Lucretius or his critic Cicero, for they are about as appropriate as the catch lines with which newspapers divide up a speech. But in working at the reconstruction of the text, we can understand its constitution much better if we examine the Verona or Venice edition, which give the *capitula* as they appear in the manuscripts, than from Lachmann's, which consigns them to a species of index, or from Munro's, where they are only alluded to as known to everybody. As it is not always easy to consult a "fifteener," the *capitula* may be inserted in an ordinary text from Lachmann's index and notes, and will greatly aid in the process of reconstruction.

The following suggestions are the result of several years' study of Lucretius, in the five editions of Munro and his contributions to the Cambridge *Journal of Philology*, both series, the edition of Lachmann and the text of Bernays, frequently comparing them with the text of 1495 above named, and Lambinus's first edition (1561). I have also Tonson (1712), the Bipont (1808), Valpy's Variorum (1823), besides translations into English, French, and Italian; but all are equally feeble helps to the restoration of the text. There have been many

¹ Yet Conington was tempted to wish this very thing. (*Works*, I, p. 238.)

other learned and acute contributions to this work since Bernays (1852), none of which it has fallen within my power to consult directly. I can well believe that the study of such criticisms would greatly have improved these notes, which I had prepared many months ago to submit to scholars, asking their indulgence for what is emphatically a *πάρρηγορ* and not the task imposed by any Tiryntian. But all plans for their publication were modified by the appearance in 1894 of a new Teubner text, edited, with critical notes and prolegomena, by Adolph Brieger, intended to supersede that of Jacob Bernays of 1852.

To those who are familiar with Bernays (and no one can call himself a student of Lucretius who is not) and can appreciate his various merits, — his modesty and good sense, no less than his industry, erudition, and penetration, — Brieger's edition must seem indeed a falling off. Any scholar engaged to edit a great classic for a cheap and handy series like the Teubner, is in an entirely different position from one who makes it a separate enterprise of his own. He has no right to force upon purchasers and readers a mass of alterations, differing widely from any known text, and dependent upon a series of conjectures. Whoever has had to examine in Virgil, and finds his paper set up from Ribbeck's text, has fully appreciated the foregoing view.

Brieger, who tells us that he has been working on Lucretius for thirty-eight years, — but so have other men, — has in that interval furnished several papers on the text and interpretation of the poet to the *Philologus*. Some of the emendations therein suggested have been noticed by Munro. To these papers he makes constant reference in his prolegomena, and it may be unfair to judge his edition without consulting them. But as he admits himself that continued study has led him to more conservative views — to speak mildly — of some passages which he once altered recklessly, it may be doubted whether after all he is injured by judgment of his latest labor only.

I may remark here that Munro in his final revisions cast aside many emendations which he had promulgated with the utmost confidence in the *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, 1855–1859, and some passages he revised three or four times.

But in throwing over a passion for wild emendations, Brieger has taken up one still wilder for finding *lacunae*. He has accepted the old story that Lucretius wrote his poem in the lucid intervals of insanity; accordingly, when any line as it stands is unintelligible, it ranks as a lucid interval, and a *lacuna* of returning insanity is indicated. Other lines are enclosed in double parallels, to indicate that they are out of place. After noting these *lacunae* and parallelisms—if we may so stretch the word—through a book or two, one simply gives up in despair. This passion reaches its climax at the [undoubtedly corrupt] passage vi. 45–50, between which two lines he places 46–49, fenced and parted with marks of five separate *lacunae*, puts 47 and its lacking mate between parallels, and alters the manuscripts into the bargain. This is to be a critic insaner than the poet.

In his notes, wherever he discusses the text, he gives the readings of the two Leyden manuscripts, calling them OQ, Lachmann (Lm), Bernays (B), and Munro (Mr), and adds other interesting contributions from later commentators. But in the way of handling these authorities he is very capricious. In his prolegomena he speaks only of Munro's small text and his first annotated edition, and seems from time to time to ignore the three succeeding ones; yet in other places he quotes the last, implying that he has seen them all. This indicates a want of revision so as to make his whole edition consistent; and, more than once, we have one reading in the text and another advocated in the notes. Nor can his references to these authorities be always trusted; his statement of the manuscript reading more than once differs from Lachmann's; nor does he tell us of any independent inspection. His three select editors have some readings and notes incorrectly quoted, and often the reading of one or other given with the indication of his name omitted. Of earlier authorities he seems to have made no use. Readings given by Lambinus in 1561 are credited to the Bipont, which can hardly be called an authority, and to Bergk (ii. 300; iv. 1026). The following note is a type of several:—on vi. 674, while printing Vahlen's absurd text, he says in the notes: "Nollem olim Vahleno adsensus essem," meaning preferably *adsensus esse*, "prudentius Lm, *quivis est maximus*, probant B. et Mr." When the reading is Bentley's, as Lachmann and Munro tell him in their notes!

It will be seen that some of the mistakes indicated are mere errors of the press; and such are frequent. It is an ungracious, and in these pages an unsuitable work, to ransack for mistakes an edition which really has independent value, reminding one strongly of the merits and demerits of Gilbert Wakefield, as described by Lachmann and Munro. Nor can I myself feel otherwise than tenderly to one who has anticipated, at least as far as publication goes, several of the points I seek to enforce in these notes, and had supposed to be discoveries of my own. But some mistakes which he has made, from carelessness and worse than carelessness, cannot be overlooked, especially as I do not find them all noticed in the recent article upon him in the *Classical Review*. Accordingly, the following pages contain, interspersed with my own observations which I had previously intended to submit to scholars, some animadversions drawn out by Brieger's text and notes. I follow the numbering of Munro's posthumous edition (1886).

i. 50. Bernays's completion of this line, by *animumque sagacem*, founded on a supposed reference of the Verona interpreter of Virgil, is adopted by Munro and Brieger. The former adds: "Lachmann has rightly seen that our reading implies the loss of one or more verses in which the poet passed from Venus to Memmius; he suggests *animumque age, Memmi*, which would complete the sentence in a way; so would *corque, include Memmi*, or the like." It seems strange that Munro should fail to see the full bearing of Lachmann's suggestion. The imperfect condition of this line shows that the archetype had early been mutilated or worn away in this place — near the bottom corner of its third page. Our present text ends at *auris*; but supposing Lachmann's reading to be correct, and to have lost only a few letters, *animumque age Mem* could readily be corrupted into *animumque sagacem*, particularly if the last remaining letters were blurred by handling; and thus the Verona interpreter obtained his reading, if indeed he did refer to this line, which is not certain.

i. 185, *e nihilo si*, credited by Munro to Junt., Lamb., etc., is in my *Ven*.

i. 271. Munro's adoption of *portus*, and his note on the destruction effected by the wind in harbors, seems to me painfully subtle

and modern. The ancient mind — and the natural mind anywhere — looks upon *portus* as a place protected from the wind (*Aen.* iii. 570), a refuge from danger, whether of open sea or harborless shore. I greatly prefer *pontum*. Brieger takes Woltjer's *corpus*, and makes it mean the "mass of ocean" on the strength of *Neptuni corpus acerbum* (ii. 472). This is equal to Ribbeck's changing *morte* (*Aen.* iv. 436) into *monte* = *montibus auri*.

i. 334. Brieger's courage is well shown by his retaining this line, rejected by Bentley, Wakefield, Lachmann, Bernays, and Munro; but in i. 453-454 his boldness is Titanic. He sticks to the datives, and insists that *aquai* is one, because Charisius says Ennius uses datives in *-ai*; yet not one of our Ennian fragments preserves such a form. By this *tour de force* he contrives to keep 454, though Lambinus pronounced it barbarous and anomalous centuries before Lachmann rejected it.

i. 469. Brieger says of Munro's *Teucris* for *terris*, "miro errore"; and so it strikes me. *Teucris* I cannot find earlier than Virgil; *Teucro* (meaning "Trojan") occurs only once in Catullus by a probable but not certain correction (lxiv. 344). If, as Munro originally expounded his reading, *Teucris* answers to *regionibus*, as *corpus* to *loci*, how is it that we have one special with three general words? In his mention of Helen and Paris above, everything is specific. Is any change necessary? *Terris* = *orbi terrarum*; some occurrences, health, sickness, slavery, liberty, wars, peace, are *eventa terrarum*, of any part of the earth; others, like the war of Troy, the plague of Athens, belong *regionibus ipsis*, to special parts alone.

i. 555. *Conceptum, summum aetatis pervadere finis*. This impossible reading has been amended by Lachmann by inserting *ad* before *summum*, and then he gets no good translation. Munro in place of *finis*, which he thinks represents a word worn off because of the position of the line, reads *ad auctum*. By reading *summam* for *summum*, and adding *ad oram* or *ad horam*, we get an easier and better text.

i. 703. The three great manuscripts read *quam neget esse ignis tamen esse relinquat*. Niccoli first inserted *summam*, which was gen-

erally accepted till Lachmann gave *quidvis*. It seems to me the true reading is found by supplying *istam*. From such sequence as IGNISIȘTAMTAMEN the dotted letters would almost inevitably fall out; and the sense is plain, "that other nature," opposed to *ardoris naturam*. It ought to be said, as to this emendation, that I cannot find *iste* used elsewhere by Lucretius; but this is not surprising, seeing how essentially colloquial and forensic a word it is rather than philosophical. But Cicero uses it more than once to mean not "that of yours," but "that which is not now mine," *i.e.* that which differs from the matter in hand (*hic*). Lucretius says, "Why may one more reasonably reject everything else, and leave the nature of heat, than say that there are no fires, and leave that [nature] before spoken of?" *i.e.* *istam rerum naturam*, which you know, Memmius.

i. 744. Brieger adopts Christ's extremely plausible *rorem* for *solem*.

i. 755. Brieger here and elsewhere accepts Munro's very important reading *utqui*; but though he refers to Munro's note, he does not seem to comprehend it, for he says nothing of our countryman, N. P. Howard, to whom Munro gives all the credit.

i. 790. On Lachmann's peremptory change of *oportet* to *neccesset* Brieger well says, "licenter, ne dicam superbe."

i. 852. Can Dante have known of this passage when he wrote, "Dai denti morsi della morte" (*Purg.* vii. 32)?

i. 1105. Brieger takes *tonitralia* (for manuscript *tonetralia*) from Lambinus; but as he gives the quotation in Lachmann's words, it may be doubted if he had read it at first hand; and objects to the universally adopted *penetralia*, because "caelum, quod *avido complexu caetera saepsit* nullo modo penetrare dici potest." Yet he must have met *penetralia* a score of times in the Latin poets, meaning simply "the inner parts," which may belong to a mantle or anything else which enwraps or fences. This is not an unfair specimen of the singular lack of perspicacity which Brieger often displays.

ii. 28. Brieger here quotes *aurata* as Lachmann's reading; but the latter in his note says, "Poetam scripsisse existimo *ornata*,"

which Brieger never alludes to. This sort of carelessness also is frequent.

ii. 40-46. Munro took as much satisfaction in his final arrangement of these lines, which indeed Lachmann had wantonly altered, as in any part of his work. Brieger combines his reading with that of Bernays. Yet Munro leaves me in the position so often reached by those who encountered him in conversation: I am amazed at his subtlety and silenced by his learning; yet, as Cicero says, when I lay the book down, "*adsensio omnis illa elabitur*," and I cannot help feeling that the true reading is yet to be found. That *Epicuri* comes from *et equorum vi*, though accepted by Brieger, who for Munro's *ecum* writes *equom*, I cannot agree.

ii. 98. The manuscript word *confulta* is accepted by the very earliest and very latest critical editors. Yet *confulcio* appears nowhere else; and though Lachmann here makes *confulta*=*conglomerata*, we want a word with a stronger force, like *contusa* of Lamb. ed. 3. Later manuscripts give *conflicta*, which several editors accept. I feel greatly impressed by *consulta*, given by Ver. and Ven. and adopted by Gifanius, derived of course from *consilio*, *consilire*. In support of it I would refer to Munro's note on ii. 363, where he retains *subitam* from *subeo*, and adduces abundant instances of "neuter passive" participles, to adopt the old name of *ausus*, *solitus*, and *gavisus*. On the same principle I would retain in v. 429 *conventa* of the manuscripts, changed by Lachmann to *convecta*.

ii. 219. This line, so important in the atomic theory, has an instructive history. Older editors read (for *depellere*) *decedere*. Lachmann changed it to *decellere*. This Munro in his second large edition called the restoration of a word to the Latin language. Taught by N. P. Howard he said, "One lives and learns," and restored *depellere*, adding *sc.* Now Brieger simply keeps *depellere*, with a neuter sense, as we use "push aside"; and why not?

ii. 226. Brieger reads *ferantur* (for *feruntur*) and claims it as his own, though Munro credits it to Victorinus. He gives as a reason for the subjunctive, "*negat enim Epicurus graviora corpora citius cedere per inane*"; and so does Lucretius himself. Munro admits

that the indicative is very harsh; and the cases he quotes here and on i. 1057 refer to instances of *admitted fact*. Now, as Brieger says, it is not admitted that there are such motions and weights. It has struck me that our older grammars recognized more truly than some later ones that the indicative is constantly used with relatives for accepted facts, and the subjunctive of those assumed for argument, without regard to the dependence on other verbs in the period.

ii. 291. Lachmann having inserted *id* and Munro *hoc* after *quasi*, Brieger boldly returns to the simple *quasi* of older editors with long *i*.

ii. 359. May not *adsittens* be a corruption for *adsitiens*, i.e. *valde sitiens*, *ad* having the intensive force, as in *adamo* and *aduro*? It is particularly pictured that the dam is not diverted by *flumina*.

ii. 422. Brieger rejects Lachmann's *figura* because, says he, we are talking about sounds, smells, and colors, and strangely overlooks that Lucretius refers all effects upon all the senses to variations of form. He himself has *figurant* of sounds in ii. 413.

ii. 460. Munro's *vesca* (for *saxa*) does not satisfy me; an object for *penetrare* seems needed. I have thought of *saepta*, *sarta*, *summa*; also of *ad ossa*, *ad ima*, and other words. If an adjective agreeing with the subject is needed, *saeva* seems nearer than *vesca* to *saxa*. Brieger keeps *saxa*, but supposes a *lacuna*,—a fair instance of his monomania.

ii. 467. Brieger takes Munro's *squalida multa creant*; but *squalida dant aliis* is a group of letters more easily corrupted.

ii. 501. Here Lachmann changes *tecta* to *tacta*, following a note of Oudendorp to Lucan (x. 491). Brieger reads *infecta*, but the Juntine and vulgate *tincta* (*tiŋta*) is nearer the manuscripts. In manuscripts like the Medicean Virgil, which the Lucretius archetype is supposed to have been, *e* and *i* are so extremely alike that either may be supposed to have usurped the place of the other anywhere. In this connection, I would mention a most probable correction of the text of Virgil, originally suggested by Mr. Edward Everett at least thirty-five years ago. The unmanageable *victu* (*Aen.* i. 445), should be *vectu*, the horse's head symbolizing the destiny of the

Carthaginians as *carriers* and riders (of the sea). Before 502 Munro supposes a *lacuna*; but Brieger for once prefers to amend, reading for *aurea, caudaque*. Qu. : *aut ea*?

ii. 529. Munro's *ostendens* seems to me particularly good; *ostendēs* was mistaken for an indicative and changed to the first person, *ostendam*.

ii. 601. Here Lachmann adds a line which Munro accepts. I have thought that *sedibus in* has taken the place of *invectam*. The lines appear to be (Lachmann *ad loc.*) at the bottom corner of the twenty-fourth page of the archetype, and the first word is likely to have been worn illegible.

ii. 937 et seqq. Brieger puts between parallels as containing a *petitio principii*; but surely Lucretius is not too logical for that.

ii. 940. *aere fluminibus terris terraque creatis*. Here Marullus wrote *flammaque* and Lachmann *aethraque* in order to introduce the four elements. Munro's note, in which he declares he cannot follow Lachmann, and praises Wakefield for retaining the manuscript reading, is itself past my following. But I believe the true reading is found by substituting *flammis* for *terris*. The proximity of *fluminibus* would cause *flammis* to fall out, and the next scribe would blunder into *terris*.

ii. 1030. Munro, in order to save *principio*, supposes a verse lost. I take it the other way. Verses 1038, 1039 really belong after 1029, and owing to their transposition, 1040 was made up to explain 1041. With this correction *cohibent* is right, agreeing with *caeli lucida templa*.

ii. 1080. For manuscript *indice mente*, where Gronovius's *inclute Memmi* has generally been adopted, Brieger gives from Winckelmann *inice mentem*, which he probably interprets "cast your mind upon"; but *inicio mentem* (Cic. *Mil.* 31. 84) means "inspire a thought."

ii. 1089. Brieger gives "*hinc generatumst rebus abundans*" and then "his [generatim rebus] abundat Bernays, Munro." But Munro has *hic generatim rebus abundans* in every edition from 1860 to 1886.

iii. 84. Instead of supposing a *lacuna*, I would read, for *suadet*, *suavem* agreeing with *pictatem*. Few letters intrude into our manu-

scripts of Lucretius oftener than *t*, especially when it makes a seeming third person. *Suavis* is a particularly Epicurean word = ἡδύς.

iii. 173. Here also I retain the manuscript *suavis*, variously altered by editors. After a prostrating wound, the actual fainting and falling to earth is a natural and agreeable relief, and is followed by the suffering of "coming to," the *mentis aestus*.

iii. 198. Brieger keeps the troublesome *spicarumque* and refers for explanation to his own page XIV, which should be XVIII.

iii. 415. Brieger very sensibly, as it seems to me, keeps *aliouqui*. That a word used by Horace, and very frequently used by Livy, which is found in all manuscripts, and gives exactly the needed sense, should be unknown to Lucretius, is one of those arbitrary dicta of which Lachmann was far too fond.

iii. 453. For the missing word between *lingua* and *mens*, where Munro accepts Lachmann's *labat*, I prefer either *vagat* or *vacat*. Many editors accept *vagare* in 628 for *vacare* as corrected by the Leyden quarto. If Lachmann chose (most needlessly by the way) to introduce *vagaret* into Catullus iv. 20, it may be endured here and complete the parallel to second childhood with 447. But *vacat* would give a good sense, "the mind is a blank"; and either would easily fall out after *lingua*.

iii. 702. Brieger in discussing this line prints *retro* for *ergo*.

iii. 743. This line, whose spurious nature was indicated as far back as Lambinus, and rejected by Lachmann and Munro, Brieger pronounces a "versus dignissimus," yet he has to suppose an indefinite *lacuna* to account for it.

iii. 784. Brieger has *salso* in text, and approves manuscript *in alto* in notes.

iii. 870. No one has appeared to notice that this line comes directly from Plato, *Phaedo* 68 B, ἄνδρος, ὃν ἂν ἰδὼς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθάνεισθαι.

iii. 935. I cannot understand why Lachmann and Munro refuse to accept Naugerius's excellent *Nam si grata fuit tibi vita anteacta priorque*. L. says of it *non inepte*; it deserves much higher praise.

The following *sin* demands a *si* which Munro strangely declares we cannot consider wanting from the manuscript reading, which he has to change himself.

iv. 79. The manuscript reading *patrum matrumque deorum* is no doubt troublesome, and Lachmann and Bernays stray very widely in their readings. Brieger rejects the words only to take *Parium marmorque deorum* which is as bad. In 81 he prints *inclusa*, and then says in his notes that "nunc demum" he sees it should be *ita clausa*.

iv. 216. Munro with Goebel and Purmann believes a line to be lost. I suggest *Mobilitate loci spatium transcurrere totum* as completing the sense and recalling several expressions which recur in the poem.

iv. 418. For the troublesome *caelum* I read *clare* or *clara*, either making perfect sense, and easily confounded with *caeli* (417) and *caelo* (419). Brieger *solem* without comment, or (seemingly) authority.

iv. 462. Munro following Bernays, whom he does not mention, reads, for *mirande*, *miracula*. Why not *mirandum ut* = θαυματον ὡς?

iv. 633. Brieger rejects Munro's very elegant *cibu' suavis et almus* for the manuscript *cibus ut videamus*; but he has again to suppose a *lacuna*.

iv. 638. Brieger reads not badly *est ut quae serpens*; but why not keep the manuscript *est itaque ut serpens* = "and it is just like a serpent" (*ita — que*).

iv. 897. This is allowed to be one of the most perplexing lines in the poem. Perhaps a clue might be found in taking *ac* = *aeque ac*. This use of *ac* = "as," without a demonstrative preceding, is recognized by Hand as belonging to the older Latin.

iv. 961. Munro changes *intus* to *intest*; if the copula is needed, *intust* would be simpler. This form is now advocated in Plautus, *Rudens*, 1174, as are several similar cases of *-ūs* before *est*, in other passages.

iv. 990. I complete the line with *corripere aequor*, "catch up the plain," cf. *Georgics* ii. 541, iii. 104. *Corripere* occurs in the immediate neighborhood of the line.

iv. 1026. Brieger takes *pusi*, crediting it to Bergk; but it comes from Lambinus, who also gives from Turnebus an etymology of *pucri* from *puri*; this is absurd; yet I fancy I have seen it ascribed to Varro, and it is quite in his style. May not euphuists in Lucretius's day have pronounced *pucri* in two syllables, from a fancy that it was the same word as *puri*?

iv. 1123, 24. Winckelmann, whom Brieger follows, has here anticipated me in what I had hoped was an original discovery — that these lines should be transposed. 1124 takes up the general sentiment; independence is lost, duty fails, and good name sickens; then stands the long enumeration of base uses to which the lover's estate comes; to break in on this enumeration by 1124, which follows so well after 1122, seems awkward. Moreover, the construction of 1123 as it now reads, whether standing before or after 1124, is of the harshest. *Res Babylonica fiunt* may pass; but *res labitur et Babylonica fiunt* is an uncomfortable collocation. Putting 1123 after 1124, I put a comma after *res*, and none after *fiunt*; then it looks as if *unguenta* had replaced a plural subject to *fiunt* of which *Babylonica* is predicate. The best word seems to me *inventa* = "acquisitions," thus :

*Labitur interdum res, et Babylonica fiunt
Inventa, et pulchra, etc.*

"Their property decays, their gains are turned into coverlets," etc. Then later their inherited estate, *bene parva patrum*, goes also. I do not see Munro's need of a pronoun referring to the *amica*; the articles named are all "woman's wares," and of themselves explain *alterius*. *Inventa* of course usually means "discoveries"; but *invenio* in the sense of "get gain" is well known. It may be as Munro says, that *unguenta* has come from *languent*, and displaced a wholly different word; in that case *congesta* or the like might stand.

iv. 1130. Brieger keeps manuscript *alidensia*, with this note: "Alidensia; i.e. *Elidensia*, prima syllaba propter metri necessitatem producta O Q Jessen, *Quaest. Lucr.* p. 5." Munro's note is "Jessen thinks that *Alidensia* may mean Elean" . . . "but we cannot get over the long ā," that is, Ἠλῆς would require *Ālidensia*; but Lucretius's line makes it *Ālidensia*, which Brieger calls a lengthening as required by the metre!

v. 396. Here again Brieger anticipates me in what I feel sure is right that *ambens* is simply a blunder for *ardens*, and that there is no need of Lachmann's *superât*. *Lambens* is not the right word to apply to the all-devouring fire of Phaethon's ruin.

v. 521. I believe Munro is right in retaining *summania* of the manuscripts and rejecting *immania*, which so many editors adopt. The word *immanis*, if used here applied to the sky, can only mean "vast"; this meaning often attributed to it arises from a confusion with *immensus*, with which of course it has no connection traceable in Latin. I believe it never refers purely to size, but always includes the notion of "monstrous" or "abnormal," the original meaning being that given by the dictionaries as the second, namely, "barbarous" or "cruel," nearly = *immitis*. It is generally referred, as well as *Manes*, to the obsolete *manus* = *bonus*, whence Varro and Festus also derive *mane*. But do not all these words point to an original form *manis*? We all know the conventional phrase *manus cerus*. But just as *unanimus* and *hilarus* stand side by side with *unanimis* and *hilaris*, so *manus* is not inconsistent with a form *manis*, as indicated by *Manes*, *mane*, and *immanis*. Whatever the form, the word must have meant "kindly" or "gracious," and I venture to restore it in iii. 962 for the impossible *magnis*, where Lachmann reads *dignis*, Bernays (followed by Brieger) *gnatis*, and Munro *magnus* = *magnanimus*. *Summania*, as Munro says, = *nocturna*.

v. 791. *Mortalia saecula*, referring to animals, Brieger changes to *animalia*, making an awkward hiatus after *loci*, because, says he, "*mortalia saecula sunt homines*." But of course the word *mortalis* in itself says nothing of men, and Cicero lays down emphatically (*N. D.* iii. 12. 30 *seqq.*) "*omne animal est mortale*." In ii. 1153 *mortalia saecula* must refer to *ferae* and *animantia*.

v. 888. For *tum demum puerili aevo florente iuventas occipit* I read *puero levi florere*, "to bloom on the smooth-faced boy." The changes in the first two words are easy; *florere* was first written *florde*, and then *florente*. T and R are not so constantly confused in the manuscripts of Lucretius as in the very inferior manuscripts of Catullus; but *t*, as I have said, is a frequent intruder, — in v. 656 *Matura* and *Matuta* seem to be confused, in v. 1451 we have *polito* for *polire*.

v. 1409. May not the real reading be *et numerum servare genis* (for *genus*), to "preserve the time with their cheeks"? Of course the inflated features are really *buccae* or *ora* rather than *genae*; but the play of muscle comes from the cheek-bone.

vi. 24. My *Ven.* has *hominum* as a correction for *igitur* in a very old handwriting. Other manuscript notes in the same writing I have been unable to decipher.

vi. 83. Here Brieger wins his greatest laurels. The Leyden manuscripts have *est ratio caelisque tenenda*, a word being deficient. Later manuscripts have *est ratio superum caelique tenenda*. Munro and others follow the *editio princeps* in reading *est ratio caeli speciesque tenenda*. Lachmann violently emends *ratio fulgendi visque tonandi*, which at least scans. Brieger treats us to *ratio caeli nubisque pōnenda*! He says of *nubis* "dum quid melius"; of *pōnenda*, I suppose, *dum quid peius*. And this metrical outrage stands in a Teubner text!

vi. 131. For *parvum* (*torvum*, Munro) possibly *pravum* = "offensive."

vi. 242. Brieger rejects Munro's change of *ciere* to *cremare*, saying, "quasi lapides igni consumi possint." How do the Germans make quicklime? How would he Latinize *Kalkbrenner*?

vi. 349. I cannot understand the indignant rejection of *transviat*. Lachmann's aversion to it is apparently because such words are Italian relics from the *infima aetas*. But the words of the *infima aetas* must often have been survivals of the *lingua rustica* older than Cato or Naevius.

vi. 743. Again, why does Lachmann pour out his fiercest wrath on Wakefield for writing *remigiom oblitae* for *remigio*? I have nothing to say for the spelling; but why not *remigium*? Cannot *oblitus* take an accusative, and thus avoid the hiatus of *remigi oblitae*?

vi. 800. In this very corrupt line I read *plenior effluit ut solio ferventis aquae vis*. "When there pours out in the bath a fuller gush of boiling water." If the position of *ut* after its verb is objected to, we may take *plenior*, as Lachmann does, to agree with the subject of *cunctere*, and read *et fluet e* (or *in*) *solio ferventis aquae vis*.

vi. 1135. Brieger gives in his text *an caelum nobis natura ultro corruptum*, but in his notes *corruptum ultro natura*. For this astounding hexameter he adduces as authority "Catullus lxvi. 3," which means Catullus cxvi. 3. But this very eccentric poem, which winds up Catullus's volume with the strange hemistich *tu dabi' supplicium*, is avowedly written in forced imitation of Callimachus, and cannot stand as a metrical parallel to anything in Lucretius.

vi. 1195. For the unintelligible reading *inoretiacet rectum* of the quarto and Vienna fragment,—the other Leyden manuscript has *in horetiacet*,—every one takes *riatum*, and Lachmann adopts Rutgers's very remote *inhorrescens*. Munro reads *in ore trucei*, and is inordinately proud of it. Mr. Postgate much more sensibly and eloquently reads *in ore tacens riatum*; but *t* is oftener an intruder than *i*, and I prefer the older, if more prosaic, reading of Nonius *in ore iacens riatum*. *tenta mebat* is the manuscript reading which has been variously corrected; Heinsius and Lachmann give *tumebat*, which has been accepted by later editors. I prefer to read *monebat*, the various signs indicated above being the warnings of death; possibly *monebant* would be better still. Either would be written in manuscripts *mœbat* (mœbât), which would *inevitably* sink into *mebat*. Nonius's *manebat* may serve as a confirmation.

vi. 1281. I supply, after *pro re*, *praereptum* = "his friend taken before him," as a word more likely to drop out after *pro re* than *praesenti*, *consortem*, etc.

Having had occasion to mention Ennius, to whom Lucretius has dedicated such a striking passage, I take this occasion to express the conviction, which I have held and communicated for many years, that Ennius was the author of the Epitaph on the son of Scipio Africanus the elder—that beginning *Qui apicem insignem Dialis flaminis gessisti*—preserved in the family sepulchre. There are touches of poetical delicacy in it, quite beyond the ordinary epigraphist. At the time of the younger Scipio's death, Ennius was on the most affectionate terms with the family, as asserted by Cicero, *pro Archia* ix. 22, and it would be simply impossible that they should have entrusted the epitaph of their lost member to any other poet.

ON 'OS COLVMNATVM' (PLAUT. M.G. 211) AND ANCIENT
INSTRUMENTS OF CONFINEMENT.

BY FREDERIC D. ALLEN.

THE slave Palaestrio, who conducts the intrigue in Plautus's play of the Swashbuckler, is engaged, early in the piece, in devising ways and means to get himself and others out of a certain scrape. Periplectomenus stands watching him in his cogitations, and comments to himself on the outward manifestations of the slave's mental efforts. After some other remarks of this nature occurs this passage (verses 209-212):

ecce autem aedificat; columnam mento suffigit suo.
apage, non placet profecto mihi illaec aedificatio;
nam *os columnatum* poetae esse indaudiui barbaro,
quoi bini custodes semper totis horis occubant.

The phrase *os columnatum*, slightly disguised in our manuscripts,¹ and badly garbled in the first printed editions, was restored to its rights by Pylades in 1506. It was recognized that the *poeta barbarus* was none other than Cn. Naevius, whose imprisonment by the *tresviri capitales* is narrated by Gellius. But a wholly inadequate conception of the phrase held possession of the Plautine commentaries for upwards of three centuries. Naevius, we were told, while in prison had been wont to rest his chin on one hand and prop his elbow with the other, just as Palaestrio is doing in the play. It was disputed whether he assumed this attitude through dejection of spirits, or through absorption in the composition of the two plays which Gellius says he wrote in prison. But it was assumed by everybody that the point of the comparison lay simply in this coincidence of attitude. It is really extraordinary that no one appears to have

¹ *osolum natum*, etc. Even after the right reading had been recognized, some interpreters, with incredible perverseness, read an obscene meaning into the phrase. See Lambinus's note.

been troubled by the frigidity and farfetchedness of this comparison. Chin on hand is a common enough posture, which cannot have been peculiar to Naevius, nor particularly characteristic of prisoners. Yet Periplecomenus, according to this interpretation, says in effect: "I hate to see a man with his hand under his chin, because I've heard that poor Naevius sat in prison in that posture." Even Julius Brix's last edition of the *Miles* (1883) repeats this feeble conception.

A. Lorenz, who edited the *Miles Gloriosus* in 1869, had, so far as I know, the first inkling that *os columnatum* referred somehow to the manner in which the prisoner Naevius was confined. Hesitatingly and with a note of interrogation, he ventured the suggestion that the "gesäultes gesicht" might be one "an einen pfeiler mittelst eines halseisens befestigt." This hint seems to have remained long unnoticed.¹ But I see that in the new Smith's



Dictionary of Antiquities (1890) the author of the article *Nervus*, G. E. Marindin, thinks that "this support of the neck is probably indicated by Plautus in the expression *os columnatum* when he speaks of the punishment of Naevius for libel." This writer is thinking of the pillory, which he understands to have been an attachment to the *neruos*.

These are certainly steps in the right direction. The reader will see at once that the pillory of recent times, if we could suppose it to have been in use among the Romans, would afford a complete explanation of the words *os columnatum* in the *Miles*. A glance at these two reproductions of old English woodcuts² will show how the

¹ In 1882 Ussing wrote in his commentary to the play: "nec magis dubitatur quin columnatum os significet uinctum aut saltem libertate priuatum; quod . . . nihil aliud significare credo nisi columnae adstrictum." This seems like a flash of intelligence, but he spoils it all by going on to explain the "fettered mouth" as a figure of speech, referring to a supposed censorship established by the magistrates on Naevius's play-writing! In fact, he denies that Naevius was ever imprisoned.

² The first was taken from the 1583 edition of Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*, Vol. II, where it faces p. 1220. The second is from Chambers's *Book of Days* (1863), Vol. I, p. 830, where it is marked "from a contemporary print."

impression of a 'face on a pillar' is produced by this interesting apparatus. In fact, it seems certain to the writer that something more or less resembling the pillory is absolutely postulated by this locution of Plautus, and in the following pages an attempt will be made to ascertain what sort of an instrument is meant, — in other words, how Naevius was confined, or was conceived by Plautus to have been confined.

We may premise that no Latin name answering to the Low Latin *pilorium* can be found, nor any warrant for the existence of just this instrument among the ancient Romans. Still less have we any evidence for the post-and-collar machine imagined by Lorenz. One might, it is true, think for a moment of the case of Chrysalus in the *Bacchides*. That malefactor's hands are tied together (v. 799), and presently (v. 823) he is led into the house and bound fast to a pillar.¹ The word *columna* is used here, but surely nothing is meant but a pillar of the house. He would naturally be bound with his back to it; but even if we fancied him as facing the pillar, there would still be nothing in his attitude analogous to the *aedificatio* of *Palaestrio* — the head supported by the hand. The off-hand mode of confinement described in the *Bacchides* cannot, therefore, be intended in the allusion to Naevius's imprisonment in the *Miles*.

Whatever the apparatus was to which Plautus alludes in this passage, it may be safely assumed that it was nothing exceptional, but one of the stock appliances for imprisonment, and that its name is among known Latin words. In fact, it will do no harm to anticipate our argument a little, and say at once that we shall find reasons for thinking it to have been the *neruos*. But it will be well to begin by eliminating other possibilities, and to this end let us take a rapid survey of the punitive appliances mentioned in the earlier Latin writers. Plautus is the most abundant source. A considerable part of the repertory is mentioned in a couplet of his (*Asin.* 549 f.):



¹ *abducite hunc | intro atque adstringite ad columnam fortiter.*

qui aduorsum stimulos lamminas crucesque compedesque
neruos catenas carceres numellas pedicas boias.

When to this list we add the names *catellus*, *codex*, *collare*, *columbar*, *furca*, *manicae*, *patibulum*, we have about the whole vocabulary.

Several of these can be dismissed at once, as having obviously nothing to do with the matter in hand. So *stimuli* to prod an offending slave, *lamminae* of red-hot metal, are mere instruments of torture. Nor can the punishment of the *crux* be thought of. This punishment, everywhere spoken of as the extremest of penalties, is reserved for slaves and the lowest malefactors. It is primarily a death penalty, although *crucior*, *cruciatu*s are metaphorically used of any torture,¹ and it is quite possible that masters sometimes employed the *crux* as pure torment, without carrying it to a fatal termination. But places like verse 372 of the *Miles* show how it was commonly regarded. Of course, *crux* did not properly mean 'cross.' It is quite possible that it was originally an impaling stake.² But to Plautus crucifixion did not mean impalement. Not only from his use of the verb *adfigere*,³ but from the verse *Most.* 360, *ut offigantur bis pedes bis brachia*, it is clear that the milder form of the punishment—nailing to a *patibulum* and a wooden post—was already in use.

¹ See, for instance, *Ter. Hec.* 774, where the *βόσωνος* applied to a slave for extracting testimony is so called.

² Lipsius de *Cruce*, Lib. I, cap. 6. Impalement is twice described by Seneca, *Ep. Mor.* II, 1, 5, and *ad Marc. Consol.* 20, 3; and in both passages the word *crux* occurs in the context, but in neither has it special relation to the impalement itself. The case is otherwise with the *acuta crux* mentioned in the epigram of Maecenas, *Senec. Ep. Mor.* XVII, 1, 11 (*Baehrens*, *Fragm. Poet. Lat.*, p. 338). Here impalement must be meant (the *eculeus* can hardly be thought of), and the word *crux* is not to be taken in any general sense. At least Seneca does not so take it. He supplies the word *suffigere*, which is elsewhere used in connection with *crux*, and can perfectly well be said of 'sticking up' on a sharp point (*Suet. Galb.* 20). Here, then, it really looks as if impalement were spoken of as a sort of crucifixion. How far this is to be understood when we read that pirates and the like were *in cruce suffixi*, *fixi cruci*, *defixi cruci*, and so on, it is useless to speculate. Of course, the *patibulum* could be used with this form of the punishment as well as with the other.

³ *Pers.* 295; *Fragm. Carbon.* II G.

Manicae and *pedicae* are evidently counterparts. *Manicae*, at least in Plautus, are not handcuffs, but only ligatures of thongs or cords. This is clear from Capt. 658 f, *ecferite lora . . . inicite huic manicas* (cp. 667, *adstringite uehementer manus*), and the similar passage Most. 1065, *manicas celeriter conectite*, taken in connexion with v. 1038 (*lora*).¹ *Manicae* again Asin. 304, *ubi manus manicae complexae sunt atque adductae ad trabes*, with which Truc. 777 and 783 may be compared. *Pedicae* recur Poen. 514 as an impediment to fast walking, *nisi cum pedicis condidicistis istoe grassari gradu*; and as snares for birds and animals were called by this name, it is pretty clear that *pedicae* too were nothing but cords.

Catenae is a general term, but it ordinarily implies some sort of shackles, to which the chains can be attached. Among the *catenae singulares* (Capt. 112) with which Hegio's two prisoners are bound, and which allow them some liberty of motion (*sinito ambulare*, v. 114), is a *collare* (v. 357), and in Menaech. 84 f. *compedes* are included in the term *catenae*. *Compedes* are very often mentioned. They are shackles for the leg (*crura*, Capt. 652; *suram*, Pseud. 1176), of iron (*ferreas*, Pers. 573), put on by a smith (Capt. 733, 1027), and worn constantly (Cist. 244), so that they shine through friction (*rediget in splendorem compedes*, Aul. 602). It is possible to move about and work in them (Capt. 723 f., 736, 944), but their weight (ten pounds, Liv. XXXII, 26; fifteen pounds, XII Tables) effectually prevents escape. They consist (Menaech. 85 f.) of a ring (*anus*) fastened with a rivet (*clauos*), and putting them on is called *impingere* (Capt. 733, Pers. 269, 573). They clank as one walks (*tintinnabant compedes*, Naevius v. 114 R. = Fest. p. 364 M.), which shows that they are connected by a chain. Those who wear them are *tintinnaculi uiri* (Truc. 782).

The *robustus codex*, or 'oaken log,' mentioned in connexion with the *putens* or underground *ergastulum* in Poen. 1153, may be many things, and receives little elucidation from two occurrences of a *codex* for confinement in later poets. It will be best to reserve this for later mention, towards the end of this article.

¹ In Lucilius ap. Non., p. 36 M (to be quoted later), where *manicae* are coupled with *catellus* and *collare*, there may be reason for thinking of iron handcuffs.

We come now to instruments for confining the neck. *Collare* (*uinculi genus quo collum adstringitur*, Nonius p. 36 M.) can be nothing but an iron ring or band. It is portable (see Lucilius, quoted on p. 45), and forms part of a set of light *catenae*, Capt. 357, as we saw a moment ago. In Varro R. R. II, 9, 15, it is a spiked leathern dog-collar.

Leaving the *columbar* of Rudens 888, to be spoken of along with the *neruos*, we come now to *furca* and *patibulum*. Neither of these is, strictly speaking, an instrument of confinement, but they cohere with others that are. We hear of them chiefly in connection with public flogging. Their use is often a preliminary to crucifixion or some other ignominious death, and the *patibulum* is perhaps mentioned only in this way. Both punishments belong to slaves and the most abandoned criminals, and it is inconceivable that either should have been applied to Naevius. Furthermore, neither, as we shall see, could suggest the figure employed by Periplectomenus. As *patibulum* and *furca* were employed for similar purposes, they are capable of being confused. Thus, both instruments are named in the several versions of the story of Autronius and his slave.¹ But it does not follow that they were one and the same thing. In fact, they appear to be different. From the exact descriptions of Plutarch² we know that the *furca* was the fork (*στήριγξ*, *στήριγμα*, *ὑποστάτης*) by which the pole of a wagon was attached to the axle. This simple implement was put over the nape of the offender's neck, and his hands were bound to the prongs, which projected in front and downwards.³ The *patibulum*, on the other hand, I suspect to have been merely a straight stick. It was primarily the bar of a door, as we learn from the noteworthy passage of Nonius, p. 366 M., *patibulum sera qua ostia obcluduntur, quod hac remota ualuae pateant*. Then follows a quotation from the Fullones of Titinius, in which some one flourishes a *patibulum* at the house-door, and threatens to break the

¹ Liv. II, 36; Cic. Div. I, 26; Val. Max. I, 7, 4; Macrob. Sat. I, 11, 3; Arnob. VII, p. 274; Dionys. VII, 68.

² Quaest. Rom. 70; Coriol. 24, 5.

³ Plaut. Pers. 854, *manus uobis do. :: et post dabis sub furcis*. Cp. Cist. 248, Cas. 389, Menaech. 943.

head of any intruder.¹ Of course Nonius's etymology is questionable. It is strange that an implement for fastening the door should be named from 'opening.' We may venture to suggest that the *patibulum* was rather a bar for holding the door open—laid, perhaps, across the tops of the two leaves when open at right angles to the threshold, and having "joggles" cut in the ends to keep the doors from closing. A cross-bar like this would furnish a handy means of stringing up a refractory slave, and so might come into use as an instrument of punishment.² This *patibulum*, as we have supposed it, might also be a *sera* for barring the door when shut; that is, the same bar might serve both purposes. There is a third use of the term *patibulum*, found in Pliny's description of an *arbustum* for vines, N. H. XVII, § 212. *Nouariensis agricola*, he says, *traducum turba non contentus nec copia ramorum, impositis etiamnum patibulis palmites circumuoluit*. These *patibula* are clearly cross-poles laid from tree to tree to train vines on, and they get their name, most probably, from the cross-bar of the door. And so, I think, the penal *patibulum* was named, not because it 'extends the hands.' In fact, it was originally, as I conceive, only the domestic implement, applied extemporaneously to punitive use. It was laid over the shoulders of the culprit, whose hands were bound (or nailed) to its extremities. Hoisted up, it became the cross-bar of the cross.

The *numella* seems to bring us nearer to the object of our search. It was certainly used for confining the neck. Nonius has (p. 144 M.) *numellae*³ *machinae genus ligneum, ad discruciandos noxios paratum, quo*

¹ Titin. v. 30 f. Ribb., *si quisquam hodie praeterhac posticum nostrum tepulerit | patibulo hoc ei caput diffringam*.

² This theory would perhaps impart a new significance to Mil. Glor. 359, where Sceledrus, standing in the doorway, with outstretched arms, is thus addressed: *credo ego istoc exemplo tibi esse pereundum extra portam | dispensis manibus patibulum quom habebis*. Punishment in the doorway would be a sort of connecting link in the speaker's mind between Sceledrus's attitude and crucifixion outside the gates. I may remind the reader also of Ritschl's well-known doctrine about *sublimen*.—It may be interesting to transcribe the two other Plautine occurrences of *patibulum*. Most. 56, *ita te forabunt patibulatum per uias | stimulis*. Fragm. Carbonaria II G. (Non., p. 221 M.), *patibulum ferat per urbem, deinde adfigatur cruci*.

³ The plural comes from the passage of the *Asinaria*. One must not be deceived into supposing a single machine to be called *numellae*.

et collum et pedes immittunt. Then follows a line from Plautus's *Asinaria*, quoted on p. 40. Elsewhere we hear of *numellae* only for animals. Columella, VI, 19, describes one for oxen, in which the neck is secured by two upright pins passed through holes in a horizontal bar,¹ and descending, no doubt, to the floor or to another horizontal piece. The epitome of Festus (p. 172 M.) describes the *numella* as a *genus uinculi quo quadrupedes deligantur*.² In the Codex Farnesianus itself the passage is mutilated. It has been restored to read thus: [*numella genus uinculi*] quo quadrup[*des deligantur, solet autem ea fie*]ri neruo aut co[*rio crudo bouis, ut plurimum*]. How uncertain this restoration is, I can best show by substituting another equally uncertain: [*numella genus uinculi*] quo quadrup[*des noxii deligari, sicut homines uinci*]ri neruo aut co[*mpedibus, lege XII iubentur*]. In fact the current supplement is rather unlikely, because a leathern *numella* controverts the descriptions of Nonius and Columella. Nothing can be built on this passage of Festus, and all that we can fairly infer from the existing evidence is that a wooden frame, like that used for confining the necks of animals, was occasionally used for coercing slaves. This might be in its construction something like the pillory, or — if Nonius is right — like pillory and stocks combined. But if paucity of mention is an indication, the machine must have been rarely applied to human beings.

Next in order is the *boia*. This is a wooden or iron machine for confining the neck. Fest. epit. p. 35 M., *boiae, id est genus uinculorum, tam lignae quam ferreae dicuntur*. Isidor. Or. V, 27, 12, *boia, id est torques damnatorum, quasi iuga bouum ex genere uinculorum*. Prudentius, praef. Psychomach. 34, *attrita boiis colla*. These are vague, but more to the point is its identification with the κλοιός of the Greeks by Jerome and the author of the Greek-Latin glossary.³ If this is right, it gives us a sufficient notion of its form, which is

¹ *Vbi potest etiam numella fabricari, ut inserto capite descendentibus per foramina regulis ceruix catenetur.*

² About the same in Luctatius Placidus s.v. *numellatus*.

³ Jerome's Comm. in Jeremiam 5, 27, κλοιός . . . *sermone vulgari boias uocant*. Gloss. Graecolat. (Corp. Gloss. II, p. 350), κλοιος *boia eculeum*, κλοιον *περιτιθημη in boio* . . . Separately, it ought to be observed, both words are rendered *catena* (Corp. Gloss. II, p. 556; IV, p. 26).

that of the forked stick, as we shall see further on. The jest in Plautus's Captives, v. 888, is to my mind a strong confirmation of this equation. If the reader will kindly glance ahead at the cut on p. 57, he will see at once how a particular force is thus imparted to this joke, where the *boia* is said to have been given to the recaptured runaway as a wife to embrace.¹ Such a stick, if heavy, would have to be carried hugged to the breast. Now if this is the *boia*, it meets in many ways our requirement. The butt-end, hanging in front, might suggest the 'pillared face.' There is only one difficulty. Naevius is confined in prison; the *boia* appears in the Captives as a portable machine — something to hamper the fugitive's movements, but not to bind him absolutely to one place. However, this can be got over, and in fact I suspect that we have here the right instrument in substance, though not in name. Bearing the *boia* in mind, let us pass on.

The 'dog' or 'puppy,' *canis*, *catulus*, *catellus*, seems to belong here. Nonius, p. 36 M., quotes from Lucilius (v. 1052 Lachm.; XXIX, 100 Müll.): —

cum manicis catulo collarique ut fugitiuom
deportem . . .

Fest. epit. p. 45 M., *catulus genus quoddam uinculi, qui interdum canis appellatur*. Plaut. Curc. 691, *delicatum te hodie faciam cum catello² ut ad cubes, | ferreo ego dico*. Cas. 389, *et canem et furcam feras*. This is not very definite, but let us add Pollux X, 167, *δεσμὸς σιδηροῦς καὶ σκύλαξ*. And to this an important passage of Polybius (to which we shall have to revert later), XX, 10, *ταῦτα λέγων φέρειν ἄλυσιν ἐκέλευε καὶ σκύλακα σιδηροῦν ἐκάστωι περιθεῖναι περὶ τὸν τράχηλον*. Putting all this together, I think the 'puppy' was about the same thing as the *boia* (only, so far as we see, always of iron), and suggest that it was so called because its prongs embraced the neck like a dog's fore paws. The jest in the Curculio passage is then like that about the *boia* in the Captivi, just spoken of. It is odd that the *canis* is combined with other neck-fetters in the passages of Lucilius and

¹ *Boius est — boiam terit; | liberorum quaerundorum causa ei credo uxor datast.*

² It is a mistake to interpret this word 'chain'; it has nothing to do with *catella*.

the Casina. But neither combination is impossible.¹ The collocation of *catulus* and *collare* in Lucilius excludes the supposition that *catulus* is merely an iron neck-band.

Having now surveyed the other machinery of confinement, we come to the *neruos*. Of all like contrivances this is the one most often mentioned in Plautus and the other older sources. It was evidently, in the olden time, the best known and most employed device for the effectual confinement of the person. But conceptions of modern scholars as to its nature have differed greatly. It has been defined as an iron chain, as wooden stocks, and so on. A part of this confusion comes from the fact that the *neruos* itself changed. The name was differently applied at different times. Later the *neruos* was something confining the feet;² in earlier times it confined the neck. As we are concerned only with the *neruos* of Plautus's time, it will be well to set forth at one view all the passages which relate to this earlier machine.

1. Fest. p. 165 M.:—

Neruum appellamus etiam *ferreum* uinculum quo *pedes* inpediuntur, quamquam Plautus eo etiam *ceruices* uinciri ait.³

2. XII Tables (Gell. XX, 1, 45):—

Ni iudicatum facit . . . secum ducito, uincito aut *neruo* aut *compedibus*, *quindecim pondo* ne minore aut si uolet maiore uincito.

3. Cato quoted Gell. XI, 18, 18:—

Fures priuatorum furtorum in *neruo* atque in *compedibus* aetatem agunt, fures publici in auro atque in purpura.

4. Liv. VI, 11, 8 (this and the four following passages relate to debtors):—

. . . qui non egestatem modo atque ignominiam minentur, sed *neruo* ac uinculis corpus liberum terrent.

¹ In the *furca* the butt would go behind; in the *canis*, in front.

² Tertull. ad Martyr. 2, *crus* . . . in *neruo*; de Cult. Fem. 2, 13, *crus* . . . in *neruo* se *patiatur* *artari*. See Festus, p. 165, quoted below. Corp. Gloss. II, p. 133, *neruos* *ἐντοπιδῆ*.

³ Then follows a quotation (no. 9 below).

5. Liv. VI, 15, 9 : —

... intercedendo, eximendo *de neruo* ciues uestros, prohibendo iudicatos addictosque duci.

6. Liv. VI, 27, 8 : —

... se nec addici quemquam ciuem Romanum ob creditam pecuniam passuros ... donec inspecto aere alieno initaque ratione minuendi eius sciat unusquisque quid sui, quid alieni sit, supersit sibi liberum corpus an id quoque *neruo* debeatur.

7. Liv. VI, 36, 12 : —

An placeret faenore circumuentam plebem ... corpus *in neruum* ac supplicia dare, ... et repleti uinctis nobiles domus, et ubicumque patricius habitet, ibi *carcerem priuatum* esse?

8. Liv. VIII, 28, 8 : —

iussique consules ferre ad populum ne quis, nisi qui noxam meruisset, donec poenam lueret, in *conpedibus aut in neruo* teneretur.

9. Plaut. ap. Fest. p. 165 (Frag. XXX inc. fab. G.) : —

Pferdioso captus edepol *neruo* ceruices probat.

10. Plaut. Aul. 743 (Euclio to a suspected thief) : —

At ego deos credo uoluisse ut apud me te *in neruo* enicem.

11. Plaut. Capt. 729 : —

Nam noctu *neruo* uinctus custodibitur.

12. Plaut. Curc. 689 ff. : —

Quia faciam ex te hodie *pilum catapultarium*,
atque ita te *neruo torquebo*, itidem ut *catapultae* solent.
:: ¹ Delicatum te hodie faciam cum catello ut adcubes,
ferreo ego dico.

13. Ibid. 720 : —

Tu autem *in neruo iam iacebis* nisi mi argentum redditur.

14. Ibid. 723 : —

Ego te *in neruom*, haud ad praetorem, hinc rapiam, ni argentum refers.

¹ Editors mark a change of speaker here. The manuscripts show none.

15. Plaut. Poen. 1269 : —
Condamus alter alterum ergo *in neruom brachialem*.
16. Ibid. 1365 (compare with 1351-1354) : —
ut sis apud me *ligna in custodia*.
17. Ibid. 1399 ff. : —
Vt minam mi argentum reddas, priusquam *in neruom abducere*.
:: Di meliora faxint. :: Sic est, hodie cenabis foris ;
aurum argentum *collum*, leno, tris res nunc debes simul.
18. Ibid. 1409 : —
Leno, quando *ex neruo* emissu's, compingere in carcerem.
19. Plaut. Rud. 872 : —
Bono animo meliust te *in neruom* conrepere.
20. Ibid. 876 : —
Tu *in neruom* rapere ; eo opsecras ut te sequar.
21. Ibid. 887 ff. : —
illic in columbam, credo, leno uortitur ;
nam in *columbari collum* haud multo post erit ;
in neruom ille hodie nidamenta congeret.
22. Ter. Phorm. 325 : —
ueoreo ne istaec fortitudo *in neruom* erumpat denique.
23. Ibid. 695 : —
quom argentum repetent, nostra causa scilicet
in neruom potius ibit.

Now let us see what can be gathered from this collection of quotations. In the first place, it is clear that the *neruos* is not, as its name would suggest, a mere thong or cord, but a stationary machine, to which the culprit is taken and in which he is fastened. This appears from the constancy of the expressions *in neruom rapere* (*deducere, conrepere, ire, dare, condere*), *in neruo iacere* (*teneri*), *de neruo eximere, ex neruo emittere*. Nowhere is the *neruos* brought and put on anyone. This has begotten a notion, which pervades our Latin

dictionaries, that *neruos* was sometimes said for 'prison' or 'place of durance.' But this notion is wholly baseless. Most of the above passages relate to private imprisonment at a creditor's house. It is inconceivable that private houses should have been generally furnished with dungeons. The pairing, moreover, of *neruos* and *compedes* is instructive (see nos. 2, 3, 8). They must be equivalent, and not wholly dissimilar means of confinement.

Secondly, the *neruos* confines the neck. Although Festus (see no. 1) says *etiam ceruices*, it must be observed that Plautus, so far as we have him, gives no hint of anything but the neck. See nos. 9, 17, 21. Also 15, where a close embrace, a hugging round the neck (compare *tenere collum* just preceding, in v. 1266) is called *neruos brachialis*. The neck, moreover, is thrust through some opening which is jocularly called a *columbar* in the *Rudens* (no. 21). For this *columbar* cannot, from the context, be a separate instrument. It must be a part of the *neruos* mentioned in the next line. Priscian (V, p. 150, Hertz) quotes this passage of the *Rudens* in support of the statement that *columbar* signifies a *genus uinculi*, but it appears to me very doubtful whether the locution was employed outside of this one passage. It is a joke of Plautus, and I suspect that the point of the joke lies, not so much in any resemblance of the aperture of the *neruos* to a dovecote, as in the assonance between *collum* and *collumbari*—for this distorted pronunciation of the word is indicated by the metre. In short, we have an elaborate pun, and are not entitled to press the dovecote comparison in attempting to define the form of the *neruos*.

Furthermore, the *neruos* does not compel a standing posture, for in that case *iacere in neruo* (no. 13) could not be said. It is not, therefore, exactly a pillory. Tyndarus in the *Captives*, wearing *compedes* on his legs continually, and delving in the quarries under the lash all day, is confined in the *neruos* at night (no. 11). It does not follow from this that the apparatus permitted a comfortable posture for sleeping, for Tyndarus is undergoing extreme treatment, and is to be worked to death anyhow (vv. 691 f., 731). Nevertheless we may be certain, from its use in confining debtors, whose rights were looked after by the law, that it was a comparatively humane means of confinement, intended to secure the person, not to torture.

In spite of Festus's statement (no. 1) that the *neruos* was of iron, we may be pretty sure that in Plautus's time it was of wood. In the *Poenulus*, the *leno* Lycus delivers himself up to be kept *lignea in custodia* (no. 16). This passage is part of the first ending of the *Poenulus*. It may be objected that the *neruos* is not named here. But it seems to me certain that it is meant. For the culprit has just proposed (1351-1354) to satisfy his creditors' claims with his neck (*collo rem solutam iam omnibus quasi baiolus*). And in the second ending of the play, which repeats this dialogue in another form, the *neruos* is mentioned as well as the *collum* (no. 17). It must be remembered, moreover, that nothing but *neruos* and *compedes*, as prescribed by the Twelve Tables, is ever heard of in connexion with the custody of debtors; and as the *compedes* are always of iron, the wooden instrument here alluded to can be nothing but the *neruos*.

If then the *neruos*, in spite of its name, is a wooden apparatus, it further seems that its weight is a matter of consequence. Such, at any rate, is the unconstrained interpretation of the language of the Twelve Tables (no. 2).¹ Of course if we start with the assumption that the *neruos* is an absolutely immovable piece of apparatus, we are obliged to restrict the definition of weight to *compedibus*. The meaning will then be: 'Let him bind him with *neruos* or with *compedes*. If *compedes* are used they must be of such and such a weight.' But the phraseology of the law by no means suggests this, and it must be noted that *minore* and *maiore* cannot grammatically refer to *compedibus* at all, though they might to *neruo*. It is more natural, however, to refer them in sense to both words, either supplying *uinculo* in thought, or connecting them directly with *pondo*.² Apparently, then, whether *neruos* or *compedes* be used, a certain weight is prescribed. Fifteen pounds (perhaps eleven English pounds) seems a small weight, insufficient of itself to prevent escape. But it is borne out, so far as *compedes* are concerned, by the prescription of 198 B.C. (Liv. XXXII, 26) about Carthaginian captives, *ne minus*

¹ Where, however, in all reason *maiore* and *minore* should be exchanged. But as that question bears in no way on our present discussion, it may here be waived.

² I am not aware that it has ever been pointed out that *pondo* may here be a live ablative: 'with a weight not less than fifteen.'

decem pondo compedibus uincti in nulla alia quam in carceris publici custodia essent. The weight in this case can be only a partial preventive of escape, and must have been supplemented by constant custody, or by further confinement of the person. So perhaps with the *neruos*. The moderate weight mentioned is not necessarily inconsistent with our former inference that it was a stationary piece of mechanism. Fifteen pounds of wood may have been a part of it, though not the whole.

This brings us to another consideration — how a wooden machine for confining the neck could have been called *neruos* at all, and whether perhaps the simplest supposition is not, that a 'sinew' or thong was (or had been) a part of the apparatus. We shall come back to this question later and may then suggest an answer, in a timid sort of way. But now may be as good a time as any to consider the curious passage of the *Curculio* (no. 12 above), in which the *neruos* is likened to a piece of artillery. I will ask the reader to turn back and peruse this passage attentively. Time was, when the writer inclined to understand *pilum catapultarium* as one of the two staves (*brachia*) which, inserted between tightly-stretched thongs (*nerui*), produced by their leverage the torsion which gave the propelling force of the catapult, and to translate the next line, 'and will twist you in the *neruos* as tightly as the catapults twist it (the stick).' This would make the comparison exceedingly direct and intelligible. But I fear that this view is after all untenable. For it seems violent to make *pilum* anything but the missile; and even *catapulta*, it must be observed, seems in Plautus to be always the projectile,¹ not the machine. How then can we understand the joke as applying to the *leno* Cappadox? The speaker is not threatening to "bounce" him, or to "fire him out."² He is threatening him with imprisonment, in order to extract money from him, and the *neruos* mentioned here can be no other than that with which the offender is menaced a moment later, in 720 and 723. We have here

¹ So, certainly, Pers. 28, Curc. 394, 398. Even Capt. 796 can perfectly well be so understood. Nonius, p. 552 M. quotes other examples. The same is true of *ballista*, Poen. 201, Trin. 668 (less distinctly Bacch. 709, 710, Capt. 796). The machine is *ballistarium*, Poen. 202.

² Although Lambinus thought so, and so have other editors.

another of Plautus's elaborate puns, with a double play on the meanings of *neruos* and *torquere*. 'I will make you a catapult-missile, in that I will *torquere* you with a *neruos*.' Apparent meaning, 'will project you with the tightened sinews'; real meaning, 'will twist you up in the debtors' machine.' The jest is labored, but nothing else seems possible. With *solent* must be understood *torqueri*.

Unless *torquebo* is figuratively said for 'torment,' we may fairly infer that some 'twisting up' process belonged to the fastening in the *neruos* machine, and so that some *neruos* or thong may really have been a part of the machine. I do not see that anything further about the *neruos* can be extracted from the above sources, except the certainty that it was something simple, ready at hand in any well-to-do domicile. Otherwise we could not have this constant talk of whisking off people to the *neruos*. Herewith we have exhausted our Latin sources, without attaining to any but a vague notion of what the *neruos* really was. It was for the neck, it was wooden, it allowed the prisoner to lie or sit. These conditions would be met by a sort of low pillory, but this is a rather complex apparatus, and affords no explanation of the name *neruos*, nor of the 'twisting' in the *Curculio*, nor of the fifteen-pound provision. It looks, therefore, as if there were something in the *neruos* which we had not yet fathomed. As to whether or not it is the instrument intended by Plautus in the *Miles*, we can only urge the general likelihood that a stationary neck-fetter, in very common use, is the one alluded to, especially as no other instrument seems to be just what is wanted. Whether the *neruos* presented any appearance of an *os columnatum* or not, we do not know, but I will venture to remind the reader that we found in the *boia* an instrument which, though movable, not stationary, met the requirement of this phrase extremely well.

In the hope of receiving further light upon this matter, let us now cast a rapid glance at the appliances used by the Greeks for confinement of the person. There is every probability that these appliances were not radically different from those used by the Romans. In fact, we have already (p. 45) received a serviceable hint from a Greek source.

The simplest δεσμά are of course cords, thongs, and withes.¹ Πέδαι are properly of this sort (Il. N 36), but the word came to be used of metallic shackles (Aesch. Pers. 747, Choeph. 493, etc.). They are properly for the feet (see Hesych. and Moeris, s.v.; Ar. Plut. 276), yet not invariably (Aesch. Choeph. 982). Shackles I understand to be meant by χοίνικες. From the two passages in Aristophanes (Plut. 276, Vesp. 440) it might seem possible to think of round holes in wooden stocks. But it is clear from Demosth. 18, 129, that the χοίνικες παχείαι, which the father of Aeschines wore while on duty in the schoolroom, were portable affairs. The scholiasts, moreover, on both passages of Aristophanes interpret χοίνικες as πένδαι.²

The σανίς or 'plank,' to which malefactors were nailed and hung up to perish,³ does not come into consideration. It was an instrument of painful death, analogous to the cross.⁴ Wholly distinct from this is the ξύλον, an appliance for mere confinement. Mentions of this are numerous. Ξύλον is, however, a generic term, comprehending several wooden implements. It was oftenest — in later times perhaps always — used of stationary leg-machines. In the noteworthy passage Lysias 10, 16, ξύλον is said to be the modern equivalent of the ποδοκάκκη mentioned in the Solonian laws.⁵ Several definitions of the ποδοκάκκη, in Suidas, Hesychius, Harpocration, Photius, Bekker's Anecdota (p. 292) and the scholion on Aristoph. Pax 479, tell us very little about it, the most definite statement being that it was ξύλον εἰς ὃ ἐν εἰρκτῇ τοὺς πόδας ἐμβάλλοντες συνέχουσιν, ὃ παρὰ Ῥωμαίους κοῦσπος⁶ καλεῖται. But the ξύλον σιδηρόδετον

¹ Il. A 105. Compare σείρωσις and σείρων in Photius's Lexicon.

² In Plut. 276, τὰς χοίνικας καὶ τὰς πέδας, the scholiasts take the two words as εἶδος and γένος, but it is obvious that alternative varieties of fetters might after all have been intended.

³ Herod. VII, 33; IX, 120; Ar. Thesm. 930–1124 *passim*. In the Thesmophorizusae, Mnesilochus is said to be 'bound' (δῆσον, δειν, etc.), but that nails were used appears from 1003. He understands that he is suffering a death-penalty; see 938 ἀποθανουμένωι, 1028 κόραξι δειπνον, 1072 θανάτου.

⁴ Hesych., τίθεται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σταυροῦ.

⁵ Compare Demosth. 24, 105.

⁶ Naber rashly conjectured κοῦστος = *custos*. But the reality of the Middle Greek word κοῦσπος is beyond question (see Du Cange), and it seems to be the Low Latin *cursus* 'wooden shoe,' 'clog,' used jocularly for the stocks.

which figures in the story of Hegesistratus (Herod. IX, 37) is perhaps a little less vague. Hegesistratus, it will be remembered, amputates his own heel with a knife, slips his foot out, and escapes. Something like stocks are indicated. Two blocks with hemicylindrical grooves, bound together with iron bands, would best suit the expression, although, since these compounds of *-δετος* are sometimes used in faded-out senses, a log with a U-shaped iron driven into it might also be thought of, or even a solid block, with an opening admitting the foot and afterwards reduced in size by an inserted spike. The *ξύλον* of Herod. VI, 75 is also easiest understood as a leg-fetter. From Hesychius under *ἐγκαλοσκελής* we learn that *κᾶλον* was sometimes said for *ξύλον*. If then in these, as well as in several passages from post-classic writers, *δεδέσθαι ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ* means to sit in the stocks, it is certain that the same phrase in the fifth century was used of confinement by the neck. In the *Clouds*, v. 592, the chorus proposes this for Cleon, as a punishment for bribery and peculation (*ἦν . . . φιμώσῃτε τοῦτον 'ν τῷ ξύλῳ τὸν αὐχένα*). The chorus of men in the *Lysistrata* utters the wish *ἐς τετρημένον ξύλον ἐγκαθαρμόσαι . . . τοῦτον τὸν αὐχένα*, in reference to the feminine chorus (v. 680). Compare *πολλὰ μὲν ἐν δονρὶ δεθεὶς αὐχένα*, Anacreon fragm. 21 Bgk. There could be a combined *ξύλον* for neck, hands and feet, for nothing else can be meant in *Knights* 1049, *τοῦτον δῆσαι σ' ἐκέλευ' ἐν πεντεσυρίγγῳ ξύλῳ*. The imaginary prisoners at the beginning of the seventh book of Plato's *Republic*, *ὄντες ἐν δεσμοῖς καὶ τὰ σκέλη καὶ τὸν αὐχένα*, may be trussed up in a like machine.

Now if we ask what sort of a neck-fetter this *ξύλον* was, it must be conceded that the expressions *πεντεσύριγγον ξύλον* 'five-piped block,' and *τετρημένον ξύλον*, in the passages just quoted from the *Knights* and the *Lysistrata*, suggest something like the pillory — a wooden instrument with a rounded hole, perhaps formed by the scooped-out edges of two planks, perhaps not. And in fact I think it likely that the stocks and the pillory were both, in substance, known to the Greeks. But *ξύλον* is an elastic term,¹ and it would

¹ Tromes, in Demosthenes 18, 129, wears a *ξύλον* as well as *χοίτικες* in his schoolroom service. This must be portable, and probably is for the neck. A light *κλοιός* may be intended.

not be surprising if in some of the above places the writers were thinking of another more primitive, and apparently more usual, way of confining the neck, which we now come to speak of. This method, in a word, is that of the forked stick. The stick is called κλοιός or κύφων.

The κλοιός (or κλωϊός) is frequently mentioned. It is always for the neck — or, as we shall see, for neck and hands. The name changed its meaning, or was extended, so that in some post-classic sources it seems to be only a collar or chain round the neck. Thus in Babrius 99 (100), 6 we have an iron dog-collar, made by forging; κλοιῶι τέτριπται σάρκα τῶι σιδηρεΐωι, | ὃν ὁ τροφεύς μοι περιτέθεικε χαλκεύσας. Hesychius (s.v. κλοιός) defines it as περιτραχήλιος δεσμός, κολλάριον, ἥτοιμανιάκης, and the word κολλάριον recurs in a scholion on Vesp. 897. Even in Euripides's Cyclops 183 f. an ornamental chain or band round the neck is called — perhaps metaphorically — a κλοιός.¹ But the regular κλοιός is more than this. In the first place it is of wood. A κλωϊός σύκινος is the punishment of the dog-culprit in the Wasps (v. 897). Here a scholiast of the Venetus explains τὸ ξύλον τὸ ἐπιβαλλόμενον εἰς τὸν τένοντα τοῦ κυνός. Another adds ἔστι δὲ ξύλινον.² As to its form we are not without a pretty significant hint. Observe that the κλοιός was used for dogs as well as for men.³ Now there was a law of Solon's, alluded to in Xenophon (Hell. II, 4, 41), but given in full by Plutarch, Sol. 24, which provided that a biting dog should be delivered over to the bitten person κλοιῶι τριπήχει δεδεμένος. It is obvious that the length is here a point, and equally obvious why. The dangerous animal is to be held off at a safe distance by a sort of handle. He may not be confined by a mere leash, which would leave him free to run at his new master's legs. There is another allusion to the length of the κλοιός in the story told by Plutarch, Moral. p. 855 A, of Philip's sneering remark about the Greeks who had left the Macedonian alliance for the Roman: λειότερον μὲν μακρότερον δὲ κλοιὸν

¹ καὶ τὸν χρῶσιν | κλοιὸν φοροῦντα περὶ μέσον τὸν αὐχένα. Said of Paris. So Clemens Alex. Paed. II, p. 244 Pott. calls a χρυσοῦν περιδέραρον a κλωϊός, but it does not appear that he means that that name was really used for it.

² Yet another says σύκινον δὲ διὰ τὸ βραχὺ (leg. τραχὺ?) τοῦ ξύλου.

³ Besides the other passages here given, see the story in Plut. Mor. p. 754 B.

μεταλαμβάνειν. Now observe that the κλοιός itself is said to be three cubits long, not to have a long handle. Considering this, it seems clear to me that the simple instrument is meant, with which one may nowadays see unruly farm-animals hampered — a forked stick placed under the neck, the two prongs joined by a withe or a cross-bar.

The phrase 'three-cubit κλοιός' receives confirmation from Euripides's Cyclops v. 235, where we read δῆσαντες δέ σε | κλωϊῷ τριπῆχει κατὰ (mss. κα̑τα) τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν μέσον | τὰ σπλάγχν' ἔφασκον ἐξαμήσεσθαι βίαι. Most editors write ὀμφαλὸν for ὀφθαλμὸν after Scaliger. This is probably right, but it is certainly not right to suppose the κλοιός to be a 'strait waistcoat,' put round the middle of the body, as Paley does. The long-handled Solonian κλοιός, placed over the neck, is meant. A comma belongs after τριπῆχει.

In the sequel of this last passage, scourging is among the indignities with which the Cyclops is threatened, and with this should be compared the gloss in Bekker's Anecdota (p. 49), κλωμάστιξ· ὁ κλοιῷ δεδεμένος καὶ μαστιγούμενος, and above all the instructive narrative in Xenophon's Hellenica III, 3, 11. Here Cinadon, δεδεμένος καὶ τῷ χεῖρε καὶ τὸν τράχηλον ἐν κλοιῷ, is led about the city of Sparta, μαστιγούμενος καὶ κεντούμενος. The κλοιός, observe, was used in public floggings, exactly like the Roman *furca*, and the hands are bound to it. This seems a strong confirmation of our theory of its form. The hands I conceive to be fastened to the prongs, as to the prongs of the *furca*; the butt-end projects behind, and is held by the μαστιγοφόρος. There are, of course, the possible alternatives that the butt is very short, or that it hangs in front and has the hands bound to it.

Now the forked stick is used at the present day in Africa for hampering unruly slaves or slaves marching in caravans. The cut from which the sketch on opposite page is taken may be found in Livingstone's "Last Journals" (London 1874) vol. I, p. 62. More detailed information is accessible in Paul Reichard's "Deutsch-Ostafrika" (Leipsic 1892) p. 462 f. The fork is secured round the neck by a small bar of iron, passed through holes in the prongs and clinched. The butt ordinarily hangs in front, and is carried by the wearer in his arms. But it may be turned backward, and

two of the sticks may be lashed together, thus joining two slaves. It seems to me that in this "slave-stick" or "sklavengabel" or "makongoa" we have the κλοιός exactly reproduced. It corresponds



both to the *boia* and to the *furca* of the Romans, and we have seen (p. 44) that κλοιός is defined by *boia*. These African sticks are often of portentous size, but smaller ones are clearly possible.

Reserving the κλοιός in Lucian's *Toxaris* for later mention, I am not aware of anything else that bears on the nature of the instrument, unless it be the epigram of the *Anthologia Palatina* IX, 19, ascribed to Archias of Mitylene. The once famous race-horse, now reduced to turning the mill, is said to be νῦν κλοιῶι δειρὴν πεπεδημένος οἷα χαλινῶι. Even here the forked stick can be understood; its butt-end may be fastened to the arm which turns the stone, or it may itself be that arm. What the etymology of κλοιός was, I do not know. That it is connected with κληῖω is not self-evident. We might suspect that κλοιός was originally some house or farm implement, only incidentally used as a means of confinement.¹ But the only hint of other uses of the word is that afforded by Hesychius, κλοιός· μέρος τι τῆς νεώς. This shows us that there were other κλοιοί beside the punitive instrument.

So much for the κλοιός. The κύφων must next be considered. I transcribe the chief passages containing the word or relating to it.

¹ It is perhaps noteworthy that the unlucky parasite in Eupolis's *Κόλακες* (fragm. 159 K), summarily expelled from his patron's house, is handed over to the police with a κλοιός on. The κλοιός seems to be right at hand when wanted. But perhaps such instruments were kept ready for insubordinate slaves.

Cratinus fragm. 115 K, ἐν τῷ κύφῳ τὸν αὐχέν' ἔχων. Ar. Plut. 476, τύμπανα καὶ κύφῳνες. Ibid. 606, Penia is ordered ἐς τὸν κύφῳνα. Aristot. Pol. V, 6 (p. 1306^b), the enemies of the oligarchy at Thebes ἐφίλονεῖκσαν αὐτοὺς ὥστε δεθῆναι ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐν τῷ κύφῳ. Aelian fragm. 39 Herch. (from Suidas), a law of Lyctus against persistent Epicureans, δεδέσθω ἐν κύφῳ πρὸς τῷ ἀρχεῖῳ ἡμερῶν εἴκοσι, stripped and smeared with honey to attract the flies. Schol. RV Ar. Plut. 476 (= Suid. s.v. κύφῳ), δεσμός ἐστι ξύλινος, ὃν οἱ μὲν κλοιὸν οἱ δὲ καλιὸν¹ ὀνομάζουσιν . . . εἴρηται δὲ κύφῳ παρὰ τὸ ἀναγκάζειν τοὺς δεσμούς κύφειν (V adds, διπλῶς ἅμα κολαζομένους, τῇ τε τοῦ τραχήλου πίεσει καὶ τῷ μηδαμῶς ἀνανεῦν δύνασθαι). Ἄλλως· ξύλα εἰσὶν ἐπιτιθέμενα εἰς τοὺς τένοντας τῶν καταδίκων, ἵνα μὴ εὖρωσιν ἀνακύναι (V adds, καὶ γὰρ τὸν κρινόμενον ποιοῦσι κύφειν). Schol. P ibid., ξύλον ὁμοιον ζυγῷ, ὃν τιθέασιν κατὰ τῶν τραχήλων τῶν δικαζομένων, κύπτειν αὐτοὺς παρασκευάζων, ἵνα διπλῶς αὐτοὺς κολάζῃ, καὶ μὴ ἔων αὐτοὺς ἀνανεῦν οὐδ' ὅλως.² Schol. RV Ar. Plut. 606, ὁ ξύλινος δεσμός ἐν ᾧ δεσμεύονται οἱ ἐν τῇ φρουρᾷ. Hesych., κύφῳ· ὅπερ ἔνιοι συνάγῃ³ καλοῦσιν· δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ δεσμόν ξύλινον ἢ ξύλον βασανιστικὸν κολαστήριον, ᾧ κατέτεμνον (sic!) τοὺς θανάτῳ κάτακεκριμένους. Photius Lex., κύφῳ· ἐστι μὲν δεσμός ξύλινος, δι' οὗ τὸν τράχηλον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας διείρουσιν. Pollux X, 177, σκεῦος ἦν τι ἀγορανομικόν, ᾧ τὸν αὐχένα ἐνθέντα ἔδει μαστιγοῦσθαι τὸν περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν κακουροῦντα. — In brief, it was wooden, something like a yoke, put on the neck, and might also confine the hands; it was called a 'choker,' enforced a stooping posture, served for floggings, and was used by public authorities to confine malefactors in market-place or prison. As compared with the κλοιός, the most noticeable thing is that it appears to be stationary. Prisoners do not walk about with it. A man is confined in it twenty days running in front of the town-hall. There is a good deal here that suggests the pillory, and for this speaks also the fact that the τετρημένον ξύλον of Lysistrata 680 (see p. 54) is interpreted by a scholiast as a κύφῳ. The expression

¹ Hesych., καλιός· . . . ξύλον ᾧ ἐδέοντο.

² Another addition in V contains, κύφῳνές εἰσι τὰ ἔρανα (leg. ὄργανα?) ἃ ἐπιτιθέασιν ἐν τῷ τραχήλῳ τῶν καταδικασθέντων.

³ Possibly this should be κυνάγῃ. At any rate Hesych. defines this word as τὸν διὰ χειρῶν δεσμόν, and defines δερριστής as κυνάγῃς περιανχένιος.

διέρουνσιν, 'stick through,' 'insert,' may also be thought to look in the same direction. On the other hand the language of the scholiasts on Plutus 476 is against this. It is a 'piece of wood put on the neck,' and is said by one man to be identical with the κλοιός. The term may have been elastic, and its application may have changed with time, but it seems to me pretty clear that the original κύφων was a simple affair not very unlike the κλοιός, and that it was rendered stationary by its greater weight, or by planting its end in the ground, or in some other way.

It may be worth while to look at the other uses of the word κύφων. First an undescribed women's garment.¹ Secondly, κύφωνες were a part of the chariot-box, — apparently the curved rails forming the upper edge of the right and left sides.² Here κύφων evidently means 'bent stick.' Thirdly, the κύφων was a part of the plough. Theognis 1201, οὐδέ μοι ἡμίονοι κύφων' ἔλκουσιν ἀρότρον. This can be nothing else than the γύης — the crooked stick rising from the top of the ἔλνυμα (ploughshare) and curving towards the front. When there is no separate ἱστοβοεὺς, the γύης is continued to form the pole. It is then a long stick with a heavy, moderately curved, butt. It would not serve to enclose the neck. But with the ἔλνυμα attached it would serve admirably. Now the most primitive form of plough had the ἔλνυμα and the γύης of one piece, and this, I should like to suggest, may be the prototype of the κύφων of confinement. It is simply a fork with no butt to speak of, but with two prongs, one long and curving, the other short and sharp. Such a plough is represented in Daremberg and Saglio (s.v. *aratrum*) fig. 429, from a relief representing the hero Echelus. The figure is reproduced in the annexed cut. A plough of this sort (or the γύης and ἔλνυμα of the composite plough) put over the neck, and supplemented by a thong



¹ ἱμάτια γυναικεῖα ἢ χιτῶνος εἶδος, Photius, citing Posidippus.

² Pollux I, 143, τῶν πλαγίων πλευρῶν τὰς ἐπάνω ῥάβδους τὰς ἔως κάτω τεينوύσας. The definition ἐπικεκαμμένη ῥάβδος in Hesychius may well refer to this chariot-rail

under the chin, would hamper a man most effectually. It would be 'like a yoke,' and would force him to crane his neck forward. If there is anything in this, the *κύφων* must have been so called because it was the 'bent stick' of the plough; not, as the later ancients thought, because it forced a man to stoop. Here, as in the case of the *furca* and the *patibulum*, the means of punishment would be a simple domestic implement intended for another purpose.

Before going further, let us sum up the present state of the question. The most frequently mentioned appliance for stationary confinement among the Romans was, we saw, the *neruos*. The *neruos* of Plautus was a wooden instrument confining the neck, weighing something like fifteen Roman pounds. Now the simplest and the most usual sort of neck-fetter, among both Greeks and Romans, we have found to be the crotched stick in one form or another. The crotched stick, with butt-end in front, would give the appearance of 'head on a pillar' which we are looking for. These and other considerations may well incline us to think that the *neruos* was the apparatus in which Plautus imagines Naevius to be confined, and that it consisted of a forked stick, in part at least. But there remain two obscure points, — how this crotched stick of moderate size could be the stationary apparatus which the *neruos* evidently was, and how it ever came to be called a *neruos* at all.

These questions are perhaps insoluble, in the incompleteness of our information. Nevertheless I should like to call attention to two noteworthy passages of Greek authors which may seem to stand as fingerposts in this wilderness. First the passage of Polybius which we quoted in part on p. 45. M' Acilius Glabrio threatens to bind the Aetolian legates 'in the chain' and clap them into prison (*δήσας εἰς τὴν ἄλυσιν ἀπάξω*). Then at his order a chain is brought, and an iron *σκύλαξ* is put round each man's neck. Here we see that both 'dog' and chain belong to the apparatus, which nevertheless is called simply a 'chain.' The 'dog' is the means by which the prisoners are fastened to the chain, at proper intervals.

The second passage is the long and interesting description of a prison in Lucian's *Toxaris*, chapters 29-33. The prison is an Egyptian prison and the time of the writer is relatively late. The

details, however, seem Greek enough, and of primitive barbarity. We cannot here transcribe the whole story. The essential features are these. The prisoners are confined in a close and ill-smelling room. They are confined with κλοιοί and with the ξύλον.¹ It is not said that the κλοιοί are for the neck, but this is plainly to be inferred from the context. In the daytime the κλοιός suffices, together with the fastening of one hand, the legs being free. How the hand is fastened does not appear, but probably it is attached to the κλοιός itself. At night the ξύλον for the legs is added.² This is called ὄλον καταδεδῆσθαι. Thus trussed up they sleep 'on the ground,' in a cramped position, unable to stretch the legs out. Evidently the κλοιός permits a sitting posture. Now these κλοιοί are all fastened into a chain,³ so that the prisoners sit in a long row (ἐξῆς). The mechanism is such, that when one prisoner gets a file and severs the chain, the whole gang are at once free.⁴ They knock the guards on the head and make a rush for liberty. This is evidently a sudden happening. The number of prisoners is large,⁵ and it is unthinkable that each man has to file himself separately free. It is also nearly inconceivable that when free from the chain they still have their κλοιοί on. Rather the chain is all that confines them in the κλοιοί. The contrivance, so far as I can see, must be something on this wise. The chain is reeved through holes in the two prongs of the κλοιός, or it is fastened to one prong and passes through a hole in the other. Drawn taut, it holds the neck firmly between the prongs. When slack, it can be loosened and the head drawn out. The

¹ ὑπερβᾶσι τοιγαροῦν ἤδη καὶ πονηρῶς εἶχεν οἶον εἰκὸς χαμαὶ καθεβδόντα καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς οὐδὲ ἀποτείνειν τὰ σκέλη δυνάμενον ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ κατακεκλεισμένα· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἡμέρας ὁ κλοιὸς ἥρκει καὶ ἡ ἑτέρα χεὶρ πεπεδημένη, εἰς δὲ τὴν νύκτα ἔδει ὄλον καταδεῆσθαι. Chap. 29.

² Possibly not for all the prisoners, but only for the particular one whose adventures Lucian is narrating.

³ We may note in passing that Pollux X, 167, in a miscellaneous list of σκεύη, mentions κλοιὸς and ἀλυσίς together, and just before the σκύλαξ (see p. 45).

⁴ εἰς γὰρ τῶν δεδεμένων οὐκ οἷδ' ὅθεν ῥίτης εὐπορήσας καὶ συνωμότας πολλοὺς τῶν δεσμωτῶν προσλαβὼν ἀποπρίει τε τὴν ἀλυσιν, ἣι ἐδέδεντο ἐξῆς, τῶν κλοιῶν εἰς αὐτὴν διειρομένων, καὶ ἀπολύει πάντας. Chap. 33. This must be in the daytime, as nothing is said of the ξύλον.

⁵ ἐν ταύτῳ πολλῶν δεδεμένων καὶ στενοχωρουμένων καὶ μόλις ἀναπνεύοντων. Chap. 29.

arrangement, along with some inconveniences, would have this advantage, that all the prisoners could be at once released, and all at once secured again by means of a hook and staple at one end of the room.

We must not forget to say that the κλοιός in this passage must be something other than a mere crotched stick, because two prisoners can be fastened to the same one.¹ But nothing forbids our supposing a double κλοιός, in principle like the simple, — say a piece of plank with two triangular notches cut in one of its edges.

To conceive the *neruos* as (originally at least) constructed in this fashion, to have consisted, that is, of a wooden fork — a *boia* or *catellus* — placed under the prisoner's neck, with the butt resting on the ground, secured at the back of the neck by a long thong passing through holes in the prongs, this thong being drawn taut and fastened to opposite sides of an apartment, would of course be pure hypothesis. But it would dispose of the two difficulties that confronted us — that of the name, and that of the immovability of the machine. It would explain *neruo torqueo* in Curc. 690, and it would make the metaphor of the *neruos brachialis* in Poen. 1269 more picturesque. Such a machine could be fabricated in a few minutes, and would be an effective means of confinement. With the cord tightly knotted or otherwise fastened to one of the prongs, the stick could not be slipped along the line, and the fastenings would be quite out of the prisoner's reach. At the same time it would not be extremely uncomfortable, as there would be no painful constriction of the body, and the stick would afford some support to the prisoner's head, as he sat on the ground. At times, the prisoner might be allowed to walk about with the clog on his neck, and this is perhaps why its weight was a consideration.

In post-Plautine times the name *neruos*, as we have seen, got somehow shifted from a neck-fetter to a foot-fetter, very likely in consequence of a change of practice in the direction of humaner methods of confinement. It was also made of iron instead of wood. We know nothing of the construction of this later machine. It may be, for aught we know, exemplified in the iron instrument found at

¹ τοῦτο γοῦν μόλις πολλὰ ἱκετεύσας τὸν δεσμοφύλακα ἐξείργασατο παρ' αὐτοῦ, πλησίον τῷ Ἀντιφίλωι καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ αὐτῷ κλοιῷ δεδέσθαι. Chap. 32.

Pompeii in the gladiator barracks, now in the Museum at Naples. This consists of a row of square compartments for the ankle, formed by two horizontal bars connected by short upright pieces. The upper bar, smaller than the lower, is movable, and passes through holes in the uprights; slipped out lengthwise it frees the prisoners.¹ This may be the *ferreum uinculum* of Festus (see p. 46), but it is unlike the ancient *neruos* as we have imagined it, and more nearly resembles the *numella*.

How long the old *neruos* for the neck remained in use we know not. There is beyond all question a reminiscence of it in Horace's picture (Sat. I, 3, 89) of the poor debtor who *porrecto iugulo historias captiuos ut audit*.² That is, 'with neck outstretched like a prisoner,' but I do not gather from this that Ruso, Horace's contemporary, actually put his debtors into this sort of confinement. It may also be worth considering whether the term *codex* may designate an instrument of this nature. The three passages in which it occurs are these. Pl. Poen. 1153, where a slave is threatened with the 'oak log,' *robustus codex*, along with the 'mill' and the 'well.'³ Propert. IV (V), 7, 44, *codicis immundi uincula sentit anus*. Juvenal 2, 57, *residens in codice paelex*. On ground of a scholion on the last passage, the *codex* is generally explained as a clog fastened to the leg. But the scholion may as well or better be understood of the *boia* or the old-fashioned *neruos*. The words are *ergo hanc insequens grauioribus poenis, domina catena uinctam infligit codici atque ita iubet facere pensa*. Note the word *infligit*.

We must revert to Naevius and his incarceration for a final remark. We have found it probable that the *neruos* was the apparatus referred to in the phrase *os columnatum*. Was Naevius's imprisonment public or private? Ussing argues that if Naevius was imprisoned at all (he thinks he was not), it was done "*priuata ui, non publica auctoritate*." He thinks, no doubt, of confinement at

¹ Excellent engraving in Niccolini, *Le Case di Pompei*, Vol. I, Caserma de' Gladiatori, Plate I, F.

² I derive this hint from Marindin in the new Dictionary of Antiquities, s.v. *neruos*.

³ The line must be drawn, I think, between this *robustus codex* and *robustus carcer* in Curc. 692, because the latter hangs on to the *robus* and the *Tullianum* (Fest. p. 264 M.).

the house of some Metellus. But we must hesitate to throw over the very definite statement of Gellius, with its express mention of the *triumviri capitales* and the tribunes.¹ Why may not the accusation have been *occensatio*, — the composition of a *carmen quod infamiam faceret alteri*? This was a capital offense according to the Twelve Tables.² Gellius clearly supposes Naevius confined in the public *carcer*. We do not, as it happens, hear of the *neruos* as used in the *carcer*. Indeed *neruos* (that is, private imprisonment) and *carcer* are contrasted in Poenulus 1409 (no. 18 on p. 48). Nevertheless it is quite possible that an instrument of like construction, even if not called by that name, was known in the public prison. Simple imprisonment without fetters was not the custom among either Greeks or Romans. And there are many allusions to the *uincula* of the Roman prison,³ though we learn little as to their nature. We know no reason why this prison may not have been arranged like that in Lucian's Toxaris.

However probable or improbable the details of our conception may seem to the reader, the main thesis here maintained — that the phrase *os columnatum* in the Miles relates somehow to the sort of machine in which Plautus fancies Naevius to have been confined — may, I hope, receive general assent. I say fancies, because we have to deal with a statement of Plautus rather than with an actuality. It is possible that Naevius was not really confined in this particular fashion, but that Plautus chose to represent it so. But Plautus's meaning seems to me quite certain. As to the *bini custodes*, I like best to understand simply the prison guards. Compare *nam noctu neruo uinctus custodibitur*, Capt. 729. Yet it is conceivable that this too refers to fetters — say for the two feet. Naevius would then sit with his neck in the *neruos*, and his legs in *compedes* or in some kind of stocks.

¹ Gell. III, 3, 15. *De Naevio quoque accepimus, fabulas eum in carcere duas scripsisse, Hariolum et Leontem, cum ob assiduam maledicentiam et probra in principes ciuitatis de Graecorum poetarum more dicta in uincula Romae a triumviris coniectus esset. Unde post a tribunis plebis exemptus est, cum in his quas supra dixi fabulis delicta sua et petulantias dictorum, quibus multos ante laeserat, diluisset.*

² Cic. Rep. 4, 10 (12).

³ For instance Liv. III, 58, 2; VI, 16, 2; VI, 17, 5; Pl. Rud. 476.

CICERO'S JOURNEY INTO EXILE.

BY CLEMENT LAWRENCE SMITH.

CICERO embarked at Brundisium, on his way into exile, on the last day of April (the twenty-ninth), B.C. 58. This date may be regarded as certain, although we have to accept it in the face of Cicero's own express statement, as it appears in our manuscripts of a letter written from Brundisium to his wife and children, that the day of his departure was April 26 (*ad Fam.* XIV. iv. 3 'Brundisio profecti sumus a. d. v K. Mai.'). This letter, however, bears the subscription 'pr. K. Mai. Brundisio'; so that Cicero must have been at Brundisium until the 29th, if the date of the letter is correct, — and of its correctness there is adequate evidence. Elsewhere in the letter (§ 2) he says he stayed at Brundisium thirteen days. Now in a letter to Atticus (*III. vii.*), written from Brundisium at this time, he says he reached that town April 17. He must therefore have stayed until the 29th. Moreover the letter to Atticus, like the one to Terentia, is dated 'pr. Kal. Mai.'; and in a subsequent (apparently his next) letter to Atticus (*III. viii.*, from Thessalonica, May 29) he refers to the Brundisium letter, — as the context plainly shows, — with the words 'Brundisii *proficiscens* scripseram ad te,' etc.

It is clear then that either (1) Cicero's departure was postponed, after he had set it down in the letter to his family as 'a. d. v K. Mai.', and that the last part of the letter — perhaps only the subscription — was added on the day of his departure; or that (2) he embarked on the 26th, returned, and finally set sail on the 29th; or else (3) he did not write what is in our manuscripts. The first of these possible hypotheses is inadmissible, because Cicero's statement that he stayed at Brundisium thirteen days (*i.e.* till the twenty-ninth) occurs *earlier* in the letter than the passage in which his departure is set down for the twenty-sixth. The second, which was held by Orelli and others, is still advocated, against recent editors, by Ger. Rauschen, in his

Ephemerides Tullianae.¹ It is based on the statement of Plutarch² that Cicero, after sailing out to sea on his way to Dyrrachium, was driven back to port by contrary winds. The theory is that he wrote the letters to Terentia and Atticus on shipboard, at the time of his second departure, and that the date of leaving Brundisium, as given in the letter to Terentia, is correct, being the date of his embarkation. This theory has little probability. What Plutarch says is this: *κάκειθεν* (i.e. from Brundisium) *εἰς Δυρράχιον ἀνέμῳ φορῶν περαιούμενος, ἀντιπνεύσαντος πελαγίου μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐπαλινδρόμησεν, εἰτ' αὖθις ἀνήχθη*, — which does not give the impression that the biographer had in mind a detention of three days. But the contents of the letters themselves furnish the strongest refutation of this theory. They are not written hastily, nor as if the writer were seizing an unexpected opportunity. The one to Terentia is a parting letter, in which many necessary matters of business are discussed; Cicero informs her of his plans for his journey, and of his wishes in regard to her following him in certain contingencies; he offers her such comfort as he can in his own distress, and closes with a most affectionate farewell to her and to each of the children. We are required to suppose that, having these feelings, and these matters of importance to communicate to his wife, Cicero left Brundisium, after staying there nine days, without writing to her at all, and only wrote when he found himself, after sailing away, unexpectedly back in port again. The reason he postponed writing till the end of his stay appears in § 5 of the letter: he had been waiting for letters from her. The letter to Atticus is still more difficult to reconcile with this theory. It was in answer to two letters from Atticus, in which the latter invited Cicero to go to his place in Epirus. Cicero expresses himself as undecided, but he had practically made up his mind to take the more northern road, and he *urges Atticus to make haste and follow him*. This was no new desire on his part, as we shall see; it was the burden of every letter written to Atticus since he began his journey. He had given up the hope; but his unexpected stay at Brundisium revived it, and I cannot believe he left that town and Italy without urging it on his friend once more. Finally, Cicero says in his letter to Terentia (§ 2), that he stayed thirteen days, not only 'at Brundisium,' — which might

¹ Page 26.² *Cic.* 32.

perhaps be held to be consistent with the supposition that during some of those days he was on board ship in the harbor,—but, 'at the house of M. Laenius Flaccus,' which was a country-place outside the walls.

We are therefore relegated to the third possible solution of the difficulty, and recent editors are no doubt right in changing the date of the departure from Brundisium, as given in the letter to Terentia, to 'a. d. 11 K. Mai.', a substitute for the usual 'pridie' attested by inscriptions,¹ but so rare that a mediaeval scholar or scribe may well have believed it did not exist, and so have corrected it on the theory that *ii* was a clerical error for *u*; or the change may of course have been quite accidental.

A singular feature of one of the two letters discussed above may be noticed here. In the letter to Atticus, though it was written on the day Cicero was to embark, and contains an urgent request to Atticus to overtake him in Greece, there is no intimation of any kind that he was to embark that day. To explain the omission we cannot have recourse to the supposition that Cicero had given Atticus this very necessary information in a previous letter; for in this letter Cicero replies to letters received from Atticus on and soon after his arrival, in a way that shows that he had not before written to Atticus from Brundisium. In the anguish which Cicero was suffering at the time, it is of course possible that the omission was an oversight on his part; but in view of the condition of our manuscripts of the correspondence and of Cicero's earnest desire to have Atticus overtake him, it is more probable that the oversight was that of some sleepy mediaeval scribe and not Cicero's. There is moreover a place in the letter where the missing statement would fill a very palpable gap in the sense. In § 3, after dwelling at great length on his own wretched plight, Cicero turns to the state of affairs at Rome and replies to Atticus' words of encouragement in this wise: 'De re publica video te conligere omnia quae putes aliquam spem mihi posse adferre mutandarum rerum; quae, quamquam exigua sunt, tamen, quoniam placet, exspectemus. Tu *nihilo minus*, si properaris, nos consequere; nam aut accedemus in Epirum aut tarde per Candaviam ibimus.' To what does *nihilo minus* refer? Boot explains: 'Cogitatione addas *etsi Romae es*';

¹ Cf. *CIL*. I. 1539 b, with Mommsen's note.

but surely this is forced. There is really no satisfactory explanation to be found in the preceding sentence, as the text stands. And how *could* Cicero, urging Atticus to make haste and overtake him, omit to say at this point that he was to begin the journey, of which he gives the route, on that very day? I am satisfied that the editors should indicate a lacuna here.

Of the letters written by Cicero on his way to Brundisium there are six preserved (*ad Att.* III. I.–VI.). They are all brief, and, with the exception of the first, hasty notes to Atticus. The latest of them, *Ep.* VI., bears the subscription ‘data XIII Kal. Maias de Tarentino.’ The correctness of this date has been questioned on the ground that, in his next letter to Atticus (III. VII. I), Cicero names this as the day on which he arrived at Brundisium. But there is no real difficulty here. The distance from Tarentum to Brundisium, forty-four Roman miles on a good road, — the *via Appia*, — ‘could be easily covered in a single day. Cicero’s actual journey was probably somewhat shorter, as he spent the preceding night, judging by the subscription of *Ep.* VI., at a country house in the *ager Tarentinus*; and he did not enter Brundisium, but stopped at the house of Flaccus, in the suburbs.¹ Assuming, then, that the dates are correct, Cicero wrote *Ep.* VI. on the morning of April 17, before setting out on the day’s journey. The character and tone of the letter are quite in keeping with composition under such circumstances. It is a hasty note, which one would suppose to have been written at the last moment before his departure, expressing, as it does, his final abandonment of the hope that Atticus would overtake him at Tarentum or at Brundisium. From this it appears, further, that he expected to embark immediately on reaching the seaport, and did not anticipate the hospitable reception given him by Flaccus, who kept him thirteen days, so that, as we have seen, his hopes of seeing Atticus revived.

Of Cicero’s journey from Rome to Tarentum this much is certain : (1) that he was undecided in his plans, because he was uncertain whether he could have the company of Atticus, whose advice he

¹ ‘Brundisium veni, vel potius ad moenia accessi. . . . In hortos me M. Laenii Flacci contuli.’ *pro Planc.* 97.

desired, and whose protection he needed if he should go to Epirus, on account of its proximity to the Catilinarian conspirators then living in exile in Greece, and also because he was not yet informed of the precise terms of the *rogatio* by which he was to be outlawed; (2) that in this uncertainty he went to the house of a friend of his named Sica, near Vibo, in Bruttium, choosing this as a place from which he could still go to Brundisium, if Atticus should join him (*ad Att.* III. II. 'intellegebam ex eo loco, si te haberem, posse me Brundisium referre, sine te autem non esse nobis illas partes tenendas propter Autronium'); otherwise he would go to Sicily¹ or Malta²; (3) that on hearing of the final form of the *rogatio*, he hastily left Vibo for Brundisium. Beyond this the particulars of the journey are subject to much doubt, which involves the order of the five letters written on the journey (*ad Att.* III. I.-v.) and, consequently, their interpretation. It is universally agreed that the letters were not written in the order in which they stand in our manuscripts; but what the original order was is a question still in dispute. Manutius concluded that the order of composition was as follows:

III. II. IV. I. V.

and this arrangement has been accepted by Wieland, Schütz, Orelli, Billerbeck, Boot, and Tyrrell. Hofmann advocated,³ and adopted in his edition, this order:

I. III. IV. V. II.

which is retained by Lehmann in the latest revised edition (1892). Rauschen's⁴ order is:

I. V. II. III. IV.

Only two of the letters are dated. *Ep.* II. bears the subscription 'data VI Idus Apriles naris luc.'; *Ep.* v. has 'data VIII Idus April. thuri.' In the former 'naris luc.' is corrected by Klotz to 'Narib. Luc.,' by Boot to 'ad Naris Luc.' Nares Lucanae, as the name of a place, occurs in the Vatican fragment of Sallust's Histories (VI. 13), where it is mentioned as beyond the *iuga Picentina* and *Eburina*. The *ager Picentinus* extended thirty Roman miles from Salernum to

¹ *pro Planc.* 95.

² *ad Att.* III. IV.

³ *Philologus* XIII. p. 645.

⁴ *Ephem. Tull.* p. 7.

the Silarus, according to Pliny (*N. H.* III. 70), who also mentions (*ib.* 98) the Eburini as an inland Lucanian people. This agrees with the Tabula Peutingeriana, where Nares Lucanae is set down at a point about nine miles beyond the Silarus, on the road from Salernum to Acerronia (the *via Popilia*, according to Kiepert).

With the identity of Nares Lucanae thus satisfactorily established, and assuming that in *Ep.* v. Cicero employs the singular form *Thurium*¹ for the more usual plural *Thurii*,—or else that he really wrote 'Thuriis,'—it becomes clear at once that the dates of *Ep.* II. and v. cannot both be right, since no rational plan of Cicero's journey can be made out which places him at Nares Lucanae two days *after* he was at Thurii, which is about 115 miles farther south. Rauschen,² following a suggestion of Nissen, would reconcile the dates by changing 'Thuri' in *Ep.* v. to 'Ehuri,' the name of a town in Campania near the Lucanian border, about fifteen miles west of Nares Lucanae. Klotz and Wesenberg, on the other hand, met the difficulty by changing the date of *Ep.* v. to 'IIII Idus April.,' a conjecture³ which, as we shall see, has much to recommend it.

But leaving, for the present, the consideration of these uncertain dates, let us examine the evidence which the letters themselves furnish. It is obvious, to begin with, that *Ep.* III. preceded *Ep.* IV., because in *Ep.* III. Cicero announces his purpose to go to Vibo ('te oro ut ad me Vibonem statim venias, quo ego multis de causis converti iter meum'), whereas *Ep.* IV. begins: 'Miserae nostrae potius velim quam inconstantiae tribuas quod a Vibone, quo te arcessebam, subito discessimus,' and was therefore written after he had left Vibo. It is clear to me, further, that *Ep.* III. was written before *Ep.* II., where all critics but Rauschen place it. In *Ep.* III. the plan of going to Vibo is evidently announced for the first time, with only a hasty and vague intimation of the reasons for the change of programme ('multis de causis'), whereas in *Ep.* II. Cicero appears to assume that Atticus is already informed of the change of route; he does not so much as mention Vibo, but proceeds at once to explain why he had decided to go there ('Itineris nostri causa fuit quod non habebam locum ubi pro meo iure diutius esse possem

¹ See *Mela* II. 68, and cf. *Θεοपुर*, *Ptol.* III. 1. 10.

² Page 22. ³ First made by Corradi.

quam in fundo Sicae, praesertim nondum rogatione correcta, et simul intellegebam ex eo loco,' etc., as quoted above). Again, in *Ep.* III. he says: 'Scilicet eo si veneris, de toto itinere ac fuga mea consilium capere potero'; and in *Ep.* II. he evidently refers to these words when he writes: 'Nunc, *ut ad te antea scripsi*, si ad nos veneris, consilium totius rei capiemus.'

So far most critics are agreed: *Ep.* III. preceded II. as well as IV. What then is the relation of II. and IV. to one another? Hofmann¹ tried to prove that IV. was written before II., from the way in which Cicero alludes in the two letters to the amendment which was made to the *rogatio* for his banishment in the interval between its promulgation and its enactment. The *rogatio* in question was the second of the two which Clodius proposed against him, banishing him by name; and the amendment, the insertion of which appears to have been secured by the influence of Cicero's friends and the interposition of the triumvirs, so far mitigated the severity of the original proposition as to prescribe a limit of distance, beyond which the exile might live unmolested. The precise terms of this amendment were first reported to Cicero when he was at Vibo, and it was this information that led to his sudden departure from that place, according to his account of the matter in *Ep.* IV.: 'a Vibone . . . subito discessimus; adlata est enim nobis rogatio de perniciē mea, in qua quod correctum esse audieramus erat eiusmodi, ut mihi ultra quadringenta milia liceret esse.' The amendment is also mentioned in *Ep.* II., where (in the part of the letter already quoted), as an additional reason for going to Vibo, Cicero says 'praesertim nondum rogatione correctā.' Hofmann's contention was that this last is an allusion to the amendment as something already familiar, whereas in *Ep.* IV. Cicero has just heard of it; hence IV. was written before II. This view is in direct conflict with the evidence which establishes the location of Nares Lucanae; for if *Ep.* II. was written after IV., it was written on the way from Vibo to Tarentum; and accordingly Hofmann held that 'naris luc.' was a corruption of the name of some place in that region.² But without pressing this point, there is evidence in the letter itself that it was written on the way *to*, not *from* Vibo. As Rauschen points out, the opening words of the

¹ *Philol.* I.I.

² Page 655.

letter — ‘*Itineris nostri causa fuit,*’ with no mention of the place the writer was going to — can only refer to the journey he was on at the time of writing; and the context shows he was going to Vibo. Furthermore, I have shown above that in his appeal to Atticus, in this letter, to come to him, he recalls his previous request to the same effect in *Ep.* III., where he expressly asks him to come to Vibo; and the deprecating tone in which he conveys the request in *Ep.* II. (‘*iter esse molestum scio, sed calamitas omnes molestias habet*’) is natural enough in reference to the journey to an out of the way place like Vibo, but was not likely to be said of the journey to Brundisium, which Atticus frequently made, on his way to Greece.

Hofmann’s view, then, of the order of *Epp.* II. and IV. is clearly untenable, and the interpretation of ‘*nondum rogatione correcta*’ in II. must be that Cicero at that time had heard that there was prospect of a mitigating amendment to the *rogatio*, the precise form of which he did not learn until he reached Vibo.

On the other hand, Hofmann was certainly right in abandoning the view of the older editors that *Ep.* I. was written after III., II., and IV. The ground for this view, as I understand it, is that in *Ep.* I. Cicero is planning to go to Brundisium, which he did not actually do until after he had gone to Vibo, and had written *Epp.* III., II., and IV.; and his own subsequent account of the matter in the speech for Plancius¹ is cited to show that his first plan was to go to Vibo and Sicily. Cicero’s words in the speech certainly do give this impression: ‘*Ex illo incendio legum iuris senatus bonorum omnium cedens, cum mea domus ardore suo deflagrationem urbi atque Italiae toti minaretur, nisi quievissem, Siciliam petivi animo,*’ — for reasons which he goes on to state. The letters, however, must be accepted as better evidence than a highly rhetorical passage in a speech delivered four years later; and *Ep.* II., as we have seen, shows that even when he had turned his course towards Vibo, Cicero had not wholly given up his plan of going to Greece, — that he chose Vibo as a place from which he could still go to Brundisium, if Atticus should join him. And there is nothing really inconsistent with this in Cicero’s later account, which must be interpreted in the light of his immediate purpose. He is replying to his antagonist’s taunt,

¹ *pro Planc.* 95 f.

that he had not been in any real danger while in exile; his object, in the passage in question, is to depict in the gloomiest colors the reign of terror which prevailed at the time of his banishment, as evidence of which he cites the fact that his friend Vergilius, who governed Sicily that year, was afraid to permit him to come to the island; and he has no occasion to say anything about the uncertainty of purpose which distracted him on his journey.

This uncertainty is apparent in *Ep.* i., as well as in those that follow. He has made up his mind to leave Italy, but how and whither he is not certain, though the route by Brundisium is evidently uppermost in his thought. He asks Atticus to follow him, 'ut, cum ex Italia profecti essemus, sive per Epirum iter esset faciendum, tuo tuorumque praesidio uteremur, sive aliud quid agendum esset, certum consilium de tua sententia capere possemus.' The tone of this request to Atticus is significant: 'Cum antea maxime nostra interesse arbitrabamur te esse nobiscum, tum vero, ut legi rogationem, intellexi ad iter id quod constitui, nihil mihi optatius cadere posse quam ut tu me quam primum consequerere.' This is the quiet language of a first request, in marked contrast with the almost feverish urgency with which it is reiterated in the other letters. Another point to be noticed is that Cicero has not yet entered on his journey; it is as yet 'iter id quod constitui'; and, further, that the determining cause of the journey is the new *rogatio*, of which Cicero has now received a copy.

These considerations seem conclusive in favor of *Ep.* i. as in its proper place at the head of the series; and it seems to me quite certain that the order of *Epp.* i.-iv. was i., iii., ii., iv. Of *Ep.* v. it is not possible to speak so confidently. The Nissen-Rauschen conjecture of 'Ehuri' for 'Thuri' will not bear examination. Cicero no doubt passed through Eburum on his journey to Vibo. But on this journey, as he distinctly intimates in *Ep.* ii., he had no place where he could stay any length of time; and Rauschen's theory keeps him in the neighborhood of Eburum and Nares Lucanae, which are only three hours apart, two whole days. Moreover in *Ep.* v. Cicero has got so far on his journey that Atticus, unless he has already set out from Rome, can no longer overtake him ('si enim es Romae, iam me adsequi non potes; sin es in via, cum eris

me adsecutus, coram agemus quae erunt agenda'). Obviously Cicero could not have written in this way just *before* the urgent and unqualified request which we find in *Ep.* II. Again, if *Ep.* v. preceded II., it preceded III. also; for III. and II., as I have shown, are closely connected, and v. could not have come between them. In other words, if v. was written before II., it was written before Cicero's decision to go to Vibo, and 'Thuri' is a corruption, not of 'Eburi,' but of the name of some place farther north, where Cicero was still thinking of going to Greece. This is not impossible; but it is — quite apart from any question of the text — very improbable. For at this stage of his journey, as appears from *Epp.* I. and II., Cicero had no mind to go to Greece without Atticus; whereas in *Ep.* v. he clearly intimates that he must go on without Atticus, unless Atticus is already on the road.

If 'Thuri' in the subscription of *Ep.* v. is right, the letter was probably written by Cicero on his way to Vibo. Thurii was more than 300 miles from Rome, and Vibo about 85 miles further. Consequently, if the letter reached Atticus at Rome, Cicero would have to wait for him at Vibo at least twelve or fifteen days, which was no doubt longer than he expected, in view of the impending *rogatio*, to be able to stay there; so that the words which I have quoted from the letter, in regard to Atticus overtaking him, fit the situation exactly. It is true that Cicero passed Thurii again on his way from Vibo to Brundisium, — for we know he made this journey also by land¹; and the words quoted would be equally true if written on this occasion. But Cicero had written on the eve of his departure from Vibo, urging Atticus to make haste and overtake him at Brundisium, and this letter (*Ep.* IV.), even if sent, as it probably was, by special courier, travelled to Thurii by the same road as Cicero, and could not have left that town many hours before his arrival there. It is not probable that, under the circumstances, he would care to send a second letter so soon after, — and all the less so because even the Vibo letter had really little chance, owing to the great distance it had to be sent, the suddenness of Cicero's change of plan, and the rapid rate at which he was now travelling, of effecting its purpose. Cicero's hope in writing it must have been that it would meet Atticus

¹ *pro Planc.* 96.

well advanced on his journey through Lucania, or else in the neighborhood of Calatia, where the Appian diverges from the southern road, so that he could press forward by the former route with no loss of time, — or, still better, that Atticus had decided not to go to Vibo at all, and was already beyond Calatia on his way to Brundisium and Epirus. This last appears to have been the hope Cicero clung to longest, and finally abandoned on leaving Tarentum (*Ep.* vi.).

These indications, which we shall find confirmed by a more minute examination of dates and distances, point to the conclusion that *Ep.* v. was written before iv., so that the order of the series was

I. III. II. V. IV.

Let us now see what sort of an itinerary we can construct for Cicero on the basis of the dates of *Ep.* ii. and v., which, as we have observed, cannot both be right, but have to be reckoned with as part of the evidence in the case.

If Cicero wrote *Ep.* v. at Thurii on the date it bears (April 6), and was on his way southward, he must have left Nares Lucanae as early as April 4 (*pridie Nonas*), if we assume that he travelled at the rate of forty or fifty Roman miles a day,¹ the distance being about 115 miles. If he wrote it April 6, on his way back from Vibo, he would have had to leave Nares Lucanae on the first of April, or earlier if we allow him more than a single night at Vibo, the whole distance travelled being about 285 miles. It follows then that, in order to retain the date of *Ep.* v. we should have to change 'Idus' in the date of *Ep.* ii. to 'Nonas' or 'Kalendas,' a change too violent to be thought of. We must therefore, it seems, abandon the manuscript date of *Ep.* v.

The change of a numeral, on the other hand, is a very common error. If, then, we retain 'Idus' in the dates of the two letters, and assume that *some* numeral stood before it, the earliest day on which *Ep.* ii. could have been written is April 6 (*viii Idus*, the day after the Nones); and the latest possible date for *Ep.* v. is April 11 (*iii Idus*), or perhaps April 12 (*ii Idus*, for *pridie Idus*). If Cicero left Nares Lucanae April 8 (*vi Idus*, the manuscript date of *Ep.* ii.), he could not have reached Thurii, on his way *back* from Vibo, before

¹ See Friedländer, *Sittengesch.* II.⁶ p. 22; Ruete, *die Correspondenz Ciceros*, p. 121.

the thirteenth. If he left Nares Lucanae on the morning of April 6, he could, by steady travelling and stopping at Vibo only one night, have got back to Thurii by the eleventh. He must then, however, have spent five days (April 12 to 16) on the road from Thurii to Tarentum, a distance of only 90 miles, or else have stayed some days at Tarentum, — both impossible suppositions in view of the haste with which we know, from *Epp.* iv. and vi., that he was travelling at this time.

On the other hand, the theory that Cicero wrote *Ep.* v. at Thurii on his way *south* presents no serious difficulties. If he wrote *Ep.* ii. on the morning of April 8 (the manuscript date), on his departure from Nares Lucanae, he could reach Thurii (115 miles) comfortably in the afternoon or evening of the tenth (IIII Idus, as Klotz and Wesenberg propose for the date of *Ep.* v.). Leaving Thurii the next morning he could easily reach Vibo (85 miles) before evening on the twelfth; and we have four days (April 13 to 16) for the journey of 175 miles from Vibo to Tarentum. As this allows him, however, only one night at Vibo, it seems to me more probable that he left Nares Lucanae a day or two earlier, and that the date of *Ep.* ii. should be VII or VIII (instead of VI) Idus Apr. If he left April 7 (VII Idus), he would be at Thurii on the *morning* of the tenth, — so that we could still keep the Klotz-Wesenberg date of *Ep.* v., which is in itself a probable correction of the manuscript reading, — and he would have two nights and one day at Vibo.

Epistle III., in which Cicero first informs Atticus of his decision to go to Vibo, was written, we may assume, as soon as possible after that decision was reached. It could not have been written more than a day or two before *Ep.* ii., for it was evidently fresh in Cicero's mind when he wrote *Ep.* ii., which is in the nature of a supplement to it, a fuller explanation of what he had stated in *Ep.* iii. hastily and briefly. This would indicate that *Ep.* iii. was written on the road, from 40 to 90 miles before reaching Nares Lucanae, *i.e.* in Campania, in the neighborhood of Nuceria, if written one day before *Ep.* ii., or of Capua, if written two days before. The use of the perfect ('quo ego *converti* iter meum') does not, of course, imply in epistolary idiom whether the writer has yet passed the parting of the ways (at Calatia) or not; but the phrase does imply that he was on the road, and that

he had not yet passed that point *when the decision was reached*, inasmuch as it was a decision not to go to Brundisium. For that he would have gone to Brundisium by the Appian road we are entitled to infer from *Ep.* I., in which Atticus is urged to make haste and overtake him without any express mention of the route, but with the distinct implication that Atticus would soon set out for Epirus on his own affairs; and he would presumably go to Brundisium by the ordinary way. This makes it probable that Cicero came into Campania by the Appian or the Latin road, rather than that he set out on this journey from a point further south, — for example, his Pompeian villa, which was only about ten miles from Nuceria.

It appears, then, that Cicero had not advanced very far on his journey when he wrote *Ep.* III., announcing his decision to go to Vibo; and *Ep.* I., which was apparently written when he was making his preparations for the journey, could not, in view of the short distances involved, have preceded it by many days. We are safe in concluding that *Ep.* I. was written after the first of April.

For the date of Cicero's departure from Rome we have no better clue than is afforded by Caesar's statement about his own departure and his arrival in Gaul (*B. G.* I. 6. 4 and 7. 1), from which we learn that the day appointed by the Helvetians for assembling on the banks of the Rhone, preliminary to their migration into Gaul, was March 28; and that Caesar, on being informed of their purpose, hastened his departure from the city, and travelling as rapidly as he could, reached Geneva in time to destroy the bridge there before the Helvetians had seized it. Plutarch says¹ Caesar reached the Rhone in eight days, which is not at all incredible, and is probably the same feat of rapid travelling that Suetonius² records.

It is not absolutely necessary to suppose that Caesar, in order to check the Helvetian irruption, reached Geneva by March 28, and hence had left Rome by March 20. In all movements of large bodies of men, especially when not well organized, accompanied by women and children, and hampered with household goods and cattle, there are sure to be delays; and the Helvetians were perhaps not on the Rhone in any great numbers for some days after the time

¹ *Caes.* 17.

² *Jul.* 57. See Friedländer, *l. l.*

appointed. We cannot, however, suppose that Caesar arrived much later than March 28, because, for the line of fortification which he proceeded to build along the nineteen miles of river-bank from Geneva to the Jura, he allowed only until April 13. Modern engineers assure us that the bank, along most of this distance, is strong enough by nature, and that with the men at Caesar's disposal the rest of it could be fortified in a few days; but Caesar could hardly have known this in advance, and the question is not how much time the work took, but how much time he allowed for it in putting off his reply to the Helvetian envoys. Caesar's other purpose in putting them off, to gain time to collect the troops he had ordered from the province, must also be considered.

On the whole, then, Caesar's departure from Rome is not likely to have been much after March 20; nor is it likely to have been much before that date, or there would have been no reason for the furious haste with which he made the journey.

Caesar, as is well known, lingered before the gates during the discussion of Clodius' first *rogatio* against Cicero, and he did not leave for his province, Plutarch says,¹ until Cicero had been driven out.² It follows, then, that Cicero's departure must have been about March 20 or earlier.

There is no evidence that Caesar stayed near Rome until Clodius' first *rogatio* was passed; and this, in fact, appears to have occurred some days later than March 20. The common statement in modern writers, that Clodius passed his law on the very day on which Cicero left Rome, is not borne out by Cicero's words in the speech for Sestius,³ on which it is based. Cicero's main purpose here was to set forth the infamous conduct of the consuls Gabinius and Piso. 'Sed ut revertar ad illud quod mihi in hac omni est oratione propositum, omnibus malis illo anno scelere consulum rem publicam esse confectam' are his introductory words; and he goes on to tell how 'illo ipso die, qui mihi funestus fuit, omnibus bonis luctuosus, cum ego me e complexu patriae conspectuque vestro eripuissem, et

¹ *Caes.* 14 fin.

² 'Out of Italy' Plutarch says; but this is of course inaccurate, as Cicero did not leave Italy till the end of April.

³ *pro Sest.* 53.

... furori hominis sceleri perfidiae telis minisque cessissem, ... illo inquam ipso die, — die dico? immo hora atque etiam puncto temporis eodem mihi reiue publicae perniciēs, Gabinio et Pisoni provincia rogata est.' This means that the two *rogationes*, one directed against Cicero, the other assigning the consular provinces, were passed at the same comitia; and that, when this was done, Cicero had already left Rome. To interpret 'illo ipso die' etc. as referring to the day of Cicero's departure would carry us too far; for it would prove that his departure was at the very hour of the comitia,¹ whereas Plutarch says² it was about midnight, and this is altogether likely under the circumstances.

It is intrinsically probable that Cicero would not wait till the day of the *rogatio*. Having made up his mind to yield, he would withdraw early enough to get to a safe distance when the storm broke. And it seems necessary to suppose that the *rogatio* was passed some days later than March 20, to account for the fact that Cicero did not begin the journey we have been discussing until April. Clodius probably let a few days go by, after passing his first *rogatio*, before promulgating the second, in which outlawry was pronounced against Cicero by name. Cicero's departure was unexpected, and required a change of programme on the part of his enemies, which must have called for some consultation. The second *rogatio* had been recently received by Cicero when he wrote *Ep.* I., which, as we have seen, was probably written early in April. I am inclined to think, therefore, that the first *rogatio* was passed as late as, say, March 23, and the second promulgated three or four days later. The second could then not come to a vote, allowing for the required interval of a *trinundinum*, until April 20, after the end of the Cerealia. This is quite in keeping with what we have learned of Cicero's hasty departure from Vibo, 'ante diem rogationis' (*Ep.* iv.).

Cicero left Rome in the night, we are told, escorted by a number of his friends and their servants,³ in addition to a considerable retinue⁴ of his own clients, freedmen, and slaves, who accompanied

¹ Cf. also *pro Sest.* 44: 'consules . . . qui eandem horam meae pestis et suorum praemiorum esse voluissent'; and *post Red. in Sen.* 17, 18.

² *Cic.* 31 fin. ³ *Plut. Cic. l.l.*; *Appian, B. C.* II. 15. ⁴ *ad Att.* III. xix. 1.

him into exile. What road he took and where he went, we are not informed. He had houses of his own at Antium, Formiae, and Pompeii, for which he would take the Appian, and at Tusculum and Arpinum, for which he would take the Latin road. Of all these, Arpinum, where two country-seats of his brother Quintus were also open to him, would seem the most natural retreat for him to seek at this time. Tusculum and Antium were too near Rome, and the Formianum — which lay close to the main thoroughfare of the Appian road, and was soon after destroyed by the mob¹ — was probably deemed unsafe. The objections to the Pompeianum have been already stated.² Arpinum, on the other hand, was two days' journey from Rome; it was fifteen miles away from the Latin road; it was Cicero's native town, and its citizens were thoroughly friendly to him. Still, the place of Cicero's retreat must remain a matter of conjecture. Drumann³ adduces as definite evidence that Cicero went to the neighborhood of Arpinum, the narrative in the *de Divinatione*⁴ of the dream he had about Marius 'in villa quadam campi Atinatis,' in which he stayed overnight in his flight. Atina in Latium, which Drumann thinks is referred to here, was a town in the hill country, about ten miles east of Arpinum, in the neighboring valley of the Melpis. There might conceivably have been some reason why Cicero should select this place as a *retreat*, rather than his own house or his brother's, so near at hand; but Cicero was on his journey at the time he had the dream, and it is difficult to see why he should turn aside to such an out of the way place, when it was necessary to push forward rapidly ('quamquam iter instaret'⁵). The district of Atina is called by Cicero elsewhere⁶ 'praefectura Atinas,' nowhere 'campus'; whereas the name 'campus Atinas' is given by Pliny⁷ to a district in Lucania, where, in the neighborhood of the modern Atena, the underground river mentioned by Pliny is still shown to travellers. This was no doubt Cicero's first stopping-place beyond Nares Lucanae, from which it was distant about 25 miles. Here the journey *was* pressing, as it certainly was not in the first days after Cicero had withdrawn from the city.

¹ *ad Att.* IV. II. 5, 7.² Page 77.³ *Gesch. Roms*, V. p. 639.⁴ I. 59; II. 137, 140. The story is repeated by Valerius Max. I. 7. 5.⁵ *de Div.* I. 59.⁶ *pro Planc.* 19.⁷ *N. H.* II. 225.

For Cicero's decision to withdraw was made in the confident anticipation, in which he was encouraged (or, as he afterwards bitterly complained, into which he was betrayed) by his friends,¹ that the fury of the storm to which he had bowed would soon be spent, and that he would be gloriously recalled, — some went so far as to say, within a few days.² This explains the fact that he did not begin his journey to southern Italy until April. He withdrew to a safe distance to await the turn of events in the city. While thus waiting he received a copy of the second *rogatio*, which must have been promulgated towards the end of March, and which put an entirely new face on the situation. The previous law had provided in general terms that 'qui civem Romanum indemnatum interemisset, ei aqua et igni interdiceretur.'³ The new bill, as first promulgated, pronounced banishment and outlawry against Cicero by name, and as an accomplished fact ('ut M. Tullio aqua et igni *interdictum sit*'⁴), making it lawful for anyone to kill him anywhere within the bounds of the empire, and further imposing a penalty on anyone who should give him food and shelter.⁵ He must have heard, moreover, of the destruction and pillage of his Palatine house and Tusculan villa, which followed the passage of the first law.⁶ It was obvious that he must seek a more distant retreat, one outside of Italy at least; and he accordingly makes his arrangements for the long journey.

The results of our discussion may be most conveniently summed up by tracing now in their proper order the successive stages of this journey.

Cicero withdrew from Rome about March 20 or somewhat earlier, and retired probably to Arpinum or some other place in southern Latium. The passage of Clodius' first law against him followed a few days later, between March 20 and 25; and this in turn was followed by the promulgation, towards the end of the month, of the second law, banishing Cicero by name. On receiving the draft of this law Cicero prepared to seek a more distant retreat. His destination is not at first settled in his mind. But he knows he

¹ Plut. *Cic.* 31; *ad Att.* III. vii. 2, and the following letters, *passim*; *de Dom.* 64.

² *ad Q. F. I.* iv. 4.

³ Vell. Pat. II. 45. 1.

⁴ *de Dom.* 47.

⁵ *de Dom.* 51, 85; *ad Fam.* XIV. iv. 2.

⁶ *de Dom.* 62.

must leave Italy, and his plan, so far as he has one, is to sail from Brundisium. Before setting out he writes to Atticus (*Ep.* i.), urging him to join him as soon as possible: if he should travel through Epirus, he needed Atticus' protection; if some other course should appear more expedient, he needed Atticus' advice to help him to a right decision; and it could not inconvenience Atticus much to come, since he must soon be ready to go to Epirus on his own account. Cicero then began his journey, early in April.

In the course of his journey through Campania he decided not to go to Brundisium at once, but to go to Vibo; and he sent Atticus a hasty note (*Ep.* iii.) announcing this change of plan. In a subsequent letter (*Ep.* ii.), written about April 7 at Nares Lucanae, nine miles beyond the Lucanian border, he explains the purpose of this new move. He had heard of the efforts which his friends in Rome were making to mitigate the severity of the new *rogatio*; and it is evident that he hoped for something better than the amendment that was finally conceded, — some provision that would permit him to live nearer Italy, if not within it. He was going to Vibo, he says, because his friend Sica's was a place where he had a claim to stay longer than he had anywhere else, 'especially as the *rogatio* was not yet amended.' Vibo was chosen for the further reason that if Atticus overtook him, he could go to Brundisium (and so to Epirus), but otherwise he dare not go there, on account of the proximity of his enemies. The alternative — which, however, he does not mention in this letter — was to go to Sicily or Malta.

His next stopping-place was a country-house in the neighborhood of Atina (or Atinum), where he lay awake most of the night, and in the early morning had his dream about Marius. At Thurii he was probably overtaken by a letter from his family, for he sent from there another letter to Atticus (*Ep.* v.), conveying to him Terentia's expression of gratitude for Atticus' kindness to her. He still hopes that Atticus will overtake him, but he sees that this is no longer possible, unless Atticus is already on the way.

He reached Sica's place near Vibo about April 11. Here he received, probably within a day or two after his arrival, despatches from Rome, announcing definitely the terms of the amendment, which set the limit within which he was to be outlawed at four

hundred miles from Italy.¹ This excluded Sicily and Malta, and made it necessary for him to revert to his first plan of going to the East; and he felt it necessary to get away at once, before the day appointed for enacting the law ('ante diem rogationis'), so that his entertainers should not be liable to its penalties. He accordingly writes to Atticus (*Ep.* iv.), once more urging him to push on and join him,² and then sets out from Vibo with a heavy heart, and not without apprehension as to the reception he will meet with on the way ('adhuc invitamur benigne, sed quod superest timemus'). He afterwards boasted of the devotion shown him on this journey by the towns between Vibo and Brundisium, and the provision they made, 'magno cum suo metu,' for his safety.³ He no doubt exaggerates the danger in his oratorical reminiscences; but the contemporary evidence of the letters shows that he travelled in haste and in some alarm for his safety. He spent the night of the sixteenth in the


¹ Not from *Rome*, as Drumann, Lange, and others state it, following Dio XXXVIII. 17. 7. Cf. *ad Att.* III. VII. 1: 'veremur ne interpretentur illud quoque oppidum (*sc.* Athenas) ab Italia non satis abesse.' There could be no question of Athens being sufficiently far from Rome, the distance by air line being about 700 miles. Plutarch says 'from Italy,' but both he and Dio state the prescribed distance as 500 miles, Dio giving it in stadia ('3750 stadia' = 500 miles, at the rate of $7\frac{1}{2}$ stadia per mile; see Rauschen, p. 23, and Hultsch, *Metrologie*, p. 570).

² In this letter he makes no mention of the reason which he subsequently gave (*pro Planc.* 96) for turning back from Vibo, — that Vergilius refused to allow him to come to Sicily, — nor of the prevalence of storms at sea as the reason for going to Brundisium by land; and in the speech he makes no mention of the 400 mile amendment. The omission of the latter is not so surprising, as it was not necessary to Cicero's purpose in the speech to mention it. But the omission of any reference to Vergilius in the letter is certainly very singular, unless we suppose that Cicero did not receive Vergilius' message till later, and that in the speech he forgot this little circumstance, or ignored it for the purposes of his argument. It is possible, on the other hand, that a line or two about Vergilius may have fallen out at the end of the second sentence of the letter, which would explain the very awkward, if not unintelligible *illo*, with which the third sentence begins; and that what Cicero wrote was something like this: 'Adlata est enim nobis rogatio de pernicie mea, in qua quod correctum esse audieramus erat eiusmodi, ut mihi ultra quadringenta milia liceret esse; (simul litterae a Vergilio nostro, quibus significabat se nolle me in Sicilia esse). Illo cum pervenire non liceret, statim iter Brundisium versus contuli, . . . ne et Sica . . . periret, et quod Melitae esse non licebat.'

³ *pro Planc.* 97.

country near Tarentum. On the seventeenth, before setting out on the day's journey, he posted a brief note to Atticus (*Ep.* vi.), expressing his disappointment at having to give up finally all hope of seeing his friend, and stating his intention to go to Cyzicus or elsewhere in Asia. In the evening of that day he reached the walls of Brundisium, where he met with unexpected hospitality from the Flaccus family, whose guest he remained, in their gardens outside the city, until the twenty-ninth. This postponement of his departure revived his hope that Atticus might overtake him, at least in Greece; but Atticus has in fact remained in Rome during this whole time. Cicero embarked at Brundisium on the twenty-ninth, after writing to his family and to Atticus (*ad Fam.* XIV. iv., *ad Att.* III. vii.), and sailed to Dyrrachium, a voyage of a hundred miles. From Dyrrachium he proceeded by land to Thessalonica, where he arrived on the twenty-third of May.¹

¹ *ad Att.* III. viii. i.



FIVE INTERESTING GREEK IMPERATIVES.

BY JOHN HENRY WRIGHT.¹

1. ΓΙΕΙ. — On many earlier examples of the Attic drinking-vase known as the cylix — datable² toward the close of the sixth century B.C. — occurs a form of the verb πίνω which has long both tempted and baffled explanation. The form is ΓΙΕΙ,³ and it has imperative

¹ This article could hardly have been written but for Paul Kretschmer's *Die Griechischen Vaseninschriften* (1894), an admirable and most suggestive book. Though at various points, as will be seen, I take issue with Kretschmer, it has always been with hesitation; and my debt to him, both for the material he has conveniently gathered and for his lucid treatment of it, cannot be understated.

² Many of these vases, all of which are of the black-figured technique, are signed by masters ("Kleinmeister": e.g. Eucheir son of Ergotimus, Tleson son of Nearchus, Phrynus, Sacontides) whose work is contemporaneous with that of the immediate predecessors of Euphronius; the activity of the latter must now be dated between 510 B.C. and 470 B.C. Cf. Furtwängler, *Arch. Anz.* VI, 1891, p. 70; P. Gardner, *Ashmolean Vases*, p. 8.

³ The form ΓΙΕΙ, which occurs on a fragment of a pinax from the "Perserschutt" of the Athenian acropolis (ἐρι τι πει), and twice on a cylix in the Gregorian Museum in Rome (χαίπε καὶ πει), is only an apparent exception. Perhaps we should write it π'εῖ (not π(δ)ει): see below, p. 93, note.

The only early example of πει on vases known to me is on a cylix by [Eucheir] 'the son of Ergotimus,' χαίπε καὶ πει (Klein, *M. S.*² p. 72). Klein (*ib.*, p. 46) is wrong in writing χαίπε καὶ πει on an oenochoë by Taleides; both Brunn (*Bull. di Inst.* 1845, p. 37) and Gerhard (*Auserl. Vasenb.* IV, 316) read πει (ἐΞΙΓ).

A late example, probably of the third century B.C., if not later, is πει καὶ μὴ δίστα· ἱήσας on a Boeotian oenochoë (Berlin, no. 4087): the letters ε, δ, σ, α are of the late cursive form (Ε, C, etc.). Kretschmer transcribes πει καὶ μὴ δίστα· ἱήσας (p. 5, note 1), probably by a typographical error: the Boeotian epichoric alphabet, in which ψ had the value of χ, can hardly have been used at a date so

force: it is commonly used in the formula *χαίρε καὶ πῖε*, with or without modifiers.¹ The vase itself, or a person with the vase in his hand, appears to be addressing a second person, the recipient of the vase, wishing him health and inviting him, often with much urgency and cordiality, to drink of its contents.² The form seems not to be found except on or in connexion with drinking-vases: hence it probably meant something a little different from the *πῖε* and *πῖθι* usual in literature.

Before we proceed to criticise the explanations hitherto offered, and to suggest our own, there are two determining factors in the question that should be clearly set forth. (1) Inasmuch as the ending is always written -EI and not -E, it is evident — since the alphabet

late as that of this vase. For the juxtaposition of *πῖω* and *δυσώμεθα* compare Her-mippus, *δταν πινώμεθα ἢ δυσώμεθα* (*Fragm.* 25 Kock I. p. 230).

¹ Kretschmer gives the references (pp. 195, 196, 238). The various forms of the phrase thus far registered are: *χαίρε καὶ πῖε*, *χαίρε καὶ πῖε εἶ* (once written *χαίρε καὶ πῖν*), *χαίρε σὺ καὶ πῖε εἶ*, *σὺ χαίρε καὶ πῖε εἶ τοι*, *χαίρε καὶ πῖε τήνδε*, *χαίρε καὶ πῖε νῆ Δί'*, *χαίρε καὶ πῖε μὴν (ν)αίχι* (Brit. Mus. B. 424; in virtue of *χαίρε μὴν* on the reverse of this cylix, I read as above rather than *χαίρε καὶ πῖε με ναίχι*, which has hitherto been read: cf. *εἶγε ναίχι* on a vase of Euthymides, Klein *M. S.*² p. 196. 6). Other forms are *χαίρε καὶ πῖον ἐμέ* (once), *χαίρει καὶ πῖα τήνδε* (twice, on the same vase, in Dresden: *Arch. Anz.* IV, 1889, p. 170), *πῖνε κ(α)λ χαίρει* (once, on a cylix in St. Petersburg: cf. Klein *L. I.* p. 27), and *χαίρε καὶ ΓΙΟΓΟΙ* (a confusion of *πῖον* + *πῖθι*: Kretschmer, p. 238).

² On a cylix bearing the pet-name Dioxippus, and showing the influence of the earlier style of the school of Euphronius, two nude women are figured reclining on cushions and facing each other. The one on the left is blowing the double pipes; the one on the right is extending to her a cylix; while in the field are the words *πῖνε καὶ σὺ* (retrograde). Cf. Klein *L. I.* p. 45 (fig.). The motif of this scene is anticipated on the archaic black-figured oenochoë by Taleides, mentioned above (p. 85; note; see below, p. 93). Here a naked man is seated on a stone at the left, facing to the right and blowing the double pipes; on the right, facing this figure, and likewise seated, is the naked god Dionysus (inscription), who holds on his knees a scyphus without handles (inscribed *Καλ(λ)ίας κα(λ)ός*), to which he appears to be pointing as he says *χαίρε καὶ πῖε*; the letters, written retrograde, are on the red ground between the two figures. — The poet Callias (*Fragm.* 6 Kock, *ap.* Athen. XI, 486 F) represents a person saying *δέξαι τὴνδὶ μετανιπτρίδα τῆς Ὑγίας*, and Athenaeus explains that the *μετάνιπτρον* (*μετανιπτρίς*) was a cylix presented after the dinner, evidently at the beginning of the symposium. On the Berlin cantharus (no. 2872), discussed below, p. 90, between the words *ὕγιαι* and *δέχοι* one may imagine the vase supplied, as it were, speaking its figure.

consistently used in the inscriptions on these vases is the Old Attic — that the diphthong is a genuine one, in which the $-ι$ was an original element ($-\epsilon + ι$), and not the ‘spurious’ diphthong; hence $-ει$ cannot have arisen from contraction ($-\epsilon + \epsilon$). (2) The form not only has imperative force, as the context shows, but is an actual imperative. In *Etymologicum Magnum* 698. 51 (cf. Bergk *P.L.G.*⁴ III, p. 170) we read: Ἔστι καὶ ῥῆμα προστακτικὸν παρὰ Αἰολεῦσιν· οἶον χαῖρε καὶ πῶι,¹ ὅπερ λέγεται . . . σύμποθι. Of course χαῖρε καὶ πῖει and χαῖρε καὶ πῶι are identical in nature. Further: on a cylix in the British Museum (Walters, B. 414: *C.I.G.* IV, 8103) occurs the variant χαῖρε καὶ ΠΙΟ ἐμέ, in which we recognize πῖον, the imperative middle. The expressions πῖνε καὶ χαῖρε,² πῖνε καὶ σύ, along with χαῖρε σύ, occasionally found on these vases, and the custom of using the imperative in invitations to drink, so abundantly illustrated in Athenaeus X, 446, in quotations from Antiphanes, Cratinus, Diphilus, Ameipsias, Menander and Alexis, furnish additional proof, if such were needed, that our form is an imperative.

Most of the former explanations³ do not satisfy one or the other of these two fundamental conditions, and for this reason, if for no other, need only be stated to be dismissed:—

1. Panofka (*Musée Blacas*, p. 48) sees in the form ΠΙΕΙ the second person of the future indicative.

2. The author of the note on *C.I.G.* IV, 8096 (Franz?), remarks, concerning the form, “ex pronuntiatione peculiari explicandum videtur, quod fere scribitur ΠΙΕΙ pro ΠΙΕ, quae vulgo pro forma poetica habetur, nisi mavis πῖει pro futuro habere.” But an explanation based on a peculiar pronunciation⁴ can hardly commend itself to scholars of the present generation.

¹ According to Bergk the reading is χαῖρε καὶ πῶ τάνδε, but the Florentine manuscript of the *Etym. Magnum* (E. Miller, *Mélanges de littérature grecque*, p. 268, cited by Bergk) gives here χαῖρε καὶ πῶι τάνδε, which as the more difficult reading should be retained.

² Panofka, quoted by Jahn (*Einleitung*, p. CXI), cites Alexis to show that χαῖρε was used with the invitation to drink, χαῖρετ' ἄνδρες συμποῖται | ὅσων ἀγαθῶν τὴν κώδικα μεστὴν πλομαί (*Fragm.* 111 Kock, *ap.* Athen. VI, 254 A).

³ Cf. Kretschmer, pp. 195, 196.

⁴ The χαῖρει (for χαῖρε) on the Dresden vase mentioned above, p. 86, n. 1, is perhaps a blunder (note πῖα for πῖον?), unless indeed the final letter contains an

3. Roscher (*Curtius Studien* IV, pp. 194-6), — whom Curtius follows (*Verbum*², I, p. 383), — sees in the word a present imperative formed by contraction on the shorter stem $\pi\epsilon\epsilon$: i.e. $\Gamma\epsilon\epsilon = * \pi\epsilon\epsilon + \epsilon$.

4. Hardly more satisfactory than the foregoing is the explanation of Bergk (*Jahrbh. f. Philol.* CXVII, p. 195), according to which $\pi\epsilon\epsilon$ has arisen from $*\pi\epsilon\epsilon\theta\epsilon$.

5. Kretschmer in 1888 (*Kuhns Zeitschrift* XXIX, p. 481) explained the form as the second person aorist subjunctive middle ($= \pi\acute{\iota}\eta$). But in his book on *Vaseninschriften* (1894) he abandons this view, remarking "man erwartet in unmittelbarer Verbindung mit $\chi\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon$ einen Imperativ," and accepts as satisfactory ("annehmbar") the explanation of W. Schulze cited in our next paragraph.

6. W. Schulze (*Quaestiones Epicae*, p. 388, n. 3) separates $\Gamma\epsilon\epsilon$ into two elements, $\pi\acute{\epsilon}' + \epsilon\acute{\iota}$ ($\pi\epsilon\epsilon\epsilon\acute{\iota}$), the second being the particle $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$, known to us in the Homeric formula $\epsilon\acute{\iota} \delta' \acute{\alpha}\gamma\epsilon$ (cf. $\epsilon\acute{\iota} \delta\acute{\epsilon}$, Hom. I, 262), in which he sees an ancient imperative of the root $-t-$, 'go,' and would therefore regularly write $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$. While this explanation is brilliant, it seems to me that the unusual, though not wholly unexampled, position of this new and hypothetical imperative — after the verb, and with no connective — makes it somewhat doubtful. Besides, this explanation does not account for $\pi\acute{\omega}\iota$ (not to speak of $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\iota$ and $\delta\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\iota$) which cannot be separated from $\pi\epsilon\epsilon$.

It is with diffidence that I venture to propose a new explanation, although it is one that appears to satisfy all the conditions. The final $-i$ in $\Gamma\epsilon\epsilon$ perhaps represents the demonstrative suffix $-i$, which is so frequently used in familiar Attic speech¹ appended to pronouns and adverbs in the sense 'here,' 'herefrom,' like Latin $-ce$. Thus $\chi\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon$ καὶ $\pi\epsilon\epsilon$ would mean 'Hail and drink *herefrom*' ('Here's to you! Take a drink!'), a special emphasis and a distinctive meaning being thus given to the second verb.

This suffix $-i$ was a floating suffix in Attic Greek, and as such must have been felt as a distinct word though not written separately.

intended anticipation of the $-i$ demonstrativum normally appended, according to my view, to $\pi\epsilon\epsilon$ at the end of this phrase.

¹ For obvious reasons $-i$ demonstrativum is not frequent on the stones: cf. Meisterhans, *Gramm.*² p. 116. — It is not confined to the Attic dialect; Blass-Kühner, *Ausf. Gramm.* I, p. 620, n. 3, where Boeotian $\tau\omicron\iota\iota$ ($\tau\omicron\iota\iota$, $\tau\omicron\iota\iota$) = $\omicron\iota\iota\epsilon$ is cited.

Thus we have αὐτῇ, οὐτοσί, τουτὶ δέ and τουτοδί, τηνδί, νυνί, ὦδί, etc. The treatment of final vowels before it shows that it was felt as a separate word: a short vowel is elided (*τοῦτ' ἔ, written τουτὶ) and a long vowel is shortened. As a virtually independent word there is no reason why it should not have been attached to a verb,¹ as well as to pronouns and adverbs, any more than that the particles τοι, μέν, μήν, δέ, to which it has many points of resemblance, should not have been thus attached. Indeed in the form πῶι, cited above, we have what seems to me a clear though hitherto unrecognized example of such a connexion, an example of striking interest; and, if my reasoning be sound, we have additional examples in the ΔΕΧΟΙ and perhaps in the δίδοι discussed below. That this -ι demonstrativum was in use on vases is seen in τοὶ (= σοὶ) τηνδί² Εὐθυμίδης (sc. λατᾶσσω), written on a red-figured hydria in the Munich collection (Jahn, no. 6) near the picture of a cylix in the extended hand of a woman playing the cottabus. Some of the variants of the simple formula χαῖρε καὶ πῖει seem to show that the sense given to the last word was more than that of πῖε alone (πίου ἐμέ, πῖε τήνδε, etc.; πῖε τήνδε = πῖε τηνδί?). The objection that in Attic Greek, when this suffix follows a short vowel, the vowel is elided (τουτοδί, not *τουτοδεῖ), and that we should therefore, on this theory, have had *πίι, not πῖει, is not as strong an objection as at first appears. We are by no means certain that τουτοδί, for example, may not once have been written *τουτοδεῖ. It is only the rules of poetic euphony that require a consistent obliteration of hiatus after the short syllable. This suffix, when we note the freedom with which in these inscriptions other particles and the oblique cases of pronouns follow it, may not have received, when once it became a recognized form, as strong an emphasis as it had when appended to pronouns and adverbs, and thus did not cause the disappearance of the preceding vowel, but coalescing with it formed a diphthong. Hence,—even with πῶι before me,—I do not accent πῖεῖ, preferring on the whole πῖα.

¹ Compare *ec-ce* in Latin, perhaps from a verbal root (*oc-ulus*); *voici* in French (vois + çà); '*Sed 'ere*' in colloquial English.

² The final letter of this word is an -ι, not -ε. Cf. Röhl *I. G. A.* 2.

2. ΔΕΧΟΙ.—On a red-figured cantharus (a drinking-cup) of 'the late fine style' in the Berlin Museum (Furtwängler, no. 2872) occur the words given in facsimile as the heading of this article, — a wish and an invitation of especial appropriateness in the present volume, — ὑγείας ΔΕΧΟΙ. Furtwängler transliterates ὑγείας δέχου. But the last letter, if we may rely on Furtwängler's very carefully executed facsimile, cannot be an Y nor a piece of an Y, as appears on comparing this letter as written at the beginning of the first word. It can only be an I. The transliteration, therefore, that I would offer is ὑγείας δέχουί, in which ου, the spurious diphthong, represents ο of the original. 'To your health :¹ receive it hence.'

This vase is of a class or group which Furtwängler places in the third century B.C. (*Arch. Anz.* VI, 1891, p. 119), when as a rule ου would have been written with OY, not with O. But Meisterhans has cited instances on Attic inscriptions,² as late as the close of the fourth century B.C., of ο = ου, and to this list I venture to add our form. The letters have, it may be noted, the characteristics of fourth century writing rather than of the next century. This inscription is certainly older by several decades than the ΨΙΛΙΑC (φιλίας) inscriptions occurring on other vases which Furtwängler includes in the same group.

3. ΔΙΔΟΙ.—In several passages in Pindar³ and in an inscription on a fragment of a Corinthian tablet (Röhl, *I. G. A.* 20, 62 = Furtwängler, *Berlin Vasens.* 946; cf. *I. G. A.* 20, 63 = *Berlin Vasens.* 453, where we have δός) occurs a very difficult imperative of the verb δίδωμι, in the form δίδοι (Pindar), or [δί]δοι, which appears to have no clear analogues. Now we have seen that πῶι (πῶ + ι) is a legitimate Aeolic form, and, bearing in mind the peculiar sense of δίδοι in all these locutions, 'bestow here' (cf. Latin *cedo* from *ce + da*), it is perhaps not too venturesome to urge that in this form also there is a trace of an -ι demonstrativum (? δίδοι < *δίδοι < *δίδου-ι < *δίδουί).

¹ For the genitive compare Alexis (*Fragm.* 111 Kock, *ap.* Athen. VI, 254 A), φέρε τὸν τρίτον [*sc.* κόσμον] | Φίλας Ἀφροδίτης; Callias, as cited on p. 86, n. 2; Nicostratus (*Fragm.* 19 Kock, *ap.* Athen. XV, 693 A), λαβὲ τῆς ὑγείας δὴ σὺ.

² *Gramm.*³ p. 21, n. 119 (*C. I. A.* II, 809, many times; 325 B.C.).

³ Pindar, *Ol.* i. 87, vi. 104, vii. 89, xiii. 100, *Nem.* v. 50. Compare Pindar's δίδοι . . . αἰδολὰν χάριν (*Ol.* vii. 89) and the [δί]δοι χαρίεσσιν ἀφορμὰν of the Corinthian tablet. — See also Blass-Kühner, *Ausf. Gramm.* II, p. 45.

4. ΖΕΛΙΟ.—On a black-figured amphora from Orvieto (published by Maass, *Ann. di Inst.* 1882, Pl. H., pp. 58 ff.) are the words

ΖΕΛΙΟΝ ΔΥ' ΟΒΟΛΩ ΚΑΙ ΜΕ ΘΙΓΕΙΣ

On one side of the vase is a naked bearded man with a tripod on his head; on the other a bearded warrior, with shield and spear.¹ Maass explains the figures as Heracles and Iolaus, and refers the inscription not to the figures but to the vase itself, which as it were addresses the purchaser, saying δὺ' ὀβελῶ καὶ με θίγεις, 'duo oboli e mi prendi.' The last five letters of the inscription, however, cannot be read θίγεις, not only because θίγεις would have been written ΖΕΛΙΟΝ, nor because an imperative is here looked for, but chiefly because this stem of the verb is an aorist stem, and would not form an indicative in -εις. For the first of these reasons, if for no other, θίγεις is also out of the question.

Whatever may be the explanation of the figures—and it is by no means certain that the figures on the two sides of the vase belong together, or that they represent mythological persons—it seems probable, especially since the inscription is at some distance from the figures, that these words do not refer to the scene but to the vase. Kretschmer accordingly suggests, but without conviction of the correctness of his reading, καὶ μ' ἔθιγες.

Should we not, however, read δὺ' ὀβελῶ² καὶ με θίγεις '[give] two obols and take me'? In this case θίγεις, an aorist second person imperative, would be an accession to the interesting but puzzling group of imperatives in -εις (Brugmann's 'injunctives') formed on the weak stem, such as ἔς, θές, -φρές, σχές, ἐνισπες. Cf. ἄγες· ἄγε, φέρε in Hesychius. θιγγάνω is also peculiar in having an imperative form θίγον.³

Two obols as the price of an amphora would at first sight seem to be too small. A cabbage costs only that amount in Alexis (*Fragm.*

¹ Kretschmer, pp. 91, 92.

² On ὀβελός for ὀβολός the coin, cf. Kretschmer, p. 117. *Etym. Magn.*, s. ὀβελίσκος.

³ Cf. Blass-Kühner, *Ausf. Gramm.* II, p. 45.

15. 8 Kock), and two obols is sometimes used to connote the idea of extreme cheapness, like "two cents" in the American expression "It is n't worth two cents." On the other hand, on the evidence of graffiti inscribed on the bottom of a considerable number of vases, probably by the seller of the vases, we may safely infer that two obols would not have been an unusual sum for a small amphora like ours. R. Schöne (*Commentt. . . . Mommsen.*, pp. 650-2) has shown that four obols was an average charge for a crater: on each of three craters, — in Paris, London and Vienna respectively, — six craters are listed as valued at four drachmae (twenty-four obols). Our amphora is both smaller and less ornate than a crater, and may well have cost half as much, especially if offered as a bargain.

5. ΓΙΕΙΣ. — On both sides of a cylix in the Munich collection (Jahn, no. 39), which belongs to the same group as the vases mentioned above on p. 85, this form, preceded by *χαίρε καί*, occurs. By Roscher, Bergk, Schulze and others, this has been taken as a blunder for *πίει σ[ύ]*, which is a possible phrase: compare *χαίρε σύ, πῖνε καὶ σύ*, etc. But, as Kretschmer points out (p. 196), although blunders and deviations from usage occur on vases, since vase-inscriptions are almost never cut short and since this inscription in particular is carefully repeated on two sides of the vase, the spelling *πίεις* would seem to have been intended. Hence Kretschmer does not hesitate to adopt this reading, and is disposed to view the form as an expanded imperative in -ς formed upon *πίει*, of the class mentioned in the previous paragraph.

But if my explanation of *πίει* be correct, and the last syllable contains an element more or less emphatic, it is not impossible that in *πίει σύ* the final vowel should have been so clipped or slurred in pronunciation as to cause it to be omitted in a phonetically written inscription (*πίει σ'*). Similarly we find in final -σεν of *ἐποίησεν* the vowel so slurred that the word is more than once¹ written ΕΠΟΙΗΣΝ (cf. 'Αθήνηθν). On the oenochoë, mentioned on pp. 85, 86, signed

¹ For *ἐποίησεν* and 'Αθήνηθν cf. Kretschmer, p. 124, who cites the *τάρων βολῶν* (for *τεττάρων ὀβολῶν*) of the fishmonger in Amphis (*Fragm.* 30 Kock, *ap.* Athen. VI, 224 D).

by Taleides,¹ ΖΟΙΖΗΟΙΔ is read (Διον'σιος), where even an accented syllable appears to have vanished. Note also, on a cylix in Munich (Jahn, no. 27), the abbreviated form ΝΕΔΙ, νῆ Δί' for νῆ Δία.

¹ Klein *M.S.*² p. 47: Gerhard *A.V.* IV, 316. Διον'σιος as a variant form of Διόνυσος is sometimes found (K. Keil *Onom.* p. 25; *C.I.G.* I, 314). It is possible, however, that in this Διον'σιος the ι — erroneously placed after instead of before σ — stands for ν. For ι = ν in Διόνυσος, cf. Kretschmer, p. 119. Other examples of transpositions of letters, both in manuscripts and in inscriptions, are registered by W. Schulze, *Quaestiones Epicae*, p. 247, n. 4.

It may be that the πει and πεν, cited above, pp. 85, 86, are not blunders, but are attempts to give the pronunciation (π'ει and π'εν).

THE PLOT OF THE AGAMEMNON.

BY LOUIS DYER.

"We measure with curiosity that variety of resources which has enabled Shakspeare to refashion the original material with a higher motive, . . . so modifying its structure as to give the whole almost the unity of a 'single scene.'" — WALTER PATER on *Measure for Measure*.

THERE is a difficulty which lurks more or less unnoticed and unnoticeable in the sequence of events presented by the plot of the *Agamemnon*, and which has received little or no attention from special students of the Aeschylean drama¹ until the publication of Dr. Verrall's edition of the play.² Dr. Verrall has coupled this diffi-

¹ At some time before the publication in 1888 of Dr. H. H. Furness's seventh volume (*The Merchant of Venice*) of the *New Variorum Edition of Shakspeare*, Dr. W. W. Goodwin, of Harvard, suggested to Dr. Furness that an illustration might possibly be found in the *Agamemnon* of a treatment of Dramatic Time similar to what some Shaksperian scholars call Shakspeare's Double Time. Dr. Goodwin further hinted that a solution of the difficulty might possibly be traced in the speech of the Herald. Acting upon this suggestion, Dr. Furness has, in the Appendix to his seventh volume, devoted pp. 342-345 — the concluding part of his essay on the Duration of the Action in *The Merchant of Venice* — to a study of the plot of the *Agamemnon*. Not without some fear that I may be justly taxed with presumption, I venture to praise Dr. Furness's account of the drift of the plot, and to hint that the present consideration of certain difficulties relating to the time covered by the action will be found to harmonize with, and to supplement what Dr. Furness has put so convincingly in his Appendix. Much the same is true, I hope, with regard to Professor T. D. Seymour's paper "On the Duration of the Action of the Oresteian Trilogy," published in the *Classical Review* for December, 1894. I owe to Dr. Goodwin my acquaintance with both of these interesting and important contributions to the understanding of the *Agamemnon*. Since, however, the present paper was written with no knowledge of either of them, my references to them will be chiefly found in notes appended to the main argument, which I have left substantially what it originally was.

² *The Agamemnon of Aeschylus*, London and New York, 1889: Introduction.

culty with others, notably with that which he finds in the account of the beacon-message from Troy, and has maintained that the problem thus offered is only to be solved by a radical change in the accepted view of the plot of the whole play. Since the late Professor Merriam published his paper on *Telegraphing among the Ancients*,¹ it has, I should think, become impossible to maintain further doubt as to the ideal plausibility, according to familiar Greek practices, of such a transmission to Argos of news from Troy as that poetically pictured in vv. 293-328 of the *Agamemnon*.² Accordingly, Dr. Verrall's refashioning of the whole plot now depends, so far as I can see, upon the still unsolved difficulty as to Aeschylus's representation of the sequence of events in the first third of the play. Why has our poet chosen to ignore in this part of the play the lapse of time which intervened between the sack of Troy and the arrival of Agamemnon at Argos? How are we to explain and reconcile Clytemnestra's vivid description of the storming of Priam's hold, as an event which has taken place but an hour or two before she tells of it in vv. 332-362, with the entrance of the herald at line 508, where we hear and see that the sunrise of the day immediately following upon the midnight capture of Troy witnesses at Argos the home return of Agamemnon's herald announcing the approach of Agamemnon himself? The difficulty as thus presented seems perhaps not very serious, but it is supposed by Dr. Verrall to become more pressing when we proceed — in the same matter-of-fact way which has led us to confront Clytemnestra's clairvoyant account of the sack, given when the first light of dawn shewed faintly, with the appearance of Agamemnon's herald when the sun had but just arisen — to note how the herald, just before he leaves the stage, gives in vv. 655-675 a most vivid and circumstantial narrative-picture of a shipwreck which must according to strict chronological computation occupy the very hours when, according to Clytemnestra's story and the

¹ *Papers of the Archaeological Institute of America*, Classical Series III, No. 1.

² References are made to the lines of Dr. N. Wecklein's critical edition (Berlin, Calvary, 1885), and so far as seemed practicable the text of that edition has been adhered to.

³ Dr. Wecklein's explanation, borrowed from that of Dr. Keck, of *Ag.* v. 817, fixes the hour, for which see also v. 914 of the *Hecuba* of Euripides.

beacon-message, the subsequently shipwrecked Greeks were sacking Troy.

The first point that strikes one is that, after sunrise, the action is consistently that of the day of Agamemnon's home-coming. If therefore our poet has so managed the transition from the introductory part of the play, — where we stand close enough in time to the sack of Troy, to see it, so to speak, with our own eyes, — to the moment after sunrise when the herald appears, then the account of the shipwreck comes in most appropriately to make us feel that we are on firm ground. If the difficulty exists in any such pressing form as to interfere with dramatic verisimilitude, it has done its worst before the account of the shipwreck. The question may therefore be dealt with — at least to begin with — apart from the account of the shipwreck, for it confronts us at v. 509, and if it does not mar the poetical unity of the play at this point, no recrudescence of it can possibly annoy us 150 lines later on. If it does not arrest our notice or shock us here, it will not be a stumbling block later. As a matter of fact, such recognition of Aeschylus's violation of the possibilities of chronology as we find in the scholia is contained in a remark upon v. 509, where the herald announces himself as arriving at Argos after ten years' absence. The scholium on this passage is: "Some blame the poet because he represents the Greeks as getting home from Troy on the same day,"¹ and although this comment cannot be demonstrably carried beyond the date of the Florentine and the Farnese manuscripts, which would place it in the fourteenth century, there is every probability that its origin goes much further back and that it may be taken to represent the view of ancient

¹ *τινες μέμφονται τῷ ποιήτῃ ὅτι αὐθημερὸν [ἐκ Τροίας] ποιεῖ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἔκοντας.* The Farnese and the Florentine manuscripts agree, except that the latter, as represented by Victorius's edition of 1557, omits the bracketed words. This agreement, as Dr. Wecklein (*Praefatio*, p. x *ad fin.*) suggests, points towards the existence of a scholium of identical import in the lost original of the two manuscripts in question, i.e. in one of the missing parts of the eleventh century Medicean manuscript. Dr. Wecklein prints this scholium, as presumably ancient, on p. 280, under line 509, excluding it from p. 337, where it would take its place among modern scholia. Enger is misleading when he puts this scholium and others like it without distinction among his *scholia recentia*; see p. 285 of his *Agamemnon* (Leipzig, 1863).

scholarship. Whether this scholium goes back to the days of Didymus Chalkenterus, as it probably does, or dates from the fourteenth century, it very adequately indicates the nature and extent of the difficulty.

Some people, then, after reading the first five hundred lines of the *Agamemnon*, have the wit to remember, when Agamemnon appears by proxy as it were in the person of his herald, that he ought not to be at hand for many a day, since he and his Greeks should be sleeping the sleep of exhaustion at Troy, which they took at midnight. These people are so right that they overshoot the mark, and simply show how completely they have resisted our poet's magical power and defied the contagion of his bold fancy. These are the critics whom no genuinely powerful piece of imaginative writing can quite ransom from their native prose, and we cannot do better perhaps in defence of our poet's plot, than to remind them of Biron's words in *Love's Labour's Lost*:

"Study is like the heaven's glorious sun
That will not be deep-searched with saucy looks."

To take out a chronometer and announce the time of day at this or any other point in the thrilling course of the *Agamemnon* is a proceeding fraught with danger chiefly to him that is guilty of it, since, — as Biron again has put it, — "ere you find where light in darkness lies, your light grows dark by losing of your eyes."

And here perhaps the argument should end, since the gist of it will always be that the overwhelming majority of those who read and care for the *Agamemnon* of Aeschylus can surrender themselves so completely to his guidance that the question of chronology raised by the 'somebodies' of the scholium on verse 509 simply does not exist. It may, however, be no barren endeavor to analyze the safe conduct of Aeschylus which warrants us in crossing over a gulf of weeks¹ without discomfort, strain, or difficulty, since certain wider

¹ Dr. Furness says, on pp. 342 f. of his Appendix already alluded to: "'The voyage from Troy to the Bay of Argos,' says Dr. Goodwin in a letter, 'would now be a good day's journey for a fast steamship. So I think we are entitled to at least a week of good weather for the mere voyage, leaving out the storm and the delays.' That much time then will it take Agamemnon to reach his home, if he starts

aspects of the meaning of the drama will be likely to offer themselves to our view, as the result of a careful analysis of our poet's method. At the outset, when his dramatic purpose was centred upon the sack of Troy, our poet represents the storming of Priam's hold as an event scarcely ended. By this means he achieves a thrilling effect at the opening of the play, which is comparable to the actual scene of shipwreck at the beginning of the *Tempest*, or to the actual duel-scene which opens *King Richard II.*, and which offers a strangely close parallel to the lively suggestions of the battle of Shrewsbury conveyed by the 'Induction' and the first scene of the Second Part of Shakspeare's *King Henry IV.* Having thus vividly dramatized the sack of Troy, so that his audience, like the chorus of

within an hour after he has conquered Troy. But the drama has begun, the Chorus is on the stage, and before it leaves the stage Agamemnon must arrive here in Argos, and yet all traces of improbability must, if possible, be concealed. The time during which the Chorus is on the stage is Aeschylus's Short Time, and corresponds to Bassanio's journey from Venice to Belmont. Aeschylus's Long Time is Agamemnon's week's voyage from Troy to Argos, corresponding to Antonio's three months' bond. The same power that can compress three months at Venice into one day at Belmont, must expand a few hours at Argos into a se'en nights' voyage from Troy." The excellence in every detail of this parallel should not, I think, lead us to accept the designations of 'Long' and 'Short' time in Shakspeare with quite the meaning attached to them by Professor Wilson (Christopher North), their inventor, from whom Dr. Furness approvingly accepts them. Professor Wilson fixed the meaning of these not very fortunate terms in three dialogues, belonging to his *Dies Boreales*, of which they form the fifth, sixth, and seventh, and grouped together under the title of "Christopher under Canvas,"—see *Blackwood's Magazine* for November, 1849, and for April and May, 1850. "Christopher under Canvas" has nothing to say about the *Merchant of Venice*, but deals with *Macbeth* and *Othello*. His conclusions have not commended themselves, so far as I can discover, to the majority of Shaksperian scholars, who seem to regard them as overstrained and fanciful. They have, however, the valued adhesion of Dr. Furness, and are accepted by the Cowden-Clarkses. So far as I can judge from a careful reading of the three essays of "Christopher under Canvas," the existence of 'Long Time' in *Macbeth* and *Othello* is not proven, although it is plain enough in the case of these plays as in that of *Measure for Measure* that Shakspeare has fused into a swiftly-moving dramatic scheme of action materials which in their original frame, and uninformed as yet by the vital energy of a great poet, were only half dramatic. The chronicles of Holinshed, from which the plot of *Macbeth* was ultimately derived, like the story by Cinthio which is dramatized in *Othello*, exhibit *in extenso* the events compressed by Shakspeare into a swifter dramatic

Argive elders in the play, are all but present at the very scene, Aeschylus was not free in the present case to make an acknowledged break in the continuity of time, as he does in the *Eumenides*. Such a break, which there suits his high and religious purpose, is incompatible here with the right realization of that same purpose in the career of Agamemnon. In the sack of Troy, and the excesses tolerated there by Agamemnon, culminates a long record of criminal and self-seeking irresolution which the king of men had initiated at Aulis by the sacrifice of Iphigenia. Our poet's dramatic problem is to visit upon this career of sin its correspondingly terrible retribution, and his conception of this retribution is colored by the dramatic

sequence. It is not, I think, a matter for wonder that a close and sympathetic scrutiny of these plays should yield traces of the longer time required by the original narrative, and used by Shakspeare with a magical effect of 'time-perspective.' So far as Professor Wilson's 'Long Time' in *Macbeth* and *Othello* is not purely a fancy of his own, it is probably best accounted for in this way, but it hardly constitutes 'Double Time.' No one has, of course, discovered anything in this connexion which at all mars the dramatic unity and congruity of these plays. The case of the *Merchant of Venice*, however, stands alone, and here Dr. Furness comes to the rescue with his masterly and convincing analysis of the plot, — see his Appendix, pp. 339 ff. Whether Shakspeare was rewriting Gosson's lost Comedy or not, one of his obvious difficulties here was the chronology forced upon him by the requirements of what were originally two, if not three, independent stories. The story of the pound of flesh required a period of three months to be covered by the action, while that of the three caskets and the carrying off of Jessica had nothing to do with such an extension of time. Shakspeare in this plot undertakes the perilous feat of riding three horses abreast, and accomplishes it to our marvelous satisfaction, only by that wonderful play of poetic illusion in respect of time which Dr. Furness describes so well. It is in the *Merchant of Venice*, and nowhere, I am confident, either in *Othello* or in *Macbeth*, that Shakspeare begins to 'hurl his dazzling spells into the spongy air' with the conscious purpose of making time pass for us according to the demands of a manifold plot. The problem is one which Shakspeare did not create; he found it and solved it. The analogous time-problem solved by Aeschylus in the *Agamemnon* was created by his conception of Divine retribution before his poetic mastership could solve it. The important difference between Aeschylus and Shakspeare in this matter lies just here. Nothing but deliberate choice prevented Aeschylus from giving a narrative account of the Sack of Troy, as an event preceding the action of his play, whereas Shakspeare could not escape the necessity of juggling with time in the *Merchant of Venice*, — it was imposed upon him unless he could consent to abandon some of the richness of his varied theme.

humiliation of Persian pride which he had witnessed in his own day. Therefore, when the vivid tale of Troy's capture has been given, he contrives, by working out a most subtle and inevitable train of thought in the part of his drama immediately following, to centre the hearts of all present upon the mourning for the dead Argives buried beneath the soil which their death had won.¹ This brings him to the difficult point where the spoiler of Troy is announced as soon to appear. By the vivid lyric strains of mourning for the Argives who fell at Troy, our poet sweeps us along with the Athenians who listened to his play in 458 B.C. from the past into the present. When the *Agamemnon* was first brought out, a present and universal grief for recent losses in many wars recently waged by the Athenians in many quarters confronted our poet in the hearts of his hearers, and he makes it enter into the economy of the plot by an irresistible implication, so real that even a modern reader cannot escape its influence.² And thus it comes to pass that the fresh memory of

¹ *Ag.* v. 462.

² See the late Professor Merriam's paper, already referred to above, on *Telegraphing among the Ancients*, pp. 20-24. Professor Merriam, after mentioning allusions "to events and persons of the time" in other plays of Aeschylus, there says: "I think that I see another case in the *Agamemnon*, which has never yet been noted, so far as I am aware." The date of the production of the *Orestia*, fixed in 458 B.C. by the Greek hypothesis handed down to us with the text, was confirmed, in 1887, by the discovery of an inscription on the Acropolis (*Amer. Jour. of Archaeol.* III, 316). "Hence," argues Professor Merriam, "the trilogy was brought out about the first of April, 458 B.C." Then he gives a summary of recent events from Thucydides (I, 102-107). Among the remoter events, he mentions the break between Athens and Sparta and the league with Argos of 461 B.C. Events subsequent to the league are (1) the Athenian protection of Megara by garrisoning Pegae and posting a force on the heights of Geraneia; (2) the summons of the Athenian fleet to aid Inaros in Egypt; (3) active Athenian operations against Corinth and Epidauros, culminating in an unsuccessful descent upon Epidaurian Halieis; (4) a naval battle with the Peloponnesians, in which Athens was victorious; (5) war between Athens and Aegina, culminating in another Athenian victory off Aegina; (6) the Athenian levy *en masse*, which repulsed the Corinthian assault on Megara, and achieved a double victory. An inscription in the archaic room of the Louvre gives the names of 168 Athenians belonging to the single Erechtheid tribe, who perished in Cyprus, Egypt, Phoenicia, Halieis, Aegina, and Megara within the same year. Professor Merriam proceeds to quote Krueger, Kirchhoff, and Dittenberger to the effect that "the

recent loss sustained has swept the mood of Aeschylus's hearers out of all inclination for strict reckonings of hours and days just at the juncture when Agamemnon, the sacker of Troy, appears in the person of his herald. Hence the poet finds it easy just here to substitute for the more or less extended break in time required of him by strict chronology, the simpler and instantaneous transformation of night into day. Before we know it we have passed the gulf separating the midnight capture of Troy from the morning of Agamemnon's victorious return, nor are we ever really allowed by the poet to become aware of the chronological difficulties involved. The herald gives, at the very end of the scene where he figures, an unwilling narration of the disastrous shipwreck which overtook Agamemnon on his homeward way. But pressing preoccupations of various kinds have been forced upon us in the meantime, we are so full of misgivings as to the impending disaster of Agamemnon, that we never attempt to put two and two together, so to speak, and it has been reserved for Dr. Verrall to point out that this disastrous shipwreck must have occupied the very hours during which, according to the vivid suggestions at the opening of the play, Agamemnon

year to which the events thus recorded belong runs from the spring of 460 to the spring of 459," and thus the date is supplied for all the events numbered (2) to (6) in the above epitome from Thucydides. It is just worth while to note that the usual chronology, now corrected by the unimpeachable evidence of the Louvre inscription, spreads these events over the space of three years, following Diodorus (xi. 77-79). Clinton, in his *Fasti*, seems to make them cover B.C. 459-457; Grote, ch. xlv, quotes the inscription, but dates the expedition against Halieis 459-458 B.C. "The burial," Professor Merriam continues, "would take place the following autumn, in the month Pyanepsion, during the celebration of the Epitaphia; hence some five months before the production of the *Agamemnon*, at which time the events of that mournful occasion would be fresh in the minds of the audience. If the number of 168 dead of the Erechtheid tribe was an average for each of the ten tribes, the total number buried would have been 1680, no doubt far in excess of any year for some time, which would make it still more memorable." I think it is impossible, after grasping the historical facts just stated, to read vv. 435-464 of the *Agamemnon* without a conviction amounting to certainty that the late Professor Merriam's contention is in every respect borne out. We can feel the thrill of melancholy delight which must have overwhelmed the audience assembled to hear the *Agamemnon*, and we can realize the vividness of their feelings for those they had lost, — persons who but for death would have been in that place among the spectators of that play.

and the Greeks are supposed to have been taking and sacking Troy.¹

Indeed this account of the shipwreck coming just where it does (vv. 655-685), and given as it is with great unwillingness by the herald, marks the climax in our poet's skilful and plausible² concatenation of events. It comes quite long enough after the gulf of time has been bridged (vv. 437-493) to prevent our confronting it with the clairvoyant description of horrors at Troy given at the very beginning (vv. 333-359). Even supposing a momentary impulse on our part to ask an inconvenient question, it is baffled and forestalled in the appeal made to our anxious imagination by the hesitancy of the narrator's manner, and in the shock with which his unwilling tale of horrors comes to us. We are too much preoccupied with the contradiction between this gruesome tale of mishap and the strain of elation and self-gratulation used at his first coming (vv. 556-587) by this herald of victorious disaster. And so, while we are thus startled and are filled with dim anxieties for the future, Aeschylus, having achieved beyond recall his dramatic and religious effect, is undetected while he moves back the sacking of Troy to the point where it rightly belongs in the past. In order to dramatize the efficacy of divine retribution, he had moved forward the scenes of Greek riot and Trojan massacre to a point where we could all but hear the groans of the vanquished and the shouts of the victors. Now, without letting us become aware of it, these horrors recede to their proper place in time.³

¹ I do not mean by these words to cast a slur upon Dr. Verrall's most able presentation of the difficulty. On the contrary, I owe to him my present understanding of the play, which, though it is radically different from his, could never have been reached without the compulsion of his able arguments in criticism of the plot. It is with his constructive theory of the play that I find myself utterly unable to agree; and I cannot help thinking that he would modify much of what he has said if he were called upon to rewrite his *Introduction*, now that the late Professor Merriam's researches have cleared up so many difficulties.

² For the whole effect upon the 'time-perspective,'—to borrow again Professor Corson's happy phrase,—of the opening speech of the newly arrived Herald of Agamemnon, see Dr. Furness's account of the matter in his Appendix, alluded to above.

³ If any one unacquainted with the discussions that have arisen about the 'time-perspective' of the *Agamemnon* were required to read the whole play and then to

The whole of this interpretation of the economy of time used by Aeschylus in this plot requires a further justification in detail, and must be connected by bringing Aeschylus's procedure into some sort of relation on the one hand with Homer and on the other with the events of his own time which so colored his conception of divine retribution as to impel him to treat the story as he does when he confronts, with the least apparent interval to separate them, Agamemnon's culminating crime and Clytemnestra's swift retribution. As to Agamemnon's character, Aeschylus followed closely in the footsteps of Homer. His variation from both of the stories of Agamemnon's crime and punishment outlined in the Homeric narrative of the *Odyssey* has been exhaustively dealt with, in connexion with problematical references to the *Oresteia* of Xanthus and Stesichorus, by others. Here we need only point out that, in spite of this departure from Homer's story, the Agamemnon of Aeschylus and the king of men as depicted by Homer are the same. That

answer off-hand the question : 'On what day did the action take place?' his answer would unhesitatingly be : 'On the day of Agamemnon's home-coming.' Therefore Dr. Furness has not, I think, covered the whole ground, so far as the *Agamemnon* is concerned, in saying, "Shakspeare must compress a long term into a short one, while Aeschylus must dilate a short time into a long one. Shakspeare presents to us the spy-glass and bids us see what is distant close at hand ; while Aeschylus reverses the glass, and what is but an arm's-length from us recedes to the verge of the horizon." This last clause describes inimitably the effect of the Herald's account of the shipwreck, which rises between us and the receding moment when Troy was sacked. But in the earlier part of the play, where Clytemnestra describes the beacon message and gives her clairvoyant account of the sacking of Troy, Aeschylus, like Shakspeare, "bids us see what is distant close at hand," and uses the other end of the spy-glass. Nowhere is this more vividly brought out than in Fitzgerald's fine paraphrase of *Ag.* 332-341 :

Aye, think — think — think, old man, and in your soul,
 As if 't were mirrored in your outward eye,
 Imagine what wild work a-doing there —
 In Troy — to-night — to-day — this moment — how
 Harmoniously, as in one vessel meet
 Esil and Oil, meet Triumph and Despair,
 Sluiced by the sword along the reeking street,
 On which the Gods look down from burning air.
 Slain, slaying — dying, dead — about the dead
 Fighting to die themselves — maidens and wives
 Locket by the locks with their barbarian young,
 And torn away to Slavery and Shame
 By hands all reeking with their Champions' blood.

having been made clear, the greatly altered conception of divine retribution which informs the whole tale of Agamemnon's life as told by the Athenian dramatist can be discussed.

From the point of view which makes Agamemnon's home-coming the climax of events at Troy, and brings his life to a tragic close under the vengeful hand of Clytemnestra, the leader of the Greeks is not so much the king of men, wielding the sceptre handed down from Zeus in the house of the Pelopidae, as the self-indulgent and unfaithful husband of Clytemnestra whom he grievously slights and insults in the opening scene of the *Iliad*. From the temper attributed to Agamemnon in this Homeric scene flows his consistent and egotistical eagerness to exploit his family for his own lordly pleasure, as shown in the non-Homeric tale of the sacrifice of Iphigenia. If any Homeric foreshadowing of the willingness of Atrides to make the Aulidian sacrifice be required, it stands ready in the ninth book of the *Iliad* (vv. 144-157), where Agamemnon in his cups adds without a moment's deliberation, as a magnanimous afterthought to all the gifts of amends offered to Achilles, the hand of any one he may choose of his three daughters. Homer makes nothing so plain in the *Iliad* as the unvarying vacillation and the unswerving incompetency of Agamemnon the man, and here he inspires Aeschylus with that conception of the king's character developed in the play. Agamemnon's peculiar egotism and fatuity make it impossible for the chorus in the play to reach him with their loyalty or to put him in any way upon his guard. When he appears in Aeschylus's play, Agamemnon's weakness is shown in the assumption of omnipotence and omniscience. An analysis of the forty-five lines¹ of his opening speech in the play reveals a striking phonetic coincidence with the five lines of the second book of the *Iliad*² where the king of men breathes fire and fury against Hector and Priam. In both poets the same mood of Agamemnon — that of the swashbuckler — is audibly expressed by the same accumulation of explosive mutes, rolling *rho* sounds, hissing *sigmas* and grumbling nasals. Homer, in spite of his clearly drawn distinction between Agamemnon the man and Agamemnon the king, is so far preoccupied with the latter that he leaves out all

¹ *Ag.* 801-845.

² *Il.* ii. 414-418.

but the very slightest indications of his domestic situation. Even if we might suppose Homer to have been acquainted with the full story of the horrors of the house of Atreus, we can see why he should have omitted any account of them, just as we can readily conceive that he might have been familiar with the tale of the sacrifice at Aulis without caring to mention it. Aeschylus, whose theme is after all chiefly what may be called the familial or domestic aspects of Agamemnon's case, had to bring in all these domestic horrors; but in the first play of the *Oresteia* his Agamemnon is the Homeric man Agamemnon. This man, as the *Iliad* abundantly shows, was of all the heroes gathered at Troy just the one whose weak and inefficient self-confidence made him the easy victim of a clever trap. Indications of this are by no means far to seek in the scenes of the play where Agamemnon figures either in person or by proxy in the utterances of his herald; a scrutiny of vv. 508-685 and vv. 801-965 of the play readily reveals them, and vv. 919-940 are a dramatization of Agamemnon's incompetency; but Aeschylus also depends upon a familiarity with Homer in his hearers, and accordingly does not expatiate upon the theme. Thus far we have tried to establish that a swift retribution brought upon Agamemnon by his sins, and visited upon him by means of a clever trap into which Clytemnestra led him, has every justification which the character of the man consistently given by Homer and Aeschylus can afford. This makes easy the way of Aeschylus, if we suppose that he had at heart the notion of instant retribution. There was nothing to retard his dramatic effect in the accredited Homeric characterization of Agamemnon.

A not unimportant point now forces itself upon our notice. The general effect of the *Iliad* regarded from a religious point of view, as Aeschylus must have regarded it, is certainly not that of a swift retribution visited upon the outrage committed by Paris. The moral of the ten years' war would rather seem to be the late than the swift vengeance of the gods. Agamemnon himself expresses it when he cries out, "if the Olympian fulfill not now, yet will he fulfill at the last, and the guilty shall pay manifold retribution."¹ How, it may

¹ *Il.* iv. 160. From the *Iliad* translated by the late John Purves, M.A. Percival, 1891.

be asked, did Aeschylus reconcile this point of view with his own conception of the swiftness of divine retribution? The answer to this is found, I think, in the first three choral numbers of the *Agamemnon* itself, more especially in the first. In the mystical and melancholy ecstasy of his survey of events at Troy and what led up to them, as well as of the final outcome in the destruction of the city, pictures of the past are mingled with forebodings of the future. The elders of Argos see Paris with a pursuit as of fate and doom upon him, and yet the pursuer is himself foredoomed and pursued. Artemis lowers behind in wrath, driving Agamemnon to be his baser self and to reap his own harvest of predestined horrors. What centres their interest is not so much the punishment of Paris and the clan of Priam as the slow but sure perdition of royal Agamemnon, for whom they tremble when he puts upon him 'the yoke of necessity' and submits by sinning to the penalties of sin.

At the outset and in departing from Argos, Agamemnon and Menelaus are two vultures befriended by Zeus who sees them high in his element, the air, wheeling aloft and screaming at the sight of their violated nest.¹ But it is not for long that Agamemnon appears as a stranger within the gates² of kindly Zeus: soon he reappears as the black eagle, swooping down upon a trembling hare and her young, and arousing the anger of heaven by cruelty,³ and the will of the gods is uttered by Calchas, the seer: *χρονῶ μὲν ἀγρεῖ Πριάμου πόλιν ἄδε κέλευθος, πάντα δὲ πύργων κτήνη πρόσθε τὰ δημοπληθῆ μοῖρα λαπάξει πρὸς τὸ βίαιον.*⁴ The vacillating Agamemnon rises before the singers' thoughts while the blasts and counterblasts of right resolve and criminal infatuation buffet his soul, and they mark him "swept by the impious veering wind of an unholy heart-change unsanctified." They see his mind "from that moment shifted to a mood of atrocity," while they note that "a miserable infatuation, the compasser of doom, the contriver of sin, hardens

¹ Ag. 49-59.

² Ag. 58.

³ Ag. 113-124.

⁴ Ag. 131-135, paraphrased, with a curious weakening of the absolute statement in *ἀγρεῖ* and *λαπάξει*, by Fitzgerald as follows:

That Troy should not be reached at all,
Or if ever reached should never fall,
Unless at such a loss and cost
As counterpoises won and lost.

men's hearts to dare."¹ Thus it appears that, by giving prominence to the sacrifice of Iphigenia at Aulis, and by keeping in mind the responsibility of Agamemnon for that and other wrong done at Troy, Aeschylus transforms the train of events which led up from the sacrifice at Aulis to the sack of Ilium into one vast and concatenated crime for which Agamemnon was answerable. Agamemnon's punishment is delayed until the cup of his iniquities is full. In other words, so long as he can still be made the instrument of divine vengeance upon Troy, his time of retribution is not yet; but Troy once sacked, the blow comes instantaneous.

I have intimated that swiftness was of the essence of Aeschylus's mystical conception of divine retribution, and that the lesson was one which he learned from events in his own lifetime. The sudden collapse in our poet's day of the pride and strength of the Persian king is still the completest exemplification which secular history offers of the dramatic and instantaneous fall of undisciplined pride; and since we, far removed from it though we are, still read the lesson there, little wonder if Aeschylus was haunted by it. In the swift destruction which overtook the host of Xerxes, our poet read a message sent to the men of his day, the law of divine retribution dramatized in his story of Agamemnon, *ἀπάραρτι παθεῖν*.² It is chiefly in the crowding together into a few hours of the sack of Troy and the home-coming of Agamemnon that the swiftness of divine retribution is accentuated in the plot of the *Agamemnon*. There is, however, no harping upon the suddenness of the event. Indeed how could there be, since the least insistence upon the point would destroy the chronological illusion, and reveal to us our poet's dramatic device. We could not be told that the sacking of Troy had been brought closer to the main action of the play than the facts warranted. But here again Aeschylus helps himself most subtly by what we might call a timely anachronism, and secures immunity for one chronological device by the effects of another. He contrives to identify by slight touches, which are yet sufficiently obvious, the excesses and impieties committed by Agamemnon and the Greeks in sacking Troy with those memorable ones committed within recent memory by the

¹ *Ag.* 228-233.

² *Ag.* 1528-1531; *Choeph.* 312.

Persians at Athens particularly, and also in other parts of Greece; and thus he lends to the retribution which visited Agamemnon that vivid color of suddenness and swiftness so conspicuous in the *Persae*, his dramatization of Xerxes's disaster. The points of contact between the *Agamemnon* and the *Persae* of Aeschylus in this regard are numerous. The temper of audacious exultation with which the home-coming Agamemnon must be credited twice over, since his mind as spoken not only by himself in vv. 804-819, but also by the newly arrived herald,¹ is echoed by that of Xerxes² as he went forth certain of victory. There are striking parallelisms in the detailed accounts of disaster at sea which the two plays contain, and finally we have a series of remarkable coincidences of phrase and metre which the commentators rarely fail to mention.³ These last mentioned coincidences establish beyond a reasonable doubt an association existing in our poet's mind between the real minutiae of the Persian sack of the Athenian Acropolis and those imagined ones of the Greek storming of Troy. Thus we arrive again, but by a surer way, at the conclusion hinted at in the beginning of this discussion, — that apart from purely dramatic convenience Aeschylus half unconsciously consulted his own experience in crowding together in time the sacking of Troy and the home-coming of Agamemnon. Had he not yielded to this impulse, had he been guiltless of the resulting dramatic artifice, had he conscientiously and methodically begun his drama with an account of Troy's capture given long after the event, then the parallel from Xerxes's invasion of Greece afforded by the day of the battle of Salamis would have failed, and a great source of vividness and inspiration would have remained inaccessible. In that case the *Agamemnon* might have been one more exemplification of that more archaic dramatic manner exemplified by the *Seven against Thebes*.

It is just possible that an objection may be made here. It may be argued that it is after all not the excesses committed at Troy but the sacrifice of Iphigenia at Aulis for which Agamemnon is punished.

¹ *Ag.* 523-542, 801-819.

² *Pers.* 747 f., 784-788, 823-833.

³ Compare *Ag.* 579 and *Pers.* 440; *Ag.* 532 and *Pers.* 811; *Ag.* 350-354 and *Pers.* 809-813.

I have already endeavored to forestall this objection, and can only urge that it is hardly possible to enter into the spirit of the drama without linking these crimes into one. Our poet's whole theory of human fate and responsibility falls to the ground when we insist upon isolating from its culmination in public events the initial and domestic stage of Agamemnon's guilt. The keynote to this close linking together of all the stages of Agamemnon's sin is struck early in the drama, where the chorus sings :

ἔστι δ' ὅπη νῦν
ἔστι· τελεῖται δ' ἐς τὸ πεπρωμένον
οὐθ' ὑποκλαίων οὐθ' ὑπολείβων
οὔτε δακρύων ἀπύρων ἱερῶν
ὀργᾶς ἀτενεῖς παραθέλει.¹

These are general reflections which the chorus makes, just after representing the Atridae as impelled in their expedition against Troy by the all-powerful Zeus, god of hospitality, who sends the late avenging Erinnys upon transgressors, and involves Trojan and Greek alike in the tug of war.² The reason for the delay in this vengeance visited upon the transgressors appears in the first choral song, to which these anapaestic strains form the introduction, and it is plainly the sin of recklessness unfolding itself in the conduct of Agamemnon culminating as it does in the sinful sacrifice of Iphigenia, a memorable picture of which forms the climax of this first choral ode. This picture is followed by a passage of general import which is unfortunately obscure,³ but the mood of it is easily identified with that underlying lines 67-71, already given in Fitzgerald's version. Literally translated, according to the fortunate restoration of the text achieved by Professor Goodwin,⁴ it reads: "Justice brings knowledge within the reach of those [only] who have suffered; the future event thou canst hear of when it comes. Till then, let be, and this is as well as to lament it beforehand." Centred as our poet's mind is upon the fate of Agamemnon, he looks upon the delays of divine vengeance in punishing Paris and Troy as due to the cumulating imperfections in Agamemnon, the instrument selected to bring retribution upon the

¹ *Ag.* 67-71.

² *Ag.* 55-67.

³ *Ag.* 259-265.

⁴ *Trans. Amer. Philol. Assoc.* 1877, vol. VIII, p. 77.

Trojan transgressors. What he sees in the events at Troy is what is congruous with his drama,—the long continued moral breakdown of Agamemnon. This had to be long just as the struggle of Orestes to free himself from moral contamination had to be long and slow.

Between the slow process of Agamemnon's perdition worked out in the visible course of events to its culmination at Troy and the long agonies of purification and self-retrievement imposed upon Orestes, Aeschylus places the swift punishment of Agamemnon by Clytemnestra, which find its answering stroke in the murder of Clytemnestra¹ by Orestes. The two figures of most conspicuous

¹ Professor Seymour, in his article "On the Duration of the Action of the Oresteian Trilogy," referred to in the first note above, points out that Aeschylus — unlike Sophocles and Euripides — suppresses the eight years of unpunished crime during which, according to Homer, Clytemnestra and Aegisthus ruled at Argos. He further argues that, in the story of Aeschylus's *Oresteia*, Orestes was not exiled as a mere child, but as a lad full-grown. To the sound arguments used by Professor Seymour I should incline to add the conception of Divine retribution as instantly overtaking full-blown crime, which governs the 'time-perspective' of the *Agamemnon*. I should also argue that the requirements of the scene of recognition between Electra and Orestes in the *Choephoroi* make it necessary to suppose that Aegisthus had only returned from exile to Argos about a year before the arrival of Agamemnon. The exile of Orestes would then take place rather less than a year before the opening scene of the *Choephoroi*. The confirmations of Professor Seymour's views, to be derived from an examination in detail of the dramatic economy of the *Choephoroi*, are numerous, nor does it seem to me that Professor Seymour's paper exhausts them. The whole attitude of Electra in her opening scene with the Chorus is that of a young woman suffering acutely under a terrible nervous shock. She is dazed by more than the terrible dreams sent to her mother Clytemnestra can account for. It is the recent and horrible murder of Agamemnon which has so shattered her in mind and body that her brother Orestes — *from whom she has not been long separated* — finds difficulty in recognizing her at the first glance, and is deeply stirred when he marks how grief has altered her (see vv. 16–19). Her mind does not respond normally to what she sees and hears, and accordingly, though she recognizes the lock of hair upon the tomb and the footprints as belonging to Orestes (see vv. 173, 175, 177, 179), yet, when she sees Orestes himself, she strangely fails to know him (see vv. 224 ff.) until he gently assists her wandering faculties by humouring her, — see vv. 228–231, and especially his exhortation in v. 232 f.:

ἔνδον γενοῦ. χαρᾷ δὲ μὴ 'κπλαγῆς φρένας·
τοὺς φιλότατους γὰρ οἶδα νῦν ὄντας πικροῦς.

The difficulties offered by these lines in their context, as it is usually understood,

importance in this dramatization of concatenated crime are the first and the last. Clytemnestra was not of the house of Atreus, and, so far as the transmission of the family doom in that house is concerned, her function in the story is to embody the *πρώταρχος ἄτη* into whose arms Agamemnon's long course of perdition hurls him at the last¹; while, for Orestes, Clytemnestra is the evil thing² from which he finally escapes with Apollo and Athena to guide him. Orestes is thought of as retracing, but upward and with his face toward salvation and escape, the downward course of Agamemnon his father. Just as Aeschylus was careful to emphasize in the *Agamemnon* by the words of the prophet Calchas the long delay and the many vicissitudes of Greek arms involved by the leadership of Agamemnon, so in the *Eumenides* he insists upon the long period required for the preliminary purgation of Orestes before he could finally escape by a formal trial and acquittal.

In the *Eumenides* we first see Orestes, the unreclaimed matricide, with Apollo and Hermes standing by, at the altar of Delphi, where they are confronted by the sleeping Furies. Apollo gives promise of help, acknowledging his responsibility; Hermes leads off Orestes; the

have led Hermann and Paley to mark a lacuna before them, while nothing short of their transposition to a place immediately after Electra's joyful words of recognition at v. 242 satisfies Rossbach and Weil, and H. Wolf cuts the gordian knot by rejecting them as spurious. Weil complains of them where they stand in the Medicean manuscript as a miserable appendage patched on to the splendidly effective speech of Orestes, making him rebuke and restrain his sister for her joyful recognition of him before she has given the least sign of knowing who he is. It seems to me that Professor Seymour's view justifies these lines exactly as they stand in the manuscript, since I conceive that it is carried out by taking the punctuation in the Medicean manuscript to indicate a full stop in v. 232 after γενοῦ. If Electra and Orestes have been separated not more than a year, Electra is bound to recognize him as soon as she collects herself. Accordingly, Orestes first helps her to collect her senses by showing the place from which he had cut the lock of his hair, and by making her recognize her own handiwork upon his clothes, and then he says, "Collect thyself." Having said this, and noting a complete revulsion of feeling in her, he fears that it may go too far, and so cautions her not to be too much carried away by joy, inasmuch as the nearest of kin are bitterly disposed toward him and her. I should explain that Professor Seymour is in no way responsible for my development of his views.

¹ *Ag.* 1469-1507.

² *Choeph.* 1024-1030; *Eum.* 461-470.

Furies, wakened by Clytemnestra's ghost, are driven away. At the close of verse 234 the stage is empty and the scene is changed. At the beginning of verse 235, Orestes appears in the act of praying to Athena. This prayer is a recital of the long period of his expiatory wanderings under Hermes's guidance. Orestes, altered now by his purificatory pilgrimage, lays claim to a just judgment of acquittal. The lapse of time which separates this shifted scene at Athens from the opening one at Delphi is made prominent for just the reasons involved in the suppression of the lapse of time in the *Agamemnon* between the sack of Troy and the arrival of Agamemnon. The question to be solved in the *Eumenides* is: How may an upright man who has committed murder upon his own mother, at the instigation of duty to his father and under the promptings of Apollo, be brought under that unbending rule of Heaven,—*πάθει μᾶθος*,—and yet escape alive? In the *Agamemnon* the question to be solved is: How may a man who has hardened his heart at the outset, and has been persistently responsible for excesses in a work of vengeance which the gods willed without sanctioning his egotism and recklessness, be brought under the application of the more pitiless form of the same great law that the doer must suffer? Delay and a shadowy lapse of time, filled in, so far as the Athenian audience of the play were concerned, by the countless stories current throughout Hellas of the purifying pilgrimages of Orestes, are necessarily prominent¹

¹ That this shadowy lapse of time is implied very urgently and obviously with the effect of putting a gulf between vv. 234 and 235 of the *Eumenides* is plain from Orestes's words in *Eum.* 235-243. If doubt were possible, then the commonly accepted tales of Orestes's purificatory wanderings in various parts of Greece would come in to dissipate all uncertainty. But the shadowy lapse of time is definitely worked into the plot of the play by this prayer of Orestes to Athena and is especially emphasized by the force of *ἡδῆ* in *Eum.* 238. This first utterance of Orestes upon his reappearance—this time at the temple of Athena upon the Acropolis at Athens—reminds us that there has been an interim of expiatory wanderings. His experiences during this interim are briefly described by Orestes in *Eum.* 238-241, and he intimates in v. 241 that the ordeal was imposed by Apollo's command. What the command here in question involved we find on turning back to *Eum.* 74-79, where a more minute description of the interim of wanderings is given by Apollo to Orestes in the form of a command and an exhortation. The expiatory season of pilgrimage was to be a second

in the *Eumenides*, because what the doer has suffered during that lapse of time is a fulfilment of the law, leaving open the way for the acquittal of Orestes. Agamemnon, on the contrary, during every moment of life in him which we realize after we know of his crowning iniquities, is an incarnate violation of the law. Hence a compression of the final crime and its punishment into a few short hours, if made dramatically plausible, vindicates and exemplifies the law in the worthiest possible manner. This compression Aeschylus has achieved with a dramatic skill in which, so far as I can see, there is no flaw.

Since so conspicuous a part is given to the law that the doer must suffer in this sketch of the Aeschylean version of the woes of the house of Atreus, it is desirable in some way to consider the whole body of fundamental religious convictions of which this law is an integral part. For Aeschylus could not of course regard "the doer must suffer" as an *obiter dictum*. Already in the first choral ode of

terrible trial, see vv. 74-79, and see also Apollo's final injunction μέμνησο μὴ φόβος σε νικᾷτω φέρας, — and therefore Apollo sends Hermes to support and save Orestes while the trial lasts. The worst is over when at last (ἤδη, v. 238) Orestes reaches Athens; and, accordingly, Hermes is needed no longer and Orestes reappears unattended. The imagination, prompted by Apollo's description beforehand (vv. 74-79) of the terrors and trials in store for Orestes, is ready to fill in the gulf between *Eum.* 234 and 235 with a period of years. But these years dwindle into months when Orestes speaks of these wanderings after they are over (vv. 237-241), and these months dwindle into weeks when (vv. 400-405) Athena arrives in person, fresh from the land of the Scamander, where she is busied "taking formal possession" — I quote from Professor Seymour — "of the portion of the Trojan territory which the Achaeans assigned to the sons of Theseus as part of the spoils of war on the capture of Troy." The treatment of 'time-perspective' in the *Eumenides* thus outlined offers a curious parallel to that discovered by the argument of the present paper in the *Agamemnon*. There is this difference, however; in the *Agamemnon* a lapse of time is first suppressed and then insisted upon, while in the *Eumenides* a long lapse of time is first insisted upon and then gradually minimized. I have followed Dr. Furness in comparing the 'time-perspective' of the *Agamemnon* to that of Shakspeare's *Merchant of Venice*, where the notion of Double Time is applicable; but in the *Eumenides*, Aeschylus's treatment of time seems more closely analogous to what we find in *Macbeth* and *Othello*, as well as in the many other plots of Shakspeare from which extracts have been gathered in the Cowden-Clarke's *Shakspeare Key*. See note on p. 98 above.

the *Agamemnon*, he reinterprets it by the more merciful law exemplified in Orestes's final escape: "By suffering comes wisdom." If the religious motive just assigned alike for the suppression of the lapse of time in the *Agamemnon* and for the insistence upon it in the *Eumenides*, is a compelling one, then we should find, in the loftier and more impressive passages of the early part of the *Agamemnon*, a full expression of those most solemn and uplifted moods of Aeschylean piety which are akin to the one in which our poet maintains with a sublime religious insight that the doer must suffer. These kindred moods are in fact most vividly and adequately expressed wherever the chorus of elders look away from the fateful intricacies of doom as concretely exemplified by the doings and sufferings of Greeks about Troy, and strive to fathom the ultimate decrees of the Gods and of Destiny. Note too that it is just while these choral odes are being sung that the compression into the same hours of Agamemnon's sin and punishment is taking place. With the close of the second choral ode the gulf of time is passed, and Agamemnon's herald appears. The difficulty, however, of presenting these moods, as expressed, out of their context and yet briefly, is so great that I should hardly make the attempt, were it not for the links by which they may be connected if we confront them with certain verses of the ninetieth *Psalm*, placing opposite each verse the corresponding Greek passage or passages from the first two choral odes of the *Agamemnon*.

PSALM XC.

1. Lord, thou hast been our dwelling place from all generations.

2. Before the mountains were brought forth, Or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, Even from everlasting to everlasting thou art God.

3. Thou turnest man to destruction; And sayest return ye children of men.

AGAMEMNON.

173-188. οὐκ ἔχω προσεύδασαι
πάντ' ἐπισταθώμενος
πλήν Διός, εἰ τοῦ ἐμᾶς
ἀπὸ φόρτῳ εἰς θεός
χρηθ βαλεῖν ἐπηρώμενος.
οὐδ' ὅστις ἀπορούει ἢ μύγας,
παμμάχῳ θάσσει βρώων
οὐδ' ἄλγεσται πρὶν ὧν,
ὅς δ' ἔπειρ' ἔφου τραυ-
κτῆρος ὄχρεται τυχών.
Ζήτω δέ τις προφρόνως
ἐνυκία κλάζων
ταῖς φρεσὶν τὸ πᾶν.
τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺς ὀδύ-
σαυτα, τὸν πάθει μάθος
θάρρα κυρίως ἔχειν.

4. For a thousand years in thy sight Are but as yesterday when it is past, And as a watch in the night.

261-265. Δίκα δὲ τοῖς μὲν παθεῖ-
σιν μαθεῖν ἐπιμύθευ.
τὸ μέλλον δ'
ἐπελ' ἔνεται ἀν' ἑλπίος· προχαίρω
ὥς δὲ τῷ ποστέρειν.

5. Thou carriest them away as with a flood, they are as a sleep: In the morning they are like grass which groweth up.

79-82. τὸ θ' ὑπερήκου φυλλᾶδος ἥδη
κατακαρπομένητι, τριτοῦδας μὲν ὀδοὺς
στέλει, παλὺς δ' ὀδὴν ἀλείων
ὅσων ἡμερόβατον ἀλάττει

Nought have I to compare
When all in the balance I weigh,
Only Zeus, if this burden
From my heart in very truth
I am to fling away.
Neither he who of yore was great,
Blooming in battle-braving recklessness, —
Though he was from the first,
Not named even shall he be,
And he who next arose
Hath found his overthrower and is gone.
But whoso'er, with zealous heart,
Cries Zeus and victory aloud
Shall find his cup of wisdom running over, —
Zeus who set men on the road of sense,
Zeus who stablished in authority
That wisdom comes by suffering.

And Justice leans her balanced scales
To lesson sufferers
In wisdom's school;
But, for what is to be,
When it befalls thou'lt know; let be till then;
To know beforehand is to borrow woe.
And they who are passing old, their leaf
Is withering fast, on triple feet they go
Their way; no better than children they,
Day-lit dreams that come and go.

6. In the morning it flourisheth and groweth up; In the evening it is cut down and withereth.
7. For we are consumed in thine anger, And in thy wrath are we troubled.
8. Thou hast set our iniquities before thee, Our secret sins in the light of thy countenance.
9. For all our days are passed away in thy wrath: We bring our years to an end as a tale that is told.
16. Let thy work appear unto thy servants, And thy glory upon their children.
17. And let the beauty of the Lord our God be upon us:
- 381-384. ἐπράξαν ὡς ἔκραναν. οὐκ ἔφα τις θεοὺς βροτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι μέλειν ὁσους δόλκτων χάρις παροῖθ'· ὃ δ' οὐκ εἰσαβήη.
- 189-193. στέζει δ' ἐθ' ὕψω πρὸ καρδίας μηχανιστῆμον πάρος καὶ παρ' ἀκορτας ἡλθε σωφρορεῖν δαιμόνων δὲ που χάρις βλαῖος σέλμα σεμνὸν ἡμέτερον.
- 467-473. τῶν πολυκτόνων γὰρ οὐκ ἀσέκτου θεοί. κελαι- καὶ δ' Ἰωνίδες χρόνῳ τυχηρὸν θνῖ' ἀνευ βλαῖας πελυντυχεῖ τριβῆ βίῳ τιθεῖσ' ἀμεινρόν, ἐν δ' ἀλ- στοις τελέθοντες οὔτις ἀλὰδ.
- 406 ff. λιτᾶν δ' ἀκούει μὲν οὔτις θεῶν τὸν δ' ἐπιστrophoν τῶνδε φῶτ' ἀδικον καθαιρεῖ.
- 192 f. δαιμόνων δὲ που χάρις βλαῖος σέλμα σεμνὸν ἡμέτερον
- 383 f. ὁσους δόλκτων χάρις παροῖθ'· ὃ δ' οὐκ εἰσαβήη.
- They fared as Zeus decreed. There was a man denied
The gods could care to mark with jealous eye
The inviolate beauty of holiness
When trampled under foot, that man knew not the holy fear of God.
- And even sleep distills upon the heart
Ill-boding pangs of prescient memory;
Though man himself resist, yet wisdom comes,
And the beauty of the gods will use constraint
Who sit their sessions in the house of Fear.
- Nor are the gods unmindful of the man
Who worketh violence. Black dooms at last,
When he hath prospered in unrighteousness,
Bring alternation to reverse his lot
And gulf him in the dark. There help is none
Where he unheeded lives banished from sight.
- Entreaties from them not one god will hear,
But smites the worker of iniquity
The man who loves the fellowship of sin.

[See opposite verse 7 above.]

[See opposite verse 6 above.]

When due allowance has been made for the widely different terms with which Aeschylus had to work out the expression of his far-reaching conceptions of human frailty, divine omnipotence, and the unfailing retribution visited upon wrong-doing, the close parallelism of thought is often striking. Least so perhaps in the case of the fourth verse. "For a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night." For these I have found no closely parallel expression in the two choral numbers under discussion. But this verse of the ninetieth *Psalm* is just the one which receives a striking poetical exemplification in the dramatic suppression of the lapse of time which Aeschylus introduces into his plot. By violating the prosaic possibilities of time in the dramatization of Agamemnon's swift punishment, our poet sets before us in action that divine retribution which is independent of time, and illuminates as it were the Psalmist's words that "a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night."

Enough has now been said, I hope, to show the higher religious motives underlying the unique manner in which Aeschylus first leads us up to the sack of Troy until we are within earshot as it were, and then, his moral lesson given, bides his time until an opportunity offers itself for restoring the event to its right chronological perspective. We know that the three plays of the *Oresteia* are his latest that survive, and when, reverting to considerations of literary form, we compare the economy of this plot, not only with that of Aeschylus's other and earlier dramas, but also with all extant plays by Sophocles and by Euripides, we can see that the possibilities of purely dramatic, as contradistinguished from epic presentation, have been carried further in the *Agamemnon* than anywhere else. The dramatic setting given in the *Agamemnon* to its only genuine messenger's speech,—the account of the shipwreck of the home-returning Greeks,—together with its small compass, quite remove it from the category in which the longer messenger's narratives of other Greek plays belong. By resort to anachronism with regard to the sack of Troy, Aeschylus avoids at the outset an archaic and semi-epical tale given by a messenger, and creates a new law of artistic perspective. His skill conquers for him substantially the freedom used in Shakspeare's

plots, and yet he adheres to a unity of time and carries his audience with him. An unwonted problem offered in the fate of Agamemnon to our poet's religious conception of divine retribution was the stimulus which quickened his powers of invention. He was undoubtedly helped to success by the mysterious appeal to the supernatural, by the mystic ecstasy which pervades the whole of the *Agamemnon*. The dim and dreamy doubts and forebodings of the first choral ode are but the prelude to the magical message of the beacons from Troy and to Clytemnestra's second sight as she relates the cruelties and impieties committed in the sack of Troy. Here is the first culmination of this mood of mysticism which transfuses the choral odes until it becomes so dim and uncertain in the last choral song that all light seems to have gone out. But just at the point where the chorus loses prophetic sight the supernatural reasserts itself, most clear and unmistakable, in the passionate vaticinations of Cassandra, and it finally dies down after the crime is consummated into obstinate forebodings of the avenger to come, which leads us on to the opening scene of the *Choephori*.

The first part of the *Agamemnon* (1-430) may in fact be regarded from the point of view of the chorus, whose joyless and desperate utterances occupy one-half of the whole play, as a dream of the taking of Troy. The dream is unutterably vivid and unspeakably sad for him who sees it, and who is in dreadful certainty that it is true, —

“But ever as he reaches forth his hands
Slips from them back into the viewless deep,
On those soft silent wings that walk the ways of sleep.”¹

Just at this point comes the rude awakening, whereby the thoughts of the chorus and of the audience are rivetted upon the dead for whom they mourn. How sharp the contrast is between the first and dreamy mood of melancholy foreboding, and this new mood of most passionate and palpable grief, has been pointed out above by appealing to the late Professor Merriam's interpretation and is evident to the most casual reader. After this wonderfully heart-searching communion with grief for their country, where, as in the Scotland described by the Lord Ross, —

¹ Fitzgerald's translation of *Ag.* 431-434.

". . . nothing
 But who knows nothing, is once seen to smile,
 Where sighs and groans and shrieks that rend the air
 Are made, not mark'd : where violent sorrow seems
 A modern ecstasy : the dead man's knell
 Is there scarce ask'd for who, and good men's lives
 Expire before the flowers in their caps,
 Dying or ere they sicken . . ."¹

the Argive elders turn upon their dreamy terrors and their vision of the impious sack of Troy. Measured by the certainty of present grief all this seems dim and doubtful. First they exclaim

" Neither a city-sacker would I be
 Nor life, myself by others captive, see,"²

and then they think of the beacon-message and revert passionately to the mood of incredulity which stirred in them when they first heard the news from Clytemnestra. Their doubts grow more pressing as they more fully express them, in their minds the remembered vividness of Clytemnestra's announcement is "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." They thus forget, and we with them, that Troy—if really taken—has been taken only a few hours ago. They remember the taking of Troy only as a matter of intense doubt. The only proof that can repel the assaults of this passionate incredulity is the instant appearance of Agamemnon's herald. At this point in the plot, anxiety and doubt overshadow our nicely calculating faculties, and this mood, so carefully prepared beforehand, is utilized by Aeschylus for bridging the chasm of weeks which logically separates the coming of Agamemnon from the beacon-message announcing his triumph at Troy. This coming is clearly marked off from what precedes by suggestions of the rising of the sun.³ Until the arrival of the herald no mention of day or of dawn suggesting more than the faintest glimmer of daybreak occurs. The action is wrapped as it were in the glooms of ending night, and such hints of dawn as are given come from Clytemnestra, who commands the eastern heavens from the stage, while the chorus front her and face

¹ *Macbeth* IV, iii, 166-173.

² Browning's translation of *Ag.* 478 ff.

³ *Ag.* 513; cf. 523-528.

the gloomy quarters of the sky. This circumstance lends an added force to the opening of the song of thanksgiving at line 367, ὦ Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ καὶ νύξ φιλία, and is not without its bearing upon the dreamy and melancholy trains of thought, what might in modern phrase be called the hypnotized condition of the chorus. It is not until the sun has risen that they quite lose that dreamy half-consciousness so wonderfully described from her own experience by Clytemnestra, where she says to Agamemnon: "The droning gnat with lightest flutter would wake me from dreams in which I saw thee pass through more than the time of my sleep."¹

Just here and in closing we may note that the marvellous first scenes of the first and fourth acts of *Macbeth*, where the supernatural element in the plot is chiefly focussed, are also enacted during those darkest hours before the dawn of which we have been speaking. Thus the plot of *Macbeth* associates itself in this regard with that of the *Agamemnon*, and something analogous is true of the plot of *Measure for Measure*. Bearing this association in mind, we may see the same close concatenation of events in *Macbeth*, which Aeschylus has achieved in his *Agamemnon*, and we may account for it by a kindred spirit of onward-marching and culminating crime, capped by instant and resistless retribution informing the two great dramas. As to *Measure for Measure*, it comes chiefly into this exalted fellowship, when we consider what changes were made by Shakspeare in adapting the ruder original which forms its framework. That done, it will appear that by means of these changes, Shakspeare has worked into it and wrought out of it, as Mr. Pater has said, "a morality so characteristic that the play might well pass for the central expression of his moral judgments."² I am confident that just this is what every reader will affirm of Aeschylus and the plot and the play of the *Agamemnon*, if only his consideration of the matter is sufficiently broad; if, that is to say, the *Agamemnon* is not considered apart from its two companion plays, the *Choephoroi*³ and the *Eumenides*.⁴

¹ Dr. Verrall's translation of *Ag.* 883-885.

² *Appreciations*, p. 177.

³ See note on p. 111.

⁴ See note on p. 113.

MUSONIUS THE ETRUSCAN.

BY CHARLES POMEROY PARKER.

THE purpose of this article is to examine afresh the evidence about Musonius Rufus. According to his contemporary, Tacitus, he was of Etruscan descent and of equestrian rank, a teacher of Stoic philosophy to young men. His name is associated with Rubellius Plautus, a man of imperial rank. He was the prosecutor of Egnatius Celer, for treachery to Celer's disciple and friend Barea Soranus. This fact, when we consider the friendship of Soranus with Rubellius, makes probable a connection with Soranus himself. Moreover Annius Pollio, the husband of Soranus's daughter, was banished at the same time with Musonius, after Calpurnius Piso's conspiracy. Piso Licinianus, afterwards Galba's adopted son, and Cornelius Laco, Galba's praetorian prefect, met as friends in Rubellius's house and may easily have known Musonius there. Musonius was influential in Rome after Galba's success. Vespasian, if we may trust Dio Cassius, honored him so greatly as to retain him in Rome when he banished the other philosophers. St. Jerome indeed says that Musonius was recalled by Titus from exile a.u.c. 833 (Suetonius, Roth, p. 301. 38). But either of these statements, if correct, shows him to have been a man likely to be honored by emperors, and Themistius says (p. 212. 13, Dindorf): *συνῆν . . . Τίτος Μουσωνίῳ τῷ Τυρρηνῷ*.

We must now notice the character and behavior of the professed Stoics who associated with Musonius. Rubellius Plautus cultivated the theories of life held by Romans of an earlier time; his deportment and dress were somewhat ascetic (*habitu severo*, Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 22), and his life retired. Yet he was suspected of a desire for political activity. Barea Soranus, who in later life was under Stoic influence, had shown in his Asiatic proconsulship an industrious

attention to the details of his office and an independence on the side of justice, both of which may have arisen from a desire to carry Stoic philosophy into ordinary public life. Egnatius Celer, the teacher of Soranus, had adopted, it would appear, the deportment, dress, beard, and ascetic expression of an extreme Stoic (*habitu et ore ad exprimendam imaginem honesti exercitus*, Tac. Ann. xvi. 32). Piso in dress and face kept to the old Roman way; his expression and deportment were of an ascetic cast (*vultu habituque moris antiqui, ex aestimatione recta severus, deterius interpretantibus tristior*, Tac. Hist. i. 14; on his promotion Tacitus represents him as preserving a calm, restrained expression and manner, *nullum turbati aut exsultantis animi motum prodidisse . . . nihil in vultu habituque mutatum.*—*Ibid.* 17). Evidently we are here introduced to a stern, serious company of men of high rank, who desired to restore the old simple Roman life, morality, and discipline, under the inspiration of Greek, but not merely Greek, philosophy; who were waiting quietly through the wild riot of the court in Nero's time till their turn should come. Musonius was presumably somewhat like them in dress and behavior as well as in ideals; but we must note in him a willingness to work with men who were not philosophers, if their influence tended on the whole to improvement, such as Vespasian and Titus. He is ready to punish offenders. His purpose is political as well as moral. His surroundings are Italian.

This man is probably the same as the C. Musonius of whom Pliny the younger says (*Ep.* iii. 11) *quantum licitum est per aetatem cum admiratione dilexi*. Pliny also speaks of this Musonius as father-in-law of one Artemidorus, a philosopher to whom he himself was a close friend. The difficulty of age lay probably only in Pliny's extreme youth at the time of Musonius's death, as Pliny had no difficulty in cultivating friendships with old men afterwards. Musonius, therefore, probably died early in Domitian's reign. At any rate, if Musonius had lived on to the gloomy later days of Domitian, it seems likely that we should have heard of him again from Pliny, who says so much of the famous victims and survivors of that time. The other reference to one Musonius Bassus (*Ep.* vii. 31), of which Nieuwland makes so much, would appear to be based on a false reading. A consultation of Keil's critical note will indicate that the

original reading may well have been "*tum in his anni bassi*," corrupted into "*tum musanni bassi*" and so into "*tum Musonii Bassi*." And in any case the surname cannot be Rufus.

The Rufus quoted by Arrian's Epictetus is generally assumed to be Musonius Rufus. If Epictetus was expelled from Rome in 89 or 90 A.D. he might before his expulsion have studied with Musonius in Rome. The six mentions of Rufus in the *Discourses* carry us right to the heart of Rome in the lifetime of Musonius. Thræsea is mentioned as in conversation with him and rebuked by him, the burning of the Capitol is referred to by a pupil as a typical crime, the murder of Galba comes up in a philosophic connection. Moreover, there is a marked sternness and seriousness in the man revealed by five of the six passages. Character, time, place, all agree with what we should expect in Musonius the Etruscan. Nor do we know of any other Rufus to whom we could assign the profession of teaching philosophy. Accepting, then, this identification, we learn from Epictetus some other important facts about our philosopher's teaching. His attitude of complete indifference to life or death is shown in his epigram to Thræsea (Epict. *Dissert.* i. 1. 27). The importance he attached to correct syllogistic reasoning is seen in the anecdote anent the burning of the Capitol (i. 7. 32). Syllogistic study will encourage a philosophy which insists largely on consistency of actions with first principles, such as was developed by Epictetus after his teacher. The third extract given by Peerlkamp teaches the strong lesson of reliance on self for all good; the slave depends not one whit upon the master (i. 9. 29). Fourthly, we learn how Rufus repelled pupils in order to test the excellence of their nature (iii. 6. 10). Another reference shows what a heart-searching moral insight into his listeners' faults there was in his speech (iii. 23. 29). The remaining extract, referring to Galba, seems to repel the idea that Rufus could ever base the proof of divine providence on any political success (iii. 15. 14). The severity of the teaching above described confirms our opinion that the teacher of Epictetus was Musonius the Etruscan.

But as regards the extracts made from one Musonius by Stobæus, the case is by no means so clear. As preliminary to the discussion we may note that the extracts of Stobæus given by Peerlkamp all seem correctly ascribed to some Musonius, except the long one

which he heads "*Quid vacuum doloris faciat*," and the two short ones beginning respectively *Θεόδωρος* and *Κακίαις*. There seems no authority in the manuscripts for connecting the name of Musonius with these. Taking, however, the others, long and short, what sort of a man do they reveal to us, and into what surroundings do they take us? There is not the slightest hint of any presence in Rome, or of any connection of the speaker with Roman traditions. Speaking of agriculture he quotes Theognis, and refers to Hesiod, Myson, and Psophidius the Arcadian. Speaking of exile he quotes Socrates, Euripides, and Heraclitus, and refers to Diogenes, Spartiacus the Lacedaemonian, Odysseus, Themistocles, Dion, Aristides, and Clearchus. Speaking of marriage and the family he refers to the names of Pythagoras, Socrates, Crates, and Admetus. On woman's life he mentions Eriphyle, the Amazons, and Socrates; on luxury, Lycurgus, another Laconian, Zeno of Citium, Heraclitus, and Socrates; on old age, Isocrates. Surely on all these subjects there were also Roman illustrations ready for a man living in the heart of the Roman empire, the friend of noble Romans. The beard is discussed, and no reference is made to the old bearded Romans (*moris antiqui*), whom presumably the friends of Rufus tried to imitate. The garments spoken of are the *χιτών* and *ιμάτιον*. The following sentence also suggests a Greek city rather than Rome: οὔτε γὰρ πομπὴν πεμπομένην θεοῖς οὕτω καλὴν θεάσασαι' ἂν τις, οὔτε χορείαν ἐπὶ ἱεροῖς κόσμῳ χορευόντων οὕτως ἀξιοθέατον, ὥς χορὸν παίδων πολλῶν προηγούμενων ἐν πόλει πατὴρ τοῦ ἑαυτῶν ἢ μητρὸς, χειραγωγούντων τοὺς γονεῖς ἢ τρόπον ἕτερον περιεπόντων κηδεμονικῶς (*Stobaeus Flor.*, Meineke, lxxv. 15). Again, reference is made to the mystic initiation rites as one of a man's regular duties: διὰ θεοὺς ἔστιν ὅτε πονητέον τῷ δικαίῳ εἶναι βουλομένῳ πρὸς θεοὺς, ὅτι θυσίας ἢ τελετὰς ἢ τινα ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν τελήσει τοῖς θεοῖς (*Ibid.* lxxxv. 20); this seems Greek and not Roman. Again, prominence is given to Ἔρως between Ἥρα and Ἀφροδίτη in a discussion on marriage (*Ibid.* lxvii. 20); Cupido would not be so placed by a Roman in a prosaic discussion. Again (in lxxv. 15) Ζεὺς ὁμόγνιος is referred to; this epithet does not seem natural in the mouth of an Italian, or to be a translation of any Italian name. In fact the setting of all these discussions is entirely Greek. The arguments, too, are in a different tone from the master of Epictetus.

They are inductive rather than deductive. They appeal to the natural instincts rather than to consistency. They welcome the listener with geniality instead of repelling him with severity. They deal with the common duties of everyday life, rather than with the prospect of death. They talk of the joys of family life rather than of the problems of Providence. They search out the good in a disciple rather than his weakness and evil. They speak of the beautiful, the healthy, the useful, and the divine rather than of self-sufficiency. In fact, a careful pondering of Epictetus's six references to Rufus, and an observation of the way in which Epictetus developed his teaching on these lines as laid down by Rufus, will make one seriously doubt whether the Musonius of Stobaeus can be Musonius Rufus the Etruscan. We find in Stobaeus five extracts headed Ρούφου ἐκ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου περὶ φιλίας. Possibly Stobaeus knew one man as Rufus and another as Musonius. Now can we find anything about such another man?

One of the Stobaeus extracts (see Wachsmuth and Hense, Lib. II, cap. xv. 46) is headed Λυκίου ἐκ τῶν Μουσωνίου. Perhaps all these extracts are from memoirs written by one Lucius. Certainly in the Lives of the Sophists by Philostratus, ii. 9 (Kayser, p. 64) there is mention of a Lucius who entered into counsel with Herodes Atticus. Of him says Philostratus: *ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς φανεροῖς σπουδαῖος ὁ ἀνὴρ οὗτος, Μουσωνίῳ δὲ τῷ Τυρίῳ προσφιλοφύσας εὐσκόπως εἶχε τῶν ἀποκρίσεων καὶ τὸ ἐπίχαρι σὺν καιρῷ ἐπετῆδεν.* This disciple of a Musonius may well be the author of the Stobaeus memoirs, and at any rate studied with some one of that name. Now if the anecdote on the next page about Marcus Aurelius is true or even probable, its date must be after 161, when the emperor was forty years of age; otherwise the epithet *γηράσκων* on which the whole story hangs would have no meaning. But Lucius at that time can hardly have been more than eighty years old, and was more probably younger than that. If he was born after 80 A.D., he cannot have studied with Musonius the Etruscan unless that philosopher outlived Domitian, which, as we saw above, does not seem probable. But even if Musonius Rufus lived to the reign of Trajan, since he must have been at least forty to have such a position as he had at the time of his exile, he would be over seventy at the accession of that emperor. We should

have to suppose that Lucius, between twenty and thirty, studied with this venerable man between seventy-five and eighty-five, and reported his genial conversations. On the whole, especially considering the likelihood of the Etruscan's earlier death, we shall do better to suppose that there was another Musonius called the Tyrian, who flourished in the reign of Trajan or of Hadrian. This Tyrian, like other orientals, may have been of Greek extraction and may have come to Athens or some other Greek city to live ; or he may have travelled from city to city according to a common custom. Long residence in Greek towns would account for the Grecian tone of his philosophy. He then would be the Musonius who made the Greek epigram on the beggar and self-styled philosopher of which Gellius heard Herodes Atticus tell (*Noct. Attic.*, ed. Hertz, ix. 2-8). His would be the Greek epigram on pleasure and pain after the same thought of Cato the Censor (*N. A.* xvi. 1). He may have known and imitated Cato, for he seems to have known enough Latin to make a Latin play upon words (*N. A.* xviii. 2. 1). His would be the enlargement of Rufus's epigram showing that praise by the listener is a proof of the nothingness of the teacher (*N. A.* v. 1). This second Musonius, living in the beginning of the second century, would be the man of whom Justin Martyr wrote as of a contemporary, ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς, and of whom Origen seems to speak as a generation or two before him, τῶν χθὲς καὶ πρώην γεγονότων. Or if we do not wish to press Origen's words, at least we may suppose that he would be more interested in a Greek oriental than in an Italian. The passages of these two authors are worth transcribing in full.

Justin (*Apol.* ii. 8, Otto, Jena, 1847) says : καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν Στωικῶν δὲ δογματῶν, ἐπεὶ δὴ κἂν (κατα?) τὸν ἡθικὸν λόγον κόσμιοι γεγόνασι, ὡς καὶ ἐν τισιν οἱ ποιηταί, διὰ τὸ ἔμφυτον παντὶ γένει ἀνθρώπων σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου, μεμνησθῆναι καὶ πεφονεύσθαι οἶδαμεν. Ἡράκλειτον μὲν ὡς προέφημεν, καὶ Μουσώνιον δὲ ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς καὶ ἄλλους οἶδαμεν. ὡς γὰρ σημειούμεν πάντας τοὺς κἂν ὁπωσδήποτε κατὰ λόγον βιοῦν σπουδάζοντας καὶ κακίαν φεύγειν μισεῖσθαι δεῖ ἐνήργησαν οἱ δαίμονες. Musonius the Etruscan who was banished for a few years to Gyara, and was afterwards an emperor's friend, cannot without more than exaggeration be said to be of the type of men hated and killed. But one who lived a

life of poverty, far below Roman equestrian rank, yet became prominent as a philosophic teacher of righteousness, might, if confounded with the Cynics of the time, have aroused hatred, and might even have been killed in a riot in some Asiatic Greek city. Origen's words are (*Contra Celsum* iii. 66, ed. Lommatzsch, Berlin, 1845) εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ πᾶσαν φιλοσοφίας αἵρεσιν, καὶ κατὰ τὸν θεῖον λόγον, οἱ τοσοῦτον μεταβεβληκέναι ἱστορούμενοι, ὥστε αὐτοὺς ἐγκέσθαι παράδειγμα τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου. καὶ φέρουσι τινες ἡρώων μὲν τὸν Ἡρακλέα καὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσεύα· τῶν δὲ ὕστερον, τὸν Σωκράτην· τῶν δὲ χθές καὶ πρώην γεγονότων τὸν Μουσώνιον. The man who had lived the life revealed in the Stobaeus extracts might well be set alongside of Socrates. The Roman knight, the prosecutor of Egnatius Celer, the friend of Titus, can hardly have seemed to Origen an example of the best life, a saint of the heathen dispensation. Clement of Alexandria would also seem to have known the Stobaeian Musonius. (See Wendland, *Quaestiones Musonianae: De Musonio Stoico Clementis Alexandrini aliorumque auctore*, Berlin, 1886.) Some connection between the two men seems to be proved by Wendland's dissertation whether we accept or not his theory that Clement used his predecessor's work as the substance of his own *Paedagogus*. In some later inquiry we may examine the relation of the Greek oriental Musonius to Clement, and to other Christian and heathen writers, taking as our starting point Wendland's discussion. But in speaking of the Etruscan we may set aside all discussion of the Tyrian, except so far as is necessary to distinguish one from the other.

There is, however, another complication. Philostratus mentions also one Musonius the Babylonian: Μουσώνιος ὁ βαβυλώνιος, ἀνὴρ Ἀπολλωνίου μόνον δεύτερος ἐδέθη ἐπὶ σοφία καὶ ἐκεῖ μένων ἐκινδύνευσεν, ἀπέθανε δ' ἂν τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ δήσαντι, εἰ μὴ σφόδρα ἔρρωτο (Philost. *Apollon.* iv. 35, Kayser, vol. I, p. 153). And again (iv. 46, p. 164): Μουσώνιος κατελλημμένος ἐν τοῖς δεσμοτηρίοις τοῦ Νέρωνος, ὃν φασὶ τελεώτατα ἀνθρώπων φιλοσοφῆσαι. He goes on to incorporate in his text a few short letters supposed to have passed between him and Apollonius; but these need not detain us now. We note that the man described as the most perfect philosopher, second only to Apollonius, seems like the typical good man of Origen; moreover the persecution of him by Nero might be part of the hatred referred to by Justin. If it were

not for his being called the 'Babylonian instead of the Tyrian we might suppose that a young man, who when about twenty years of age did some bold act which drew on him Nero's punishment, lived to be seventy at the accession of Hadrian and was alive in the early days of Herodes Atticus, Lucius, and Justin. If he spent his later life in Greece and Asia he might be no more mentioned by Pliny than were Plutarch and Epictetus. What else then does Philostratus say of him? In *Apollon.* v. 19, p. 178, Demetrius the Cynic is mentioned as finding Musonius in chains at the Isthmus occupied in digging; the work would be Nero's canal. Musonius is represented as saying *λυτῶ σε ὦ Δημήτριε, τὸν Ἰσθμὸν ὀρύττων τῇ Ἑλλάδι; εἰ δὲ καὶ καθαρωδοῦντα με εἶδες, ὥσπερ Νέρωνα, τί ἂν ἔπαθες;* If this story has any historical foundation or possibility, we can hardly refer it to Musonius the Etruscan (Tyrrhenian), who in a later book (vii. 16, p. 271) is said to have been banished to Gyara; who is not said by any authority to have been put in chains; who is not likely as a Roman knight to have been ordered to the work of digging the canal; who shows no sign of harmony with Demetrius, and who takes quite a different line towards Egnatius Celer and Vespasian. (See Tacitus, Dio Cassius, Suetonius, *passim.*) The same connection of one Musonius with Nero, with Isthmus digging, and with Nero's music, is seen in the dialogue printed by Kayser with the works of Philostratus, and by Jacobitz doubtfully with those of Lucian. Here, however, Menecrates and not Demetrius is the interlocutor. In Themistius we find traces of other parts of the same tradition. He says: *Νέρων Μουσώνιον ἐξεκρήρυττε, καὶ εἶργε τὸν ἐκ Τυάωνων ὁ ἀδελφοκτόνος* (86. 19, Dindorf, 1832). Here is the connection with Apollonius of Tyana. Again, *καλῶς Νέρωνα ἀπετρέπετο Μουσώνιος καθαρωδοῦντα* (460. 8, Dindorf). It would appear that Musonius got into trouble from some bold protest against Nero's artistic display. Again: *Νέρωνος μὲν αἰδίδιμος ἢ πρὸς Μουσώνιον ἐπιείκεια* (112. 12, Dindorf). To let off an oriental with his life and hard labor might be easy treatment, but to put chains upon a Roman knight could not be called *ἐπιείκεια* by any but a flatterer of Nero. Still such boldness of speech might win fame even for a young oriental. There is no sign in Themistius that this man is the Etruscan; whereas the orator does give this epithet to the friend of Titus: *συνὴν Τίτος*

Μουσωνίῳ τῷ Τυρρηνῷ (212. 23, Dindorf). The Babylonian is probably the man referred to by Lucian *De Morte Peregrini* 18. Peregrinus (Proteus) is there banished from Rome, and gets great renown as ὁ φιλόσοφος διὰ τὴν παρρησίαν καὶ τὴν ἄγαν ἐλευθερίαν ἐξελαθείς. καὶ προσέλαυνε κατὰ τοῦτο τῷ Μουσωνίῳ καὶ Δίῳ καὶ Ἐπικτήτῳ. The Etruscan was perhaps less famous for boldness of speech than for discretion. But now as to the identity of the Babylonian, we may note that the emperor Julian is likely to have mentioned without title the same whom Themistius knows as simply Musonius. He says (*Epist. ad Themistium* 22): Μουσώνιος ἐξ ὧν ἔπαθεν ἀνδρείως, καὶ νῆ Δι' ἤνεγκεν ἐγκρατῶς τὴν τῶν τυράννων ὀμότητα, γέγονε γνῶριμος, ἴσως οὐκ ἐλάττων εὐδαιμονῶν ἐκείνων τῶν τὰς μεγάλας ἐπιτροπενσάντων βασιλείας. Again in 7 of the same letter he mentions Musonius in a comparison of the theoretic and the practical life. Such descriptions, however, apply equally well to the Tyrian. I strongly suspect that these two are really one man. Each of the epithets is at least oriental, and may have come from a double residence, or from origin in one and long residence in the other city. This oriental, after his first bold attempt in a young man's enthusiasm to stop the disgraceful career of Nero by converting him, may always afterwards have used boldness of speech against vice, and yet have shown in the conversations of later life with Lucius that genial good sense and enthusiasm for right living which characterize the Stobaeian dialogues. Indeed, only a man with great faith in human nature could have tried to turn Nero (ἀπέρπεε) to self-respect. Yet in spite of geniality, if he dared to tell the truth, he might well have incurred the enmity of powerful men, or of mobs, and havē been put to death. This man, however, does not belong with the political Stoics; he is more like a Christian. The Christian writers seem to have felt this, to have appreciated his life, studied his words, and looked on him as a Greek saint preparing the way for the progress of Christianity as truly as did the Hebrew prophets. For the present, however, we turn from him to the Roman knight.

Let us then, if we have disentangled the evidence rightly, arrange chronologically the facts of his life. He was born at least as early as 25 A.D. When therefore Seneca returned from exile and began his work of applying Stoic philosophy to imperial politics,

Musonius may have been speculating in a more republican and freer spirit. By the beginning of Nero's reign he may have begun to gather pupils about him; at the time of Rubellius Plautus's death, A.D. 62, he was influential, and probably famous, as was certainly the case at his exile three years later. In order to see what his doctrine was we must add to the six passages in Arrian, five given by Stobaeus under the title 'Ρούφου ἐκ τῶν [τοῦ] Ἐπικτήτου περὶ φιλίας. First comes the doctrine so often maintained by Epictetus: τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἔθετο ὁ Θεὸς, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν. Ἐφ' ἡμῶν μὲν τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ σπουδαιότατον ᾧ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς εὐδαίμων ἐστί, τὴν χρῆσιν τῶν φαντασιῶν . . . τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐποιήσατο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμᾶς συμψήφους χρὴ τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι . . . (Stobaeus, Wach. and Hense, Lib. II, cap. viii. 30). In the time of Agrippina and Nero such a doctrine if applied to politics would lead to a waiting policy and to much renunciation. It was based on an orthodox study of the Stoic physics (see Stobaeus *Flor.*, Meineke cviii. 60) and on careful study of syllogistic logic (Arrian, *Epict.* i. 7. 32). Nature's work was shown to be the fitting of a man's impulse to the insight which he had of what is right and useful (Stobaeus, W. & H., Γ. xx. 60). The condition of the bad man was shown to be the contemptible and feeble one of inability to harm or help (*ibid.* xx. 61). He taught that power was best seen in the making of men better (*ibid.* xix. 13). But stern discipline was required for this, and some young men were unequal to the test (Arrian, *Epict.* iii. 6. 10). Self-reliance must be learned (*ibid.* i. 9. 29, 30), and deep heart-searching conference must be held with the teacher (*ibid.* iii. 23. 29). The duty in hand must be carefully done (*ibid.* i. 7. 32).

In the first eight years of Nero's reign the young satirist Persius was probably much in Rome, and we can hardly suppose that with eyes wide open as his were to all the city sights and city literature, he, a pupil of the Stoic Cornutus, would neglect to inform himself of so striking a teacher as Musonius. Perhaps we have an echo of some conference with Musonius, which he may have attended along with other young men of political promise, in the fourth satire of Persius. Musonius must often have found it necessary to deal with young aspirants for honor who knew the theories of right and wrong as well as Alcibiades (a good representative of Nero) is said in the

satire to have known. Nor are the references to flattery of the people other than most appropriate to Nero's way of winning favor with the amusement loving throng at Rome. But the young statesman who wished, as Musonius's friends evidently did, to restore the old Roman manners, had to be led by the way of self-examination and repentance and self-reliance. Τοιγαροῦν, says Epictetus, οὕτως ἔλεγεν, ὥσθ' ἕκαστον ἡμῶν καθήμενον οἶεσθαι, ὅτι τις ποτε αὐτὸν διαβέβληκεν· οὕτως ἤπτετο τῶν γινομένων, οὕτω πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐτίθει τὰ ἑκάστου κακά (Epict. iii. 23. 29). Compare Persius iv. 23 :

Ut nemo in sese temptat descendere, nemo.

and again iv. 42 seq.:

Caedimus, inque vicem praebemus crura sagittis.
Vivitur hoc pacto ; sic novimus. Ilia subter
Caecum vulnus habes ; sed lato balteus auro
Protegit. Ut mavis da verba et decipe nervos
Si potes. "Egregium cum me vicinia dicat,
Non credam?" Viso si palles, improbe, nummo,
Nequiquam populo bibulas donaveris aures.
Respue quod non es ; tollat sua munera Cerdo ;
Tecum habita ; noris quam sit tibi curta suppellex.

This satire has the ring of the teacher of Epictetus. Again, in the first satire, by way of protest against the Neronian littérateurs, we have (i. 7)

nec te quaesiveris extra

and i. 26, 27

O mores ! usque adeone

Scire tuum nihil est, nisi te scire hoc sciat alter ? ...

Again in the third satire is a passage which no doubt would be in the spirit of the political Stoics among whom Musonius was a power, iii. 35-38 :

Magne pater divom, saevos punire tyrannos
Haud alia ratione velis, cum dira libido
Moverit ingenium ferventi tincta veneno ;
Virtutem videant intabescantque relictæ.

But not all the Stoic passages of Persius show the Musonian stamp. The passage in ii. 61 seq., "*O curvae in terris animae*," with the long

description of the work of the flesh, has more of an oriental and Pythagorean flavor, such as we find at times in Seneca, then in the height of his influence, but not harmonious with the Musonian school. In the third satire the exhortations to learn the sort of life we ought to lead, and in the fifth satire the warning against procrastination in finding the true end of life, together with the excellent sermon on liberty, — all these are more in the vein of what Persius would learn from the moral instruction of his private tutor Cornutus. I think the passages quoted at length may give us some idea of the effect of Musonius's teaching on high-spirited earnest young men. Nor were older men such as Thrasea, Soranus, and Helvidius likely to keep out of the influence of the stern magnetic teacher as the villainy of Nero's reign deepened, and all compromise with his works and ways was seen to be impossible. Thrasea had shown himself no puritan in early days; at a great festival in his native Patavium he put on the tragic dress and sang. He often travelled and took with him on his journeys Persius, whose training in Horace gave him a good dash of Epicurean love for the pleasures of life. But after Persius's death in 62, warned by the fate of Rubellius in 63, finding that senatorial action was useless and Nero unfriendly, Thrasea began to abstain from useless forms of effort and to gather round him a company of bold protestants. "*Habet sectatores vel potius satellites qui nondum contumaciam sententiarum, sed habitum vultumque eius sectantur, rigidi et tristes, quo tibi lasciviam exprobrent.*" Such language is put into the mouth of Nero's courtier by Tacitus (*Ann.* xvi. 22). Here we catch a sight of the dress and demeanor which we have learned to associate with Musonius's friends. In Arrian's *Epictetus*, we find Musonius trying to train Thrasea to that complete indifference which Epictetus learned so thoroughly (i. 1, 27). Probably the necessities of that hard time morally forced puritanism upon Thrasea, and when converted he became the political captain of the movement whose prophet was Musonius. But Rufus especially influenced the studies of young men, some of whom we can probably name. There was in that company of Thrasea, Arulenus Rusticus, "*flagrans juvenis*" who wanted to veto the condemnation of Thrasea at the risk of life. There was Curtius Montanus who won Nero's enmity, so gossip said, "*quia protulerit ingenium,*" perhaps in the form of

satire that sounded libellous (Tac. *Ann.* xvi. 28, 29). Montanus might perhaps seem a bolder successor of Persius. That he was of a fiery, eager nature is shown by the effect of his oratory a few years later as described in Tac. *Hist.* iv. 42 and 43. Older perhaps and more self-contained was Paconius Agrippinus whose father had been killed by Tiberius. Διὰ τοῦτο ἐπαινεῖν Ἀγριππῖνον δίκαιον, ὅτι πλείστου ἄξιος ἀνὴρ γενόμενος, οὐδεπώποτε ἐπήνεσεν ἑαυτόν· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἄλλός τις αὐτὸν ἐπῆνει, ἡρυσθρία. οὗτος δ', ἔφη, ὁ ἀνὴρ τοιοῦτος ἦν, ὥστε τοῦ συμβαίνοντος αἰεὶ ἑαυτῷ δυσκόλον ἔπαινον γράφειν· εἰ μὲν πυρέττοι, πυρετοῦ· εἰ δὲ ἀδοξοῖ, ἀδοξίας· εἰ δὲ φύγοι φυγῆς (Epictetus, Schweighaeuser, Tom. III, Fragmenta lvi). Here the lesson of content with circumstances had been thoroughly learned, and the searching rebukes of Musonius had taken deep effect. This man was banished at the time when Thrasea was killed and Helvidius sent out of Italy. Ἀπηγγέλθη αὐτῷ ὅτι, Κρήνῃ ἐν συγκλήτῳ. Ἀγαθὴ τύχη. Ἀλλὰ ἦλθεν ἡ πέμπτη· ταύτῃ δ' εἰώθει γυμνασάμενος ψυχρολυτρεῖν· ἀπέλθωμεν καὶ γυμνασθῶμεν. Γυμνασασμένῳ λέγει τις αὐτῷ ἐλθὼν ὅτι, Κατακέκρισαι. Φυγῇ, φησὶν ἢ θανάτῳ; Φυγῇ. Τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τί; Οὐκ ἀφῆρέθη. Εἰς Ἀρίκειαν οὖν ἀπελθόντες ἀριστήσωμεν (Arrian, *Epicteti Dissert.* i. 1. 28-30). Here we have the dramatic posing so characteristic of Musonius's disciples, but to estimate it rightly we must remember it was their means of political and moral protest, and was very effective in establishing their doctrine. Among the many young men who were in this company we must remember the slave Epictetus whom Rufus taught as carefully as any. Annius Pollio, the husband of Servilia, daughter of Soranus, may have been especially bold in this Stoic opposition, for he was of course well known to Musonius, and was banished with him before Thrasea was attacked. That Nero should suspect Musonius as the prophet of the republican Stoics was most natural, as also that finding Thrasea holding the party together he should next year kill him and banish his violent son-in-law; for Musonius had done his work well. A lofty ideal purpose had been breathed into the opponents of the Julian house, and the spirit of martyrs had been given them. When Galba was set on the throne the Stoics became active at once. Musonius indeed would not recognize Galba's death as proving lack of Providence, nor his life as proving the fact of Providence, but his brief rule had given a chance

to the new life which Otho and Vitellius could not destroy. Still at first this new life was eager and revengeful. Helvidius Priscus tried to punish Eprius Marcellus, the accuser of Thrasea, and Curtius Montanus tried to destroy the power of Regulus; nor can Musonius have failed in sympathy with his disciples, for he made a successful effort to punish the traitorous Egnatius Celer. (Tac. *Hist.* iv. 6-10; 40-43.) However, the Stoics tried to make peace between the Vitellians and the Flavians. Arulenus Rusticus, then praetor, was wounded on the embassy by the soldiers of Cerialis,—and Musonius, equestrian though he was, went down among the common soldiers of Primus Antonius, and talked of the blessings of peace and the perils of war till they nearly thrust him out of the camp. (Tac. *Hist.* iii. 80, 81.)

When, however, Vespasian was thoroughly established in power there came a schism in the party. Some, like Helvidius, insulted the emperor till he killed Helvidius and banished the rest; these saw in him still the possible and in some ways actual tyrant. But Musonius must have recognized the improvement, and seen the uselessness of further revolution. He knew what was and what was not in his power. He saw no interference with his essential liberty on the part of the first Flavian. Vespasian retained him at Rome when others were banished, and Titus was his friend. Meantime he could still train young men. Arulenus Rusticus lived on, and a Montanus who seems to be the same as Curtius received two letters from Pliny (vii. 29 and viii. 6). In token of his identity, note the description of him at the end of viii. 6 "*scio quam sit tibi vivus et ingenuus animus,*" and observe Pliny's expectation of full sympathy in anger against the flatterers of Pallas. Herennius Senecio may also have been a pupil of Musonius. At any rate he with Arulenus was active for justice and against such men as Regulus (Pliny *Ep.* i. 5; vii. 33). Pliny himself as a very young man admired and loved the great teacher, and though Musonius probably died early in Domitian's reign, as we have argued above, yet his party lived on to furnish new martyrs in the last gloomy years of the same period. In Trajan's reign the men who revered the earlier saints of the sect were high in favor. In the second century, Stoic philosophy was powerful at court. Musonius, through his party's victory, and through the moral

influence of Epictetus, was then a power in the world. Meantime another Musonius had arisen, named from Babylon, or Tyre, or both, better known than Rufus to the eastern and Christian world. Two epigrams given by Plutarch (*De Ira*, 2; *De Vitando Ære Alieno*, 7) may refer to either philosopher, but have a Roman air, and Plutarch certainly knew Arulenus Rusticus (*De Curiositate*, 15). The distinction which has been made between the two Musonii is, it is true, contradicted by Suidas, but he may easily have confused the two, especially if the eastern one was sometimes called the Tyrian, and so easily confused with the Tyrrhenian. Certainly the Suidas lexicon has made a great error in attributing to Asinius Pollio, of the time of Pompey the Great (s.v. Πωλίωv), the authorship of ἀπομνημονεύματα Μουσωνίου τοῦ φιλοσόφου. Perhaps the name of Annius Pollio is here corrupted and misplaced; the son-in-law of Soranus may have written down a memoir, now lost, of Rufus, while in the next century Lucius reported conversations held with Musonius of Tyre. As regards the words (s.v. Μουσώνιος) ὁ δὲ ἐπεμέλετο βαρῶν ὀπηγίκα φεύγειν αὐτὸν ἐπέταττε Νέρων, that they are not clear in meaning I agree with Nieuwland, whose able dissertation has been a great help to me as to so many others on the whole subject of Musonius. Only one emperor after Nero was opposed to Musonius and his friends, and our Roman knight was long afterwards represented by descendants and known to fame in Italy. See the inscription by Avienus (*Anthol. Meyer*, I, 278) where "*Festus, Musoni suboles*," "*lare cretus Volsiniensi*," dedicates a monument amid Italian surroundings, and lives a life, if we may trust his own description, worthy of his puritan ancestor "*vitam insons, integer ævum*," and boasting of his wife and children, ends with a contrast between the spirit of man and circumstance, which repeats in happier surroundings the old doctrine of Rufus and Epictetus:

vivax et spiritus ollis;
Cetera composita fatorum lege trahentur.

NOTES ON THE ANAPAESTS OF AISCHYLOS.

BY HERBERT WEIR SMYTH.

NO single system of classification discloses all the points of view from which we may study the various functions of the anapaest in tragedy. For the purpose of the present paper, the old division into march and melic, or severe and free, anapaests is more satisfactory than the classification that has been made by M. Paul Masqueray in an interesting article in the *Revue de Philologie* for 1892. According to M. Masqueray anapaests are to be divided into two classes: (1) those that accompany a choric or scenic movement, and (2) those that do not accompany such a movement. Melic anapaests do not appear in the scheme proposed by the French scholar; but, apart from this, the value of such a classification is vitiated by the fact that it is impossible to know in all cases whether the delivery of anapaests was or was not accompanied by a movement on the part of the chorus or an actor.

On the basis of their metrical structure we divide the anapaests of tragedy into march and melic anapaests. The former class presents the following subdivisions:

- A. Anapaests of the parodos.
- B. Anapaests at the beginning of the episodes.
- C. Anapaests at the end of the episodes and of the play.
- D. Anapaests between strophic songs and threnoi.

Melic anapaests appear either in systems or as isolated verses. We are not concerned here with anapaestic feet that constitute a part of lyric verses.

In place of an account of the structure and ethos of the various kinds of march anapaests in Aischylos, we subjoin the statistics of each form of verse.

ACATALECTIC DIMETERS.				A.	B.	C.	D.	T'l
1	UU—	UU—	UU—	UU—	7	2	3	3 15
2	UU—	UU—	UU—	—	7	0	3	4 14
3	UU—	UU—	—	UU—	7	5	3	2 17
4	UU—	UU—	—	—	2	2	2	2 8
5	UU—	UU—	—UU	—	12	3	6	3 24
6	UU—	UU—	—UU	—UU	P. 51	0	E. 320	0 2
7	UU—	—	UU—	UU—	0	1	3	2 6
8	UU—	—	UU—	—	0	1	3	2 6
9	UU—	—	UU—	—UU	S. 5	0	0	0 1
10	UU—	—	—	UU—	7	2	4	5 18
11	UU—	—	—	—	0	0	Pr. 905, 1097, Sept. 1054	0 3
12	UU—	—	—	—UU	0	0	0	E. 994 1
13	UU—	—	—UU	—	3	2	6	5 16
14	UU—	—UU	—	UU—	0	0	Ag. 370, E. 307	Ag. 1568 3
15	UU—	—UU	—UU	—	0	Ag. 788	0	Ch. 400 2
16	—	UU—	UU—	UU—	4	5	6	9 24
17	—	UU—	UU—	—	1	9	7	6 23
18	—	UU—	—	UU—	9	4	9	12 34
19	—	UU—	—	—	0	1	4	4 9
20	—	UU—	—UU	—	10	7	14	13 44
21	—	UU—	—	—UU	0	0	Sept. 812, 1060	0 2
22	—	UU—	—UU	—UU	0	Sept. 853	0	0 1
23	—	—	UU—	UU—	2	2	5	5 14
24	—	—	UU—	—	0	2	3	3 8
25	—	—	—	UU—	3	0	6	0 9
26	—	—	—	—	0	0	Pr. 1109, 1110	Pr. 93 3
27	—	—	—UU	—	5	0	5	2 12
28	—	—	—UU	—UU	0	Sept. 851	0	0 1
29	—	—UU	—	—	P. 47	0	0	0 1
30	—	—UU	—UU	—	Ag. 92	0	0	0 1
31	—UU	—	UU—	UU—	6	2	6	9 23
32	—UU	—	UU—	—	3	0	5	7 15
33	—UU	—	—	UU—	8	2	12	6 28
34	—UU	—	—	—	2	1	6	4 13
35	—UU	—	—UU	—	11	8	20	14 53
36	—UU	—	—UU	—UU	2	2	0	1 5
37	—UU	—UU	UU—	—UU	0	0	0	E. 950 1
38	—UU	—UU	—	UU—	S. 6, Ag. 63	0	Sept. 1047	0 3
39	—UU	—UU	—UU	—	P. 14, Ag. 62	0	0	E. 993 3
40	—UU	—UU	—UU	—UU	0	0	0	Ag. 1552 1
				119	66	152	130	467

PAROEIACIACS.				A.	B.	C.	D.	T'l.	
1	υ υ —	υ υ —	υ υ —	—	4	3	1	11	19
2	υ υ —	υ υ —	—	—	0	<i>P. 155</i>	<i>Sept. 811, Ag. 378</i>	0	3
3	υ υ —	—	υ υ —	—	6	2	9	3	20
4	—	υ υ —	υ υ —	—	8	3	13	9	33
5	—	υ υ —	—	—	<i>P. 33, S. 7</i>	0	0	0	2
6	—	—	υ υ —	—	5	4	6	4	19
7	—	—	—	—	0	0	<i>S. 987</i>	0	1
8	— υ υ	—	υ υ —	—	3	4	12	4	23
					28	17	44	31	120
MONOMETERS.				A.	B.	C.	D.	T'l.	
1	υ υ —	υ υ —		7	2	5	5	19	
2	υ υ —	—		1	1	4	5	11	
3	—	υ υ —		1	5	4	5	15	
4	—	—		3	2	2	2	9	
5	— υ υ	—		8	2	8	12	30	
6	— υ υ	— υ υ		<i>S. 20</i>	<i>Ag. 794?</i>	0	<i>Pr. 162</i>	3	
				21	13	23	30	87	

Sept. 809, Ag. 1522-3, and the responsion 1514-8 have been omitted. Two successive dimeters are metrically alike in *Pr.* 180-1, 1091-2, 1109-10, 1123-4; *P.* 43-4; *Suppl.* 982-3; *Ag.* 75-6, 776-7, 1479-80, 1526-7-8; *Ch.* 720-1, 862-3; *Eum.* 951-2, 971-2. The above numbers, and those in the table, are from Wecklein; elsewhere the references are to the lines of Dindorf's *Scenici*.

The table was first prepared from Dindorf's text, and then, in its present form, on the basis of Wecklein's edition, in order that the statistics should rest, so far as possible, upon manuscript testimony. Conjectures have been admitted only in the very few cases when a verse would not scan; and a dimeter and monometer have been substituted for a trimeter in one place. We do not advocate slavish adherence to the Medicean, and indeed in some passages would prefer a different verse arrangement from that found in that manuscript; but, unless we abandon ourselves to the arbitrary guidance of the ultra-responsionists, it is imperative for us to follow the tradition preserved in our only trustworthy guide as regards colometry.

It is easier to distinguish melic from march anapaests in Aischylos than in Sophokles or Euripides. The following statement of the principles that have been employed in separating one class from the

other, though it contains nothing that is essentially new, will serve to explain the position taken in the present paper.

The metrical differences between march and melic anapaests are differences in respect of feet, caesura, continuity, use of the paroemiac, and catalexis. Melic anapaestic systems may contain many severe anapaests, but they must show one or more of the under-mentioned characteristics. Of the mint-marks that distinguish the melic type of anapaest, some are absolute, others relative. The specific characteristics of melic anapaests are: (1) The presence of the proceleusmatic either in the acatalectic dimeter or in the penultimate foot of the paroemiac. The proceleusmatic is one of the slightest variations from the march type. (2) The use of catalectic monometers. (3) The association of a different character of verse with anapaests (often in proödes and epodes). The metres of different structure which are brought into conjunction with anapaests are, in Aischylos, iambs, trochees, and logaoedics. In Euripides we find also dochmiacs, bacchics, and dactylic series. (4) The employment of a paroemiac at the beginning of a system, and of two or more paroemiacs in succession. (5) The use of a dactyl in the second place in the paroemiac. (6) The presence of catalectic and acatalectic (prosodiac) tripodies. Aischylos makes use of these forms intermediate between the monometer and dimeter. (7) The employment of catalectic dipodies (in form = ionics).

The following deflections from the normal acatalectic and catalectic dimeter are an indication, not a proof, of the presence of melic anapaests. That is, they are found much oftener in melic than in march verses. (1) The occurrence of spondaic verses, where the contractions indicate sadness or despair. (2) The succession of at least four 'dactyls,' a succession which expresses perturbation or anger. Christ regards the dactylic line as an absolute criterion of the melic character. *Hipp.* 1361 is no doubt melic, but *Ag.* 1553 occurs in a passage whose metrical texture is severe in tone. The line in question belongs, however, in class *D*, which shows some affiliations to the melic type in respect of verse incisions. (3) The freedom granted to hiatus and syllaba anceps. (4) The absence of the paroemiac at the end of a system. (5) The presence of abnormal caesuras. But the caesura after the first short of the second dipody,

which occurs frequently in Aischylos (12 times in the *Agamemnon*, 5 times elsewhere), rarely in Sophokles, never (in a genuine verse) in Euripides except *I. A.* 594 (see p. 155), is not a criterion of the melic anapaest. In Euripides such caesuras as *πέρπας Εὐξεί|νου* *ναίοντες* are melic.

Conclusions are not to be drawn as to the march or melic character of a verse: (1) When the dimeter or monometer shows syllaba anceps or hiatus in the interior of a system in violation of the law of synaphea, provided this violation is due to change of persons, pause (expressed by heavy punctuation), occurrence of interjections, or vocatives. (2) When the dimeter shows elision. (3) When a dactyl stands in the second foot of the first or second dipody. (4) When a dactyl precedes an anapaest. (5) When the third foot of the paroemiac is a spondee (only in Aischylos of the tragic poets, except *O. T.* 1311). (6) When monometers are frequent. (7) When responsion exists. Anapaests that express agitation and all free anapaests tend to antistrophic form; but responsion, though often present in severe, as in free, anapaests, is often absent where it might be expected.¹

Tragic melic anapaests are threnodic. In contrast to the equable gravity that usually pervades the severe anapaests, they express a variability and instability that is the result of violent agitation. The grief to which they give expression is either that of intense excitement, or of melancholy, as is the case especially in Euripides. Finally all melic anapaests were sung to recurring melodies in the Lydian and Ionian modes. That the march anapaests were not sung outright follows from the inequality of the length of their systems. Their mode was the Dorian.

¹ In Aischylos responsion does not exist in the parodes, though of necessity there are several systems that contain an equal number of verses. All three parodes have three isolated systems. In the anapaests after choral songs and in the middle of episodes, there are only a few traces of responsion; some passages are certainly not antistrophic. Responsion in the anapaests before the stasima is gained only by assuming textual corruptions in most of the plays in question. Final anapaests are certainly antistrophic in one case, and interjected systems clearly respond in three cases out of four.

The anapaest is an intermediary between the trimeter and the choral measures. It mediates between the action and the lyric comment on the action. It leads up to the choral songs that occupy a commanding position in the economy of the thought. It forms the bridge between the stasimon and the dialogue, even when it subserves the additional purpose of introducing the actor. Its half-lyric nature makes it the fitting prelude to the catastrophe, where a predominance of the musical element had been oppressive. Again the termination of the play often calls for a half-lyric tone that lulls to repose after the storm. On the other hand the anapaest is often the measure of expectation. When the trimeter ceases, and the anapaest begins, we know that something of importance is to take place, be it the arrival of an actor, the singing of the stasimon, or perhaps the catastrophe itself. Aischylos does not use anapaests as the metre of ordinary dialogue between actors, or between actor and coryphaeus.

In the present paper attention has been directed to some peculiarities in the construction of the anapaests of Aischylos that are not commented on in the editions consulted by students. Some matters concerning respension have found a place, but only in reference to the interjected systems of class *D*. Especial attention has been given to the question of dialect, that we may gain a securer foundation for criticism in dealing with such an elusive stylistic artifice as the forms of Doric complexion; and we have sought to fix, as far as possible, the position of the manuscripts in respect of the transmission of dialectal forms.

It may be premised that the Doricisms admitted by Aischylos into his anapaests occur chiefly in proper names or in words that were not used in the ordinary Attic speech of his time. Apart from these, Doricisms are found only in the forms of *ναῦς* and in words which occur in prose, but are used by the poet under special circumstances, as the exclamatory *γᾶ*. Most of the Doricisms appear in the *Agamemnon*, while the other plays of the *Oresteia* avoid their use altogether.

MARCH ANAPAESTS.

A. *Anapaests of the Parodos.*

The primitive form of the anapaest as a march measure is reproduced in the parodos, which was recited by the coryphaeus as the chorus entered the orchestra. The *Suppliants* and *Persians* are alike in that the play opens with an anapaestic overture, while in the *Agamemnon* the parodic anapaests follow the prologue. In these three tragedies the first stasimon follows immediately upon the conclusion of the anapaests. In the *Eumenides*, v. 307-320 precede the first stasimon, and have therefore been regarded by Rossbach and others as falling under the parodic class. Because of the presence of the chorus at the opening of the play, v. 140-178 are rather to be regarded as the parodos, and v. 307-320 as a prelude to the first stasimon, after the fashion that is peculiar to Aischylos. *Prometheus* 120-127 link the hero's soliloquy to the announcement of the approach of the Okeanides, and therefore fall under another division.

In respect of the dialect, the following rule may be formulated. Except in proper names, no case of non-Attic¹ \bar{a} is admissible except it also occurs in trimeters in the same or a similar word. The dialect of the true march anapaest as it appears in the parodos differs from that of its modifications *B* and *C*, in that it lends itself more readily to the adoption of forms that are not contemporary Attic.

Suppl. 2, $\nu\acute{\alpha}\iota\omicron\nu$, as in trimeters *Pers.* 279, 336, *Med.* 1122; $\nu\eta\iota\omicron\iota$, *Suppl.* 719 in M and other manuscripts, is retained by Hermann, Kirchhoff ($\nu\acute{\alpha}\iota\omicron\iota$, Dindorf, Tucker). In melic passages, $\nu\acute{\alpha}\iota\omicron\varsigma$, *Suppl.* 826, *Aias* 356, *I.A.* 260, 300, *I.T.* 410, 891, *Rh.* 459. — $\phi\upsilon\epsilon\alpha\nu\omicron\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$ in 9, as $\pi\omicron\lambda\nu\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\rho\omicron\varsigma$, *Ag.* 62. In trimeters we have $\sigma\tau\upsilon\gamma\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\rho$, *Pr.* 724; $\pi\epsilon\iota\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\rho$, *Ag.* 1638; $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\rho$, *Ag.* 856,—all words peculiar to Aischylos. In melic passages, $\delta\gamma\alpha\nu\acute{\omicron}\rho\epsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma$, *Pers.* 1026, *Sept.* 849 (melic iambs: $\delta\gamma\alpha\nu\acute{\omicron}\rho\epsilon\alpha$, Hermann, Dindorf; $\delta\iota\delta\upsilon\mu\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\rho\alpha$, Wecklein); $\delta\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\gamma\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\rho$, *Pr.*

¹ We use the expression 'non-Attic,' though we are aware that some regard the occurrences in question as survivals of the period when Attic had not yet adopted η in place of \bar{a} .

898; *δυσάνωρ*, *Suppl.* 1064; *εὐανορία*, *H. F.* 407; *μεγαλανορίαν*, *Phoin.* 185 (manuscripts: *-αγορίαν*, *Dind.*); *πειθάνωρ*, *Ag.* 411, *Pers.* 136; *ποιμάνωρ*, *Pers.* 241 troch. (from *ποιμ(αν)-ανωρ*¹); *ποιμανόριον*, *Pers.* 75; *πολύανωρ*, *I. T.* 1282; *τρυσάνωρ*, *Phil.* 209; *ὑπεράνωρ*, *Phoin.* 185; *φιλάνωρ*, *Ag.* 411, *Pers.* 136. On the other hand, even in melic parts, we find *ἀγήνωρ*, *Sept.* 124 (*-άνωρ*, *Dind.*); *ἀντήνωρ*, *Ag.* 442 (*Ἀντήνωρ*, *Eur. frag.* 891₂); *δαισήνωρ*, *Ag.* 154, — all proper names in Homer. In connection with the retention in tragedy of the epic forms, it is interesting to note that, while the Hom. *Εὐήνωρ* reappears as the name of an Amphilochean Argive (*CIA.* II, 186, 187), the centripetal tendencies of the dialect produce *Εὐάνωρ*, name of an ἔφηβος, II, 469, III 95. So *Ῥηξάνωρ* in Thera, *Ἀντάνωρ* in Elis (Polybios), take the place of the Homeric names, whereas *Ἀγήνωρ*, Δ 59, *Phoin.* 281, *Ran.* 1226, appears in this form on an Attic inscription (III, 720). The early use in Attic is not clear from the inscriptions: *Ἀγαθάνωρ*, *CIA.* I, 324 C, II 6, is old (cf. *Ἀγαθήνωρ* in Smyrna), but other evidence for *-ανωρ* is late: *Τεισάνωρ*, II, 465₆, 955₁₆ (second century); *Νικάνωρ*, 469, III 99, III, 1145, B 34; *Τελεσάνωρ*, II, 368₁₂. *Ἀριστάνωρ*, *CIG.* 164₁₅, is not an Athenian. On the other hand, we have *Παντήνωρ*, *CIA.* II, 1024₂ (before 307 B.C.); *Κυδήνωρ*, III, 1621; *Τιμήνωρ*, II, 2407; *Ἀμφήνωρ*, 3503₉. The non-tragic but epic *ὑπερηνωρέουσι* occurs in parody, *Pax*, 53. — On *Suppl.* 17, Hermann reports that *ἡμέτερον* in M has been made out of *ἄμ-*, a statement that is not corroborated by Wecklein and Merkel, though such corrections were made in M, as appears from *Ag.* 45, 47. See on *Pers.* 146 (p. 150).

In *Pers.* 1-64 we find *ναῶν*, 39, 54 (*ναῶν*, Lips.); whereas in 18, M has *νηῶν*, Lips. α with η superscribed. *ναός* occurs in anap. also in *Aias* 201, whereas *Eur. El.* 1348 has *νεῶν*. The use in trimeters is as follows: *ναός*, A. 3 times, S. 3, E. 8; *νεός*, A. 7, S. 9, E. 3; *νηός* has more or less authority in *Sept.* 62 = *Med.* 523, *Soph. frag.* 699, *I. T.* 1385, *Kykl.* 239; *νηῖ*, always; *νῆες*, *Pers.* 417, *Suppl.* 734 (*Dind.* would prefer *νᾶες*); *ναῶν* is found in all manuscripts, *Pers.* 340, 359, *Suppl.* 767, *Soph. frag.* 379₁₀, *I. T.* 10, *I. A.* 1379 (troch.); *νεῶν*, A. 8,

¹ *Ποιμαρχος*, *C. D. I.* 3364₃₂, if correct, is an analogue of *Ποίμ(αν)-ανδρος*, *Ποιμανδρία*. See Prellwitz *ad loc.*, and cf. *Εὐφράνωρ*.

S. 2, E. 6 (*Kykl.* 290 is incorrect); *νηῶν*, *I. T.* 1485. Fluctuation appears in *Pers.* 383, 455, 480, all in the first foot, where *νεῶν* is adopted by some; 457, 478, both with unmetrical *ve-* in the arsis of the second foot. In melic passages *νεῶς*, *Phil.* 516; *ναός*, *Pers.* 963, *Trach.* 656, *Phil.* 217, 1180, *I. T.* 1136; *ναί* and *νᾶες*, always; *ναῶν*, *Ag.* 227 (195 now changed to *νεῶν*), *I. A.* 231, 258, 1319, *Troad.* 122; *νεῶν*, *Ag.* 113, 184, *Aias* 710, *Rh.* 43; *ναυοί*, *Pers.* 338, 350, 370 (*νη*, M), 448 (*νη*, M, etc.), *Phil.* 1027, *Eur. El.* 2, 1241 (conj.), *Rh.* 120, 436, 990; *νηας*, *Suppl.* 744 (Meineke *νεας*, approved by Dindorf), *I. A.* 254. The forms in *η* are proper in non-choral parts only in *νηί*, *νηες*, which may be derived from closed **νη*, **νης*. — 23. *ταγοί* as *Pr.* 96 (anap.); so in trimeters, *Pers.* 324, 480, *Antig.* 1057, *Eg.* 159 (paratragedic); *ταγέιν* (first foot), *Pers.* 764; *τάγευσαι*, *Sept.* 58; *ταγός*, melic *I. A.* 269. *ταγός* was in common use in Thessalian as the designation of the Chief of the Confederacy (*Hellen.* VI, 1. 8, 1. 18, 4. 28, 4. 33; Pollux I, 128), though in the Thessalian inscriptions it is used of a civic magistrate and in Attic poetry *ταγός* is not always equated with *στρατηγός*. Until the publication of the recently discovered Delphic inscription (*Bull. de Corr. Hellén.* 1895, XIX, p. 10, C 13) the use of *ταγός* as an official title was unknown, except in Thessalian, where the *ταγεία* was originally a military institution. See Gilbert, *Alterthümer* II, 10. It is of significance that the inscription referred to shows traces of Thessalian connections in *δαράτα* and the elision of the *ι* of *περί*. Homolle edits *τάγοι*, but *τάγος* should mean "command," as it is the prior member of *ταγοῦχος*, whereas *ταγός* is a *nomen agentis*. The *α* of Thessalian *ταγός* is regarded as short by Hoffmann, *Griech. Dial.* II, 261, on the strength of *ταγοί*, Ψ 160, where Aristarchos' *οἱ ταγοί* has long yielded to *οἱ τ' ἀγοί*. There is no need to differentiate the Thessalian from the Attic word. We have ablaut relation in *τᾱγός*, *τᾱγή*. In *Ag.* 110 the objection to *τᾱγάν* in *a*, *f*, *h* is rather because of *τᾱγοῦχος*, *Eum.* 296, *τᾱγᾱς*, *Lysistr.* 105, etc., than because of the abstract for the concrete. The support for Hermann's *τᾱγαν*, Verrall's *τᾱγα*, usually sought in the *v.l.* *ταγῆν* (*sic*) in *Hellen.* vi. 2. 10, is not convincing. Only one manuscript, though that is B, has the word, but with the same accent that occurs in *Ag.* 110. Five manuscripts have *ταγόν*, whence recent editors have adopted with much probability the read-

ing στρατηγόν. The Thessalian form ταγόν, or the 'poetical' τάγην, would be ill suited to the Athenian Stesikles. Scaliger's emendation of τάης· διοικήτης, προστάτης to τάγης cannot stand against Soping's ταμίης. Cf. ταίῃ· διοικήτρια, προστάτρια. Kennedy edits τάγαν = *ductores*, regarding the word as an instance of the abstract for the concrete. But unless the isolated analogy of διφράγες· τινῶν στρατιωτῶν τῶν παρὰ Πάρθοις ταγαί is accepted, we should have τᾶγάν, which is impossible. Dindorf's ταγώ is the most probable emendation. Blomfield read ταγόν, Keck ταγοῖν. — The caesura in 47 often appears in comedy. In 55 (cf. *Ag.* 67) we find the incision after — — that is rare in the paroemiac. The hiatus in 18 is of doubtful legitimacy.

Ag. 40–103. Ἀτρειδᾶν 44, manuscripts and Rob.; -ῶν, Ald., Turn.; -αιν, Dindorf (who at one time defended -ῶν), Verrall, Wecklein, Gleditsch. Against the possibility of the displacement of an original dual, which, it is assumed, is in place because of διθρόνον and δισκήπτρον in 43, we set the following facts. The tragedians never employ the dual in speaking of the sons of Atreus, even where, as in *Ag.* 123 (δύο Ἀτρεΐδας), *Aias* 57 (δισσοὺς Ἀτρ. = δικρατεῖς Ἀτρ. 251), there is a distinct reference to both. Homer uses the plural, except in *A* 16 = 375 (with δύο; so Aristar., -as Zenod.; cf. *Jahrb.* 81, 584), and *T* 310 (with δειώ; *v.l.* -αι), never the oblique cases of the dual. So with Αἴαντε. In *I. T.* 142 (melic anap.) we find Ἀτρειδᾶν in close relation with χιλιοναῦτα, as in this part of the parodos of the *Agamemnon*. In trimeters the tragedians use Ἀτρειδᾶν, in melic parts Ἀτρειδᾶν, whether they refer to the brothers specifically or to the family in general. Cf. *Ag.* 3, 1088 with 400. It should be noted that the use of Doric in proper names is not confined to passages that display excitement. — 45. χιλιοναῦταν with H superscribed in M. By a reverse procedure α is superscribed in *Cho.* 377 (γῆς), 403 (ἄτην), where the Attic forms are correct. χιλιοναῦτα is proper in the melic anapaests of *I. T.* 141; συνναῦταν, *Aias*, 902 ch. — 47. ἄρωγάν with H superscribed in M, but ἄρωγῆς in 73 is the only reading. It is thus probable that the α forms in the first system of the parodos are due to the influence exerted upon the copyists by Ἀτρειδᾶν. ἄρωγῆν, *Cho.* 477, occurs in a passage that is entirely Attic. — 57. ὄξυβόαν. In this word *f* was lost after *ā* became *η*, whereas νέ*f*α lost its *f* before

ā became η.¹ Hence the native Attic form is βοή, which often appears in the dialogue parts of the three tragedians, in severe anapaests only once (*Trach.* 1262). βοήν occurs in *Med.* 201, in the speech of the nurse, to which non-Attic forms are generally regarded as alien, but it is attested in B alone, a manuscript whose authority is vitiated by its βοήν in 131 (melic anap.). Melic anapaests show βοά, *Pers.* 936. In melic choral passages we find καλλιβόας, *Trach.* 640; ἀδυβόα, *Bacch.* 127; μειξοβόαν, *Aisch. frag.* 392. The trimeter *Ag.* 920, by a singular inconsequence, contains βόαμα (so in f with η superscribed, βόημα in h). The word is confined to Aischylos among the tragedians, but Aristophanes employs it in anapaests, *Nub.* 967, where the beginning of an old song is cited from the dithyrambic poet Kydides of Hermione (Τηλέπορόν τι βόαμα).—62. πολυάνωρος; cf. on *Suppl.* 9 above, and *I.T.* 1282, *Av.* 1313 (melic). The form πολυνήνωρ is unknown, though we have εἰανωρία and εἰήνωρ. *Lykoph.* 851 used τριάνωρος of Helen.—72. ἀτίται is ἀτίται, not ἀτίτα (Herm.). Cf. *Eum.* ἀτίτας 256 (melic).—101. ἀγανά, M, in a corrupt passage. Karsten, Weil, and Dindorf emend to ἀγανή, thus equating the form with the Atticisms that occur throughout the same system. By way of defending ἀγανά Verrall suggests that there was a tendency in Attic to retain ā after ν as after ρ. His list of seven words containing νā in trimeters might be extended by the addition of the Euripidean θοινάσσομαι, -άτωρ, -ατήριον, -αμα, and possibly, of εἰναπήριον, -άτειρα, -άτρια, -άεντος, though these words are reported in various forms. εἰνάσιμος, included in Verrall's list, is a Xenophontic word and open to suspicion as a prose form. But ἀγανά differs from all the words referred to by Verrall in the fact that its ā is a case-suffix. πρύμνāν, *Philokl.* 482, is now abandoned. While it is true that ā appears in trimeters more frequently after ν than after any other one consonant, it must be emphasized that it also appears after β, γ, δ, θ, κ, λ, μ, π, χ, and τ, in some cases several times. In this connection reference may be made to a suggestion of Hoffmann, *Griech. Dial.* II, 361, that in Aiolic κρονέοισι (= Attic κρανοῦσι) on an inscription in *Mithl.* XIII,

¹ Forms with ι (βοιηθέν, βοιήθος, καταβοιήη) on inscriptions contain a glide sound which appeared long after ς disappeared. βοή therefore has a different suffix from πῶα, σῶα, θῶα, etc.

59, no. 9, the *o*, instead of *ă*, is due to the influence exerted by the following *v*. Such an influence is however isolated, if indeed it actually existed, in Aiolic; and differs from that suggested by Verrall for Attic, both in the position of the nasal and in the quantity of the vowel affected.

B. Anapaests at the Beginning of Episodes.

These anapaests represent a development from those of the parodos. There the chorus announced, through the coryphaeus, its entrance; here the coryphaeus may announce the entrance of a new actor (even the deuteragonist), or the new actor, especially if he take the part of a divinity, may announce himself. In Aischylos the coryphaeus often begins the anapaests before the actor has actually appeared—thus preparing the audience for a new scene. The employment, as in *Trach.* 971, of melic anapaests to introduce an actor is foreign to Aischylos. The dialect is Attic except in proper names. In other words Doricisms are doubtful.

Pr. 277–297 (277–283 ch., 284–297 Okeanos). Only here are the entrance anapaests of an actor certainly accompanied by a movement on the part of the chorus. Only Attic forms are used. The incision is peculiar in 293: γνῶσε δὲ τὰδ' | ὡς ἔτυμ', | οὐδὲ μάρτην. The trochaic caesura in the paroemiac 297 is rare.—561–565 (Io). γῆς ἦ, 565 M, b, and the old editors; γᾶς ἦ, d, Vit., Lips., etc.; γᾶς ᾶ, g, Vind. I, despite γῆ 561 in all manuscripts. The passage is preceded by a choral song and followed by Io's lyrics, so that the Doricisms of the inferior manuscripts may be due to the influence of the Doric environment. This is the only case in Aischylos where anapaests introduce a song that is not sung by the chorus. When anapaests serve to introduce choral songs, these are in $\frac{3}{8}$ measure. Here, it is true, after the anapaests, we have a proöde in $\frac{3}{8}$ time, but there soon follow dochmiacs, bacchics, etc.

Pers. 140–154 (ch.).—146. ᾄμέτερον, corrected from ἀμ- in M; ἀμ- with η superscribed in Lips.; ἦμ-, late manuscripts. With γένος ἡμέτερον here, cf. *Suppl.* 17, where the words recur. ᾄμέτερον γένος is found in a melic passage (*Suppl.* 532). ἡμέτερον occurs in anapaests *Suppl.* 2, 968; *Eum.* 975. Only one manuscript has ἀμ- in *Rhes.* 13, where it was wrongly adopted by Matthiae. In trimeters

ἡμ- is the invariable form, and this form occurs even in lyric parts: *Sept.* 627 (dochmiacs; retained by Wecklein); *Eum.* 375 (dactyls), where only ἀμ- is correct. The retention of the Doric form by Hermann alone was ill advised because of the purely deliberative character of the situation. So in his edition of 1830 Hermann retained A's ἀμερέρα in *Antig.* 110, where there is at least some plausibility for the Doricism in view of the connection of 110-116 with the thought and language of the strophe preceding 110. In his other anapaests Sophokles used only ἡμέτερος. — 908-921 (908-917 Xerxes, 918-921 chorus) are composed in Attic. With 922 follow the melic verses of the chorus, whose sudden shift to melic anapaests and to the Doric dialect presents one of the happiest instances of the twofold function of anapaestic verse. The usual metre, the usual dialect no longer suffice when once the lyric impulse is felt. The incision in the paroemiac 917: θανάτου | κατὰ | μοῖρα καλῖψαι is noteworthy, as it is not of the strict type that obtains in the catalectic dimeter. Cf. on *Ag.* 1467 (p. 160). It may be significant that the next utterance of Xerxes (931) is in melic anapaests.

Sept. 861-873 (ch.). — 868. ἰαχεῖν Ἀῖδα in M and the other manuscripts (ἰαχεῖν, Par. E). In favor of the change to ἀχεῖν (Lachmann, Dindorf, Weil, Wecklein; ἡχεῖν, Elmsley, Verrall) the following facts are to be noted. In verbal and other forms ἰᾶχ occurs in Eur. *El.* 707, *Or.* 1465, *Hel.* 1147, *Ion* 499, *H. F.* 883; ἰαχ, with the second syllable long (whether we leave the affrication unexpressed, or write ἰακχ with Porson, is immaterial to our present purpose), in *Phoin.* 1302, *Or.* 965, 1473, *Hel.* 1486, *El.* 143, 1150, *H. F.* 348, *Bacch.* 149, *Herakl.* 752 (unless the glyconics permit ἰᾶχ), 783, *Troad.* 337, 515, 829 (unless we follow Seidler), 1229, *I. A.* 1039. *O. T.* 1219 is corrupt, *Or.* 826 doubtful. To preserve the responsion it is certain that we must substitute ἀχ- for ἰαχ- in *Trach.* 642, *I. A.* 1045, *Phoin.* 1040, 1295 (cf. ἰαχάν 1302), and probably in *H. F.* 1026, *I. T.* 180. In Eur. *Suppl.* 72, B has ἰαχ, the other manuscripts ἀχ, which is to be adopted. In *Med.* 204 the manuscripts have ἰαχ, which is retained by Kirchhoff and Verrall. So *Chr. Pat.* 809, ἰαχάν Brambs after D's ἰ ἀχάν, ἀχάν A, and B *pr. m.*¹ We are not compelled to desert the

¹ ἀχά is surely attested in no tragic passage. In *Sept.* 915 it is a conjecture. We find ἀχεῖν in melic anapaests *Ion* 883 (cf. *Vesp.* 1489) and in melic passages

manuscripts in *Med.* 149, since anapaests stand outside of syllabic responsion, or in *Hipp.* 585, where there is an exact responsion which is not demanded in dochmiacs (cf. 586 with 580, and Wilamowitz, *Herakles*¹, II, p. 211). The substitution of ἀχ- is everywhere possible in the above mentioned passages. In some it is demonstrably correct. The possibility of the change to ἀχεῖν¹ in *Sept.* 868 becomes a probability in view of the fact that the presence of ἰαχεῖν creates a proceleusmatic between 867 and 868, which Hermann and Paley do not seek to avoid. Marks of a careless hand in the metre of 824, 826, and 827-828 (—υυ | υυ—) should not weigh against Aischylos's usual strict procedure or operate to the disadvantage of an emendation that aims at the restoration of that strict procedure. The medial —υυ υυ— of *Eum.* 949 stands alone in Aischylos (ἀκούεσθε, Ahrens; ἀκούεις, Meineke, for ἀκούετε; χώρας for πόλεως, Weil), though it is paralleled by six passages in Euripides and two in Aristophanes. Eur. *El.* 1319-1320 and 1322-1323 are the only other cases of —υυ | υυ—. In the latter case a colon follows φίλτατε. *Suppl.* 9 is certainly wrong in the manuscripts. Rossbach, *Metrik*, 141 (cf. Hermann, *Elementa*, 377) would defend the exceptions to the rule in Aischylos on the ground that, when —ύυ and υυ— belong to different dipodies, the anapaest is clearly separated from the dactyl by its stronger arsis and by the caesura. In *Troad.* 101 we find —υυ υυ— in the same dipody. — With the language of *Sept.* 868 we may compare, e.g. *I. T.* 180 ff. (melic anap.) βάρβαρον ἀχὰν | — τὰν ἐν | θρήνοις μούσαν νέκυσσι μελομένην | τὰν ἐν μολπαῖς Ἄϊδας ὕμνεϊ, | δόχα παιάνων, *H. F.* 1026 (dochm.) ἦ τίν' Ἄϊδα χορὸν ἀχίσσω, and Eur. *El.* 141 ff. (melic monody) γόους νυχίους | ἐπορθρεύσω, | ἰαχὰν μέλος Ἄϊδα πάτερ —. The pathos of the Doric Ἄϊδα in the passage in the *Septem* is evident,

Eur. *Suppl.* 72, frag. 632a; so, too, ἀχημα, ἀχέτης even in Aristotle, ἀχέτας, πολυ-ἀχητος, εὐδάχητος, and βαρυνάχη. In trimeters, ἀχῆ, ἡχέω. ἡχώ is the melic anapaest of Soph. *El.* 109, is noteworthy when compared with ἀχώ, *Hek.* 156.

¹ An analogous substitution has occurred in Homer according to Schulze, *K. Z.* XXIX, 230 ff., whereby the aorist ἐπι-φφαχον was displaced by ἐπ-ιαχον. φφαχον is to be connected with Goth. *swēgnjan* ἀγαλλιᾶζειν, and, originally, has nothing to do with ριφάχω. (The tragic ἰαχέω, ἀχέω are of course denominatives.) From the aorist φχαον arose the present ἄχέω in the hymn to Pan, 18, and the future ἄχῃσεται (?) in Hesychios (μεγαχῃσεται· μέγα βοήσει).

especially if conjoined with $\delta\chi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$. Hence Elmsley's 'Αιδη is to be rejected. Elsewhere in the anapaests of Aischylos we have 'Αιδου , which Blomfield, Weil, and Dindorf (see *Lex.*) would adopt here. Sophokles has 'Αιδου , *El.* 110, in melic anapaests, and L has 'Αιδαν in *Antig.* 822, where many editors adopt the Attic form. If we follow B in *Hipp.* 1366, where E has 'Αιδαν , Euripides uses only 'Αιδην in anapaestic verse. Against Elmsley's $\eta\chi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ is the fact that $\iota\alpha\chi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ never elsewhere displaces any other than the Doric form, and is a *v.l.* only of $\delta\chi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ where the manuscripts vary.

Ag. 782–809 (ch.). The manuscripts show only Attic, apart from $\sigma\epsilon\beta\acute{\iota}\xi\omega$ in Farn., which recalls M's $\sigma\phi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\iota\zeta\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$, *Suppl.* 39. The Doric aorist subjunctive is appropriate, but the Attic present is supported by $\tau\acute{\iota}\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$, etc. To account for the hiatus after 794 Hermann desiderates a paroemiac, the loss of which Christ is inclined to regard as probable. Rossbach accepts the hiatus as Aischylean. The double incision in 806 is remarkable because of the position of the second.

C. Anapaests at the End of the Episodes and at the End of the Play.

Like those of class *B*, these anapaests represent an extension of the original march use. In their stricter use they serve to accompany the departure of an actor or of the chorus. But too much stress may be laid upon their embateric character in the middle of a play. The coryphaeus may in fact fail to recognize expressly the departure of an actor. As the embateric character disappears, the ethic quality of the verse becomes more apparent. The events upon the stage move the coryphaeus to praise, blame, lament, exhortation, or appeal to the gods. Sometimes the lyric note that is heard in full in the stasimon is anticipated to some extent, though the language does not rise to the level of the choral strain. Aischylos, alone of the tragic poets, employs anapaests as preludes to stasima, as he gives greater prominence to closing anapaests than his successors, who gradually restrict their appearance to the end of the play. Attic is the dialect employed except in proper names.

Suppl. 625–629 (ch.) introduce the stasimon. 966–979 (ch.) accompany the departure of Pelasgos, who quits the stage at 976.

977-979 belong to the chorus, not to Pelasgos (Hermann), because, apart from other reasons, the king could not employ anapaests in this situation; and serve to prepare the daughters of Danaos for the return of their father (980). λαῶν occurs in 976, but, since λαός is used in trimeters, the "Dorian" paroemiac is not the cause of the adoption of the Dorian form. The presence of a paroemiac in 974 is somewhat strange, and has been accounted for on the supposition that some verses have been lost immediately thereafter. While it is true that the *Suppliants* presents more occurrences of "abrupt" paroemiacs (cf. 5, 14, 33) than any other play (the only other case in Aischylos is *Ag.* 66, on which and on *Suppl.* 5 see Hermann, *Elem.* 379, whose explanation is improbable¹), the difficulty in adopting such a paroemiac here has, it seems, been underestimated by Tucker, who would join directly εἴη δὲ τὰ λῶστα with ξύν τ' εὐκλείᾳ, etc. εἴη δὲ τὰ λῶστα is an independent prayer according to prevalent Greek usage. Cf. τὰ λῶστ' ἂν εἴη, *Herakl.* 1021; τὸ μὲν ἂν βέλτατον εἴη, *Suppl.* 1055; εἴη δ' ἐπὶ νίκῃ, *Cho.* 868 (a paroemiac at the close of a system, as παισὶν προφρόνως ἐπὶ νίκῃ, 478; πέμπειν πόλεως ἐπὶ νίκῃ, *Eum.* 1009); τὸ δ' εὖ νικάτω, *Ag.* 121. Even *Ag.* 349, τὸ δ' εὖ κρατοίη, μὴ διχορρόπως ἰδεῖν, is not strictly analogous to Tucker's reading.

The other preludes are *Pers.* 532-547, 623-632, *Sept.* 822-831, *Ag.* 355-366, *Eum.* 307-320 (*Cho.* 306-314, *Pers.* 140-149 may also be regarded as introductory anapaests, but have been treated elsewhere). In *Pers.* 532-547 the chorus notice the departure of Atossa, but in 623-632 her departure is not alluded to. Old editors adopted ψυχάν in 630 without authority. Cf. *Hipp.* 174. *Sept.* 822-831 contain metrical corruptions which Verrall would father upon an imitator who was careless of the laws of synaphea. *Ag.* 355-366 are preceded by four iambic lines, as are 1331-1342; but in the latter case, instead of a choral song, there follows the death-cry of the king.

Eum. 307-320 (ch.) have been regarded by some as forming part of the parade. The introductory formula ἄγε δὴ indicates, as in *Suppl.* 625, the movement preparatory to the chorus taking its posi-

¹ There is an "appreciable pause" in the severe anapaests *Suppl.* 37, *Ag.* 47, 356, *Cho.* 862, *Eum.* 309, 317.

tion to sing the *δέσμιος ὕμνος*. These verses are therefore a prelude. In 311 for *ἄμα* in M, Canter read *ἀμά*, a change that has been widely adopted. Nevertheless there is no reason for the appearance of a Doric termination in a passage giving evidence of no unusual excitement. Since all the other forms are Attic, *ἀμή* is to be accepted with Wecklein and Kirchhoff. This is the only certain passage in the tragic poets where *ἀμός* is used for *ἡμέτερος*, as in II 830, λ 166. Since Aischylos is not wont to use the plural of the first person for the singular, *ἀμῆς* in *Eum.* 440 has been suspected. The initial *ā* of *ἀμός* presents no difficulty, since it is used in dialogue as well as choral passages. The paroemiacs in 309, 311 produce the shortest systems in Aischylos. Cf. *Cho.* 308, 311, 721, 858, 1067, *Pers.* 545, 547, *Ag.* 356, *Sept.* 1067 = 1073. The hiatus in 314, which was healed by Porson, is not to be defended on the score of the antistrophic character of the passage.

In *Ag.* 1331-1342 we have a monologue of the coryphaeus after, or accompanying, the departure of *Kassandra* (1314). Such an employment of anapaests occurs only in the earlier plays of Sophokles and Euripides.

Cho. 719-729 (ch.) consists of a prayer after the departure of *Klytaimestra*. The announcement of the arrival of the nurse (734) is made known in four iambics (730-734). 855-868 follow the departure of *Aigisthos* and precede his death-cry. 1065-1076, consisting of two systems, the simplest form of exodos, recalls the use of Sophokles and especially of Euripides. The separation, by the caesura, of *τε* and the preceding word in 864 is noteworthy; cf. *frag.* 1923, *I. A.* 594, the only sure case in severe anapaests in Euripides, where the caesura after the thesis of the third foot is excused by the proper names. The incision in 1073: *νῦν δ' αὖ τριτός | ἦλθέ ποθεν | σωτήρ* is also unusual.

Pr. 877-886 (Io) is the only example in Aischylos of closing anapaests spoken by an actor in the middle of a drama. In Sophokles also there is one such case (*Antig.* 929-943). Cf. *Troad.* 777 ff. Only in *Pr.* 877 and *Suppl.* 625 do closing anapaests consist of a single system. The legitimate hiatus in 877 should be noticed. 1040-1093 (end): the only certain case of antistrophic responsion in closing anapaests (1040-1053 *Pr.* = 1080-1093 *Pr.*, 1054-1062

Hermes = 1071-1079 Hermes), while 1063-1070, spoken by the coryphaeus, forms a mesode. The scheme is α (14), β (9), $\mu\epsilon\sigma.$, β^1 (9), α^1 (14). The diaeresis of the first foot in the paroemiac 1053 is paralleled only in Eur. *frag.* 4753, 550. In 1070 the caesura before $\mu\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu$ is unaccompanied by the usual diaeresis after the first foot. The caesura in 1074 is also noteworthy.

Sept. 1053-1077 form the exodos, 1053-1065 being recited by the coryphaeus, 1066-1071 probably by the leader (*παραστάτης*) of one semi-chorus, 1072-1077 by the leader of the other (the coryphaeus). Responsion (2 + 5) is probably to be admitted between the semi-choruses, though the means to effect it vary greatly with the editors. With the paroemiacs in 1067, 1073, cf. *Ag.* 356. The $-\acute{\cup}\cup$ in the second part of the second dipody of 1068, unaccompanied by a $-\acute{\cup}\cup$ in the first foot, is noteworthy from its rarity. Klotz has however not proved its spuriousness, nor disproved the cases of $-\acute{\cup}\cup$ in the second foot of the first dipody. *Οἰδιπόδα* 1055 occurs in 886, and appears in *Antig.* 380 (both anapaests), and in melic parts of the three tragic poets. Sophokles often uses *Οἰδιπόδου* in melic passages. It is an error to regard the form *Οἰδιπόδα* as specifically local in tone. The gen. in $-a$ is very rare in Boiotian. In Collitz' *Samml. griech. Dial.-Inscr.* there are about 300 certain cases of the Boiotian gen. in $-ao$, and of these at least 120 end in $-\delta ao$; and $-\delta a$ is suspicious.

D. Anapaests between Choral Songs and Threnoi (Intermediate Systems).

The innovation upon the old form of the parodos effected by Aischylos in the *Prometheus* (128 ff.) brought the anapaest into conjunction with melic measures. If we recall the fact that the anapaest was adapted to the expression of grief because of its flute accompaniment, it is apparent that the transition was not difficult by which Aischylos brought the anapaest into close proximity to the threnoi of tragedy. The function of the anapaest is here new. It is no longer a mint-mark of separation between one division of a tragedy and another division. It plays an important rôle in the interior of these divisions.

The anapaests of this class stand midway between those of the previous subdivisions of the march verse and the melic type of anapaest. On the one hand, their intervention between choral songs does not necessitate the abandonment of their severe structure. Their systems remain as regular as those of the parodos. On the other hand, they are profoundly affected by their environment. Instead of the gravity of the stately parodos, the tone reflects that of the surrounding melic. Their ethos becomes akin to that of the sustained laments which we often find in the free anapaests. In view, however, of Euripides' fondness for melic anapaestic threnodies, it must be emphasized that the severe systems are also employed for lament by that poet. As Aischylos employs the severe anapaest in intermediate systems, so too does Euripides. The tone of the intermediate systems in the later poet is not invariably that of profound lamentation.

In general, the interjected systems evince the function of the anapaest as a measure of relief. Retaining their severe structure, they voice a calmness that contrasts with the excited measures of the strophic songs which enclose them. In commatic passages the anapaest is one of the most delicate instruments in the tragic poet's possession. When there is a difference in character or mental attitude, the calmer, the more self-contained spirit, be he actor or coryphaeus, uses anapaests. It is the resolute and sustained Prometheus, the cold-blooded Klytaimnestra, the judicial Athene that employ this measure of relief. And even melic anapaests may be calmer in tone than their surroundings.

Pr. 93-100, 120-127 may be included in this division. From the trimeters 88-92 the transition to the anapaests is immediate. The note that is sounded in 92 echoes through the entire system. So 120-127 follow the trimeters 118-119 without a break, though the five verses 115-119 differ from 88-92 in that the former are partly melic. Not only is the number of anapaests the same, but ἰδίοθι in 92 is recalled by ὀρᾶτε in 119; φεῦ, φεῦ in 98 is balanced by φεῦ, φεῦ in 124 (which corresponds syllable for syllable with 98), and the painful π (cf. *Ag.* 63) pervades the following verses in each system. It is impossible to follow Weil in accepting an antithetic relation between the iambics and anapaests in 88-113. Verses 124-127

announce the approach of the chorus, which takes its position in 128-192. We have here the peculiar usage that the anapaests of an actor accompany the parodos of the chorus, which itself uses melic measures.

The commatic parodos 128-192 contains four systems spoken by Prometheus. Responson between these systems is not apparent, and cannot be restored unless we resort to emendation that is more or less violent. Retaining M's division in 136 ff., this system can be equated with 152 ff. if we regard the exclamatory line 136 as *extra metrum*. This is easier than to suppose $\phi\epsilon\upsilon$, $\phi\epsilon\upsilon$ has fallen out before 152. Hermann thought a dipody had been lost after 156. Responson between 167-178 and 186-192 can be established only by supposing that five verses have disappeared from the fourth system, whether after 187 (Scholefield, Hermann, Nieberding) or after 189 (Weil, who in the year 1861 supposed that four lines had been lost after 141). Wecklein indeed, comparing *Aias* 257, suggests that the absence of responson between systems 3 and 4 is due to the fact that the fourth system forms the close, the chorus in 193 shifting to trimeters. If these four anapaestic systems do not correspond, we must recognize an exception to the usage of the poet as regards the relation of epirrhema and antepirrhema in a *commos*. Elsewhere in Aischylos the anapaestic antepirrhema corresponds to the epirrhema (verse with verse, not foot with foot); as his commatic passages are always antistrophic. Neither Sophokles nor Euripides (except *Andr.* 501-544) in a *commos* with anapaestic epirrhemata permits responson of the anapaests.—With the incision in $\mu\epsilon\lambda\iota\gamma\lambda\acute{\omega}\sigma\sigma\omicron\iota\varsigma$ 172 we may compare that in 188, 294, *frag.* 1924. The arsis falls upon the end of the first member of the compound, and thus sets forth the bipartite nature of the word that is bisected. In *Eum.* 988 Dindorf adopts $\phi\rho\omicron\nu\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha$ $\gamma\lambda\acute{\omega}\sigma\sigma\eta\varsigma$ for $\phi\rho\omicron\nu\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu$, with the usual Attic lengthening before $\gamma\lambda$. As regards the dialect of the foregoing passages, it is to be observed that the words with \bar{a} ($\tau\alpha\gamma\acute{o}\varsigma$ 96, and $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\pi\omicron\rho\alpha\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$ 142 conj., $\xi\mu\pi\alpha\varsigma$ 187) are not foreign to trimeters. On $\tau\alpha\gamma\acute{o}\varsigma$, see p. 147; with $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\pi\omicron\rho\alpha\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$ cf. $\pi\acute{o}\rho\pi\alpha\sigma\omicron\nu$ 61; $\pi\acute{o}\rho\pi\alpha\mu\alpha$ Eur. *El.* 820, *H.F.* 959 ($\pi\acute{o}\rho\pi\alpha\acute{\xi}$, *Hel.* 1376; *Rhes.* 385 anap.); $\xi\mu\pi\alpha\varsigma$ 48, *Eum.* 229 (cf. schol. *Aias* 122).

Ag. 1448-1576 (commos). The use of refrain by Aischylos in *Ag.* 121 = 139 = 159, 1489-1496 = 1513-1520; *Suppl.* 120-121 = 131-132, 141-143 = 151-153, 162-165 = 173-175; *Sept.* 975-978 = 986-989; *Eum.* 329-333 = 341-345, was no doubt sufficient warrant for the parody in *Ran.* 1264 ff. But if the refrains are extended to the first and third antistrophes of the *Agamemnon*, and to the second and third antistrophes of the *Eumenides*, the travesty of Aristophanes gains in effect because of the preëminence of the *Oresteia*. Only the insertion of the additional refrains, proposed by Burney and Schneider, and adopted by Kirchhoff and Wecklein, enables us to restore the responsion in the two plays mentioned. The lacuna after 1458, proposed by Hermann and accepted by Dindorf, in order to equate 1455 ff. with 1537 ff., is highly improbable. The scheme of responsion in Kirchhoff's text is as follows (anapaests are indicated by italics):

Strophe	Kl.	Antistr.	Kl.	Strophe	Kl.	Antistr.	Kl.	Strophe	Kl.	Antistr.	Kl.
A		A'		B		B'		Γ		Γ'	
6 3 3	6	6 [3 3]	6	6 5 3	8	6 5 3	8	7 8 3	9	7 [8 3]	11

Weil has argued that in the responses of Klytaimestra no attention is paid to the first and third refrains. This lack of connection may be explained by the theory of Wecklein that, in each set of strophes, the first division was sung by a *στοῖχος*, the anapaests recited by the coryphaeus, and the third part sung by the entire chorus. As the main idea is embodied in the words of each of the three *στοῖχοι*, it is to each *στοῖχος* that the queen turns in her reply. The lyric character of the anapaests of the coryphaeus is evidenced by *Ἑλένα* 1455 as contrasted with *Ἑλένην* 1464. So Doricisms appear in 1537 (which recalls *Pr.* 152, though there the exclamation is not addressed to the earth) and 1540, where *δροίτας* and *χαμεύναν* should not be rejected for the *η*-forms with Kirchhoff and Wecklein. It is to be noticed that the environment of these anapaests admits Doricisms, while the anapaests of the queen are solely Attic. *γέννας* in 1477, the reading of h, Vict. (*γέννης* with *as* superscribed in f, g), should

not have been adopted by Hermann. It is due to the inability of the scribe to distinguish between the dialect of the anapaests of the coryphaeus and that of those of the queen. *θoinατῆρος* 1502 is correct. Cf. the usage in the trimeters of Euripides: *Ion* 1206, 1217, *El.* 638, 836, *Rhes.* 515, *Kykl.* 550, *frag.* 134. Nauck's *ἐκθoinάσεται* in *Pr.* 1025 has found favor with some. In 1570 *θεμένα* in Vict. and (with *η* superscribed) in *h* is incorrect, because of the calm though scornful tone of the queen. All the other forms, too, are Attic except *Πλεισθενιδᾶν* in *f*, *g* (*ω* superscribed in *h*). Dindorf and Kirchhoff adopt *-ᾶν*, but the Doric aloofness is in place here as in *Ἀτρειδᾶν* 44. The coolness of the queen appears from her abstention from all purely melic forms except the genitive in *-ᾶν*, which is to a certain extent stereotyped.—The incision in 1467, *ἀξύστατον | ἄλγος | ἔπραξεν*, is unusual. Cf. *Pers.* 917, also a passage of lament, though in severe anapaests. Irregular incisions in paroemiacs are not a standard for separating melic from severe anapaests. The hiatus in 1522–1523 is illegitimate, and to be removed by the seclusion of 1521–1522. In 1537 there is a strong pause after the first dipody, and the *γα* may be treated like strict exclamations; cf. *Rhes.* 749. In 1574 the hiatus is defended by Paley (whose parallels are not to the point) and Kirchhoff, who both remove the stop-gap *δ'*. As there is no pause here to excuse the hiatus, we follow Erfurdt in transposing. Verrall's *'μοι δ'* is unsatisfactory. 1553 contains the only pure 'dactylic' line in the severe anapaests of Aischylos. See p. 142.

Cho. 306–479 is a *commos* introduced and closed by anapaests, between which there occur strophes of Orestes, the chorus, and Elektra. This elaborate invocation of the dead Agamemnon, and the incitement to vengeance on the part of his son, form the most complicated system of commatic responsion that exists in tragedy. The prelude 306–314 and the conclusion 476–478, spoken by the coryphaeus, stand outside the responsion. 306–314 represents also, as it were, the conclusion of an act, and 476–478 is one of the very rare occurrences of an anapaestic conclusion to a *commos*. The anapaestic systems are thrown into the part 315–422, and 372–379 form the *mesode* of the entire *commos*. In *Ag.* 1448–1576 and in this passage there is apparently no movement on the part of the chorus. This absence of movement is also probable when the coryphaeus soliloquizes on the events that have just been enacted.

The arrangement of 315-422 is as follows. The distribution of the parts, which is defective in M, is that of Wecklein:

Or.	Ch.	El.	Cor.	Or.	Ch.	El.	Cor.	Or.	Ch.	El.	Cor.	Or.	Ch.	El.
A 8	B 8	A' 8	α 5	Γ 8	B' 8	Γ' 8	β 8	Δ 6	E 8	Δ' 6	α' 5	Z 5	E' 8	Z' 5

The dialect is Attic in all the anapaestic systems. Only two blunders are found in the manuscripts: the superscription of *a* in M over γῆς in 377, and over ἀρην in 403, due to the influence of ἀραν in 382 (ἀραν b, Ald.), while ἀρην in 404 was not tampered with. The systems produced by the paroemiacs in 308, 311, and 314 (end) recall those of *Eum.* 311, 315, and 320 (end). See above, p. 155.

Eum. 916-1020 is regarded by Rossbach as a stasimon, though, according to the ancient definition, a stasimon may not contain anapaests. By others it is regarded as a species of commos. The best parallel is the parodos of such plays as the *Prometheus* and *Antigone*. Of the five anapaestic epirrhemata, the third forms the mesode (here between the second strophe and antistrophos); and of the others, the first corresponds with the last, the second with the fourth, as in the close of the *Prometheus*, where there is also a mesode. The scheme is as follows:

Ch.	Ath.	Ch.	Ath.	Ch.	Ath.	Ch.	Ath.	Ch.	Ath.	Ch.
A 9	α 11	A' 9	β 7	B 9	γ 8	B' 9	β' 7	Γ 4	α' 11	Γ' 4

927-937 corresponds to 1003-1013, but the number of systems (1:2) is not equal, unless something has been lost in 933, a supposition that requires a change in the strichometry in M. Weil as usual disturbs the stichometry far more than Hermann. On the metre of 949, cf. p. 152. The dialect is Attic. There is no alien intrusion of Doricisms from the choral parts, an intrusion that is most frequent in passages of mental tension. In place of the storm in the intermediate systems of the *Agamemnon* we have here the serenity of prayer.

MELIC ANAPAESTS.

Suppl. 162-165 = 173-176. Schmidt and Rossbach would make all these verses anapaestic by reading *κονῶ δ' ἄταν γαμετᾶς* | and *οὐρανόνικον, χαλεποῦ γάρ* |. Hermann inserted *σᾶς* after *γαμετᾶς* to gain a paroemiac. Dindorf (see *Lex.*) would change so as to adopt three paroemiacs, and a choriambic and dochmiac close. The logaoedic close seems to me most probable. Tucker's treatment of the passage is at variance with the scholiast, and introduces a different metrical scheme. As *γαμετᾶς* is a conjecture, the only certain Doricism is *ἄταν* (or *ἄγαν*). This is in place after the Doricisms of the preceding trochaics. *Ζάν*, proposed by Bamberger, is unlikely, as the tragedians, like Pindar, avoid the *a*-forms in melic parts. Cf. *Ζην- Suppl.* 46, 385, 585, 652, 671, *Ag.* 173, *Hipp.* 62 *Ζανός* (*Ζηνός B*), but *Ζηνός* 69 in *ABB*. In *Med.* 209 all manuscripts have *Ζηνός*, where Brunck's *Ζανός* is adopted by Dindorf. In an anapaestic passage, *Eur. frag.* 475^a 2, Dindorf adopts *Ζηνός* in place of *Ζανός*; cf. *Soph. frag.* 229. This passage in the *Suppliants* is the only place where the tragic poets used the nom.-voc. form *Ζήν* (*Ζάν, Av.* 570). — With the shift to *θεῶν* here from *θεῶν* (υ —) in 161, cf. that to *μελίοι* (υ υ —) in anapaests *Sept.* 878 from *μελέοι* in trochaics, 877.

Sept. 878-879 = 886-887 in the threnos. Wecklein thinks these verses belong to the coryphaeus, the melic trochees to the whole chorus, not to Antigone and Ismene. The lament is equally distributed throughout the two parts of strophe and antistrophe; yet in 879 we have *λύμη* after *ἀλκῆ* in 877, and *ἀληθῆ* in 886. With *Οιδιπόδα* here, cf. 1055 (p. 156).

Cho. 1007-1009 = 1018-1020 contains two paroemiacs. The incisions in *μίμνοντι δὲ* | *καὶ πάθος* | *ἀνθεῖ* are melic. In march anapaests we should have had a diaeresis after the first foot in conjunction with the closing | —. Althaus thinks these anapaests with their exclamations offer a contrast to the quieter language of Orestes. The opposite is true. 1018-1020 are distinctly alleviate in tone. Althaus's comparison of *El.* 1160-1162 is vicious, because there the anapaests are inserted in the trimeters of the heroine; and indicate a comparatively late date.

Pers. 694-696 = 700-702 may be regarded as consisting of two prosodiacs and a paroemiac. It is, however, better to scan the first two verses as ionic dimeters, retaining the paroemiac close, though a logaoedic rhythm ($\asymp : - > | \sim \vee | - \vee$) often occurs at the end of a strophe. The assumption of ionics avoids the necessity of resolving the second arsis of the prosodiacs.

In the threnos 922-1076 we find an anapaestic proöde and three pairs of strophes composed either entirely or in part of free anapaests. The severe entrance anapaests of Xerxes 908-917 are answered by the severe anapaests of the chorus, 918-921; and only Attic is used. But the dialect suddenly shifts to Doric with the proöde, which was sung either by the coryphaeus or by the whole chorus. The lyric character of 922-930 follows, furthermore, from the absence of a paroemiac (cf. 934, 942, 973), from the presence of a proceleusmatic in the concluding verse, and from the presence of three spondaic lines (928 is a prosodiac in M, but *ααα* should be repeated). The hiatus in 927 is noteworthy, as the interjection here occurs in the next verse. The first strophe and antistrophos contain only one verse that is not exclusively a melic anapaest. The second pair consists of threnodic anapaests, with the exception of two trochaic tetrapodies. (Wilamowitz, *Isyllos von Epidauros*, p. 150, regards the four verses of Xerxes as ionics.) Hiatus appears in 949, a short final syllable in 950, 962. In the third pair the alloio-metric verses manifest the increasing distress of the king, while the anapaests of the chorus, though melic in construction, show that even here this verse may express relative calmness. After the restful paroemiac in 984 = 999, the excited measures of the king reappear. In the following agitated dialogue, 1074 is anapaestic (with a short final syllable).—In the three strophes Doricisms are constant. The only Attic forms found in all the manuscripts (apart from the *ov* of *Ἰδου*,¹ 923) are *Περσῶν*, 979, and *μῆν*, 992. The former is retained by Hermann and Kirchhoff, but may be an error. In 1013, Merkel reports *Περσῶν* from M (which has the incorrect *ναυβάρων* in 1011), but Wecklein does not attest this reading. In 1017, M has

¹ This mixed form occurs in melic parts: *Ag.* 1115, *Phil.* 1211, *Ant.* 1284, *Hek.* 1076, *Hipp.* 1387, *Troad.* 588; *Ἰδα* or *Ἰδα*, eleven times.

Περσῶν. In both these places and in 924 the inferior manuscripts vary. The Atticism in μήν can scarcely be defended on the score of the formulaic character of the phrase καὶ μήν. If τί μήν, οὐ μήν, ἀλλ' οὐ μήν, οὐδὲ μήν adopt in Sophokles and Euripides the form μάν (cf. *O. C.* 153, 1467; *Alk.* 89; *O. T.* 870, where L, A have μήν), καὶ μήν in Aischylos or his successors cannot be an inflexible Atticism. In fact, in *Ion* 201 we find καὶ μάν, and even Homer has οὐ μάν, ἀλλ' οὐ μάν. In choral parts we find μάν: *Suppl.* 1018 (cf. ἄγρει μάν, *E* 765), *Cho.* 963, *O. C.* 182. The stereotyped character of καὶ μήν in entrance anapaests is no warrant for transferring the expression in this form to a melic passage. Nor is πεπλήγμεθα (1007) in the melic iambics of Xerxes an excuse for μήν. In derivatives of πλάγ-, tragedy adopts the Doric forms with certainty only in πλαγά; πεπλαγμένους, *Sept.* 896, is suspicious. — ἀπηύρα, 949, is not a peculiarly Attic-Ionic form from ἀπ-αυράω. In Doric and in the other dialects before *f* the augment was *η* in the imperfect. Compare ἀπ-ηύρα > *η-φρα* with ἀπούρας > ἀπο-φρας. — Attic forms appear in some inferior manuscripts (Colb. 1 at 934, Par. A at 972). Apart from these, an interest attaches to the Atticizing tendency that pervades the superscriptions in the Lipsiensis (fifteenth century). In the anapaests of the threnos the erroneous *η* appears in 922, 923, 928, 934–936, 953, 959, 997. Elsewhere *η* is superscribed incorrectly e.g. in 54, 18 (a grievous slip due to carelessness as the writer ran his eye hastily over the manuscript in his search for *α*-forms). The superscription restores the correct form only in 146, but the preservation there of the Atticism is due solely to the constant procedure which has attempted to displace Doric forms even in choral songs (*Pr.* 560, *Pers.* 907, and often elsewhere). Superscription in other manuscripts, even in M, seems to be fortuitous and an untrustworthy guide. In *Ag.* 45, 47 the correct form is indeed restored in M, as it is in 1570 in h, but the superscribed *α* in M in *Cho.* 377, 403 is as faulty as it is in f, g in *Ag.* 1477. So, too, with the *ω* of h in 1569.

Allusion may here be made to the presence of Ionicisms in anapaestic verse. Εἰσοιχνεύσιν, *Pr.* 122, is genuine, but it is difficult to convince oneself of the force of the over-sea coloring in Ἀσιῆτις, *Pers.* 61, since in the same parodos we find Ἀσιατογενής (12) and

'*Ἀσίας* (57). Blomfield indeed adopted (the misshapen) '*Ἀσιητιγενής* in 12, but did not have the hardihood to substitute for '*Ἀσίας* the form '*Ἀσίης* ('*Ἀσίην*, Mimnermos 92). In trimeters we find '*Ἀσιᾶτις*, *Andr.* 1, *Troad.* 1219; but in Eur. *El.* 315, Hermann's '*Ἀσίδες* is better than '*Ἀσιήτιδες*. The remoteness of the Ionicism is suited to the tone of melic passages, and we read '*Ἀσιη* in *I. T.* 180, 396, *H. F.* 643, *Andr.* 119 (only *C* has '*Ἀσια*-). The fact that the dialect of the succeeding strophes has been disturbed to the advantage of the *η*-forms makes it the more likely that in *Pers.* 61 we should read '*Ἀσιᾶτις*. Inferior manuscripts adopt Ionic forms in 59, *αἴης*, Par. A, B, Ven. (?); 627, *γαίης*, Viteberg.; 971, *Μασίστρης*, Par. K, L. Casaubon's *νείρη*, *Ag.* 1479, should not have been adopted by Dindorf in his text of 1880.

THE DATES OF THE EXILES OF PEISISTRATOS.

BY HAROLD N. FOWLER.

SINCE the discovery and publication of the 'Αθηναίων πολιτεία of Aristotle various attempts have been made to reconcile the Aristotelian account of Peisistratos and his rule with the facts (or supposed facts) known from other sources. In his note on 'Αθ. πολ. 14. 3, Sandys gives a conspectus of the views of Bauer, Poland, Kenyon, and Th. Reinach, and discusses them at some length, without, however, reaching any definite conclusion. Since the appearance of Sandys' edition, U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (*Aristoteles und Athen*, vol. I, pp. 21 ff.) and J. B. Bury (*Class. Rev.* 1895, pp. 106 f.) have propounded new theories. If I bring forward still another attempt at a solution of the difficulties, it is because one or two small but important considerations seem to me to have been overlooked. For convenience I copy Sandys' table of the four systems of chronology first mentioned above, adding those of v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff and Bury.

	BAUER.	POLAND.	KENYON.	REINACH.	V. WIL.-M.	BURY.
First τυραννίς . . .	5	5	5	5	5	C. 5
First exile	6	6	4	3	4	6
Second τυραννίς . .	1	6	6	6	2	1—
Second exile . . .	10	10	10	10	10+	10
Third τυραννίς . . .	11	6	8	C. 9	11+	C. 12
Years of τυραννίς . .	17	17	19	C. 20	18+	17 to 19
Years of exile . . .	16	16	14	C. 13	14+	16—

Two dates may be regarded as fixed. Peisistratos began to rule in 560 and died in 527. These dates have long been known, and v. Wilamowitz (*l.c.*) has reviewed the evidence without finding a flaw

in it. That the first τυραννίς lasted five years is distinctly stated 'Αθ. πολ. 14. 3, οὐπω δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐρριζωμένης ὁμοφρονήσαντες [οἱ] περὶ τὸν Μεγακλέα καὶ τὸν Λυκοῦ[ργο]ν ἐξέβαλον αὐτὸν ἔκτω ἔτει μετὰ τὴν πρώτην κατάστασιν, ἐφ' ἧς Ἡγησίου ἀρχοντος. So far all is in order, or, at any rate, nobody has as yet objected to the term of five years for the first τυραννίς.

The statement in the 'Αθ. πολ. concerning the duration of the first exile has been rejected with great unanimity. We read ἔτει δὲ δωδεκάτῳ μετὰ ταῦτα περιελανόμενος ὁ Μεγακλῆς τῇ στάσει, πάλιν ἐπικηρυκευσάμενος πρὸς [τὸν] Πεισίστρατον ἐφ' ᾧ τε τὴν θυγατέρα αὐτοῦ λήψεται, κατήγαγεν αὐτὸν ἀρχαϊκῶς καὶ λίαν ἀπλῶς. This has been altered in various ways. Bauer, Poland, and Bury assume that ἔτει δωδεκάτῳ is reckoned from the beginning of the first τυραννίς. This necessitates the change of μετὰ ταῦτα to μετὰ ταύτην (Bauer), referring to τὴν πρώτην κατάστασιν, or the rejection of μετὰ ταῦτα altogether. Bury thinks these words were introduced by a scribe "not understanding that ἔτει δωδεκάτῳ referred to the starting point of the πρώτη κατάστασις," and calls them "erroneously explicit." Kenyon and Reinach change δωδεκάτῳ to τετάρτῳ, while v. Wilamowitz, though confessing that there is no palaeographical probability to support him, changes δωδεκάτῳ to πέμπτῳ to make the number fit the dates; as he says, "so zwingt die Rechnung" (*Arist. u. Athen* I, p. 23). I do not believe in the necessity of any emendation. Accepting the reading of the manuscript of the 'Αθ. πολ. (the only authority we have on the subject), I assume that the first τυραννίς of Peisistratos lasted five years, and his first exile eleven.

Concerning the second period of rule, Aristotle says (15. 1): μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ὡς ἐξέπεσε τὸ δεύτερον ἔτει μάλιστα ἐβδόμῳ μετὰ τὴν κάθοδον, — οὐ γὰρ πολὺν χρόνον κατείχεν, ἀλλ[ὰ] διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τῇ τοῦ Μεγακλέους θυγατρὶ συγγίγνεσθαι φοβηθεὶς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς στάσεις ὑπεξήλθεν.¹ καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, κτέ.

¹ This is properly characterized by Kaibel, *Stil u. Text d. πολ. 'Αθ.* p. 155, as a "Periodenmonstrum." If Kenyon's reading ὡς is correct, there must be some fault in the text lower down. The elimination of ὡς seems to be the easiest mode of emendation, but the rejection of καὶ before πρῶτον makes quite as good a sentence and better sense. That κατείχεν for manuscript κατέσχεν is necessary seems too evident to need argument. Nevertheless v. Wilamowitz, *Arist. u. Athen* I,

Von Wilamowitz and Bury say this is nonsense, on the ground that, as Aristotle has not expressly called the first *τυραννίς* of five years *short*, he cannot say οὐ γὰρ πολλὸν χρόνον κατείχεν of the second *τυραννίς* of six years. And indeed at first sight it does seem as if οὐ γὰρ πολλὸν χρόνον κατείχεν were intended to contrast the second *τυραννίς* with the first. But on second thoughts it is evident that this is not the case. The passage in 14. 3, quoted above, οὐπω δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐρριζωμένης, κτέ., would also (but for the ἐκτω ἔτει) seem at first sight to refer to a very brief rule, for the ἀρχή might be expected to be pretty firmly rooted before the lapse of five years. But the numeral has not been tampered with by anyone, and there is no excuse for tampering with it. Οὐπω τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐρριζωμένης implies that throughout the five years the rule of Peisistratos met with constant opposition, so that it was unable to take firm root. If five years is not a long enough period to allow the rule to take firm root, a period of six years' occupation may fairly be considered short. "He was driven out in the seventh year, — for his power was not (as was seen the first time) such that he could maintain himself long."¹

p. 22, reads κατέσχεν, which he carefully abstains from translating. The imperfect is needed even if the verb refers only to the second period of rule; but there is no reason why it should not refer to the first as well: "He did not (in either case) succeed in maintaining himself long in power."

¹ Comparison of these passages with Herodotos shows that the second *τυραννίς* is not contrasted as regards its length with the first. There is so much verbal similarity between Aristotle and Herodotos here, that, although Aristotle abbreviates, amplifies, and even corrects Herodotos, his account is manifestly based in great part on that of Herodotos. We read then, Hdt. i. 60, Μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον τῶντ' ἄνθρωποι φρονήσαντες οἱ τε τοῦ Μεγακλέους στασιῶται καὶ οἱ τοῦ Λυκούργου ἐξελαύνουσι μιν. οὕτω μὲν Πεισίστρατος ἔσχε τὸ πρῶτον Ἀθήνας, καὶ τὴν τυραννίδα οὕκω κάρτα ἐρριζωμένην ἔχων ἀπέβαλε. If Arist. 14. 3 omits the οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον, it is because he regards οὐπω τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐρριζωμένης as a sufficient indication that the period of rule (five years) was not long. Nor can the failure of Herodotos to give the duration of the second *τυραννίς* be accepted as a proof that it was very short. He may not have known the exact dates (for he had apparently access to less complete information than Aristotle) or he may not have considered them important. It seems to me, too, that the story, Hdt. i. 61, about the neglect of the daughter of Megakles implies that the second period of rule lasted for some years. Certainly Bury's theory that the second *τυραννίς* lasted but a few months is not supported by Hdt. i. 61, τὰ μὲν νυν πρῶτα ἔκρυπτε ταῦτα ἡ γυνή, μετὰ δὲ εἰτε ἱστορεῖσθαι εἴτε καὶ οὐ φράζει τῇ ἐωυτῆς μητρὶ, κτέ., for it would seem but natural that

After the second *τυραννίς* comes the second exile. Here Aristotle gives more information than Herodotos about Peisistratos's movements, yet it is evident here also that, whatever attidographic or documentary evidence Aristotle may have consulted, he did not neglect Herodotos, whose account (i. 61) is as follows: ἀπικόμενος δὲ εἰς Ἐρέτριαν ἐβουλεύετο ἅμα τοῖς παισὶ. Ἰππίεω δὲ γνώμην νικήσαντος ἀνακτᾶσθαι ὀπίσω τὴν τυραννίδα, ἐνθαῦτα ἤγειρον δωτίνας, κτέ. . . . 62. Ἐξ Ἐρετρίης δὲ ὀρμηθέντες διὰ ἑνδεκάτου ἔτεος ἀπίκοντο ὀπίσω, κτέ. Aristotle, 15. 1, 2, says: ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη κάθοδος ἐ[γένετο] τοιαύτη. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὡς ἐξέπεσε . . . πρῶτον μὲν συνώκισε . . . ἐκεῖθεν δὲ παρήλθεν . . . ὅθεν . . . ἐλθὼν εἰς Ἐρέτριαν ἑνδεκάτῳ πάλιν ἔτει τό(τε) πρῶτον ἀναψῶσασθαι βίᾳ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπεχείρει, κτέ. The verbal similarity is not striking, and some details are differently given; nevertheless it seems to me pretty clear that Aristotle or his "source" had the account of Herodotos in mind. Sandys in his note on πάλιν says this "confirms the account of Hdt., implying that Peisistratos had in the first instance retired to Eretria, though we are not expressly told so in the text." Herodotos does not tell us that Peisistratos went to any other place than Eretria, evidently regarding his other movements as unimportant so far as the narrative is concerned. Aristotle, on the other hand, mentions a number of other places, and ends by saying that Peisistratos went to Eretria before making his attempt to recover his power in Athens. It seems to me that the two accounts are to be reconciled, not by assuming that Peisistratos went first from Athens to Eretria, afterwards returning to the same place, but that Herodotos simply does not care to mention his movements before he reached Eretria. Incidentally, this might serve as a hint that those movements did not take many years and were not of the highest importance. Sandys' explanation of πάλιν seems to me unsatisfactory. Still more unsatisfactory is Kaibel's remark (*Stil u.*

some time must elapse before the wife would care to bring such an accusation against her husband. Then after Megakles himself became incensed, some further time may have elapsed before Peisistratos found it necessary to leave the city. The two years assumed by v. Wilamowitz might be long enough, but as there is no manuscript authority for two years and Aristotle says six, it seems not improbable that six may be right.

Text, p. 13) that *πάλιν* seems to be inserted on account of the hiatus. That is no doubt the reason why *πάλιν* stands just where it does, but it is by no means meaningless. The only question is, what does it mean, and what does it modify? Sandys takes it with *ἐλθών*, for which I see no reason. I believe it belongs with *ἐπεχείρει*, and that it means not "back" but "again."¹ In the *Ἀθ. πολ.* the following cases of *πάλιν* occur: 11. 2, οἱ δὲ γνώριμοι (ῥοντο) [πάλιν ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἀποδώσειν ἢ, κτέ., where *πάλιν* may possibly mean "on the other hand," but more probably belongs with *ἀποδώσειν* and means "again"; 14. 4, *πάλιν ἐπικηρυκευσάμενος*, "again," referring to reestablishment of peace between the factions, not to the bringing back *again* (for this was the first time) of Peisistratos; 15. 2, our passage; 16. 9, *ὅτ' ἐκπέσοι πάλιν ἀνελάμβανε ῥαδίως*, where it seems to emphasize the contrast between *ἐκπέσοι* and *ἀνελάμβανε*, but may perhaps emphasize the repetition of the act of recovering the rule, "he recovered it again and again"; 20. 2, *ὁ δὲ Ἰσαγόρας ἐπιλειπόμενος τῇ δυνάμει πάλιν ἐπικαλεσάμενος τὸν Κλεομένην*, where *πάλιν* means "again," referring to the previous presence of Kleomenes (19. 5); 4. 3, *πάλιν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς*, also denotes repetition; 12. 2, 3, 4, and 5 *πάλιν* means "again,"

¹ Herodotos uses the expression *ἀπικοντο ὀπίσω*. Here *ὀπίσω* does not correspond exactly to the *πάλιν* of Aristotle, for Herodotos uses *ὀπίσω* with *ἀπικοντο*, not with any word like *ἐπεχείρει*. In i. 61, *ἀνακτᾶσθαι ὀπίσω τὴν τυραννίδα*, and i. 130, *ἀποστάντες δὲ ὀπίσω κατεστράφησαν μάχῃ νικηθέντες*, and possibly in i. 68, *μετρήσας (sc. τὸν νεκρὸν) συνέχουσα ὀπίσω*, iii. 75, *εἰ μὴ ἀνακτησαίητο ὀπίσω τὴν ἀρχὴν*, and vii. 57, *ὀπίσω δὲ περὶ ἐωυτοῦ τρέχων ἦξειν ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον*, the idea of iteration is implied if not expressed, but in all these cases there is a return to a former place or condition, so that it would be wrong to render *ἀπικοντο ὀπίσω* in such a way as to imply distinctly that it was a *second* return. But in telling of the rules and exiles of Peisistratos, Herodotos seems by special phrases to mark the points from which he reckons time, e.g., i. 60, *μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον*, *ibid.* *οὕτω μὲν Πεισιστρατος ἔσχε τὸ πρῶτον Ἀθήνας*, 61, *ἀπολαβὼν δὲ τὴν τυραννίδα τρόπῳ τῷ εἰρημένῳ*. Now after the beginning of 61 there is no expression marking a fixed point of time. As Herodotos gives no period, even in the most indefinite way, for the second *τυραννίς*, he naturally reckons, in using the expression *διὰ ἑνδεκάτου ἔτους*, from his last fixed point, i.e., from the first restoration. Otherwise we might imagine that *διὰ ἑνδεκάτου ἔτους* was reckoned from the time of Peisistratos's arrival in Eretria. There may have been some special reason for dating in this way which is now no longer to be discovered.

though in a somewhat peculiar and restricted sense, as it merely introduces quotations from Solon's poems.¹

Now if *πάλιν* means "again" and is joined with *ἐπεχείρει*, the connexion of thought is as follows: — "Such was his first restoration. But after this, when he had been driven out, etc., coming to Eretria, he again undertook in the eleventh year (evidently after his previous restoration) to recover his rule, and now for the first time he employed force." The restoration is the only thing repeated, so *πάλιν* refers back to the previous restoration. But if this is the case *ἐνδεκάτῳ ἔτει* cannot refer to anything else. The sentence is made obscure by its length, by the fault in the text in the early part, and to some degree also by the position of *βία* after *ἀναψώσασθαι*, which last is, however, accounted for by the hiatus that would be caused if *βία* stood where we should otherwise expect it, before *ἀναψώσασθαι*.

The second return of Peisistratos took place, then, in the eleventh year after the first. That leaves but four years for the second exile. This is, however, quite enough. To be sure Hdt., i. 61, says *χρόνος διέφν*, but this does not necessarily mean a long time, nor need we assume that more than four years would be required for the business and the political combinations mentioned by Aristotle. Peisistratos had made up his mind to return, he had his sons to help him, and he was not the man to let the grass grow under his feet.

Our chronology is then as follows: first *τυραννίς* B.C. 560–555, first exile 555–544; second *τυραννίς* 544–538, second exile 538–534; third

¹ 12. 5 Sandys' text reads *καὶ πάλιν ὀνειδίζων πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον αὐτ[ῶν] μεμψιμοιρίας ἀμφοτέρων*, and his critical apparatus gives no other reading except *αἰθίς* for *αὐτῶν*. I would suggest *αὐτοῦ* (or *αὐτοῦ*), an objective genitive.

This may be as good a place as any to suggest what I believe to be a new interpretation of the second line of the poem of Solon 12. 4,

*ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὐνεκα ξυνήγαγον
δήμον, τί τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάμην;*

I punctuate (after Jebb, Sandys, and others) with a question mark, and interpret not "why did I stop?" but "in regard to which of these things did I stop before attaining it?" This seems to me to be demanded by lines 15–17,

*ταῦτα μὲν κρᾶται
νόμου, βίαν τε καὶ δίκην συναρμόσας,
[ἐρ]εξα, καὶ διήλθον ὡς ὑπεσχόμην.*

If this interpretation is not new, it has hitherto escaped my notice.

τυραννίς 534-527. This gives as the total for the years of τυραννίς $5 + 6 + 7 = 18$. But the fact that Aristotle gives all his dates in ordinal numbers makes it impossible for us to perform the addition with accuracy. The same fact, as has been observed by others, enables us to reconcile 'Αθ. πολ. 17. 1 ἀφ' οὗ μὲν κατέστη τὸ πρῶτον τύραννος, ἔτη τριά[κο]ν[τ]α καὶ τρία βιώσας, ἃ δ' ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ διέμεινεν, ἐνὸς δέοντα εἴκοσι with *Pol.* viii. (v.) 12, 1315b, ἐν ἔτεσι τριάκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἑπτακαίδεκα ἔτη τούτων ἐτυράννευσεν, by supposing that in one reckoning the fractions of years are counted in the periods of rule, in the other in the periods of exile.¹

So far as mere arithmetic is concerned there is no difficulty in accepting this chronology. It may be objected that the statement 'Αθ. πολ. 16. 9, δίο καὶ πολλὸν χρόνον ἔμεινεν (ἐν) [τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ] ὅτ' ἐκπέσοι πάλιν ἀνελάμβανε ῥαδίως and that 17. 1, Πεισίστρατος μὲν οὖν ἐγκατεγήρασε τῇ ἀρχῇ imply that the last period of rule was much longer than either of the other two. But there is nothing to show

¹ One point in this chronology deserves an additional word. The battle of Pallene is assigned to the year 534. Von Wilamowitz, *Arist. u. Athen* I, p. 24, says: "In der chronik des Eusebius steht (oder hat gestanden) der anfang des Peisistratos richtig zu ol. 544, der tod des Hipparchos zu 65,3; dazwischen steht *Pisistratus apud Athenienses tyrannidem exercuit* zu 59,3 oder 4, also 542 oder 41: das kann nur die schlacht von Pallene meinen ... ich betrachte 541 als ein festes datum für die schlacht von Pallene; dass sie auch 542 gewesen sein kann, ist für jene zeit eine unwesentliche differenz." Now there is a good deal of confusion in the Chronicle of Eusebius as it has come down to us, and such references as that of v. Wilamowitz do not help to clear matters up. The wording of his quotation is that given by Schoene for the *versio Armenia*, where the entire legend is: *Pisistratus apud Athenienses tyrannidem exercuit et in Italiam migravit* (cf. Syncellus, p. 454. 15: Πεισίστρατος Ἀθηναίων ἐτυράννευσε καὶ εἰς Ἰταλίαν παρήλθεν). Now it seems hardly fair to use the first half of this singular statement and neglect the second, though it is hard to see what the second means. Possibly for Ἰταλίαν we should read Ἐρέτριαν, but even then there remains plenty of difficulty. Perhaps some reference is intended to the sojourn of Peisistratos in Eretria or the assistance granted him by the Eretrians. At any rate, until some good explanation of the second part of the statement in Eusebius is offered, it seems rather daring to use the first part to fix the date of the battle of Pallene. Still, if the first part of the statement may be used apart from the second, it fits admirably the chronology I have proposed, for the year 541 is the middle year of the middle τυραννίς of Peisistratos, and not very far from the middle year of his whole period of interrupted power, 560-527.

that 16. 9 refers to any one period of rule, in fact I should think it much more reasonable to refer it to the three periods collectively, and certainly if Peisistratos was already elderly when he obtained the power for the last time, a period of seven or eight years would justify the expression *ἐγκατεγήρασε*. The ordinary duration of a Greek *τυραννίς* must, by the way, have been pretty short and uncertain if Aristotle finds it necessary to call attention to the long continuance in power of a man who ruled nineteen years in all, and those scattered through a period of thirty-three years.

I have tried to interpret the text of the 'Αθ. πολ. without violent emendation. I hope I have succeeded in showing that the dates given in the manuscript do not disagree with the chronological data of Herodotos, and that the account of the tyranny of Peisistratos given in the 'Αθ. πολ. contains nothing impossible, inconsistent, or unreasonable.


APPENDIX.

Iophon, the Son of Peisistratos.

Aristotle, 'Αθ. πολ. 17. 3 f., says ἦσαν δὲ δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς γαμετῆς, Ἰππίας καὶ Ἱππαρχος, δύο δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἀργείας, Ἰοφῶν καὶ Ἡγησίστρατος, ᾧ παρωνύμιον ἦν Θετταλός. ἔγνημεν γὰρ Πεισίστρατος ἐξ Ἀργεῖος ἀνδρὸς Ἀργείου θυγατέρα, ᾧ ὄνομα ἦν Γοργίλος Τιμώνασσαν . . . ὄθεν καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους ἐνέστη φιλία καὶ συνεμαχέσαντο χίλιοι τὴν ἐπὶ Παλληνίδι μάχην Ἡγησιστράτου κομίσαντος. γῆμαι δέ φασι τὴν Ἀργεῖαν οἱ μὲν ἐκπεσόντα τὸ πρῶτον, οἱ δὲ κατέχοντα τὴν ἀρχήν. In 18. 2 it is said that Thessalos was νεώτερος πολὺ than Hipparchos. As in 17. 3 Hippias, the eldest, is mentioned before Hipparchos, the second son, it is probable that Iophon, who is mentioned third, was older than Hegesistratos-Thessalos. But the last was old enough to bring a thousand horse to the aid of his father at the battle of Pallene. If that battle took place in 534 and Peisistratos married Timonassa during his first exile, Hegesistratos cannot have been more than twenty years old, even if he and Iophon were twins. If, as is more probable, he was a year or more younger than Iophon, it becomes evident that Peisistratos married Timonassa during his first period of power. This is, by the way, an argument against setting the date

of the battle of Pallene as far back as 542, for if that date were correct, the marriage with Timonassa must have taken place before Peisistratos first obtained the power in 560.

Of Hegesistratos-Thessalos we know only that he was, according to Aristotle, the cause of the murder of Hipparchos, and that he was later (Hdt. v. 94) tyrant of Sigeion. Of Iophon nothing is known except what Aristotle tells us, from which it appears that he was the third son of his father. Von Wilamowitz (*Arist. u. Athen* I, p. 113) thinks Iophon was the tyrant of Sigeion, and that he may have taken his brother's more sounding name when the latter began to call himself Thessalos, or perhaps that Herodotos is wrong. But the only reason for assuming a mistake in Herodotos or an exchange of names among the brothers (the like of which, Toepffer rightly says, is unheard of in Greece), is that Thuc. vi. 55 does not mention Iophon's name as appearing on the *στήλη περὶ τῆς τῶν τυράννων ἀδικίας*. Thucydides probably gives all the names mentioned on the stele, but the fact that the name of Iophon was not recorded does not prove him to be identical with the tyrant of Sigeion. So far as is known, only those were mentioned who had actually been tyrants (or were believed to have been tyrants, as Hipparchos) or were living when the decree was passed and the stele set up. As v. Wilamowitz shows, the stele cannot well have been set up before 479, and it is by no means improbable that Iophon was then dead. The fact that Hegesistratos, and not his elder brother (like himself half Argive), led the Argive horse to the battle of Pallene may be an indication that Iophon died even before that event. This seems more probable than that he lived through the period of his father's prominence, but allowed his younger brother to lead the Argive horse to Pallene, and afterwards to be tyrant of Sigeion, while he himself was of no importance. If, as Toepffer (*Hermes* XXIX, pp. 463 ff.) thinks, Hegesistratos-Thessalos was made an Athenian citizen, while Iophon was not (which would be an unaccountable piece of favoritism on the part of their father), that might account for the omission of Iophon's name from the stele, but it would still not account for his absolute obscurity. The acknowledged son of Peisistratos could be made so utterly insignificant only by being hidden in the darkness of the grave.



CORONELLI'S MAPS OF ATHENS.¹

BY J. R. WHEELER.

IN the *Athenae Christianae* of August Mommsen, p. 7, there are a few remarks upon a plan of Athens by the Padre Coronelli which are calculated to arouse the curiosity of those who are interested in early maps of Athens. Mommsen says that he should have overlooked the plan, if Professor Conze had not called his attention to it, and placed a copy at his disposal. He further expresses the opinion that, while the map is not of high importance since there is no reason for believing that Coronelli himself had ever been in Athens, it is yet not without certain points of interest, and, at p. 14, he regrets that Laborde should not have published it in his *Athènes au XV^e, XVI^e et XVII^e siècles*.

Laborde too, in the work which has just been cited,² has a long note on the maps of Coronelli, the author of the great *Atlante Veneto*, in the course of which he makes mention of two plans of Athens by the "cosmographer"; at least he seems to mention two, though his words are not as precise and clear as they generally are. The first of these plans he believes to have been based on the view of Athens which was published with Babin's letter to the Abbé Pecoil and upon Spon's map, and in support of this opinion a cut of the Acropolis and the Parthenon as Coronelli represents them is given. This plan is here published on the plate facing this page. Coronelli's second plan, the one noticed by August Mommsen, is vaguely mentioned by Laborde, but no account of it whatsoever is given. With the exception of a passing reference to Mommsen's remarks by Wachsmuth in his *Stadt Athen*, I, p. 79, note 3, and a simple citation of Coronelli's

¹ The larger map referred to in this article is inserted in the pocket at the end of the volume.

² Vol. II, p. 98, note 1.

name by Lolling in Müller's *Handbuch*, Vol. III, p. 293, I know of no other allusions to his maps of Athens than those which have been mentioned. These brief notices are of course unsatisfactory, and I was therefore much pleased three years ago to find a copy of the larger map — the one which is dedicated to Cristino Martinelli — in the library of the German Institute at Athens. It was presented to the library by Professor Conze, and is mounted on linen and bound by itself; that is, the plate is not in Coronelli's *Conquiste nella Morea* as the copy, which will be noticed later, in the St. Mark's Library is. Through the kindness of the authorities of the German Institute the map was lent me, and Rhomaïdes took the photograph of it from which the plate at the end of this volume has been made. It is very slightly reduced from the size of the original and is in all essentials a perfect reproduction of it.

In order to make clear the nature and quality of these maps of Athens by the Padre Coronelli it will be necessary to say a few words in regard to three of the better known and more important plans of the city which date from the seventeenth century. In the year 1658, after the French Jesuit missionaries had removed to Euboea, members of the Capuchin order of monks, also Frenchmen, took their place, and for a century or more the Capuchin monastery was the hospice of strangers from western Europe. A few years after these monks came to Athens, one of their number, Père Simon,¹ acquired for the monastery a property which included the Choric Monument of Lysicrates, and this has remained in the hands of the French government until to-day. These Capuchins have left a visible record of their life in Athens in the form of the earliest real plan of the city which has come down to us. This plan, we may be sure, was completed in the form that Laborde has published it² at any rate by the year 1685, when the expedition of d'Otières was sent to the Levant by Louis XIV for the purpose of making military surveys. It is to this expedition that we owe the preservation of the Capuchins' plan

¹ Spon & Wheeler, *Voyage* (Hague edition), Vol. II, p. 142. "Pour ce qui est des Capucins, ils sont établis à Athenes depuis l'année 1658. & le Pere Simon acheta le Fanari & la maison joignant en 1669." Cf. Laborde, *Athènes au XVI^e, XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles*, I, p. 75, note 2.

² I, p. 78.

which is in the *Bibliothèque Nationale* at Paris and is numbered as *feuille* 34 in the collection of drawings made by the Engineers.¹ In all probability the Engineers made their copy, when at the monastery, directly from the original drawing of the monks, and we may thus attach to it the importance which a drawing done on the spot by persons who were not simply passing travellers might naturally be held to possess. No explanation of the plan directly accompanies it, but Laborde discovered in a general topographical work of the same library an *Explication de la Nouvelle Athènes* which may with some probability be brought into connection with the Capuchin work. The second map of Athens which calls for notice is that published in the work of Guillet de Saint-Georges entitled *Athènes ancienne et nouvelle*, a first and second edition of which appeared in 1675. Other editions followed, and in 1676 an English translation was published in London. Guillet presents his account of Athens as the record of a visit made there by his brother La Guilletière. This book, with all its shortcomings, which Spon clearly enough pointed out, has a right to be called the first modern Topographical Sketch of Athens. Unfortunately, however, Guillet de Saint-Georges had himself never been in Athens, and thus, in spite of his knowledge of the writings of Meursius and of the fact that he was in communication with the French monks,² his work abounds in errors of the kind which would be made by a person who had never seen the places which he sets out to describe. Now, even if we did not know that much of Guillet's information was derived from the monks, three of whom he actually mentions by name in the preface to his book, a glance at his plan³ will show that it must have in the main the same origin with that of the Capuchin monks, the important copy of which is preserved among the drawings of the French Royal Engineers. The expedition of the Engineers did not take place until the years 1685-87, so of course Guillet could not have known, when he wrote his book, the copy of the Capuchin plan which has come down to us. There is, however, one important difference between the two maps in the quarter to the

¹ Laborde, I, pp. 77, 78, note, and II, pp. 60, 62.

² Laborde, II, p. 32, note. Many allusions to the monks will be found on pp. 222 ff. of Guillet's book. The references are to the second edition of 1675.

³ Laborde, I, p. 228, reproduces the plan from the *Athènes*.

west of the Acropolis. On the Capuchin plan the two very distinctive structures of the Theseum and Pnyx are given, while on Guillet's plan nothing of the kind exists. It seems not unlikely, as Laborde has suggested, that Guillet received a somewhat imperfect plan from Athens, and that to this he added the remains of buildings the existence of which he thought was to be inferred from the literary sources that he had studied, and especially from Pausanias. Of the third map of Athens which concerns Coronelli's work it is necessary to say but a word. It is the one which Spon publishes in his well-known *Voyage*. The map has in itself little real merit, but it serves to lend some helpful illustration to the traveller's excellent narrative. He does not allude to it, however, and thus apparently attached little importance to it.

It now remains to consider the origin of the maps which Coronelli has left us, and which have a more or less close relation to those that have just been mentioned.

In the year 1684 the Venetians assumed an aggressive attitude toward the Turks. The Morea was the chief point of attack, and under the able leadership of Morosini and Königsmark the soldiers of the Republic overran the peninsula, so that by the summer of 1687 when the battle of Patras was fought it was wholly in their hands. Soon after in the same year, as a feature in the projected campaign against Euboea, the famous siege of Athens took place — the siege which reduced the Parthenon to ruins. It was of course natural that the Venetian government should wish to have the record of its conquests placed before the public in permanent form, and thus the Padre Coronelli, Cosmographer of the Republic, and author of the great atlas, *Atlante Veneto*, was charged with this work.

In the year 1686 he brought out a folio entitled: *Memorie istoriogeographiche delli regni della Morea e Negroponte e luoghi adiacenti, descritte e consecrate all' Altezza serenissima del sigr Principe, Massimiliano Guglielmo, duca di Brunswick, Luneburg, etc. etc. Generale dell' armi Venete del P. Mro Moro min. conv. Nel laboratorio del P. M. Coronelli cosmografo della sereniss. repubblica di Venezia.*

In this work, together with a rude map of the Attic coast which appears to be only an ignorant enlargement of the general map of the Morea and adjacent regions at the beginning of the folio, is the smaller

plan of Athens which Laborde believed to have been based on the view published with Babin's letter and on the map in Spon's *Voyage*. It may be doubted whether the Babin view influenced the plan at all, but Spon's map,¹ on the other hand, is unquestionably its chief and possibly its only source. A comparison of the two soon makes this plain, though Coronelli represents the minaret of the Parthenon in a slightly different way and makes little attempt to indicate the dwellings within the city wall. The wall itself too he shows more as a real wall, and does not simply indicate its extent, as Spon has done, by a line. The location, however, of the towers and gates and of the irregularities in the line of the wall are plainly the suggestion of Spon,² and the representation of the region near the Theatre of Herodes Atticus is an almost exact reproduction of the French traveller's drawing. The dependence of the Venetian's work upon Spon might be further illustrated by other points of similarity in the plans, and it is shown also in the text which accompanies Coronelli's plates. Spon's remarks indeed are often reproduced almost word for word and it is very plain that the whole account is taken from his book.³ As was to be expected, this map of Coronelli, which has

¹ Republished by Laborde, II, p. 23.

² The exact nature of the wall at this period is made plain in the recently discovered view of Athens now in the Museum at Chartres. It was not an unbroken line of fortification, but the circuit was formed by the walls which enclosed the houses that were situated at the edge of the town. See Père Barnabé's letter in Laborde, II, p. 33. The Chartres view has lately been published by M. Homolle in the *Bulletin de Corr. Hell.* 1894. Compare his remarks on p. 519.

³ Cf. Spon, *Voyage* (Hague edition), II, p. 136, with Coronelli, *Description Geographique*, etc. (French Translation of the *Memorie*, Paris, 1687), p. 90. Spon : "Athenes peut contenir huit à neuf mille habitans, dont les trois quarts sont Grecs, & les autres Turcs. Ceux-ci ont quatre Mosquées dans la Ville, & une cinquième dans le Château. Les Juifs n'y sont pas soufferts, & peut-être ne pourroient ils pas bien s'accorder ensemble car les Atheniens ne sont pas moins adroits qu'eux, & j'ay ouï dire quelquefois ce Proverbe qui court en ces quartiers là : Dieu nous garde des Juifs de Salonique, des Grecs d'Athenes, & des Turcs de Negrepont." Text of the *Description* : "Il y a dans Athenes huit, ou neuf mille Habitans, dont les trois quarts sont Grecs naturels, & le reste Turcs qui ont quatre Mosquées dans la Ville, & une dans le Château. On y souffre aussi des Juifs ; mais les Atheniens ne sont pas moins adroits qu'eux, ce qui a donné lieu à ce Proverbe, Dieu nous garde, etc." Spon's words about the Jews have evidently

been here reproduced, has no real scientific value. It is inferior to Spon's because far less worked out in detail; yet, when we compare it with the views of Athens which were current in the fifteenth century, like that of the *Chronique de Jean de Courcy* and of the *Nuremberg Chronicle*,¹ it marks the growth of a more accurate popular knowledge in western Europe in respect to Athens, and may be regarded as one of the tokens of the gradual spread of the Hellenic renaissance; this too in spite of the fact that Coronelli's maps were made primarily to extend the knowledge of Venetian conquests and were confessedly "adombrati dalle caligini di penna troppo veloce."²

In the years immediately following 1686, successive editions of Coronelli's book appeared. He himself was called to Paris to do some geographical work, and while there he published the *Memorie* in French. The success of this French translation was such that there soon appeared a "pirated" edition in Amsterdam, and Coronelli, in the hope of forestalling this new edition, brought out a sixth edition in French (chez Nicolas Langlois, à Paris, 1687) "aux dépens de l'Autheur," and "augmenté d'un plus grand nombre de Plans, & de Descriptions, que celuy d'Amsterdam, qui a paru le mois dernier." It is from a copy of this latter edition, which is in the George P. Marsh Collection of the Billings Library at Burlington, Vt., that the plate which faces p. 177 has been taken. There are slight differences in the plates in different editions, but they are quite unimportant.³ So far of the map which is based on Spon's work. It now remains to consider the more important and elaborate one, reproduced at the end of this volume.

been misunderstood, or else in the process of passing first into an Italian edition of Coronelli's book and afterward back again into a French translation of it they have become distorted. Many other instances of similarity might be cited.

¹ Laborde, I, pp. 38, 40.

² See Laborde, II, p. 102, note.

³ I have the following note made at the Library of St. Mark in Venice, where by the courtesy of Count Soranzi I was allowed access to Coronelli's works. "The edition of 1687 of the *Memorie* has the same plan and map of the coast of Attica as that of 1686, and also one from a different plate, the map being printed below the plan of the city instead of above it as in the earlier edition. This latter map and plan must be from a different plate, — as the absence of one or two trees shows, and also one or two slight differences in the detail of the map. These differences are wholly unimportant."

One of the editions of Coronelli's work on the conquest of the Morea, which is not dated, but which must have been subsequent to the siege of Athens, was published under the title, *Conqueste nella Morea della Sereniss: Republica di Venezia, nella seconda Campagna della Guerra intrapresa l'anno M.DC.LXXXIV. sotto la valorosa condotta del Cap. Generale Francesco Morosini, Cavalier, e Procuratore di S. Marco contro Meemet IV Imperator dei Turchi*. At page 64 of this folio is the large plan here republished, the same which exists separately in the library of the German Institute at Athens.¹

The main source from which Coronelli drew the data for the composition of this plan is at once evident, and it is made clear by the treatment of the region just west of the Acropolis, that is, the region *really* west which, according to the false orientation of the plan, appears as south. This whole quarter with the Enneacrunus as its central point is a fairly exact copy of Guillet's map.² The error in orientation, too, goes back to Guillet's map, though not to its source, the plan of the Capuchin monks. It is perhaps not easy to say just how this wrong conception of the points of the compass came to be introduced into the plans of Athens, but it might naturally have arisen from the false identification of a single building. For example, when the true conception of the topography to the west of the Acropolis, which in general is reflected in the plan of the Capuchins and that of Spon, was neglected through the ignorance of Guillet, and hence so distinctive a topographical landmark as the so-called Theseum lost sight of, the application of this particular name to the singular structure, marked 22 on Coronelli's plan and 144 on Guillet's, might have introduced a variation of some eight points in the orientation

¹ Note made at the Library of St. Mark: "The folio which contains the large map of Athens has the number xxxiv. 4., 26166. On the back is *Coronelli, Morea Riacquisitata*." (The expression *riacquisitata*, French *reconquise*, appears in the titles of certain of the editions of Coronelli's *Morea*, that for example of 1687 and the French edition already spoken of.) "The map of Athens is found at page 64 of the folio, but the plate is without the dedication to Cristino Martinelli below. On page 64 itself is the view of Athens which is based on Spon's map made from a plate much worn. The large map may have been pasted in after the rest of the work was done. There is no description of the buildings etc., except what is on the map itself."

² See p. 179.

of the map — just about such a variation in fact as is indicated on Coronelli's plan. The processes of the change would be as follows: quite near the Theseum, two hundred paces says Spon,¹ was the figure of a lion; this lion was on the road to Eleusis; if, then, the Theseum is placed at the spot indicated by Guillet and Coronelli, the lion and the road to Eleusis must be in the same region. But Eleusis, it is known in general, lies to the west of Athens, and hence the west is forced around to the direction adopted for it by Coronelli. Guillet had already made the change, though on his map he does not actually commit himself to any definite points of compass.

It may then be regarded as certain that Guillet's plan is the chief source of Coronelli's, but a comparison of the two will show that the Venetian copyist allowed himself considerable liberty. This is evident if we compare the representation of the Acropolis itself — the *Monte Tritonia* — on the two plans. Again, on Coronelli's plan the wall of the contemporary city is much more distinctly defined than on Guillet's, so much more so, indeed, that one might almost suspect its definiteness to be due to some other authority. Then, too, the lion near the Theseum, already mentioned, is of a conventional rampant type on the Venetian plan; Guillet, however, has represented him, indistinctly to be sure, as lying down, and this latter position is as Spon describes him. It would be possible to mention many other instances where Coronelli has evidently copied with a free hand,² but the fact is so patent that it is scarcely worth while to do so, though it should in general be noted that many of the localities indicated on Guillet's plan have been omitted by the Venetian.

On the other hand, Coronelli makes mention of certain things which Guillet has passed by entirely, and this fact shows plainly that some of his material was drawn from other sources.³ Indications

¹ *Voyage*, II, p. 110. See also Guillet's *Athènes ancienne et nouvelle*, p. 254.

² Note for instance that the part of Hadrian's aqueduct near 35 is out of line when compared with Guillet's drawing, and that little buildings at 109 and 114 have been drawn in.

³ I mention every indication that I have been able to observe of sources other than Guillet. It may therefore be understood that in all points where no comparison is drawn between the plans his work is to be regarded as the source of Coronelli.

of this nature are to be found first on the plan itself, and secondly in the brief descriptions of the numbers in the *Tavola delle cose più osservate*.

On the plan itself to the west of the Acropolis we find mentioned the *Cimiterio de Turchi* which Guillet has omitted, but which was a well-known landmark in this quarter, appearing on Spon's plan and later in the views of Stuart and Revett. Coronelli also adds the designation, near numbers 30, 31, and 32, *Strada che va à Negro-ponte*, and this does not appear on Guillet's plan, though Spon has it. Again by a curious confusion the Venetian map gives the *Tempio di Giove Olimpico* twice, once to the west of the Acropolis beyond the so-called Enneacrunus (and here Guillet is followed) and again at 2 within the walls of the contemporary city. This 2 may possibly roughly represent Spon's 12 or perhaps Q on the plan of Verneda and San Felice in Laborde's *Athènes*, II, p. 180.¹ It thus appears that Spon's map may to a limited extent enter into the composition of Coronelli's, though it must at best have been very carelessly used, since we find, for instance, no mention of the Areopagus, probably because Guillet passes it by on his map.²

There are, however, one or two features of the Venetian plan which are not so easily explained. Chief among these is the dotted line encircling the city at a distance from the wall and marked *Recinto della città antica d'Athene*. It is just possible that this may have been developed out of a dotted line on Spon's map which in part follows the same directions, though it is likely that Spon merely indicates by this a road or path. Coronelli's *Recinto* has, of course, absolutely no topographical value. Again, the addition of *rovinato* to the designation of the bridge over the Ilisus is puzzling, since it is not spoken of as being in a ruined condition either by Guillet, Spon or by the compilers of the descriptions of Athens, so far as we know them, which have their origin in the Venetian siege.³ In

¹ Spon's 12 (see his description, II, p. 107) and the Q of Verneda-San Felice are the so-called "Stoa of Hadrian." Fanelli, *Athene Attica*, p. 344, agrees with Verneda and San Felice.

² Spon places this on the site of the Pnyx. In the *Athènes*, pp. 185, 186, Guillet mentions the Areopagus, but on the map it is not given.

³ Spon, *Voyage*, II, 123. Guillet, *Athènes ancienne et nouvelle*, p. 263. Fanelli,

indicating also the bed of the Ilisus, Coronelli has added *hora secco*, an observation which in itself true does not depend on Guillet's map, but is probably taken from his book.¹

If now we turn to Cornelli's *Tavola delle cose più osservate*, there is further evidence of the use of other material than Guillet. The following table is intended to show the probable sources of Coronelli's explanations, so far as they can be determined.

CORONELLI.

GUILLET.

1. The measurements are probably from the papers of officers engaged in the Venetian siege, and they are doubtless in the main correct. See the Verneda-San Felice map, published from Fanelli by Laborde, *Athènes*, II, p. 180. Fanelli, *Atene Attica*, p. 314, says "al presente circonda solo due mila ottocento passi veneti formato però dalle sole habitationi, e da annessi giardini."² These last words should be compared with note 8.
2. See p. 185.
3. See Spon, *Voyage*, II, p. 106. *Map*, 18. Fanelli, p. 345 (depends very likely on Spon). Verneda-San Felice, P.
- 4, 7 and 8 owing to the inexactness of Coronelli cannot be traced certainly. U and Y, however, on the Verneda-San Felice plan represent similar structures, and Y corresponds fairly well with Coronelli's 7.
- 5.

34.

Atene Attica, p. 335. My thanks are due to Edward Robinson, Esq., of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, for lending me this book. Fanelli's book, though not published until 1707, is very likely based in part on the same documents as those which Coronelli used in compiling his *Tavola* at the top of the plan, or at any rate on documents having a similar origin to these. See also the description of the plan of Verneda and San Felice published by Laborde, II, p. 184, no. 16, and compare Wachsmuth, *Stadt Athen*, I, p. 761, note 1. This bridge did not disappear till much later.

¹ Guillet, *Athènes*, p. 264.

² Professors Dietrichson in the *Zeitschr. für bil. Kunst*, 1887, and von Duhn in the *Archaeologische Zeitung*, 1878, have set a good example in publishing the notes of officers engaged in the Venetian siege. It is greatly to be desired that the MS. alluded to by Professor Waldstein in the *Journ. of Hell. Stud.*, IV, pp. 86, 88, should be carefully examined with a view to publication.

CORONELLI.

GUILLET.

- 6.
9. Corresponds very nearly to A in the description of Verneda's *Pianta del Castello*, Laborde, II, p. 184. Verneda, however, gives the number 418 inside measurement. Fanelli, *Atene Attica*, p. 314, has Coronelli's exact figure 478.
10. Coronelli's source here is puzzling, nor is the explanation itself quite plain. The numeral *i* (cf. the form of the numeral *one* in the date 1687 at the beginning of the *Tavola*) which follows *piedi* is not clear. Probably *Cimonium* is the abbreviated word at the end of the remark; see Guillet, *Athènes*, p. 191. The word would doubtless be clear on a copy of the plan which had never been cut for mounting, and I regret having no note on this point from the one in Venice. The nature of the *Recinto basso* is well seen on Verneda's *Pianta*, B. (Laborde, II, p. 182) and on the *Veduta* of the same engineer (Laborde, II, p. 176). Its dimensions must have been about what Coronelli gives. When Fanelli, *Atene Attica*, p. 315, speaks of the *basso recinto* as "col giro di quaranta otto piedi," the measurement may probably be referred to the court out of which gate G leads on Verneda's *Pianta*.
11. Corresponds with Q in the description of Verneda, *Pianta* (Laborde, II, p. 185), except that the latter gives *piedi* 204, not 240, as the length of the temple. Fanelli, p. 317, also gives 204.
12. The explanation, which probably goes back to Guillet, *Athènes*, p. 179, reflects the confusion common at this time which made the cave of the *Panagia spiliotissa* identical with the cave of Pan, and so placed the *Macrae Petrae* in this locality. Spon, II, pp. 93 and 97, points out this error.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.

13.

8.

1.

Athènes, p. 178.

7.

105.

108.

CORONELLI.

GUILLET.

- | | |
|---|--------------------------|
| 17. | I. |
| | <i>Athènes</i> , p. 336. |
| 18. | 90. |
| | <i>Athènes</i> , p. 302. |
| 19. | 83. |
| <i>Figlio di Semele</i> , etc., does not come from Guillet, who mentions the temple, pp. 279 and 307. | |
| 20. | 71. |
| <i>Al quale</i> , etc., does not come from Guillet who simply mentions the temple, p. 304, like Pausanias i, 18, 4, in connection with Theseus and Perithoüs. | |
| 21. | aa. |
| | <i>Athènes</i> , p. 299. |
| 22. | 144. |
| | <i>Athènes</i> , p. 252. |
| 23. | 145. |
| | <i>Athènes</i> , p. 253. |
| 24. | 142. |
| 25. | 140. |
| 26. | 138. |
| 27. | 137. |
| 28. | 136. |
| 29. Omitted on the plan. | 131. |
| 30. | 132. |
| 31. | 133. |
| 32. | 135. |
| | <i>Athènes</i> , p. 276. |
| 33. } | 128. |
| 34. } | <i>Athènes</i> , p. 277. |
| 35. | R. |
| 36. | 123. |
| | <i>Athènes</i> , p. 263. |
| 37. | 124. |
| | <i>Athènes</i> , p. 263. |
| 38. The description is identical with that of No. 17 on the Verneda-San Felice plan, Laborde, II, p. 184. | |
| 39. | 119. |
| | <i>Athènes</i> , p. 266. |

From the foregoing it is evident that Coronelli derived the materials for his large plan from three sources, — first, and chiefly, from Guillet's plan and book ; secondly, in all probability, from Spon, and, thirdly, from documents which had their origin in the Venetian siege of 1687. It is not, however, possible in all cases, as for instance in the case of Nos. 19 and 20 of the *Tavola*, to say just what these documents were. It seems likely that the "cosmographer" may have seen the actual plans of Verneda and San Felice which we now have, but, as we know that many other officers brought with them from the siege inferior accounts and drawings of Athens, it is not impossible that some of these may have been used as well.

Certainly Coronelli's work has no independent value in the study of Athenian topography, but it represents, as has been said, a landmark in the spread of the Hellenic renaissance, and hence may lay claim to a historical value of its own.

NOTES ON PERSIUS.

BY MORRIS H. MORGAN.

- i. 13. *Scribimus inclusi, numeros ille, hic pede liber,
Grande aliquid.*

THE general idea in this passage is clear enough, but critics have always differed in their views of the style in which it is expressed. In this note, without offering much that is positively new, I have brought together the principal opinions with the object of showing that nothing better than the vulgate has been suggested, and that the vulgate itself is intelligible.

The only variant from the traditional text is *numero* in an inferior manuscript (B 5 of Jahn). But on the meaning and syntax of single words, questions have been current from an early time. Thus we find among the scholia: "*inclusi*, cura remoti, aut metri lege coarctati"; and "*numeros ille*, numeri proprie rhythmici sunt, nunc vero metrum significat." Before considering the improvements (?) which have been suggested, it will be convenient to see whether the words, taken in the light of nature, mean anything as they stand.

Scribimus presents no difficulty. For *inclusi*, 'shut up' (or, with Gifford, 'Immured within our studies'), cf. Verg. *Aen.* ii. 45, *hoc inclusi ligno occultantur Achivi*; vi. 614, *inclusi poenam expectant*; Hor. *C.* iii. 16. 1, *inclusam Danaen*; iv. 6. 13, *ille non inclusus equo*; Cic. *Rab. Perd.* 21, *inclusum atque abditum latere in occulto*; Petr. xxvi. *cum inclusi* (sc. in a room) *iacerent* (cf. Ter. *Phorm.* 744, *conclusam hic habeo uxorem saevam*). But why 'shut up'? One of the oldest commentators, Fontius (1477), notes: "quod secretis in locis a strepitu ac turba remotis scribitur"; and his contemporary Britannicus (1481) compared Juv. vii. 28, *qui facis in parva sublimia carmina cella*.

Lubinus in 1603 added Ov. *Tr.* i. 1. 41, *carmina secessum scribentis et otia quaerunt*. Casaubon (1605) cited Quint. i. 12. 12, *cum ad stilum secedet*. And if further evidence on this ancient practice is needed, one may consult Pliny's description of his *Zotheca* in *Ep.* ii. 17. 21 and 24, and his advice to Fuscus on the latter's studies in *secessu*, vii. 9. 1. Instructive too is Cicero's expression in *Legg.* iii. 14: *ex umbraculis eruditorum otioque*; cf. Hor. *E.* ii. 2. 77 *scriptorum chorus omnis amat nemus et fugit urbem*. Old Fontius, it appears, was on the right track; not so Heinrich in his note: "*inclusi* ist verkehrt, von Mönchen ausgedacht, die glaubten, man könne nur in Zellen eingeschlossen schreiben."

We pass on to the rest of the sentence. Again the natural way is (with Jahn, who compares Sen. *Ep.* lxxix. 7, *iam cupis grande aliquid et par prioribus scribere*) to take *grande aliquid* as the principal object of *scribimus*. In explanation of 'something in the grand style' are inserted two sorts of literary productions. The general feeling, as one reads, suggests that they are in poetry and in prose respectively; for of course *numeros* suggests poetry and *pede* equally suggests *sermo pedestris*, while *liber* suggests *soluta oratio* (for *liber* frequently linked as a synonym to *solutus*, cf. Reid's note to Cic. *Acad.* ii. 105). But general feeling is often a dangerous guide, and, as everybody knows, *numeros* does not really mean *poetry* but *rhythm*. One cannot *write rhythm*, say the critics, since it is *in rhythm* that one writes. *Scribere numeros* finds no support in *tendere versum* (i. 65), or *claudere versum* (i. 93), in spite of Hauthal¹ and Kissel²; for *versus* and *numeros* are very different words. A typical example of the proper use of *numeros* is to be found in Ov. *Am.* i. 1. 1, *arma gravi numero violentaque bella parabam edere*; and Persius knew this usage, — witness i. 64, 92; v. 123; vi. 3. But, passing over this objection for a moment, we go on to *hic pede liber*. This, taken naturally, means 'another in prose,' and it can hardly mean anything else. Granting this, *numeros ille*, harsh though it may be (cf. Jahn, ed. 1843, p. 81), must mean 'one in poetry'; and we must say that *numeros* is here used for *carmina* and that it was a new usage, originating with Persius

¹ A. Persii F. Sat. I ed. et castigata ad XXX edd. antiqq., p. 16.

² Specimen Criticum, p. 59.

(unless some lost author first wrote it).¹ The expression is far from defensible as a model. There are many expressions in Persius which the stylist will not defend. But I for one am not surprised to find it in this young unformed poet, any more than I am surprised to find *intus palleat* (iii. 43²) — or than I wonder at blemishes in the works of another youthful poet, — Keats. Persius, in beginning the verse, was following Hor. *E.* ii. 1. 117, *scribimus indocti doctique poemata passim*. His choice of phraseology was unfortunate but the result seems to me intelligible. Not so to all others. And doubtless one of the objections to the above interpretation has always been the feeling that *inclusi* and *liber* form such a nice contrast that *inclusi* ought to be taken with *numeros*, as part of the phrase that means poetry, just as *pede* and *liber* are taken together. It has been thought that Persius would hardly have missed so happy a turn.

Accordingly Hand, in a note in his edition of Gronov's *Diatriba*, I, p. 277, suggested *inclusi numeros, illhic pede liber*. But '*illhic*' (i.e. *illic*) is only ante-classical; and *numeros* is impossible as a 'Greek accusative.'³ For even if nothing else were to be said against it, the *numeri* themselves 'include' or 'hamper' (as Jahn remarks) and are not themselves the sufferers. Gronov himself had suggested

¹ In Verg.-*Aen.* ix. 776

*Crethea Musarum comitem, cui carmina semper
Et citharae cordi numerosque intendere nervis*

the use of *numeros* seems to be at least a step in the direction of its meaning in Persius. The commentators, however, take it in the sense of 'rhythm.' Servius says: *rhythmos facere intentione nervorum; nam numeri sunt rhythmici, ut numeros memini si verba tenerem. Hoc ergo dicit secundum chordas verba componebat.* Ludewig's note is: '*intendere*, steigern, erhöhen. Dem Rhythmus des Liedes durch den Klang der Saiten grössere Kraft verleihen. *Nervis* ist abl. instr.' Benoist: '*sonos edere intentione nervorum. Ordinairement on dit intendere nervos numeris.*' And so in effect Conington, who calls it a mere effort after variety. But is it not possible that Vergil was consciously imitating a use of *ἐντελέω* in Greek? Cf. Plat. *Prot.* p. 326 A *ποιήματα διδάσκουσι μελοποιῶν, ἐς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντελέοντες.*

² See *Classical Review*, 1889, p. 314.

³ It seems likely that Persius never used this construction. Burmeister, *Observationes Persianae*, p. 19, cites *pellem succinctus*, v. 140, as the sole occurrence; but the verb here has the reflexive or middle signification. And the accusatives in i. 78 and v. 86 (cited by Sörn, *Die Sprache des Satirikers Persius*, p. 9) may be similarly explained.

inclusi numeros illi, hic pede liber (*Elenchus Antidiatribes*, II, p. 267), upon which Hand's emendation was hardly an improvement. Markland (*ad Stat. Silv.* iv. 5. 67) read *inclusus numeris*,¹ and before him Cruceus (*Antidiatribe*, II, p. 86) *inclusi numeris*. This ablative has met with some approval (see Pretor's note), and 'hampered by rhythm'² is easy enough to understand. But the very simplicity of the correction is against its acceptance when we consider the obstinacy of the tradition, both in text and scholia, in favor of *numeros*, and the utter lack of reasons for corruption from *numerus* to the 'lectio difficilior.' Some, too, would say that the very nicety of the balance between *inclusi numeris* and *hic pede liber* is just the sort of thing that Persius, the lover of the strange and unexpected, strove to avoid. Emendation, therefore, has done nothing for this passage, and the vulgate must stand.

i. 14. *Grande aliquid quod pulmo animae praelargus anhelet.*

Here *a* has *quo*, and so four or five inferior manuscripts cited in Jahn '43, while P and the others have *quod*. Of the editions, the Paris of 1472 (see Hauthal, *ibid.* pp. xxi, 17), Jahn of '51 and '68 and Bücheler of '86 have *quo*. In all the others, including Jahn of '43 and Bücheler of '93, *quod* is found. No editor of consequence has thought the matter worth a note save Gildersleeve, and he merely remarks "*quo* is not so vigorous." But recently Johann Bieger³ in his general defence of cod. P, supports *quod* here by new arguments (p. 27). He calls attention to Persius's fondness for the use of the accusative with intransitive verbs instead of the ablative of cause. He cites:

¹ After what has been said, Passow's combination *inclusus numeros* (adopted by Heinrich and Maclean) calls for nothing more than mention.

² Cf. Liv. xxiv. 8. 7 *imperatorem . . . nullis neque temporis nec iuris inclusum angustiis*.

³ In his valuable thesis *De Auli Persii Flacci Codice C* (= P of Bücheler) *recte aestimando*. This work is already of great authority in the determination of questions of the text of Persius; witness Bücheler's third edition ('93) in which, influenced by Bieger's arguments, he seems in many instances to follow P simply because it is P.

- i. 124 *iratum Eupolidem . . . palles* (for *Eupolide irato lecto palles*).
- iii. 43 *palleat infelix quod proxima nesciat uxor.*
- iii. 59 *oscitat hesternum.*
- iii. 85 *hoc est quod palles.*
- v. 184 *recutitaque sabbata palles.*

In not a few of these passages he says that the metre forbids us¹ to think that the ablative has been changed to the accusative by scribes. In view of this habit of Persius he concludes that we cannot read *quo* here; further, that, if we read it, we must clumsily supply *quo recitato* or *quo in recitato*.

But Bieger does not seem to see that of his five examples two (i. 124; iii. 85) are cognate accusatives (so Gildersleeve and Conington). There is nothing at all surprising in this construction, whether the verb be transitive or not. Omitting his example with *oscitat*, the other two (iii. 43 and v. 184) are cases of verbs of emotion, which, intransitive in English, are transitive as well as intransitive in Latin. Thus used, *palleo*, for instance, has to be rendered 'be pale at'; *doleo*, 'grieve for,' etc., and the category is too common to need illustration here. But Bieger's view of the meaning of *palleo* as used by Persius seems different; for he goes on to compare *anhelo* with the accusative in the verses quoted by Cic. *N. D.* ii. 112, *gelidum de pectore frigus anhelans . . . Capricornus*; also Lucan vi. 92 *rabiem anhelant*, Mart. vi. 42. 14 *siccus pinguis onyx anhelat aestus*. Yet in all three we clearly have nothing but cognate accusatives. His argument, therefore, does not help us much towards a choice between *quo* and *quod* in our passage. Nor does it illustrate fairly the syntactical usages of Persius with this class of verbs. For, to judge by Bieger, one would think that Persius had the habit of using the accusative (and that, too, not the cognate accusative) with them. But compare *rideo* used with the ablative in iii. 86, and with the cognate accusative in v. 190; *gaudeo* with the ablative in vi. 63, cognate accusative in i. 132; *impallesco* with the ablative in v. 62. It is clear that Persius cannot be said to have had a *habit* in this matter. Hence it is, so far as Bieger's arguments go, still an open question whether *quo* or *quod* is the right reading; and hence Bieger

¹ The metre interferes in i. 124 and v. 184.

is not justified in confidently counting (p. 27 f.) this passage as one of the eight in which P is far superior to a.¹ This conclusion affects only Bieger's line of argument and does not mean that Persius did not write *quod*. He may have done so, and it doubtless is, as Gildersleeve says, the more vigorous reading. But whether the poet always chose the more vigorous way of putting a thing is another question, into which I do not venture now to enter. I should prefer to defend *quod* on two grounds: 1) because the ablative of cause is never, so far as I know, found anywhere with *anhelo* unless here; 2) because the accusative is not infrequently found with this verb. For to the cognate accusatives cited above may be added Lucr. iv. 864, Auct. ad Her. iv. 68, Cic. *Cat.* ii. 1, Stat. *Theb.* xi. 7. So far is the accusative from being unusual that dictionaries treat the verb as a real transitive as well as intransitive, assigning to it the meaning 'emit.' This finds its best support in Stat. *Theb.* xi. 241 *haec trepido vix intellectus anhelat*; cf. also Cic. *de Or.* iii. 41 *verba . . . inflata et quasi anhelata*, Ov. *H.* xii. 15 *anhelatos ignes* (so *F.* iv. 492). If this view be adopted, Conington rightly translates 'to be panted forth by the lungs with a vast expenditure of breath.'

i. 60. *Nec linguae quantum sitiāt canis Apula tantae.*

On *sitiāt*, Bieger (p. 2) remarks: "coniunctivus nullo modo satis explicandus." But the usage, which has passed without note in the editions, is merely potential and it is sufficiently illustrated by Hor. *S.* i. 6. 127 *pransus non avide, quantum interpellat inani Ventre diem durare*; Mart. xii. 83. 4 *dicentem tumidas in hydrocelas Quantum nec duo dicerent Catulli*; Juv. v. 69 *solidae iam mucida frustra farinae, Quae genuinum agitent*. Bieger's remark, however, is part of a general attack which he makes (p. 2 f.) upon the versification of Persius, and which he ends with the words: "huius poetae arti metricae parum perfectae atque eleganti." Without disputing for the moment this conclusion, one may examine the grounds upon which it is based.

¹ On the same principle his preference for *iram scintillant* iii. 116, another of his eight passages, could be attacked; but there now seems to be some doubt about the real reading of P here (see Bücheler's third edition).

Bücheler, in his well-known article in the *Rh. Mus.* (XLI, p. 454 ff.), observed that where the two recensions represented by *a* and *P* agree, we must follow their tradition (save in a few cases of mere orthographical blunders) in all except in five passages (i. 97; i. 111; ii. 19; iii. 66; v. 134). Bieger holds that in two of these five the tradition is not at fault. In each of these the question at issue is one of metre. In iii. 66

discite, o miseri, et causas cognoscite rerum

and in v. 134

et quid agam? rogas? en saperdas advehe Ponto,

he believes that the hiatus in the one and the use of *rogas* as a pyrrhic in the other were blunders which Persius was likely to have committed. He proceeds to prove his theory by criticizing ten other passages as being metrically unsound. Mr. G. R. Scott in a notice of Bieger's thesis (*Classical Review*, 1890, p. 467 f.) briefly remarked that, in some of these, grammar, not metre, had been sacrificed. Let us look at them in detail.

In four of the ten (ii. 13; ii. 10; iii. 9; v. 57) the metre does seem to limp. But in the first, ii. 13

inpello, expungam, nam et est scabiosus et acri

codd. *a* and *P* do not agree. Only *a* has the verse as just quoted, while *P* has the impossible *nam est* which *p* (the second hand of *P*) corrected to *namque est*, the reading of many other manuscripts and of the vulgate. Such a passage cannot be accepted in evidence against the poet. In ii. 10

o si

Ebulliat patruus, praeclarum funus, et o si

not only are the manuscripts again at odds (*P* reading *ebulliat*, *a* *ebullit*, and inferior manuscripts *ebullet*¹), but also modern authori-

¹ There is really no essential difference in meaning between *bullo* and *bullio*. The former occurs (see Neue, *Formenl.*³ IIL, p. 291) five times intransitively, of the bubbling of liquids (Calp. i. 11; Plin. *N. H.* ix. 18; xviii. 359; xxviii. 68; Cato, *R. R.* 105. 1). The latter occurs about as often in the same sense (Pers. iii. 34; Apic. viii. § 334; 345; etc.; Vitruv. viii. 3. 2), and in a metaphorical sense in Apul. *Met.* x. 24, p. 250, 34 *ne bulliret indignatione* and in Hieron. *ad Eustach.* p. 236,

ties on metre are not agreed altogether to condemn such a synezesis as *ebulliat*.¹ Here again therefore we must hesitate before accusing Persius too harshly. The third passage is iii. 9 in which we find the verb *rūdere* with a long vowel, contrary to all the extant usage except in the imitation of this verse in Auson. *Ep.* (5) 76. 3 (p. 313 Peiper). But does this necessarily mean that Persius committed a downright metrical blunder? Is it likely that a man of his education and surroundings would not have known how to pronounce a word so common as *rudere* must have been? If he blundered, is it probable that Cornutus, in correcting his pupil's manuscript, would have suffered so obvious an error to stand as a mark for ridicule? Hardly. What is to be said when we find *strīgibus* in Plautus, but *strīgibus* in Ovid and Propertius, — *cōturnix* in Plautus and Lucretius, but *cōturnix* in Ovid and Juvenal, — *glōmus* in Lucretius, but *glōmus* in Horace?² That either of these poets made a blunder? Rather that each was following the pronunciation in vogue in his own day. Now what are the facts about *rudere*? Vergil and Ovid have *u* short, while Persius has it long. Between the deaths of Ovid and Persius there are only two years less than there were between the deaths of Lucretius and Horace, — 45 in the one case, 47 in the other. This is ample time for the pronunciation to have changed.³ The fourth passage is v. 57

hic campo indulget, hunc alea decoquit, ille.

1. 1. *libidine incendia bulliebant*. But when we come to the compound verb we find a different state of things. Only *ebullio*, not *ebullo*, is found in the authors outside of Persius, and it is used metaphorically (cf. Sen. *Apoc.* iv. 2; Petr. xlii.; lxii.; Cic. *Tusc.* iii. 42; *Fin.* v. 80; Apul. *Met.* ii. 30, p. 128; Tert. *Idol.* iii; cf. *ad Scap.* iii). When we find the phrase *animam ebullire* in Seneca and in Petronius, the odds are heavily in favor of the same verb in Persius. But of course there is no intrinsic reason why *ebullo* may not also have been in use, although we do not find it in the remains of Latin literature.

¹ See Christ, *Metrik*,² p. 32; Müller, *de R. M.*² p. 299 ff.; Lachmann *ad Lucr.* iii. 917. Instances of synezesis in Persius are *pituita*, ii. 57; *tenuia*, v. 93; *deinde*, iv. 8; v. 143. Note also the Pompeian verse (*CIL.* IV, 813)

Otiosis locus non hic est. discede morator.

² Cf. Stolz, *Hist. Gramm. der Lat. Spr.*, I, p. 226; Müller, *de R. M.* p. 436 ff.

³ It may also be thought that Vergil and Ovid were following the 'dictionary' pronunciation, Persius that of everyday life; cf. Quint. i. 6. 21 and 27.

Here Bieger admits that ictus and caesura (penthemimeral at that!) are some excuse for *-ēt*; and well he may, particularly considering that this may be a survival of original long *-ēt*; cf. *subiit*, ii. 55, and my note in the *Classical Review*, 1889, p. 10. This is hardly the sort of thing to charge up severely against one who was such an imitator of Horace, who has the license a dozen times. It is unlikely that Persius would have observed the fact that the license is not admitted in the *Epodes* and *Epistles*; enough for him that it was employed by most of the great poets from Ennius down. It is scarcely to be called a metrical fault, but it was perhaps an error of taste; for the license began to find disfavor under Augustus and it is almost obsolete in the Silver Age.¹

In the remaining six of Bieger's ten passages the difficulties are not in themselves metrical but syntactical. Scott, as we have seen (p. 197), felt that Bieger's citation of these did nothing towards proving his point, but Bieger would probably contend that the poet could not swing the metre freely enough, being so hampered by its requirements that he forced the laws of language in his anxiety to fulfil the bare necessities of the metre. The first two cases occur in the same sentence, iii. 28 f.,

*an deceat pulmonem rumpere ventis
Stemmate quod Tusco ramum millesime ducis
Censoreme tuum vel quod trabeate salutas?*

With this passage Bieger might have compared i. 123,

*audaci quicumque adflate Cratino
Iratum Eupolidem praegrandi cum sene palles.*

For all three belong together. On the last, Gildersleeve remarks: "Persius, like some other Roman poets, goes beyond reasonable bounds in the use of the vocative as predicate. The Greeks were cautious and in Vergil the vocative may be detached and felt as such,² but not here, nor in iii. 28." The examples generally cited here in support of Persius's usage (Verg. *Aen.* ii. 283; ix. 485; Hor.

¹ On it, see Christ, *Metrik*,² p. 200; Müller, *de R. M.*² p. 396 ff., especially p. 405 ff. The latter indeed admits *metuis* in vi. 26, but here P reads *metuas*.

² So it may in Pers. iv. 124.

S. ii. 6. 20; Tib. i. 7. 53) do not, with one exception (Juv. vi. 277) supply us with anything so harsh as Persius's uses of the vocative as predicate in a relative clause. Bieger's next case also occurs in the same sentence. It is the collocation *-ve . . . vel*, in support of which, in spite of the pages that have been written, nothing satisfactory has been said.¹ If the text is correct (a and P do not here agree) the superfluous particle was tucked in carelessly as the needed extra syllable. The fourth of Bieger's six is v. 114, where he says of *liberque ac sapiens*: "absurdum est *-que . . . ac*, quoniam hoc toto loco ostendere studet poeta idem esse sapientem fieri et liberum." The sequence *-que . . . ac* (or *atque*) is certainly rare though it is found (the grammars and the dictionary to the contrary) earlier than Vergil in poetry and Livy in prose; cf. Lucr. v. 31 and Munro's note, also Varro ap. Non. p. 75, 20. But Bieger's line of criticism might as well be applied to Verg. *Georg.* i. 182 *saepe exiguus mus Sub terris posuitque domos atque horrea fecit*. Or the idea in *ac* may be 'and so,' 'and thus,' in both passages. A better passage for Bieger's purpose would have been ii. 32 *frontemque atque uda labella* where the rare combination seems certainly to be used for the metre. Bieger's fifth passage is i. 60, wherein the subjunctive *sitiat* has already been defended (p. 196). His sixth is iv. 2, where the 'historical' present *tollit* in a relative clause is exceedingly harsh, in spite, as Gildersleeve remarks, of all the examples and all the commentators. But this is no reason for saying that Persius had not facility in writing verse, unless we are to bring the same charge against Vergil and Horace (see the examples cited by Jahn).

Our examination of the ten passages cited by Bieger shows that, whatever may be thought of the poet's taste in the choice of language, there is very little in them upon which to base against him a whole-

¹ The fullest note is to be found in Hauthal's edition of 1837, p. 188 ff. Bücheler in his third edition thinks it worth while to explain thus: "vel quod censor tibi cognatus est vel quod ipse es eques." This is far from being new, for though Gildersleeve ascribes it to Pretor and Stocker to Farnaby, and though both Pretor and Farnaby, like Bücheler and, years before, Lubinus, as well as J. B. Mayor (*Classical Review*, 1888, p. 85), put it forth without a hint that it is not original, the fact is that it is the explanation of Valentinus (1578) and that the suggestion for it comes from Badius Ascensius (1499).

sale accusation of metrical ignorance or even of infelicity.¹ Consequently the two passages which led to Bieger's argument are not to be defended on the ground which he takes. They were iii. 66 and v. 134. For the hiatus in the former

discite, o miseri, et causas cognoscite rerum

there is no exact parallel. Passages containing proper names should not be taken into account, nor those in which ictus falls on the unelided syllable. It seems strange to cite Verg. *Ecl.* ii. 53 *addam cerea pruna: honos erit huic quoque pomo*, and *Aen.* i. 405 *et vera incessu patuit dea. ille ubi matrem*, and hence to believe that on account of the pause in the sense after *discite* the hiatus may stand. For there is certainly as much of a pause after *miseri*; and yet that word is elided, in spite of the ictus. With Müller (*de R. M.*² p. 371) and Bücheler (*Rh. Mus.* l. c.) I believe that this hiatus is not to be left in our text, and that we must take our choice between the readings of the inferior manuscripts *disciteque* or *discite et*, as being, either of them, more like Persius than the *io* of Barth or the *vos* of Guyet.

We come finally to a more vexed question, v. 134. Here a P give

et quid agam? rogas? en saperdas advehe Ponto.

The scholiast too seems to have read *rogas*, which must of course be taken as a pyrrhic. The inferior manuscripts help us out of the difficulty with *rogitas saperdas* or *rogitas en saperdam*. The reading *rogitas* is the vulgate, found (before 1886) in all the editions that I have examined except in the Venetian of 1482. But in this, the commentary (by Fontius) has *rogitas* for a lemma, so that *rogas* in the text may be a misprint. Bücheler (*Rh. Mus.* l. c. and in his apparatus to his edition of 1886 where he printed *rogas*) suggested *rögän*, comparing *min*, i. 2 and *vin*,² vi. 63. But in his third edition (1893) he has this note on *rogas*: "num corripuit poeta *rogas* more prisco ac volgari? cf. scholion." Why not? The verse is highly dramatic, — divided, in fact, between two speakers. And *rogas*

¹ I am, however, far from asserting the converse, that Persius was a skilful metrist. Witness, for example, his harsh elisions of monosyllables (i. 51; 66; 131; iv. 14; 33), and his admission of elisions in the fifth foot (14 times, see Eskuche, *Rh. Mus.*, 1890, p. 236 ff., 385 ff.).

² Here P has *vis*.

seems to belong to the class of iambic words which were frequently used in verse as pyrrhics because people pronounced them so in everyday conversation.¹ The principle is familiar enough. We find it working in Persius, for example, in *pută*, iv. 9; *vidēsīs*, i. 108; cf. *volō*, v. 84, 87; *vetō*, i. 112; *quēō*, v. 133. When, for example, we find *avē* in Ov. *Am.* ii. 6. 62 we know that we have not to do with any mere metrical license, for Quintilian (i. 6. 21) expressly tells us that the word was universally pronounced with *ē*. But the shortening of the ultima was not confined to iambic words; cf. *accedō*, vi. 55; *nesciō*, iii. 88; *dixerō*, Hor. *S.* i. 4. 104; *mentiō*, *S.* i. 4. 93; *quomodō*, *S.* i. 9. 43; *ergō*, Ov. *H.* v. 59; *salvē*, possibly in Mart. xi. 108. 4. But it is true that before final *s* the long quantity was very persistent and instances of shortening are rare. We find *manūs*, Plaut. *Mil.* 325; *habēs*, Aul. 187; possibly *virginēs*, Enn. *Ann.* 102 M. and Plaut. *Pers.* 845 (unless we take it as *virgnes* in both). The phenomenal *palūs* in Hor. *A. P.* 65 is much debated. Of actual *-ās* we have *eniciās*, Plaut. *Rud.* 944; *intonās* and *claudās* in hexameters in an inscription of the third century, *CIL.* VIII, 4635. Doubtless other instances might be picked up. But for actual *rogās* I know only *CIL.* I, 1454, on one of the *sortes*:

Qur petis posttempus consilium? quod rogas, non est

and on a hexameter (?) like this little can be based. In Plaut. *Bacch.* 980 a foot is lacking, and Ritschl inserted *hem* before *rogas*. Still, I think one can scarcely doubt that many people said *rogās*. The question is whether it is likely that Persius would have admitted it into his verse. When I think of the shortenings which he *did* admit, and reflect how many words and phrases there are in his 650 verses which seem to be taken directly from the dialect of the people, from slang, and even from a lower language still, I am strongly tempted to believe that he wrote *rogās* here.² On the other

¹ Cf. Lindsay, *The Latin Language*, p. 210, "This shortening was not a mere metrical license but reflected the actual pronunciation," and Keller, *Grammatische Aufsätze*, p. 264, who thinks that the 'rule' of *breves breviautes* worked, chiefly at any rate, only in familiar words which were in constant use. Thus he distinguishes between *dōmī*, 'at home,' and the true genitive *dōmī*.

² To speak only of words, not phrases, cf. *agaso*, v. 76; *baro*, v. 138; *cachinno*, i. 12; *calo*, v. 95; *palpo*, v. 176; *aristae*, iii. 115; *bullire*, iii. 34; *canthus*, v. 71;

hand, the reading *rogitas* of the inferior manuscripts cannot be impeached (as some have attempted) on the ground that this verb is a frequentative and therefore out of place here. Passage after passage might be cited, from Plautus (e.g. *Pseud.* 1163) down, in which *rogito* serves as a mere synonym of *rogo*. Further, a glance over Jahn's index will show Persius's fondness for verbs of the frequentative formation. Küster (*de A. Persii Fl. elocutione quaestiones*, p. 6) cites eleven verbs occurring in twenty passages. In but a few of them can the real meaning of the frequentative be distinguished. Against *rogitas*, then, we can say only that it is the easier reading, found in inferior manuscripts.

ii. 1. *Hunc, Macrine, diem numera meliore lapillo,
Qui tibi labentis apponet candidus annos.*

Here P and half a dozen of the inferior manuscripts have *apponet*, the variant *apponat* stands in G by a correction, and all the other manuscripts (including α) have *apponit*. This is one of the twenty passages in which Bieger (p. 48) believes that P is inferior to α; he thinks *apponet* a pure blunder. This is a strange verdict, particularly as coming from one whose *métier* it is to find the best in P whenever he possibly can. It seems as if Bieger must have been influenced by tradition; for it is a fact that the future *apponet* had, when Bieger wrote, been adopted by only two editors of consequence — Pithou in 1590 (naturally, as he was the owner of P) and Schrevel in his edition of 1648 and later reprints. In 1893 it was revived by Bücheler in his latest edition, possibly on the principle that it is the reading of P though rejected by P's defender.

I think it the right reading. For 1) it is undoubtedly the 'lectio difficilior'; 2) it is supported by such futures as are found in relative clauses like Hor. C. i. 9. 15 *quem fors dierum cumque dabit lucro Appone*, Mart. ii. 32. 8 *sit liber, dominus qui volet esse meus*, and Pers. i. 91 *verum nec nocte paratum Plorabit, qui me volet incurvasse querella*.

centussis, v. 191; *cevere*, i. 87; *cirrati*, i. 29; *ebulliat*, ii. 10; *exossatus*, vi. 52; *gurgulio*, iv. 38; *inmeiare*, vi. 73; *iunix*, ii. 47; *lallare*, iii. 18; *mamma*, iii. 18; *pappare*, iii. 17; *patrare*, i. 18; *papa*, vi. 74; *saperda*, v. 134; *sartago*, i. 80; *scloppus*, v. 13; *tressis*, v. 76; *trossulus*, i. 82; *tucceta*, ii. 42.

NOTES ON SUETONIUS.

BY ALBERT A. HOWARD.

A supposed fragment of Suetonius in Scott's Waverley.

AN article by G. Becker in the *Rheinisches Museum* XXXVII, p. 642 fg., calls attention to a supposed fragment of Suetonius in Scott's *Waverley*, chap. 10, which Becker thinks Scott may have found in some old glossary of which nothing further is known.

In the novel the "Baron," in speaking of the feasts at Waverley-Honour, which he calls *epulae lautiores*, continues, "I say *epulae* rather than *prandium*, because the latter phrase is popular: *epulae ad senatum, prandium vero ad populum attinet*, says Suetonius Tranquillus."

L. Schwabe, in the last edition of Teuffel's *Römische Literatur*, § 347. 3, cites the article of Becker in a manner which seems to imply that he is convinced of the genuineness of the gloss.

Aside from the improbability that Scott was acquainted with any sources of information about Suetonius which have since 1829 disappeared, there are several passages in the preserved works of Suetonius which show that he did not recognize the distinction between *epulum* and *prandium* which is made in this supposed gloss. Cf. *Iul.* 26, *munus populo epulumque pronuntiavit in filiae memoriam: quod ante eum nemo*; *Aug.* 98, *spectavit assidue exercentes ephebos . . . isdem etiam epulum in conspectu suo praebuit*; *Cal.* 17, *congiarium populo bis dedit, . . . totiens abundantissimum epulum senatui equestrique ordini, etiam coniugibus ac liberis utrorumque*; *Cal.* 18, *et panaria cum obsonio viritim divisit; qua epulatione equiti R. contra se hilarius avidiusque vescenti partes suas misit*. In none of these passages is the *epulum* restricted to the senate, and it is therefore highly improbable that Suetonius ever made the statement attributed to him by Scott.

The real source of the quotation is almost certainly Faber's *Thesaurus Eruditionis Scholasticae*, a copy of which (the Leipzig edition of 1696) was in the Abbotsford library. Under the word *epulum* in this book occurs the following passage: "Sueton. *Caes.* c. 38, *Adiecit epulum ac viscerationem et post Hispaniensem victoriam duo prandia.* Ubi non frustra *Epulum* et *Prandia* distinguit. Nam *Epulum* ad magistratus et senatus, [unde et inter senatorum privilegia erat ius epulandi publice, de quo idem Suet. August. cap. 35] *Prandia* ad populum pertinebant."

Quoting possibly from memory, and therefore inaccurately as he not infrequently did, Scott probably assigns to Suetonius what is merely an explanation of the lexicographer. Becker may have been led to think of some old glossary as the source of this information by another passage in *Waverley*, chap. 48, where Scott speaks of "an ancient Glossarium upon the rule of St. Benedict, in the abbey of St. Amand," quoting ostensibly from it the words "*caligae dictae sunt quia ligantur; nam socci non ligantur sed tantum intromittuntur.*" In reality these words are quoted, with an unimportant omission, from DuCange, *Glossarium ad Scriptores Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis*, Paris 1733-36, vol. II, p. 46, a copy of which was in the Abbotsford library. Even the words "an ancient Glossarium," etc., are a translation from DuCange, "*Antiq. Gloss. in Regulam S. Benedicti à Bibl. Abbatiae S. Amandi,*" and the derivation of the name Caligula in *Waverley*, chap. 48, is another slightly inaccurate quotation from DuCange, vol. II, p. 47.

Oppidum.

Nero 23, cantante eo ne necessaria quidem causa excedere theatro licitum est. Itaque et enixae quaedam in spectaculis dicuntur, et multi taedio audiendi laudandique, clausis oppidorum portis, aut furtim desiluisse de muro aut morte simulata funere elati.

Even a slight consideration of this passage must make clear the fact that, if the words "*clausis oppidorum portis,*" which are found in all the manuscripts of Suetonius, are correctly handed down to us, *oppidum* must here be used in a technical sense and cannot mean "town." One naturally asks why closing the gates of the towns should prevent the spectators from leaving the theatres by the regular

outlets, or why, inasmuch as leaving the theatre was the only thing forbidden, it should have been necessary to close the town-gates. It is further apparent from Dio Cassius, *Xiph. ep.*, lxiii. 15, that the spectators who feigned death did so for the sake of getting out of the theatre and not out of town: ἐκ τῶν θεάτρων ἐκφέρεσθαι. Evidently therefore *oppidum* is here used either in a technical or in a popular sense to designate some part of the theatre.

In the Roman circus the *carceres*, at least in early times, were called *oppidum*, as appears from Festus, Paul. ep., p. 184 Müller, *oppidum dicitur et locus in circo, unde quadrigae emittuntur*; cf. Varro *L. L.* v. 153, *in circo primum unde mittuntur equi nunc dicuntur carceres Naevius oppidum appellat . . . quod ad muri speciem pinnis turribusque carceres olim fuerunt, scripsit poeta*:

Dictator ubi currum insidet, pervehitur usque ad oppidum.

Cf. Placidus gloss. s. v. *iuxta, iuxta oppidum prope carceres*.

In the ruins of the circus of Maxentius at Rome, which are taken as the basis for all reconstructions of the Circus Maximus, the main entrances lie at either end of the horseshoe-shaped rows of seats and between these ends and the *carceres*. The *carceres* are the counterpart of the *scaena* of the theatre, and these main entrances to the circus correspond closely to the *πάροδοι* of the ancient theatre, which Vitruvius v. 6. 5 in speaking of the Roman theatre calls simply *itinera*. Now, as the circus was undoubtedly a much older institution at Rome than the theatre, and as the general resemblance between the two structures is so marked, it seems not unnatural that the *scaena* with the *versurae procurrentes* should have been somewhat loosely called *oppidum* as corresponding to the *carceres*, and that the *πάροδοι* should have been called *oppidorum portae*, perhaps from a similar popular designation of the entrances to the circus. In many of the theatres of Greece the only means of entrance was through the *πάροδοι* (cf. Baumeister's *Denkmäler*, p. 1741), and, in such cases, closing the gates of the *πάροδοι* would have effectually prevented the departure of the spectators except in the manner described by Suetonius and Dio Cassius.

The *murus* was probably the outer wall of the theatre itself, and in the case of a theatre built on the natural slope of a hill, as most

Greek theatres were, the leap from the wall would not necessarily involve much danger to life or limb. The use of the word *murus* to designate the wall of a building, while unusual, is not without parallel, Suetonius himself using the word, *Nero* 38, in speaking of the outer walls of a granary.

Ascopa deligata.

Nero 45, *Alterius collo ascopa deligata simulque titulus ego quid potui sed tu culleum meruisti.*

For *ascopa* at least one manuscript, Parisinus 5802, reads *et scopā*; for *deligata* nearly all the manuscripts, including ABCDML of Becker's¹ classification, read *delicata*.

Xiphilinus, in the epitome of Dio Cassius, lxi. 16, speaking of the popular attacks on Nero, says: *μολγὸν τέ τινα ἀπ' ἀνδριάντος αὐτοῦ νύκτωρ ἀπεκρέμασαν, ἐνδεικνύμενοι ὅτι ἐς ἐκείνον αὐτὸν δέοι ἐμβεβλήσθαι.* Assuming that the same incident is referred to in both these passages, Politian proposed to read *ascopera* for *ascopa* and this reading has been accepted by most modern editors of Suetonius, including Roth. Turnebus, *Advers.* xxx. 11, proposes *ascoma* and suggests that the Romans may have used this word in the feminine gender, as they occasionally took such liberties with other Greek words.

The manuscript variant *scopa* is almost certainly incorrect, since Varro, *L. L.* viii. 7, x. 24, Quintilian, i. 5. 16, and all of the later grammarians unite in saying that *scopa* is not to be used in the singular, a point of style which must have been known to Suetonius.

The word *δοσκήρα* occurs once in a fragment of Diphilus, cf. Pollux, x. 18, and once in a fragment of Aristophanes, cf. Pollux, x. 160. As a Latin word it seems to occur but once, Judith 10. 5 of the *Vulgate*. In spite, therefore, of the ease with which this word can be derived from the manuscript reading it does not seem likely that Suetonius, writing for a Roman audience, made use of it.

Still more improbable is *δοσῶμα*, which does not occur as a Latin word, and which in Greek means the leather padding of a row-lock,

¹ G. Becker, *Quaestiones criticae de C. Suetoni Tranquilli de vita Caesarum libris VIII.* Memel, 1862.

in late Greek a bellows; for neither of these meanings makes any possible sense in the passage under consideration.

Another serious difficulty is found in the use of *deligare* with the dative *collo*, a construction for which I find no authority in Latin. The verb *deligare*, with the meaning which it here has, occurs only twice in Suetonius, *Claudius* 34, *Nero* 29, and in both cases it is joined with the preposition *ad* and the accusative. It occurs six times in Caesar, *B.G.* i. 53, iv. 29, v. 9, v. 48, *B.C.* iii. 39, iii. 40; six times in Livy, ii. 5, 6, viii. 7, 19, xxvi. 13, 15, 15, 8, 16, 2, xxviii. 29, 11; and once in a fragment of Licinius quoted by Nonius, Müll. p. 331. 16, in all of these cases joined with *ad* and the accusative. In Cicero, *Verr.* ii. *Act.* iv. § 86, *in ea [statua] Sopatrum . . . divaricari ac deligari iubet*, the use of the ablative may be due to the presence of the verb *divaricari*, although in Nepos, *Hann.* 5. 2, we have the same construction, *sarmenta in cornibus deligata*. Quintilian ii. 17. 19, uses *circum* and the accusative, *sarmentis circum cornua deligatis*. These are the only examples of the use of the verb *deligare*, meaning "to bind to something," which I have been able to find; the word does not occur at all in Sallust or in Tacitus; it occurs but once in Curtius, used, however, absolutely.

I would suggest, therefore, to change *ascopa deligata* into *ἀσκός praeligatus*, this compound of *ligare* being joined with the dative in Livy xxii. 16. 7, *fascēs . . . aridi sarmenti praeligantur cornibus*. The word *ἀσκός* may have been used to avoid anticipating the jest in *culleum* of the inscription which follows; it harmonizes well with *μολγόν* in the quotation from Xiphilinus, and is a word which any Roman, with even a slight knowledge of Greek, would know. After the form *ascopa*, which looks like a feminine noun, had been coined, the gender of *deligatus* would naturally be changed to agree with it.

The words "*ego quid potui sed tu culleum meruisti*" were apparently intended to be metrical, although I find no direct evidence that this fact has ever before been noticed. Even as the words are preserved in the manuscripts they form an imperfect dactylic hexameter, lacking the initial long syllable and containing a fault in the fourth foot. If, however, *quid* is interrogative the use of *sed* is peculiar, there being no strong antithesis between the two halves of the sentence such as we should naturally expect to find; if *quid* is indefinite for *aliquid*

the construction is unusual. The emendation proposed by Gruter, *egi quod* for *ego quid* supplies the initial syllable of the hexameter and introduces the necessary antithesis. Perhaps, however, the verse began *egi ego quod*, etc., and, through carelessness on the part of the copyist, *egi* which so much resembles *ego* was omitted in the archetype of our manuscripts. A possible solution of the difficulty in the fourth foot is suggested by a passage in Paulus, cf. Festus ed. Müller p. 60 s.v. *corius*, where occur the words : *cullus quoque masculine dixerunt, est enim genus tormenti e corio*. If in spite of the warning given by Müller in his notes to this passage, a warning which he supports by no evidence, it may be assumed that the reference is to the punishment of parricides, the change of a single letter in the quotation from Suetonius will give the desired hexameter. For *culleum* read *cullum* and we have :

egi ego quod potui sed tu cullum meruisti.

If *δορός* is used in the sense of wine-skin or bottle there may be a reference to some old proverb about people born to be hung.

Other examples of poetic tags attached to statues are found in *Iul.* 80, where the titulus is in trochaic septenarii, and in *Aug.* 70, where it is an iambic senarius. With these may be classed the graffiti in *Nero* 39, of which three are elegiac couplets.

Sestertium deciens.

The word *sestertium* preceded or followed by a so-called numeral adverb occurs twenty-three times in Suetonius's *Lives of the Caesars*, and aside from the variant *sestercium* it is the only form of the word found in this construction in any of the manuscripts of Suetonius which have been examined, including two Paris manuscripts, Nos. 5801 and 5802, collated by me during the summer of 1895. The manuscripts are numerous, and a very considerable number of them have been collated. They represent at least three different classes, and are derived from an archetype which was certainly as old as the ninth century ; indeed Becker, *Quaestiones criticae*, p. 17, concludes that the codex Memmianus of the ninth century is the third in line of descent from the archetype. The word *sestertium* is always written

out in full, the final *m* being sometimes indicated by a dash above the *u*. The abbreviation HS, if we can trust the apparatus criticus of Roth and Becker, does not appear in any of the manuscripts; it certainly does not occur in any of them which I have examined. In spite of this weight of manuscript authority, emendations, based on the theory that in this construction *sestertium* is always a neuter singular substantive regularly inflected, and that it is never the genitive plural of *sestertius*, have been proposed in eight of the twenty-three passages mentioned, and these emendations have been unhesitatingly adopted into the text of all modern editions including that of Roth.

The emended passages are as follows:

Iul. 50, *Sed ante alias dilexit . . . Serviliam, cui et primo suo consulatu sexagiens sestertium (sestertio Oudendorp.) margaritam mercatus est.*

Aug. 30, *ut qui in cellam Capitolini Iovis sedecim milia pondo auri gemmasque ac margaritas quingenties sestertium (sestertii J. F. Gronov) una donatione contulerit.*

Aug. 41, *Senatorum census ampliavit ac pro octingentorum milium summa duodecies sestertium (sestertio Ernesti) taxavit.*

Tib. 48, *Publice munificentiam bis omnino exhibuit, proposito milies sestertium (sestertio Glareanus) gratuito in trienni tempus.*

Cal. 38, *nec licendi finem factum, quoad tredecim gladiatores sestertium (sestertio Ernesti) nonagies ignoranti addicerentur.*

Claud. 6, *Qui tamen moriens et in tertiis heredibus eum ex parte tertia nuncupatum, legato etiam circa sestertium (sestertii J. Gronov) vicies prosecutus commendavit, etc.*

Nero 27, *Indicebat et familiaribus cenas quorum uni mitellita quadragies sestertium (sestertio Salmasius) constitit.*

Vesp. 19, *interrogatis palam procuratoribus quanti funus et pompa constaret ut audiit sestertium (sestertio J. F. Gronov) centiens, exclamavit, etc.*

In support of this same theory the following emendations have been found necessary: *Livy* xlv. 4. 1, *decem pondo auri et argenti ad summam sestertium (sestertii J. F. Gronov) deciens in aerarium rettulit*, where the form *sestertium* has the support of the only manuscript, the codex Vindobonensis of the fifth century; *Macrobius* iii. 15. 10, *huius Hirii villam . . . constat . . . quadragies sestertium (sestertio*

J. F. Gronov) *venum datum*, where *sestertium* is the only manuscript reading; Val. Max. ix. 1. 4, *uter igitur luxuriosior est, egone qui decem columnas centum milibus nummum emi, an tu, qui decem arbuscularum umbram tricies sestertium* (*sestertii* Kempf) *summa compensas*, where *sestertium* is the only manuscript reading. No other form than *sestertium* is found anywhere in manuscripts either of Livy or of Macrobius.

Unquestionably the forms *sestertii*, genitive, and *sestertio*, ablative, are found joined with the numeral adverb in the manuscripts of some authors (I have found in all twenty-seven¹ cases) and there is no reason for doubting the correctness of these forms. It does not, however, follow as a necessary conclusion from this evidence that wherever the sum expressed is in the genitive or ablative, only the forms *sestertii* and *sestertio* are possible. The two constructions *decies sestertium* in which *sestertium* is a genitive plural, and *decies sestertium* in which *sestertium* is a neuter singular substantive, probably existed side by side, and were, if not equally common, at least equally correct.

The reasons for believing that *sestertium* in this construction is a genitive plural are as follows. Varro *L. L.* ix. 88, after explaining the system of numbering in use among the Romans for sums less than one thousand, says: *Antiqui his numeris fuerunt contenti. Ad hoc tertium et quartum actum ab decies minores imposuerunt vocabula, neque ratione, sed tamen non contra eam de qua scribimus analogiam. Nam [ut] decies cum dicatur hoc decies, ut mille hoc mille, ut sit utrumque sine casibus vocis, dicemus ut hoc mille, huius mille, sic hoc decies, huius decies, neque eo minus in altero, quod est mille, praeponemus hi mille,*

¹ The genitive *sestertii* is found in ten passages (I give in each case the numeral adverb): Cic. *Phil.* ii. § 95, *centiens*; Sen. *Nat. Q.* i. 16. 1, *milies*; Tac. *Ann.* ii. 37, *decies*, ii. 86, *decies*, xii. 53, *ter miliens*, xii. 58, *centies*; Plin. *ad Trai.* 4, *quadringenties*; Val. Max. iii. 7. 1 d, *quadragies, milies*, iv. 8. 3, *centies atque quinquagies*. The ablative *sestertio* is found in Varro *R. R.* iii. 17, *quadragies*; [Caes.] *Bell. Afr.* 90, *miliens*; Cic. *pro Font.* § 4, *ducenties et tricenis*; Nepos *Att.* 14, *vicies, centies*; Vell. ii. 48, *centies*; Sen. *cons ad Helv.* 10. 4, *centies*, 10. 9, *centies*, 12. 6, *decies*, *Benef.* iv. 36. 2, *centies*; Tac. *Ann.* iii. 17, *quinquagies*, vi. 17, *milies*, xvi. 13, *quadragies*, *Hist.* iv. 42, *septuagies*; Plin. *Ep.* iii. 19. 7, *tricies*; Val. Max. ix. 1. 4, *sexagies, tricies*. I have found no other examples in which the forms *sestertio* and *sestertii* were not emendations for HS of the manuscripts.

horum mille . . . Evidently there is a lacuna in the text after *mille*, but the meaning of the passage is undoubtedly that *deciens*, and the other numeral adverbs may be used as substantives in all cases singular or plural without change of form, exactly as *mille* is used.

The word *mille* occurs repeatedly as a substantive, and in the oblique cases. As a substantive it can be modified only by a genitive, as *mille hominum*, etc., and it is repeatedly joined with a verb or adjective in the singular, as we learn from Gellius i. 16, Macrobius i. 5. 5; cf. Draeger *Hist. Syntax* I, p. 179 fg., where ten examples are quoted, while Gellius says: *in his atque in multis aliis "mille" numero singulari dictum est*. Again in Varro *L. L.* ix. 85, although the text is slightly corrupt, the implication seems to be that when *mille* is a definite number, the shorter forms of the genitive are used with it, e.g. *mille denarium*, *mille nummum*.

After the analogy of *mille*, *deciens* as a substantive should therefore be modified by the genitive, preferably the shorter form, and when used in the singular, *hoc deciens*, should be joined with a verb or adjective in the singular. The fact that verb and adjective forms in agreement with phrases like *deciens sestertium* are regularly in the singular has always been the strongest point in the argument against *sestertium* as a genitive in this construction. In the rare instances in which *centena milia* is added to the numeral adverb, verb and adjective forms are always neuter plural in agreement with *milia*, as was to be expected, and it has been argued that even if the words *centena milia* were understood the plural would be required. It is undoubtedly true that so long as the numeral adverb was felt as such, adjective and verb forms would necessarily agree with the *milia* expressed or implied, but when *deciens* was used as a substantive in condensed expressions to mean millions, the natural result would be utter disregard of the words *centena milia*, and the adoption of new constructions, *deciens* as a substantive being modified by the genitive, exactly as we find to be the case with *mille*.

Unfortunately these large numbers are used almost exclusively to denote sums of money, and in the great majority of cases the abbreviation HS¹ is used to represent the unit of value. There are

¹ In the manuscripts of Cicero's Orations *sestertius*, etc., occurs but sixteen times; HS is used in all other cases.

not lacking however passages which point strongly to the use of the genitive in this construction: e.g. Cic. *de re p.* iii. § 17, *aeris miliens . . . triciens*; Livy xxiv. 11, *decies aeris*; Plin. *N. H.* vii. § 97, *acceptis hominum centiens viciens*; Mon. Ancy. VI, 30, *denarium se[xi]c[ns] milliens*], where the Greek text ἐξ μυριάδων μυριάδων makes the restoration certain.

There is another place in this same inscription III, 24, where *sestertium*, if it stood in a manuscript, would on Gronov's theory be changed to *sestertii*: *ea [s]u[mma sest]ertium circiter sexxiens milliens fuit*; cf. Suet. *Claud.* 6, *legato etiam circa sestertium (sestertii J. Gronov) vicies prosecutus*. Finally Priscian ed. Hertz, vol. I, p. 307. 1, quotes *sestertium* as a genitive in Cic. *Verr.* ii. *Act.* i. § 92, *cum ad sestertium vicies † quingenta milia rem esse constaret*; where, however, the manuscripts of Cicero read: *cum ad HS viciens quinquiens redegissee constaret*.

From this evidence it seems necessary to admit the existence of the construction *decies sestertium* in which *decies* is used as a substantive in the various cases of the singular, while *sestertium* is a genitive plural depending upon it. But if the existence of this construction be admitted, the necessity for these numerous emendations in Suetonius ceases to exist, even if the construction be regarded as archaic. For both Suetonius and Macrobius had a leaning toward grammatical studies and therefore the adoption of an archaic expression in their writings could not excite surprise.

VARIA CRITICA.

By H. W. HAYLEY.

Livy i. 21. 4, *et soli Fidei sollemne instituit.*

IN this passage the word *soli* has given much trouble. No really satisfactory explanation of it has ever been suggested, and Weissenborn-Müller bracket it as spurious. Perhaps we should read *Sollae Fidei*, i.e. 'to unbroken Faith.' The old Oscan word *sollus* (cognate with Skt. *sarva*, Greek *ὅλος*, Latin *salvus*) meant 'whole' or 'entire,' as in the line of Lucilius quoted by Festus s.v. *sollo*, *vasa quoque omnino dirimit non sollo dupundi*: cf. the same lexicographer s.v. *solitaurilia*. *Solla Fides* would, therefore, be equivalent to *Salva Fides*: cf. *Bona Spes* and the like.

Ib. i. 55. 9, *et nullius ne horum quidem magnificentiae operum fundamenta non exuperaturum.*

So the manuscripts. Ussing and Frigell strike out *magnificentiae*; Riemann conjectured the true reading to be *nullius ne horum quidem magnificentiae* (*inauditae*) etc., while Reiz proposed the reading *nullo- rum ne huius*, etc., which Weissenborn-Müller accept. If I mistake not, the disturbing word is not *magnificentiae* but *fundamenta*. Strike out the latter word and read *magnificentiam* instead of *magnificentiae*, and sense and syntax become plain and simple. *Fundamenta* was probably added in the margin by someone who wished to explain the vague expression *horum operum*, and was then copied into the text by the next scribe. Then in order to make the construction somewhat more tolerable *magnificentiam* was changed to the genitive, as the second accusative had to be disposed of in some way.

Terence *Phor.* 333-334,

*Aliis aliunde est periculum, unde aliquid abradi potest :
Mihi sciunt nihil esse.*

So the manuscripts and the editors. There is, however, a difficulty in the above reading. If *aliis aliunde* has the usual distributive sense, the rendering will be: 'men out of whom something can be got have their danger, some from one source, others from another.' But on the other hand it is clear, both from the general sense of the passage and from the emphatic position of *aliis* and *mihi*, that these two words are strongly antithetic. One feels that the sense required is: 'other men, out of whom something can be got, stand in danger; but people know that *I* have n't a penny.' This meaning, however, cannot fairly be deduced from the words as they stand, unless we suppose that a second *aliis* is implied so that the rendering will be: 'other men, out of whom something can be got, stand in danger, some from one source, others from another; but people know that *I* have n't a cent.' This is really translating *aliis* twice in two quite different senses, and seems very hard. Should we not read *alicunde*, inserting a single letter and so doing away with the distributive force of *aliunde*? This will leave the needed antithesis between *aliis* and *mihi*, and the translation will then be: 'other men, out of whom something can be got, stand in danger from some source or other; but people know that *I* have n't a cent.'

Extorris.

The common etymology of this curious word is that which derives it from *ex* and *terra*. This presupposes an older form †*torra*, which doubtless did exist at some remote period (cf. *torreo*, etc.), but for which as a distinctively Latin form we have no direct evidence. It has occurred to the writer that possibly, after all, the true derivation of *extorris* may be from *ex* and *torris*. *Torris* (older form *torrus*) is a 'brand,' 'lighted piece of wood'; hence *extorris*, if this view be correct, would be a formation similar to *exanimis*, *inermis* and the like, and would mean 'brandless,' 'fireless,' 'igni

interdictus,' and so 'exiled.' The word may possibly go back to a time when the banished man was formally excluded from the privilege of lighting his fire at the common hearth. Cf. Herod. vii. 231, οὔτε οἱ πῦρ οὐδεὶς ἔνανε Σπαρτιηγέων οὔτε διελέγετο, which, in common with many other passages, points back to this primitive usage.

Petron. c. 61 *ad fin.*, *per scutum per ocream egi aginavi, quemadmodum ad illam pervenirem.*

The curious verb *aginare* perhaps merits a fuller treatment than it has hitherto received. Any discussion of it, to be complete, must include *agina* and *aginator*.

(1) *agina* (from *ago*, properly 'the place where moving is done'; cf. *lapicidinae*, *fodina*, etc.) is defined by Festus s.v. as follows: *agina est, quo inseritur scapus trutinae, id est, in quo foramine trutina se vertit*, i.e. the hole or slot in the handle of a balance in which the beam was inserted and in which it turned on its pivot. This is the earliest meaning that we can trace with certainty. A similar definition is probably contained in a desperately corrupt gloss (*Corp. Gloss.* IV, p. 13): *agina hictus vel quadrudine prespicitur* (one manuscript, *a*, has *istus ū quatrutine prescitur*), where perhaps we should read *agina, hiatus vel (foramen) quo trutinae scapus inseritur* (cf. Festus l.s.c.).

The same meaning appears in mediaeval Latin; cf. the glosses (cited by Ducange s.v. *agina*), '*agina, ae, ab ago, foramen librae*,' and '*agina, le treu de la balance*.'

Next, the word came to be used of the beam itself; cf. the gloss of Placidus (*Corp. Gloss.* V, p. 7; cf. ib. p. 45): '*aginam scapum trutinae quod eo mensura ponderis agatur*.' So Tertullian *adv. Hermog.* c. 41: '*in neutram partem pronus et praeceps mediae (quod aiunt) aginae aequilibrato impetu ferebatur*,' where the reference seems to be to the balancing of the beam at its middle point.

There is *one* passage in which the meaning of the word seems to be extended to include the *whole* of the scales or balance, Tertullian *De Pudic.* c. 9: '*non enim admittetur exemplorum adaequatio, licet in agina congruentissima, si fuerit saluti nocentissima*.'

(The meaning 'quickness,' which *agina* has in the Romance tongues, will be discussed later.)

(2) From *agina*, the beam of the balance, was formed *aginare*, 'to move or vibrate quickly or easily,' like such a beam. Everyone has noticed the peculiar leaping, vibrating motion of a scale-beam before it comes to rest, and this motion is precisely what is meant by *aginare*. From this signification the word readily passed into that of 'to hasten' = *festinare*. Thus in the mediaeval glosses (see Ducange l.s.c.) we find '*agino, nas, festinare,*' '*aginare, hâter,*' '*cochar, Prov. citare, festinare, aginare*' and the like. When this meaning became well established it reacted in its turn upon *agina*, which thus came to denote 'quickness,' 'activity,' a sense which is assigned to *agina* in some mediaeval glosses (see Ducange l.s.c.) and which the word has in the Romance tongues. Hence it is quite unnecessary to suppose (as Diez and others have done) that there were two distinct words, *agina*, 'a scale-beam,' and *agina*, 'motion,' 'quickness.' The verb *aginare* is, however, lacking in the Romance languages (Groeber in *Wolfflin's Archiv* I, p. 236). In the *Glossary of Philoxenus* (*Corp. Gloss.* II, p. 11) *aginare* is defined by *σπαρεύεσθαι* and *aginat* by *σπαρεύει*. This may have arisen from a misunderstanding of some passage in which an army marching rapidly was said *aginare* = *festinare*; though it has been suggested that we should read *τρακτεύεσθαι* and *τρακτεύειν*.

In the *Glossary of Philoxenus* (l.s.c.) we have also the definition '*aginat, διαπράσσεται· σπρέφει μηχανᾶται.*' This meaning, too, is easily derived from that of moving quickly to and fro; in fact *σπρέφειν* is a very good parallel. In the passage from Petronius quoted above *aginavi* means, if I mistake not, 'I contrived' or 'schemed.'

(3) From *aginare* comes *aginator*, 'one who moves easily or quickly.' This original meaning survived in the mediaeval Latin, as is clear from the glosses '*aginator, hoc est qui vet trot,*' '*aginator, qui rem suam agiliter agit*' (Ducange s.h.v.). From this signification the word readily passed into that of 'one who is moved or influenced by trifles,' especially by small pecuniary gains: '*aginatores dicuntur qui parvo lucro moventur,*' Festus l.s.c. Hence the term came to be used of hucksters and petty traders — *Kleinhändler*, as a German might say. Thus we find in glosses '*aginatorem negotiatorem actus,*' *Corp. Gloss.* V, 7 and 45 ('*actus*' is corrupt; Nettleship proposes '*aginator*

est negotiator exactus'), and '*aginator, mercator de facili vendens*,' Ducange s.v. (It is curious how the original idea of *ready* or *easy* motion comes out even here in the '*de facili*.') Buecheler (*Rhein. Mus.* XXXVII, p. 518) traces this signification back to *agina* in the sense of 'balance,' from the fact that such tradesmen *weighed out* their goods (cf. *exigere, examen, exagium*). But I know of no evidence that *aginare* ever meant 'to weigh'; and *agina* in the sense of a *whole* balance occurs only once, so far as I have been able to discover, and that in Tertullian; while *aginator* is clearly a very old word.

Again, just as *aginare* sometimes = *στρέφειν, μηχανᾶσθαι*, *aginator* may sometimes have passed into the meaning of 'schemer' or 'trickster.' The gloss '*acinari, tricari, in parvo morari*' occurs repeatedly (*Corp. Gloss.* IV, 480; V, 590; cf. V, 260, '*acinari tricari mora arit*'). But here we are on dangerous ground, for the *deponent* form and the *c* instead of *g* may point to the existence of another, entirely distinct, word *acinari* (from *acinus*, a berry; cf. *tricari* from *tricae*). In the gloss (*Corp. Gloss.* V, 438) '*aginatus, qui agit aliquid, id est negotiat aut tricatorum morator vacuus*' two words may have been confused and their definitions united. Perhaps we should read *aginator, qui agit aliquid, id est, negotiat. acinator, tricator, morator vacuus*.

There remains the curious gloss *aginantes explicantes* (*Corp. Gloss.* IV, 13; V, 591, 625), which is not easy to explain. As Loewe (*Prodromus* p. 427) points out, it is probably mutilated. Nettleship would read *tricantes*.

Euripides *Hippol.* 1189, αὐταῖσιν ἀρβύλαισιν ἀρμόσας πόδας.

A very puzzling line. Some take ἀρβύλαισιν in its usual sense, and render 'having fitted (to the chariot) his feet, hunting-boots and all.' This is sadly unpoetic, and in my opinion absurd. The dative is most naturally taken with ἀρμόσας, not as dative of accompaniment. The other alternative is, with the schol., Eustathius p. 599. 22, Wecklein, Mahaffy, Wilamowitz (if we may judge from his translation), and others, to take ἀρβύλαισιν as meaning the places in the chariot (depressions in the floor?) in which the driver stood. Very little reflection will show that in the springless chariot some such con-

trivance was needed to enable the driver to maintain his footing. The difficulty then is with αὐταῖσιν. Mahaffy and Bury would render 'having fitted his feet *exactly* to the boot-holes,' lit. 'to the very boot-holes'; but this, as they admit, is hard. Perhaps we should read εἰ ταῖσιν ἀρβύλαισιν ἀρμόσας πόδας (or πόδα), changing one letter. Cf. *Alc.* 365, ἐν ταῖσιν αὐταῖς γάρ μ' ἐπισκῆψω κέδροις, and the like.

Ib. *Alcestis* 1125, ἡ κερτομός με θεοῦ τις ἐκπλήσσει χαρά;

So Prinz. All the manuscripts except α (which has ἡ) read ἡ, and all except P (which has ἐμπλήσσει) have ἐκπλήσσει. Nauck and Prinz suspect the words ἐκπλήσσει χαρά, the former on the ground that the ideas expressed by ἐκπλήσσειν and χαρά are not congruous. It would be easy to emend the line, e.g. ἡ κερτομῶ με θεῶν τις ἐκπλήσσει χαρᾶ, or in deference to Nauck's objection ἡ κερτομός με θεοῦ τις ἐκπέπληγ' ἀρά; but surely if one can say ἐκπλαγῆναι χαρᾶ (cf. Aesch. *Choeph.* 231) or ἡδονῇ (cf. Soph. *Trach.* 626), the expression χαρὰ ἐκπλήσσει τινά ought to be both possible and natural. So in English we can say 'joy crazes a man' as well as 'a man is crazed with joy.' On the other hand, the simple genitive θεοῦ is certainly hard. If it is possessive, 'some delusive joy of the divinity,' it is ambiguous, and if it is a genitive of source we miss some verb indicating motion or origin. Should we not insert one letter and read μ' ἐκ θεοῦ? This seems better than to escape the difficulty by altering χαρά to χάρις with Kviçala (*Studien zu Euripides* II, p. 36).

Alcestis 883, τῆς ὑπεραλγείν.

The use of the verb ὑπεραλγέω with a genitive, 'to grieve for or because of a thing,' is attested by the Greek lexicons from Stephanus down. It is curious, however, that only four passages are cited as examples of this usage (all from poetry) until we come down to late writers. These passages are: the one from the *Alcestis* quoted above; *Hippol.* 260, τῆσδ' ὑπεραλγῶ; *Antigone* 630, ἀπάτης λεχίων ὑπεραλγῶν; Aristoph. *Aves* 466, οὕτως ὕμῶν ὑπεραλγῶ. It is clear at a glance that in all these cases the verb follows the genitive, so that it is perfectly possible to read ὕπερ with anastrophe. Hence they by

no means prove that the compound verb *ὑπεραλγῆν* was used by classical writers with a genitive in this sense. While I will not venture to assert that the verb was never so used by them, I have not been able to find a certain instance. There is none, at all events, in Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, or the tragedians and comedians, and I doubt if there is any case earlier than the time of Aristotle (who, if we may trust the Berlin index, has *ὑπεραλγῆν τινι* but not *τινος*). The genitive with *ὑπεραλγῆν* occurs in Arrian and other late writers, and should probably be confined to them.

Alcestis 320–322,

δεῖ γὰρ θανεῖν με· καὶ τόδ' οὐκ ἐς αὔριον
οὐδ' ἐς τρίτην μοι μηνὸς ἔρχεται κακόν,
ἀλλ' αὐτικ' ἐν τοῖς μήκετ' οὖσιν λέξομαι.

So the manuscripts, except that L and P have *οὐκέτ'* instead of *μήκετ'*. The main difficulty is with *ἐς τρίτην μηνὸς* in 321. If these words are sound, the only explanation which seems to suit the case is that which assumes that the *κύριον ἡμαρ* on which Alcestis was to pay the debt of nature was the first of the month. The words *ἐς τρίτην μηνὸς* will then mean 'on the third of the month,' which might be a possible expression in verse, though in Attic prose a writer would have said *εἰς τρίτην ἰσταμένον* or the like. See *Am. Jour. Phil.* (1895) XVI, 1, p. 103.

Most recent editors, however, have regarded 321 as corrupt, perhaps with reason. Herwerden conjectured *ἐς τρίτον μοι φέγγος* for *ἐς τρίτην μοι μηνὸς*; Earle proposes *ἐς τριταῖον ἡμαρ*. Weil conjectured *ἐς ἔτην μοι μηνὸς*, which at first sight seems plausible, as *τρίτην* might well be a gloss on *ἔτην*: but if *ἔτην* means the same as *τρίτην* the difficulty with *μηνὸς* remains; while if it = *ἔτην καὶ νέαν*, the Hesiodic *ἐς τ' αὔριον ἐς τ' ἔννηφιν* (*Works and Days* 410) and phrases like *αὔριον καὶ τῇ ἔτῃ* (Antiphon 143, 44) and *εἰς ἔτην* (Aristoph. *Achar.* 172) are distinctly against the conjecture.

The well-known line of Hesiod (*Works and Days* 770)

πρῶτον ἔτη τετράς τε καὶ ἐβδόμη ἱερὸν ἡμαρ

should not be urged in favor of the second interpretation, as it is far

from certain that by *ἐνη* Hesiod means *ἐνη καὶ νέα*. Naber proposes the reading *οὐδ' ἐς τρίτην μοι συμῆνος ἔρχεται κακῶν*, which is clever but not convincing.

If the line is not sound as it stands, the difficulty is clearly with *μηνός*. *Οὐκ ἐς αὖριον οὐδ' ἐς τρίτην* is a perfectly clear expression, and taken by itself can occasion no difficulty. What then is to be done with *μηνός*? It is probably a corruption either of some word meaning 'day,' like Herwerden's *φέγγος*, or of an adjective agreeing with *κακόν*. Taking the latter alternative I have thought that possibly the true reading may be *οὐδ' ἐς τρίτην μοι νηλὲς ἔρχεται κακόν*, i.e. *NHΛEC* for *MHNOC*. Euripides has *νηλής* in *Cycl.* 368, and it also occurs in Aeschylus and Sophocles. Cf. the Homeric *νηλεὲς ἦμαρ*, *νηλεὲς ὕπνος*, etc. *τόδε νηλὲς κακόν* will then = death, the ruthlessness of which is proverbial among almost all nations.

A POINT OF ORDER IN GREEK AND LATIN.

BY J. W. H. WALDEN.

THE copula, being but the connecting-link between the parts of the clause, has as a rule so little intrinsic value, that we are accustomed to consider it logically a matter of comparatively slight importance where in the Greek or Latin sentence it was inserted. Weil's¹ and Goodell's² statements of the facts for the Greek, and Professor Greenough's³ statement for the Latin, are, in effect, that the copula often took shelter under the cover of a more emphatic word. The truth of this can hardly be doubted, but the reason for this position is another question. Weil's explanation—and the explanation, as will be seen, applies not alone to εἰμί, but to other similar intrinsically unemphatic words as well—is as follows: An emphatic word, if followed by a word which, though syntactically necessary to the sentence, is in itself unemphatic, receives an access of emphasis from the lingering of the attention which results from the juxtaposition of the two. This principle he designates the principle of *repose of accent* (*repos d'accent*). Without intending to disprove what is true in this theory, I wish in these pages to consider briefly a few sentences, with a view to inquiring whether, after all, the theory explains the whole story, and whether there is not a logical explanation of the phenomenon here referred to.

There can, of course, hardly be a question that euphony plays a part—and, apparently, a not inconsiderable part—in the arrangement of the words in a sentence, and that it often makes practically no difference, other than a difference of euphony, which one of several orders shall be chosen. But this is not to say that, even though the meaning be not different, the shade of thought or the

¹ *L'ordre des Mots dans les Langues Anciennes comparées aux Langues Modernes*, chap. III.

² *Trans. of the Amer. Philol. Ass.*, 1890, p. 34.

³ *Grammar*, p. 39L

suggestion is exactly the same for the several collocations. Even though there be a choice of arrangements, and euphony or variety or fancy be the determining factor, we may at times be able to say that there is a difference in *feeling* between the various arrangements; and a difference in feeling suggests a difference, perhaps hardly to be analyzed, in the picture or the shade of thought.

When Cato (*R. R.* 33. 2) says *veteres* [sc. *vites*] *quam minimum castrato. potius si erit, deicito, biennioque post praecidito. vitem novellam resecari tum erit tempus, ubi valebit*, what does he suggest to us by the order of the words in the clause *tum erit tempus*? Excluding the words *vitem novellam resecari*, the important idea in the last sentence—the idea which it is intended to bring into relief—is expressed by *tum*. *Tempus* has a minimum of emphasis,—the fact that there is a time has been suggested in what precedes. The important question here is, *when* is that time? *Erit* in itself seems not to be emphatic, but it is important that it should come early in order to stamp *tum* as a fact as soon as possible; in so far it is of more importance than *tempus*. By no other order could the desired turn to the thought be given: ‘It is then that it will be time.’ If *tum tempus erit* had been written, *tum* would still be the emphatic word, but not so overwhelmingly emphatic as in the present order. *Tempus*, in that case, would be more in the way of a newly introduced idea in the thought. The point not to be overlooked is, that, while *tempus* would be more emphatic, *tum* would be less so, and this not through loss of its prominent position, but on account of the change in the order of the other two words. An example in which the copula finds its place after *tempus*, and not after the particle, is Liv. v. 12. 8, *inter has iras plebis in patres cum tribuni plebi nunc illud tempus esse dicerent stabiliendae libertatis et...* Though *nunc* is emphatic, *illud tempus* is also prominent, and the position of *esse*, by bringing *illud* into greater prominence, gives to the gerundives which follow more of the character of explanatory clauses than they would have if *esse* followed *nunc*. In Liv. iv. 2. 2, *cuius rei praemium sit in civitate, eam maximis semper auctibus crescere*, the word *sit*, by lending its whole force to *praemium*, acts as a prop to that word. The connection between the two words is closer, and *praemium* gains something more of emphasis than would be the case if *sit* followed *civitate*.

The following sentences may be compared :

(1) Liv. vii. 13. 8, sin autem non tuum istuc, sed publicum *est* consilium; (2) Caes. B. G. ii. 1, coniurandi has *esse* causas; (3) Liv. i. 50. 9, dixisse enim nullam brevior *esse* cognitionem quam . . .; (4) Liv. vii. 13. 7, quid enim aliud *esse* causae credamus . . .; (5) Cic. *de Fin.* i. 10, Latīnam linguam non modo non inopem, ut vulgo putarent, locupletior *esse* quam Graecam; (6) Cic. *de Fin.* i. 18, hunc naturalem *esse* omnium corporum motum; (7) Nep. *Thras.* 2. 1, hoc initium *fuit* salutis Atticorum; (8) Liv. xxii. 14. 4, nec ulla *erat* mentio pugnae; (9) Nep. *Alc.* 1. 2, quod tanta *erat* commendatio oris atque orationis ut . . .; (10) Liv. vi. 41. 11, tanta dulcedo *est* ex alienis fortunis praedandi; (11) Sall. *Jug.* 85. 8, quae ante vostra beneficia gratuite faciebam, ea uti accepta mercede deseram non *est* consilium; (12) Liv. i. 47. 5, si ad haec parum *est* animi; (13) Caes. B. G. i. 21, qualis *esset* natura montis et qualis in circuitu ascensus; (14) Caes. B. G. vii. 15, quae et praesidio et ornamento *sit* civitati; (15) Cic. *de dom. sua*, 32, quae multo *est* verbosior; (16) Cato, *R. R.* 38. 4, hoc signi *erit*, ubi calx cocta erit, summos lapides coctos esse oportebit; (17) Cic. *Tusc.* v. 7, nam sapientiam quidem ipsam quis negare potest non modo re *esse* antiquam, verum etiam nomine?; (18) Cic. *de Fin.* i. 11, quis alienum putet eius *esse* dignitatis, quam mihi quisque tribuat?; (19) Liv. v. 15. 9, respondit profecto iratos deos Veienti populo illo *fuisse* die, quo sibi eam mentem obiecissent; (20) Liv. vi. 12. 5, aut innumerabilem multitudinem liberorum capitum in eis *fuisse* locis, quae nunc vix . . .

A few words may be said by way of comment on these sentences. In each case the emphasis of a prominent word draws the copula within the influence of that word, and so makes the connection between the two members closer than the connection between the copula and any other word in the sentence. The verb thus seems to give its force to this word alone, and to bring it forward as the important fact of which it states a truth. Thus, if in (6) or (7) we place the copula after each word successively, the difference in the shade of thought is apparent. With *hoc signi erit* (16) we may compare our *tum erit tempus* above. The idea of *signum* is brought forward for the first time in the words *hoc signi erit*; in the other case, the idea of *tempus* has, as noticed above, already been suggested before the words *tum erit tempus* are introduced. In the one case something is stated about *signi*, in the other something about *tum*. The importance of the copula seems to lie in its parasitic character,

and it attaches itself to the word of which a truth is stated; that is, to the word with which it belongs logically. Similar to (16) is Cato, *R.R.* 88. 1, *id aliquotiens in die cotidie facito, usque adeo donec sal desiverit tabescere biduum. id signi erit: menam aridam vel ovum demittito; si natabit, ea muries erit.* In (3), although *nullam* is the more emphatic word, *breviorem* receives the support of *esse*, because, being the word which paves the way for the clause that follows, it is the word to be brought into relief. (14) is an example of a not uncommon collocation. *Civitati*, as the least important idea, falls at the end of the clause; but is it not also the case that prominence is given to *praesidio* and *ornamento* by the position of *sit*? *Sit* is made to seem to give its whole force to these two ideas, and, by closing in a way the thought at that point, to exclude, as of slight importance, the idea of *civitati*. It is about *praesidio* and *ornamento* that the truth is stated, not about *civitati*. (10) is a case of the copula not attached immediately to the emphatic word, but still influenced by it. *Tanta* carries its emphasis through *dulcedo*, which it limits, to *est*. Still greater prominence would be given to *tanta* if *est* followed it immediately, as is the case with *erat* in (9). In (18) the verb is appended to a genitive, and in (19), (20), and (17) to an ablative. In each case, however, the word to which it is appended, though not the most emphatic word in the sentence, is a prominent word and one needing to be brought into relief, as being (excepting in (17)) a word leading to a clause. So, in (19), if *fuisse* fell anywhere else in the sentence, *illo* would lose much of its prominence; the verb being where it is, *profecto iratos deos Veienti populo* are at once the emphatic words of the sentence, and *illo* is saved from falling quite into shadow. Thus: 'He replied that the gods had surely been angry with the people of Veii, — on *that* day, that is, they had been angry, on which they had put that thought into his head'; but the Latin can say it all in one statement and with one verb. In (13) something of prominence seems to be given to *qualis* by the position of *esset*. *Qualis*, and not *natura*, is the word with which *esset* is closely connected in thought; the contrary would be the case if *esset* fell later in the clause. This position of the copula, closely following the interrogative word, is a not uncommon one. It is also not uncommon for the copula to fall early in a relative or demonstrative

clause.¹ It is possible that the order is to be explained in such cases by the fact that the connection between the subject and the verb is felt to be closer than that between the verb and any other part of the clause.²

Hitherto the copula alone has been considered. But the working of the principle extends to other verbs as well. Thus, in Liv. vii. 30. 17, *non loquor apud recusantem iusta bella populum; sed tamen, si ostenderitis auxilia vestra, ne bello quidem arbitror vobis opus fore*, the verb *arbitror* gives us the effect by its position of modifying *bello* alone. The word seems drawn to the place it occupies by the emphasis of *bello*. So, in English, the position of the word *do* is comparable: 'Not even of war do I think you will find there is need.' Perhaps the same feeling which induced the Roman to put *arbitror* immediately after *ne bello quidem*, almost obliges us to do what is equivalent to inverting the subject and verb.³ Here (as well

¹ E.g. Caes. B. G. i. 7, *pontem, qui erat ad Genavam*; i. 10, *quae civitas est in provincia*; i. 10, *hi sunt extra provinciam*; Sall. Jug. 85. 30, *haec sunt meae imagines, haec nobilitas*. The following is an interesting example of the use of the copula: Liv. ii. 15. 3, *ea esse vota omnium, ut, qui libertati erit in illa urbe finis, idem urbi sit. proinde, si salvam esse vellet Romam, ut patiatur liberam esse, orare*.

² Observe the word which *εἶναι* follows in these two Greek sentences. Lys. xvi. 1, *ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ τοῖς ἀδίκως διαβεβλημένοις τοῦτους εἶναι μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους, οἵτινες ἂν αὐτοὺς ἀναγκάζωσιν εἰς ἑλεγχον τῶν αὐτοῖς βεβιωμένων καταστήναι*. Lys. xvi. 3, *δέομαι ὑμῶν ἐμὲ μὲν δοκιμάζειν, τοῦτους δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι χεῖρους εἶναι*. So often the predicate position of adjective or noun; e.g. Lys. xii. 37, *ἤξιουν ἱκανὰ εἶναι τὰ κατηγορημένα*. *εἶναι*, by its position, not only emphasizes *ἱκανὰ*, but also makes prominent the dependence on *ἱκανὰ* of τὰ κατηγορημένα.

³ Comparison may also be made to the position of the verb in the German sentence when any other word than the subject comes first: *Haben Sie ihn gestern oder vorgestern gesehen? Vorgestern habe ich ihn gesehen*. Does this order of verb and subject owe its origin to the fact that the first place is one of emphasis and that the verb tends to attach itself as closely as possible to the word to which it really gives its meaning? *Habe*, by its position, shows that *gesehen* is, in a way, a modifier of *vorgestern*. If *vorgestern ich habe ihn gesehen* could stand, the last words would introduce a new truth; as it is, *vorgestern* represents the only advance made in the thought, and the other words attach themselves to *vorgestern* in a parasitic way. The same tendency is continually present in the English; e.g. 'never shall I see him again.' Comparing the two expressions, 'For twelve whole years was that the case,' and 'For twelve whole years that was the case,' shall we not say that more importance is given to the words *for twelve whole years* in the

as in the case of the copula) the Greek is parallel to the Latin; e.g. Dem. xix. 1, ὅση μὲν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, σπουδῇ περὶ τουτονὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ παραγγελία γέγονε, σχεδὸν οἶμαι πάντας ὑμᾶς ἤσθῃσθαι. It is σχεδόν that is emphasized, and emphasized because οἶμαι modifies it in thought. Thus: 'I am pretty sure about everybody has learned this, — perhaps not everybody, but nearly everybody, I think.' Thus an emphatic adjective or other word often draws the verb to itself and leaves the modified word to fall at the end of the sentence; e.g. Liv. i. 7. 13, *forte ita evenit, ut Potitii ad tempus praesto essent, iisque exta adponerentur, Pinarii extis adesis ad ceteram venirent dapem. Ceteram*, being singled out to receive the whole force of the verb, seems to be rather more emphatic than if *dapem* had been placed with it. It gains perspective. The point is, not that they shared in the feast, but that they shared in the part of the feast that followed.

I subjoin a few sentences in which the position of the verb, and the effect due thereto, are noteworthy.

(a) Cic. *Acad.* ii. 118, princeps Thales . . . ex aqua *dixit* constare omnia; (b) Cic. *de leg. Man.* 19, non enim possunt una in civitate multi rem ac fortunas amittere, ut non plures secum in eandem *trahant* calamitatem; (c) Cic. *pro Sull.* 1, sed quoniam ita *tulit* casus infestus ut . . .; (d) Liv. v. 41. 2, qui eorum curules *gesserant* magistratus . . .; (e) Liv. v. 40. 6, inde pars per agros dilapsi, pars urbes *petunt* finitimas.

Of course, in all these cases the last word is unemphatic, but whatever importance the verb in question has seems to be due to its close connection in thought with the highly emphatic word pre-

first sentence than in the second? At the same time, the position of *was* makes the dependence of the last idea on this prominent idea more marked. The verb, by attaching itself to the emphatic word or phrase, when there is one preëminently emphatic word or phrase in the sentence, emphasizes the subordination of the other ideas. Compare the expressions 'said he,' 'said I,' and the like, used when a direct quotation precedes. These are apt to come after emphatic words or clauses. The usage which makes the verb in Sanskrit unaccented or enclitic may also be mentioned; e.g. *agnim ide puróhitam*. See Whitney's *Grammar*, 592. If we needed any proof that *est* is often enclitic to the preceding word, we should have it in such combinations as *humanumst*. With the sentence in the text, compare Sall. *Jug.* 82. 1, *reges opperitur melius esse ratus cognitis Mauris, quoniam is novus hostis adcesserat, ex commodo, pugnam facere*.

ceding; that is, if the preceding idea were not so prominent in the writer's mind, the verb would be more likely to fall at the end. Further, it is not simply a matter of separating two words which belong together, in order to give the attention time to linger on the emphatic idea. Something of this effect certainly does result, but there is also a genuine logical reason why the verb should occupy the position it does. It is possible that we have here the origin of what seems to have become more or less of a stylistic trick. In the sentences above the position of the verb is explained in each case by the emphasis of the preceding word; but in some cases there seems to be little or no such emphasis present, and it was apparently more or less of a recognized *σχήμα* to separate two closely connected words at the end of the sentence by a verb. Nepos is particularly rich in such forms. The following case of the present participle may be added to the above examples: Liv. v. 14. 1, *quorum prope maior patribus quam belli cura erat, quippe non communicatum modo cum plebe, sed prope amissum cernentibus summum imperium.*

The same tendency seems to be at work in sentences similar to the following: Isocr. xv. 125, οὕτω πρῶως διώκει καὶ νομίμως; and 302, πολὺ γὰρ καλλίω δόξαν ἐκείνων κτώμενοι τῇ πόλει τυγχάνουσι καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρμόττουσαν. Professor Goodell, in commenting on these passages,¹ remarks that νομίμως and ἀρμόττουσαν gain an emphasis because, coming after the thought is really closed, they in a way begin a new sentence. Is it not the case that πρῶως and καλλίω also gain by the separation? The idea expressed in each case by these words is so prominent in the mind of the speaker that, for the moment feeling it to be the sole idea, he hastens to close the thought by bringing in the verb, and then, as it were, bethinks himself of the second idea. The greater the number of ideas introduced before the thought closes, the less is the comparative prominence of each single idea.²

¹ p. 37 of the article cited above.

² Cf. Xen. An. ii. 4. 21, ὁ δὲ εἶπεν ὅτι πολλὴ καὶ κῶμαι ἔνεισι καὶ πόλεις πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα. Similar, as far as the effect on the word preceding the verb is concerned, are the following: Cic. Tusc. v. 1, *quintus hic dies, Brute, finem faciet Tusculanarum disputationum*; Sall. Cat. 4. 4, *nam id facinus in primis ego memorabile existimo sceleris atque periculi novitate*; Cic. de Div. ii. 2, *quintus eum locum complexus est, qui . . .*; Sall. Jug. 8. 2, *si permanere vellet in suis artibus.*

The remoter effects of the principle here under discussion are not always obvious. Some mention should therefore be made of those cases in which the copula is combined with the future participle, the perfect participle, and the gerundive to form the compound tenses of the verb. Properly, of course, there is no normal order for the two members of these combinations, and the copula should be as free here to shift its place as when it is used in combination with substantive, adjective, or other part of speech. In the nature of the case, however, when the participle or gerundive is present, that is likely to be the word in the sentence which the copula oftenest modifies in thought, and it is true that the prevailing order is participle (or gerundive) followed by copula. The usage is subject to fluctuations, however, owing to individual peculiarities of style and thought. Thus, in Sallust there are only two cases in which the copula precedes the participle, and one of these is in Catiline's letter to Catulus. In general, Sallust's style is one in which the principle in question plays very little part. In Nepos, on the other hand, where the working of the principle is everywhere prominent, there are, in round numbers, two-thirds as many cases in which the copula precedes the participle (or gerundive) as there are cases in which the order is the reverse.

The examples of inversion (for convenience this term may be used to designate the less common order) in which the copula follows immediately the emphatic word are numerous, and are not essentially different from cases of the use of the copula which have been considered above. The following may serve to illustrate:

(α) Liv. vii. 31. 11, *haec legatis agentibus in concilio Samnitiū adeo est ferociter responsum ut . . .*; (β) Liv. ii. 7. 10, *adeone est fundata leviter fides . . . ?*; (γ) Caes. B. G. vii. 30, *et sic sunt animo consternati . . . ut . . .*; (δ) Liv. v. 28. 7, *pavorque inde Verruginem etiam ad praesidium alterum est perlatus*; (ε) Nep. Eum. 12. 1, *a quo tot annos adeo essent male habiti ut . . .*; (ζ) Nep. Tim. 1. 6, *quibus rebus ille adeo est commotus ut . . .*; (η) Nep. Hamil. 2. 3, *quibus malis adeo sunt Poeni perterriti ut . . .*; (θ) Liv. vi. 41. 1, *et ita maxima sunt adepturi, ut nihil ne pro minimis quidem debeant.*

It is difficult in some cases to say just how far the participle is on its way to being an adjective, but the idea of completion seems often

to be present in a greater or less degree. Sometimes the influence of the emphatic word is carried over one or more intervening words to the verb, but it is still sufficient to cause inversion. Such are the following :

(ι) Caes. *B. G.* vii. 25, *nec prius ille est a propugnatoribus vacuus relictus locus, quam . . .*; (κ) Liv. v. 27. 10, *tanta mutatio animis est iniecta ut . . .*; (λ) Caes. *B. G.* ii. 27, *horum adventu tanta rerum commutatio est facta ut . . .*; (μ) Caes. *B. G.* vii. 42, *quae maxime illi hominum generi est innata.*

Less obvious are the following :

(ν) Liv. vi. 23. 5, *qui adveniens castra urbesque primo impetu capere sit solitus, eum residem intra vallum tempus terere*; (ξ) Liv. v. 11. 15, *pro certo se habere neminem in contione stare, qui illo die non caput, domum fortunasque L. Verginii ac M. Sergii sit exsecratus detestatusque*; (ο) Liv. xxii. 19. 7, *tumultusque prius in terra et castris quam ad mare et ad naves est ortus.*

In the first sentence there are two contrasted pictures ; each word in the relative clause, as being a part of the first picture, and so standing in contrast to what is in the second, is emphatic, and this emphasis is sufficient to cause the inversion. In the second sentence the idea from *illo die* through *Sergii* is emphatic, and the emphasis is distinctly greater than it would be if *sit* followed the participles. The participles coming at the end, all the emphasis falls on the preceding ideas. In the third sentence the force of *prius* is carried through to the end. In each of these passages the prominence of the idea preceding the verb is sufficient in itself to make the idea contained in the participle seem an unimportant one, and so to throw it to the end. By monopolizing the whole force of the part of the verb which, while it states existence, adds nothing to the picture, it gains in vividness. To illustrate: If the question were asked, 'To what extent were they frightened?', the answer might be, as in (γ) above, *sic sunt animo consternati ut . . .* ('to such an extent were they frightened that . . .'). *Sunt*, by its position, shows that the force of the whole verb, participle as well as copula, goes with *sic*. Now, the extent of their consternation is felt to be so striking that, without any previous suggestion of the idea of fright, the emphasis of *sic* is

alone sufficient to draw *sunt* to itself, and so to throw the idea of *consternati* into shadow; the extent of the fright would be somewhat less prominently brought to our notice if *sunt* fell after *consternati*.¹ So is it, I think, in many less obvious cases, as (v), (ξ), and (o).

One imagines that in the following sentence something of vividness is given to the picture by the order *sunt usi*: Caes. B. G. ii. 32, *et tamen circiter parte tertia . . . celata atque in oppido retenta, portis patefactis, eo die pace sunt usi*. The three features, *portis patefactis*, *eo die*, *pace*, coming out with so much individual distinctness, seem to gain perspective through the position of *sunt*. The point is necessarily very intangible, however, and it may be doubted by some whether *usi sunt* would be anything other than slightly different euphonically. The following sentences may be compared with the above: Liv. v. 21. 17, *atque ille dies caede hostium ac direptione urbis opulentissimae est consumptus*; Caes. B. G. vii. 28, *parsque ibi, cum angusto exitu portarum se ipsi premerent, a militibus, pars iam egressa portis ab equitibus est interfecta*; Caes. B. G. vii. 25 (last verb), *nec prius ille est a propugnatoribus vacuus relictus locus, quam restincto aggere atque omni ex parte submotis hostibus finis est pugnandi factus*. The sentence at the end of the following passage is also worth examining: Liv. i. 46. 1, *Servius quamquam iam usu haud dubie regnum possederat, tamen, quia interdum iactari voces a iuvene Tarquinio audiebat se iniussu populi regnare, conciliata prius voluntate plebis agro capto ex hostibus viritim diviso ausus est ferre ad populum, vellent iuberentne se regnare; tantoque consensu, quanto haud quisquam alius ante, rex est declaratus*. The position of *est* brings *rex* to our notice with almost the vividness of the spoken word.

Enough has been said to suggest that most of the other combinations cited by Weil as examples of *repose of accent* have a logical explanation as well. A few may be briefly referred to. Thus, *āv*, which often performs the function of a finger-post to the verb that follows, frequently suggests by its position that the whole force of

¹ Sometimes the whole verb, copula and participle, follows the emphatic word; e.g. Nep. Eum. 12. 1, *admirarentur non iam de eo sumptum esse supplicium, a quo . . .* Here it is easy to feel the lack of emphasis of *supplicium*, but it is hard to see that *sumptum esse* is emphatic except in so far as it closely modifies in thought the emphatic word *eo*.

that verb is to be given to a single emphatic word; e.g. Dem. i. 1, ἀντὶ πολλῶν ἂν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χρημάτων ὑμᾶς ἐλέσθαι νομίζω—‘more than much wealth (i.e. it would be much, no slight amount) would you prize it if . . .’ As, in the sentences (α) to (θ) above, the copula alone is sufficient to show that the force of the whole verb, participle and all, belongs to the emphatic word, so here the same is the case with the particle. The vocative commonly falls after an emphatic word or phrase; e.g. Cic. *de Div.* i. 11, *ego vero, inquam, philosophiae, Quinte, semper vaco.* The attention of the person addressed is thereby called to the word or phrase in question, as if that were the important part of the utterance and the part to which he is to direct his thoughts. Similarly other words are attracted to the parts of the sentence they distinctly modify. Compare the following: Lys. vii. 6, ὁ πόλεμος καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν αἴτιος κακῶν γεγένηται; Dem. i. 22, εἰ δὲ τούτων ἀποστερηθήσεται τῶν χρημάτων; Dem. i. 27, οὐδεμιᾶς ἐλάττων ζημίας.¹

The inquiry might be carried further, but this brief examination is perhaps sufficient to show that it is not a fortuitous circumstance that the copula and other apparently unimportant words of the sentence follow in the wake of emphatic words, and, further, that the position of such words is not, as a rule, a matter of indifference logically. This conclusion does not belittle the part that other factors, such as euphony and the desire for variety, play in the sentence, for it is plain that virtually the same idea may be expressed in a variety of ways. Nor does it deny that Weil's explanation of the phenomenon in question is true as far as it goes. After all has been said, however, it must be admitted that there are many cases our feeling for which is so intangible as to seem to defy analysis, and this is especially true of the combinations of participle or gerundive with copula.

¹ Similar is the position of *quisque* after *se*, *suus*, and of *uterque*, *homines*, and *plerique* in the following sentences: Caes. *B. C.* i. 40, *suas uterque legiones reducit*; ii. 39, *ut de suis homines laudibus libenter praedicant*; iii. 95, *missis plerique armis*.

OMENS AND AUGURY IN PLAUTUS.

BY CHARLES BURTON GULICK.

OF all the topics relating to ancient life which we find so abundantly illustrated in Plautus, perhaps none can be regarded as affording in general such safe evidence of purely Roman habit and custom as that which relates to popular superstition. It is my purpose to record all references and allusions to omens and augury in the extant comedies, treating them wherever possible with special reference to the question whether they may be considered as representing Greek or Roman habits of thought.

The word *omen* seems originally to have meant only a spoken word, which by its favorable or unfavorable import might seem to shadow forth a favorable or unfavorable event in the future. This was expressed in Greek by *φήμη*.¹ Hence often the necessity of complete silence, the familiar *fauere linguis* or *εὐφημεῖν*,² cf. Fest. p. 195, *omen uelut oremen, quod fit ore augurium, quod non auibus alioque modo fit*. To talk of death, or use the word *letum*, was a bad omen, cf. *Merc.* 482, Charinus: *Te nunc consulo: Responde, quo leto censes me ut peream potissimum?* — Eutychus: *non taces? caue tu istuc deixis*, where *istuc* refers euphemistically to self-destruction as a bad omen, and the whole command is equivalent to *fauere lingua*. In the same play, Demipho dreams of a goat, which he interprets to be himself. Lysimachus shortly after enters and says, v. 272: *Profecto ego illunc hircum castrari uolo, Ruri qui nobeis exhibet negotium*; this Demipho overhears, and he says: *Nec omen illuc mihi nec auspicium³ placet: Quasi hircum metuo ne uxor me castret mea*. Here the mention of a goat by Lysimachus, at the very moment when Demipho is also thinking of one, is a coincidence which is interpreted as an

¹ Xen. *Mem.* i. 1. 3.

² Cf. the "*Underufen!*" of the Germans.

³ *Auspicium* here means 'beginning,' cf. *Men.* 1149 below, p. 240.

omen, in this case unfavorable. A mention of death in one's family was naturally ominous to one returning from a journey, as in the case of Theopropides in *Most.* 462, when Tranio tells him that by touching the door of the alleged haunted house he has committed murder: *Occidisti hercle* — Theop.: *Quem mortalem?* — Tran.: *Omnis tuos.* — Theop.: *Di te deaeque omnes faxint cum istoc ominē.* A malicious prediction in reference to an unborn child was also a bad omen, and it is no sooner uttered than the gods are at once invoked to avert the evil; cf. *Amph.* 718, Sosia: *Amphitruo, speravi ego istam tibi parturam filium: Verum non est puero grauida.* — *Amph.*: *Quid igitur?* — So.: *Insania.* — Alcumena: *Equidem sana sum et deos quaeso ut salua pariam filium: Verum tu malum magnum habebis, si hic suum officium facit: Ob istuc omen, ominator, capies quod te condecet.* *Ominator* occurs only here, and means, not 'diviner,'¹ but 'one who utters a word of ill omen.'² A blessing or good wish at the beginning of an enterprise was regarded as a good omen. So *Epid.* 396, Apocides: *Di deaeque te adiuuant.* — Periphanes: *omen placet.* — Apoec.: *Quin omni omnis suppetunt res prosperae.*

In the passage cited from the *Amphitruo*, Alcumena calls upon 'the gods' in general to avert the omen. But Jupiter was particularly the source of omens, and could foresee the future and avert evil. In this capacity he is called *prodigialis*. Thus Sosia, alleging that Alcumena has had a bad dream, says to her, *Amph.* 739: *Sed mulier, postquam experrecta's, te prodigiali Ioui Aut mola salsa hodie aut ture conprecata oportuit.* Here the word *tus* points to the Greek origin of the passage, and *mola salsa* may be a rough translation of οἰλά.³ *Prodigialis* appears in this sense only here, and evidently represents τεράστιος,⁴ an epithet of Zeus which expresses part of his function as ἀλεξίκακος or ἀποτρόπαιος. Here, therefore, we have a reference to the Greek (as well as Roman) custom of piacular sacrifice

¹ White and Riddell.

² The fact that it is a ἀπαξ εἰρημένον may possibly indicate that it is the translation of some Greek word. But the word is formed naturally, and there is no reason for supposing that it was not in common use.

³ For the difference between the two, see Schoemann, *Gr. Alt.* II, 239.

⁴ *Luc. Tim.* 41; *Aristid.* II, p. 86 Dind. *Zeus* τεράστιος had a sanctuary near Gythion, 'Εφ. 'Αρχ. 1892, p. 57.

offered to avert portended evil. The sooner it was done, the better, as *hodie* indicates. When Jupiter interpreted the future himself, there was of course no need of *arioli* or *aruspices*.¹ Yet any god might inspire prophecy in his own realm, as Venus is said to do *Mil. Glor.* 1257,² and the process of taking auguries and observing omens was embraced in the general conception of *religio*.³ Cf. *Merc.* 875:

Eu. Si huc item properes ut istuc properas, facias rectius.
Huc secundus uentus nunc est: cape modo uorsoriam.
Hic faunius serenust, istic auster imbricus:
Hic facit tranquillitatem, iste omnis fluctus conciet.
Recipe te ad terram, Charine, huc: nam dextrorsum quid uides?
Nimbus ater imberque instant. spice⁴ nunc ad sinisteram:
Caelum ut est splendore plenum non ex aduorso uides? —

Cha. Religionem mi obiecisti: recipiam me illuc.⁵

This is remarkable, as occurring in a play so preëminently Greek in character.⁶

The regular classes of professional interpreters and soothsayers are frequently mentioned. The *haruspex* in particular examined the entrails of sacrificial victims, often exacting a high price; cf. *Poen.* 463: *Condigne haruspex, non homo trioboli, Omnibus in extis aibat portendi mihi Malum damnumque et deos esse iratos mihi. Quid ei diuini aut humani aequomst credere? Mina mihi argenti dono postilla datast.* The passage is Greek, as the words *trioboli* and *mina* show, yet the practice of *extispicium* formed part of the Roman (or Etruscan) *haruspicina*, as explained by Cicero.⁷ The office of the *ariolus* was the same as that of the *haruspex*. In *Most.* 571, the money-lender says: *Certe hic homo [Tranio] inanis est.* — *Tranio: Hic homost certe*

¹ *Amph.* 1132-4: *ariolos, aruspices Mitte omnis: quae futura et quae facta eloquar, Multo adeo melius quam illi, quom sum Iuppiter.*

² Below, p. 238.

³ The origin of the word *religio* points clearly to this connection, Hom. *Il.* 12, 237-240; Curt. *Gr. Etym.*³ p. 364.

⁴ Technical word applied to augural observation. See below, p. 246.

⁵ Somewhat different is *Curc.* 350, *Vocat ad cenam: religio fuit, denegare nolui.*

⁶ The *Ευρωπος* of Philemon. In it (v. 945) Calchas is mentioned as a well-known seer.

⁷ *De Div.* ii. 12. 28. *Extā inspicere* is mentioned of a sheep, *Aulul.* 565.

hariolus; i.e. "he has guessed the truth—I am empty." Tranio takes the word *inanis* to refer to his own hungry condition, and jokingly remarks that the money-lender can see through his inwards as well as a *hariolus*. *Arioli* and *haruspices* are closely joined in one expression in *Poen.* 791, *Eheu, quom ego habui hos ariolos haruspices*, etc. A prophet in general was called *coniector*, a word applied even to the great Tiresias in *Amph.* 1128. The feminine was *coniectrix*, *Mil. Glor.* 693. So *ariolus* and *ariola*. Their ravings and frenzy, with sighs, gnashing of teeth, and striking of thighs, are referred to in *Truc.* 599, *Med intuitur gemens. Traxit ex intumo uentre suspirium. Hoc uide: dentibus frendit, icit femur. Num obsecro nam ariolust, qui ipse se uerberat?* The *arioli* belonged to the artisan class, *δημιουργοί*, or *artifices*, as *Cas.* 355 implies.¹ Chalinus: *At pol ego hau credo, sed certo scio.*—Lysidamus: *Plus artificumst mi quam rebar: hariolum hunc habeo domi.*

A frequent term applied to persons who possessed clairvoyant powers was *superstitiosus*, *Amph.* 323, Sosia: *Illic homo [Mercurius] superstitiosust* (since he knows that I have been away); *Curc.* 397, *Superstitiosus hic quidemst: uera praedicat.* The feminine occurs *Rud.* 1139, *Quid si ista [Palaestra] aut superstitiosa aut hariolast?*² *atque omnia Quidquid inerit uera dicet?* From the frequent use of *hariolor* = 'foretell,' we often find the word in the sense merely of 'divine,' 'guess' the truth. The passages are *Asin.* 316, 579, 924; *Rud.* 347, 377, 1141; *Mil. Glor.* 1256; *Cist.* 746.³ In the case of *Mil.* 1256, where the word means 'guess,' the allusion to prophecy as inspired by Venus is still very plain, and the original sense of the word seems to me to be not wholly forgotten. By extension, also, the Plautine *auguro* often means 'be circumspect,' 'look round with an augur's care' (*a terra ad caelum*, *Pers.* 604), as in *Cist.* 694. Again, *augurium* can mean 'interpretation of an augury,' as in *Asin.* 263.⁴ This extensive use of words like *hariolor*, *auguro*, *augurium*, etc., only shows how thoroughly the custom of taking auguries and auspices was fixed in the habits and thoughts of the people, and

¹ So *μάρτυς* in Homer, *Od.* 17, 383-4.

² *Superstitiosa* is joined with *ariolatio* in Enn. ap. Cic. *de Div.* i. 31. 66.

³ Cf. Langen, *Beiträge* pp. 260-1.

⁴ Cf. *Ov. Met.* i. 395, where *augurium* is the interpretation of an oracle.

how readily, therefore, such words occurred to them. So Cic. *de Div.* i. 16. 28, *nihil fere quondam maioris rei nisi auspicato ne priuatum quidem gerebatur, quod etiam nunc nuptiarum auspices declarant, qui re omissa nomen tantum tenent*.¹ An unfavorable *auspiciu*m would deter one from prosecuting an undertaking (*Amph.* 690, *An te auspiciu*m *conmoratumst*), and even an unfavorable warning, if received in time to prevent loss or harm, was regarded with gratitude, *Aulul.* 669,

Ni subuenisset coruos, periissem miser
Nimis hercle ego illum coruom ad me ueniat uelim,
Qui indicium fecit, ut ego illic aliquid boni
Dicam.

Cicero's mention of the taking of auspices just before a marriage ceremony may be illustrated from *Cas.* 86, prologue, where *auspices* means *παράνυμφοι*, and the importance of incurring no evil by the bride's stumbling when she crosses the threshold of her new home is indicated in the warning words of the hymn in *Cas.* 815, *Sensim supera limen, tolle Pedes, mea noua nupta: Sospes iter incipe hoc, ut uiro tuo Semper sis superstes*, etc. A jocose, half ironical reference to taking auspices, showing how widely they might be applied, occurs *Capt.* 766, where Aristophontes, one of the captives, as he is sent off under guard by Hegio, says: *Exauspicaui ex uinclis: nunc intellego Redauspicandum esse in catenas denuo*, i.e. "I've got to get myself 're-auspiced' back into chains, though before I thought I had 'auspiced' myself out of them." In like manner auspices were taken just before a battle, *Pers.* 604. Dordalus is speaking of the girl to Sagaristio: *Hospes, uolo ego hanc percontari*. — Sag.: *A terra ad caelum quid lubet*. — Dord.: *Iube dum ea hoc accedat ad me*. — Sag.: *I sane ac morem illi gere. Percontare, exquire quiduis*. — Toxilus: *Age, age nunc tu: in proelium Vide ut ingrediare auspicato*. — Virgo: *liquidumst auspiciu*m. Cf. *Pseud.* 759 below. So at the beginning of a day, *Pers.* 689, *Lucro faciundo ego auspicaui in hunc diem*, and *Rud.* 717, *non hodie isti rei auspicaui, ut cum furcifero fabuler*. *Auspiciu*m then comes naturally to signify 'beginning,'² and in the

¹ Cf. Liv. vi. 41. 4.

² Conversely, *principium* occurs in almost the sense of *auspiciu*m, *Merc.* 963, *Stich.* 672, but not 358.

phrase *auspicio*, 'by the authority of,' 'at the instance' or 'on the responsibility of,' cf. *Amph.* 192, *Epid.* 343, 381. As the manner of beginning constituted an omen for the enterprise begun,¹ *auspiciū* may have both senses of *beginning* and *omen*, as in *Men.* 1148, where Menaechmus II says of his slave Messenio: *Liber esto.* — *Men.* I.: *Quom tu's liber, gaudeo, Messenio.* — *Mess.*: *Sed meliorest opus auspicio, ut liber perpetuo siem* (i.e. he wants money).

After comparing these instances of the thoroughly Roman use of *auguro*, *auspico*, *auspiciū* with Cicero's statement, we find it clear that in all these cases Plautus is representing Roman custom, even when he finds the occasion for employing these words in his Greek originals.

In general, a bird appearing on the left was a favorable omen, described in the phrase *auspiciū liquidum*, cf. *Pseud.* 759, *Quicquid incerti mi in animo prius aut ambiguū fuit Nunc liquet, nunc defaecatumst cor mihi, nunc peruamst: Omnis ordine sub signis ducam legiones meas Aui sinistra, auspicio liquido atque ex mea sententia.* So *Epid.* 181, *Tacete! habete animum bonum Liquido exeo auspicio foras Aui sinistra.* Cf. *Pers.* 607, above. But special superstitions were attached to certain birds, as the *coruos* and the *parra*, which, seen from the right, were considered lucky. For this we have Cicero's express testimony (*Div.* i. 7. 12), so that we may safely trust the passage in *Asin.* 258, with all its joking:

Vnde sumam? quem interuortam? quo hanc celocem conferam?
 Inpetritum, inauguratūst: quouis admittunt aues.
 Picus et cornix ab laeua, coruos, parra ab dextera
 Consuadent: certum herclest uostram consequi sententiam.
 Sed quid hoc, quod picus ulmum tundit? haud temerariumst.
 Certe hercle ego quantum ex augurio auspicioque intellego,
 Aut mihi in mundo sunt uirgae aut atriensi Saureae.

Here the *picus* and the *cornix* on the left have the beneficial potency of ordinary birds, while the *coruos* and the *parra* on the right possess an influence equally good. The slave's interpretation of the striking of the elm by the woodpecker, however, only shows to what comic extent individual imagination might run in explaining auguries, and

¹ Cf. *Merc.* 274, p. 235.

is not to be taken as a proof that there existed any popular superstition¹ with regard to such a phenomenon.

On the other hand, we find from another well-known passage (*Aulul.* 624) that the cry of a *corvus* on the left was unlucky. There Euclio is fearful that his treasure has been discovered: *Non temerest quod corvus cantat mihi nunc ab laeva manu. Semul radebat pedibus terram et uoce crocibat sua.*² It would seem, therefore, that the influence of the *corvus* was exercised in a reverse way to that of most other birds.³

In speaking of 'right' and 'left,' it is to be remembered that the Roman augur faced the south when taking auguries,⁴ whereas the Greek practice was just the reverse. To a Roman, therefore, a bird coming from the left, or east, was lucky, while one from the right, or west, was unlucky. Among the Greeks, too, a bird from the east was lucky, one from the west unlucky, but east and west are here right and left respectively. Thus:

Greek	{ (1) right — east — lucky, (2) left — west — unlucky,
Roman	{ (3) right — west — unlucky, (4) left — east — lucky.

The cases quoted (*Pseud.* 759 ff., *Epid.* 181 ff., and the *picus* and *cornix*, *Asin.* 260) of favorable birds appearing from the left, fall under (4) above; an exception to (3) and (4) is found in the case of the *corvus* (and *parra*), *Asin.* 260, *Aulul.* 624. That this is really an exception to (3) and (4), believed in by the Romans themselves, and not an accidental intrusion of Greek superstition according to

¹ Yet it was always important in augury to observe a bird's actions, ἐνέργεια. Cf. M. Psellus quoted below, note 2.

² According to Michael Psellus (11th century), four things were to be distinguished in observing ravens and crows in augury: πτήσις, φωνή, καθέδρα, ἐνέργεια. The second and fourth are denoted in the passage here. See the fragment of Psellus in *Philol.* VIII, 1. 166-8.

³ That birds were to be thus distinguished is shown, for the Greeks, by Aesch. *Prom.* 488, γαμψωνύχων τε πτήσιν ολωνών σκεθρῶς | διώρῳ, οἰτίνες τε δεξιῶι | φύσιν εὐωνόμους τε.

⁴ Varro ap. Fest. p. 339 M., *L. L.* vii. 7, quoted p. 242. Cf. Liv. i. 18; Plin. *N. H.* ii. 142.

(1) and (2), is clear from the passage in the *Asinaria*, which consistently gives the Roman belief. To the Roman of Plautus's day, therefore, a *coruus* from the right or west was just as favorable as a *picus* coming from the left or east. When we find the opposite superstition recorded in the Augustan Age, what is the explanation? In *Ov. Her.* ii. 115 the expression *auibus sinistris* indicates a bad omen, cf. *omen sinistrum* *ibid.* xiii. 49. Horace (*Carm.* iii. 27. 11-16) speaks of a *coruus* from the east as lucky, a *picus* from the left as unlucky. The explanation is not, as A. Kieseberg thinks,¹ that belief had changed in the relatively short interval between Plautus and Horace. It simply means that Horace and Ovid, in their fondness for Grecizing, have here followed Greek, not Roman, superstition. The 27th ode of the third book is preëminently Greek in theme and spirit.²

The phrase *in mundo* here calls for attention. It is usually derived from a substantive *mundum*, and means 'in readiness.' Cf. Charisius p. 201, 10, *in mundo pro palam, et in expedito ac cito*, where Plaut. *Pseud.* 499 is quoted, *quia mihi sciebam pistrinum in mundo fore.*³ Plautus uses it besides in *Cas.* 565, *Epid.* 618, *Pers.* 45, *Asin.* 264, 316, *Stich.* 477. But aside from the fact that the form *mundum* never occurs, this derivation does not make clear the real origin and primitive sense of the word. In at least two of these passages (*Asin.* 264, quoted above, and 316), the word is used in conjunction with augury or guesses at the future. Here it might mean 'on the horizon,' or, in astrological language, 'in my horoscope.' It has this sense, I think, in Varro ap. Fest. p. 339, *A deorum sede cum in meridiem spectes, ad sinistram sunt partes mundi exorientes, ad dexteram occidentes. factum arbitror, ut sinistra meliora auspicia quam dextra esse existimentur.* This agrees with what he says about a 'templum' in *L. L.* vii. 7, *eius templi partes quattuor dicuntur, sinistra ab oriente, dextra ab occasu, antica ad meridiem, postica ad septentrionem. In terris dictum templum locus augurii aut auspicii causa quibusdam conceptis uerbis finitus, etc.*⁴ Now, *mundus* in the sense of *templum*

¹ *Quaestiones Plaut. et Terent. ad religionem spectantes* p. 8.

² See Kiessling's introduction to the ode.

³ So Placidus p. 58, Deverling. Cf. *Enn. Ann.* 457, Vahlen.

⁴ Cf. Fest. p. 157. J. B. Greenough, *Harv. Studies* III, 182.

is well known. The famous *mundus* or circular excavation made at the founding of Rome, as described by Cato,¹ was a *templum* sacred to the Di Manes, and thrice a year the spirits rose from it to earth again.² Taking *mundus*, then, to mean the horizon as marked off and inspected by the augur, — in other words, an augural *templum*, though larger than the *auguraculum*, being in fact the circle of which that was the centre, — the phrase *in mundo* can be explained as signifying originally 'on the augural horizon,' and so 'foredoomed,' 'ready.' This meaning is suitable to all the passages above mentioned.

The effect of a good omen might be annulled by the immediate interposition of some other sign of unfavorable import. This was denoted by the verb *obscauo*. Thus, after Libanos in *Asin.* 258 ff. (quoted above, p. 240) has observed all the signs of the birds which seem to him favorable for carrying out his trick, he is interrupted by the sudden appearance of Leonida in great trepidation (vs. 265), *Sed quid illuc, quod exanimatus currit huc Leonida? Metuo, quom illic* ('for in that way') *obscauauit meae falsae fallaciae*, which Nonius, 146. 1 explains thus: *obscauauit, quasi scaeuum, malum omen obstulit*. Here *scaeuus* evidently has the unfavorable signification of the Greek σκαίός, with which it is related.³ Yet *obscauare* seems to be used in a good sense by the parasite in *Stich.* 459, *Auspicio hercle hodie ego optimo exiui foras. Quom strena mi obscauauit, spectatum hoc mihist, Mustella murem ut abstulit praeter pedes. Nam ut illa uitam repperit hodie sibi, Item me spero facturum, augurium ac facit*. The passage is corrupt, but the general meaning is that a good omen (*strena*) has interposed to prevent the fulfilment of a bad omen observed previously.⁴ It thus forms part of the whole process of the *auspiciu*; cf. 463, *augurium facit*, and 502, *eam auspicauit ego in re*

¹ Fest. pp. 154-7. Cf. Müller-Deecke, *Etrusker* II, 98-100, 147, and note 72, against Prell. *Röm. Myth.*³ II, 67, note 3.

² Ateius Capito ap. Fest. *loc. cit.*

³ Curt. *Gr. Etym.*⁵ p. 160.

⁴ As it happens, what he had interpreted here as a *strena* turns out to be, untrustworthy, *Stich.* 497 ff., especially 499, *certumst mustellae posthac numquam credere*. The mere appearance of a weasel, γαλῆ, without reference to its ἐνέπρεια is a bad omen in Aristoph. *Eccles.* 792.

capitali mea. The term *strena* was applied to a gift bestowed especially on the first day of the year, for the sake of the good omen, in the hope that more blessings would follow.¹ Fest. p. 313, *strenam uocamus quae datur die religioso ominis boni gratia*. It thus formed a good beginning, *auspicium*, εὐαρχισμός,² expressed in holiday gifts. It appears that *strenae* were originally the consecrated branches brought from the grove of the goddess Strenia, and carried to the seat of augury on the Capitol at the beginning of each new year.³ The custom was instituted by Titus Tatius,⁴ to whom in general was attributed the establishment of many augural rites.⁵

In Plautus, then, *strena* means 'good omen,' as in *Stich.* 459, just quoted, and 672, *Sequor, et domum redeunti principium placet. Bona scaeua strenaque obuam ocessit mihi*. Here we note that the word *scaeua* is qualified by *bona*, as it is again in *Pseud.* 1136-8, *Hic quidem ad me recta habet rectam uiam. Bene ego ab hoc praedatus ibo: noui: bona scaeuast mihi*. It is evident, therefore, that *scaeua*, as Nonius uses it, had an unfavorable meaning, which appeared in *obscaeuauit*, *Asin.* 266, and thus corresponded to σκαυός. But Plautus must have felt that it had a neutral sense, inasmuch as he always qualifies the word, and *obscaeuauit* in a good sense has already been noted in the passage from *Stichus*. So Varro *L. L.* vii. 97, in giving the derivation of *obscaenum* (=turpe): *potest uel ab eo, quod pueris turpicula res in collo quaedam suspenditur, ne quid obsit, bonae scaeuae causa scaeuola appellata*. I have not, to be sure, found *mala scaeua*, but adjectives equally ominous occur in *Cas.* 969 ff., *Ecce autem uxor obuamst. Nunc ego inter sacrum saxumque sum nec quo fugiam scio: Hac lupi, hac canes: lupina scaeua fusti rem gerit. Hercle, opinor, permutaui ego illuc nunc uerbum uetus. Hac ibo: caninam scaeuam spero meliorem fore*. Lysidamus is here suddenly confronted by his

¹ Pompon. ap. Non. p. 16, *adside si qua uenturast alia strena*.

² KGL IV. p. 578. Joh. Lyd. *de Mens.* 4. 4.

³ Prell. *Röm. Myth.* II, 234. Varro *L. L.* v. 47. Joh. Lyd. *loc. cit.*

⁴ Symmachus, *Ep.* x. 15, Seeck. He connects *strena* with *strenua*, as do Non. p. 16, Augustin. iv. 11. 16, Joh. Lyd. *loc. cit.* '*Strenia*, or *Strenua*, the [Sabine] goddess of healthy bodily development.' Prell. II, 213.

⁵ Varro *L. L.* v. 85. For the later customs relating to *strenae*, see Pauly, *Real-Encycl.* s.v.

mistress (*lupa*) and his wife (*canis*¹). They both constitute respectively a *lupina* and a *canina scaeva*, which are for him decidedly unfavorable. *Scaeva* here cannot possibly retain any of its original sense of 'left-side omen.'² The word alone is strictly neutral in meaning. There is, however, an allusion to the common superstition that the appearance of a dog was often an unfavorable omen (hence *canina scaeva* = *mala scaeva*), but Lysidamus reasons that to follow his wife (*canina scaeva*) is safer than to follow the courtesan (*lupina scaeva*), and thus he has, as he thinks, completely changed the old idea about the ominousness of a *canina scaeva*. From being *peior*, it becomes for him *melior*.

Another superstition remains to be noticed, — the belief in the ominous significance of twitching, *palpitatio*.³ This, with ringing in the ears (*tinnitus aurium*), and sneezing (*sternutatio*), was regarded as ominous, and the interpretation of them all is included by Suidas under a single separate branch of augury, τὸ παλμικὸν οἰώνισμα,⁴ under which he also puts the phenomenon of itching. Plautus has several references to the last: *Mil. Glor.* 397, *ita dorsus totus prurit*; *Pers.* 32, *iam scapulae*⁵ *pruriunt*; *Asin.* 315, *scapulae gestibant mihi*; *Amph.* 295, *perii, dentes pruriunt*; *Poen.* 1315, *num tibi, adolescens, malae aut dentes pruriunt*; *Bacch.* 1193, *caput prurit*;⁶ so, comically, *Amph.*

¹ For *canis* in this sense, cf. *Cas.* 317, where Lysidamus says: *Quid istuc est? quicum litigas, Olympio?* — Olympio: *Cum eadem qua tu semper.* — L.: *Cum uxorem mea?* — O.: *Quam tu mi uxorem? quasi uenator tu quidem es: Dies atque noctes cum cane aetatem exigis.* κῶων is a familiar term of reproach applied even to goddesses in Homer.

² Harper's Dict. s.v. *scaevus*.

³ Augustin. *de Doctr. Christ.* ii. 20, *his adiunguntur millia inanissimarum observationum: si membrum aliquod salierit, etc.*

⁴ Suid. s. οἰώνισμα. Cf. Cram. *An. Ox.* IV, 240. Ameis, *Adnot. ad Theocrit.* p. 26.

⁵ Perhaps we may compare the special ὁμοπλατοσκοπία of a sacrificial animal. See Michael Psellus, *Philol.* VIII, 1. 166-8.

⁶ This last is excluded by Lorenz (ad *Mil. Glor.* 397), as referring merely to pruriency. But so does *Pers.* 32, which Lorenz admits. Sweating and trembling are comically regarded as an ill omen in *Asin.* 287 ff., Leonida: *perii ego oppido, nisi Libanum inuenio iam, ubi ubist gentium.* — Lib.: *Illic homo socium ad malam rem quaerit quem adiungat sibi. Non placet: pro monstro extemplost, quando qui sudat tremat.*

323, *gestiunt pugni mihi*. In Juvenal,¹ itching of the eye sends the superstitious woman to her horoscope. The twitching of the eyebrow is mentioned as portending some unknown good or evil in a passage often cited, *Pseud.* 104, *Spero alicunde hodie me bona opera aut mala mea Tibi inuenturum esse auxilium argentarium. Atque id futurum unde unde dicam nescio, Nisi quia futurumst: ita supercilium salit*. The eyebrows, we are told in Fest., p. 304-5, were deemed by women to be under the special protection of Juno Lucina, who was at once the goddess of light, which is perceived through the eye, and of childbirth,² and perhaps it is from this circumstance that the eyebrow generally was thought to have the power of portending good and evil. But Juno Lucina as goddess of light and of childbirth is a purely Roman divinity, whereas the twitching eyebrow was an object of Greek superstition. In illustration of the passage just quoted, the editors cite Theocr. iii. 37: ἄλλεται ὀφθαλμός μιν ὁ δεξιός· ἀρά γ' ἰδησῶ | αὐτάν; But the cases, though close enough for purposes of comparison, are not exactly alike, since one refers to the eyebrow, the other to the eye; and, according to the Alexandrian Melampus, who wrote on the subject,³ the two had distinct interpretations attached to them, which it is not worth while to quote. It is interesting to observe, however, that St. Chrysostom⁴ interprets the twitching of the right eye unfavorably, in opposition to Theocritus. A case really parallel to that from the *Pseudolus*, and one which I have not seen quoted in illustration, is *Mil. Glor.* 691 ff., where Periplectomenus describes wives who say: *da, mi uir, Calendis meam qui matrem moenerem: Da qui faciam condimenta, da quod dem quinquatribus Praecantrici, coniectrici, hariolae atque haruspicae: Flagitiumst si nil mittetur, quae supercilio spicit*; i.e. 'it's a sin not to send something to her who divines by the eyebrow,' or 'who augurs from the twitching of the brow.' For *specio* or *spicio* used especially of augury, cf. Varro, *L. L.* vi. 82: *in auguriis etiam nunc augures dicunt*

¹ vi. 578.

² Cf. Varro, *L. L.* v. 69.

³ *De Palpitatione Divinatio*, ed. Franz, Altenburg, 1780. His work is addressed to Ptolemy [Philadelphus], Fabr. *Bibl. Gr.* I, 1. 15, p. 99.

⁴ Ad Paul. *Ephes.* 4, *Homil.* 12, πολλῶν δειμάτων αὐτοῖς ἡ ψυχὴ μεστή, οὐκ ἔχω . . . ἐξελεῖν ὁ ὀφθαλμός μοι ὁ δεξιὸς κάτωθεν ἀναπηδᾷ· δακρύων τοῦτο τεκμήριον.

auem specere. So *Merc.* 880, *spice ad sinisteram*.¹ Note that Plautus has no special word for such a prophetess: she is simply one *quae supercilio spicit*. Later, such augurs were called *salisatores*. Cf. Isidor. *Orig.* viii. 9. 29, *salisatores uocati sunt quia dum eis membrorum quaecunque partes salierint, aliquid sibi exinde prosperum seu triste significare praedicunt*. The Egyptians were noted for this art.² Celebrated writers on the subject were Phe-monoe,³ Antiphon,⁴ and Posidonius.⁵

¹ Of entrails, *inspicere* is used, *Aulul.* 565. Cf. *Fest.* p. 2.

² Melampus, *op. cit.* p. 460.

³ Fabr. *Bibl. Gr.* I, i. 25, p. 154.

⁴ Melampus, *loc. cit.* Cic. *de Div.* i. ii. *passim*. Suid. s.v.

⁵ Suid. s.v.

SYLLABIFICATION IN ROMAN SPEECH.¹

BY WILLIAM GARDNER HALE.

THE following article² is intended only as a *prolusio* for a fuller discussion which I hope at some time to publish, with supplementary material at several points.

The received doctrine of Latin syllabification is that, in any given case, as many consonants go with the following vowel as can begin a word in Greek³ (or, as some have it, in Latin). Seelmann, whose

¹ The editors regret that the preceding pages were all in type before the manuscript of Professor Hale's article was received from Rome. Academic seniority, followed elsewhere in this volume, would have entitled him to a position at page 85.

² The principal points of the argument of this article were incorporated in a paper entitled "Did Verse-Ictus destroy Word-Accent in Latin Poetry?" which was read at the meeting of the American Philological Association in Cleveland, in July, 1895. Only the conclusions, however, could be given at that meeting, on account of the demands of the main question.

³ So, in effect, Seelmann; while Landgraf, in his Grammar, says that as many consonants go into the following syllable as in *Latin* may begin a word (Latinized Greek words being of course taken into the reckoning).

In America, the received doctrine appears in Gildersleeve's Grammar, § 10, new edition, and in Bennett's (so far, at any rate, as any reader could have the right to infer), § 4, 3. (In the separately published Appendix, which has appeared since the above was written, Professor Bennett says that in the Grammar he has followed the traditional principles, but adds that "the validity of them is open to question." See the next footnote, and the footnote on p. 267.) In Allen and Greenough's, § 14, an uncertain statement is given, all that is said on the subject being that "this rule [namely that 'a single consonant between two vowels is to be written and pronounced with the latter'] is sometimes extended to double consonants, or any combination of consonants which can be used to begin a word: as *hospes, magnus, dixit*." A more recent statement of Professor Greenough's view, however, has been made, with complete explicitness, in the *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, vol. V, in an article upon "Early Latin Prosody." The treat-

exposition I select for criticism (*Aussprache des Latein*, published in 1885; see especially pp. 132-148), writes *sic-cus* but *no-ctem*, *al-ma* but *a-mnis*, *cras-sus* but *pote-stas*, etc.

Occasional dissenting voices have been raised against this view. It continues, however, to be the orthodox opinion, appearing, for example, in so important and advanced a book as that of my friend Mr. W. M. Lindsay, entitled *The Latin Language* (1894). I cannot better introduce our discussion than by quoting the section (chap. ii, § 139) in which Mr. Lindsay states his views:

"The Romance languages show a remarkable agreement in their division of the word into syllables, their principle of division being to make the syllable end with a vowel, and begin with a consonant, or combination of consonants. Any combination of consonants that is pronounceable at the beginning of a word is made to begin the syllable, with the one occasional exception of combinations beginning with *s*, where the *s* is in some languages allowed to end the preceding syllable. An Italian says *a-bli-quo*, *te-cni-co*, *e-ni-gma*, *a-tle-ta*, *no-stro*, *be-ne*, a pronunciation which often offers considerable difficulty to Englishmen, who would, for example, more naturally pronounce the last word as *ben-e*, like 'any.' A Spaniard says *ha-blár*, *bu-llir*, but *nues-tro*, attaching the *s* to the first syllable. The Roman division of syllables was that of the Romance languages, not of the English, as is proved to certainty by the very precise and unmistakable statements of the grammarians on the subject. Their rule is, 'Never let a syllable end in a consonant if the consonant can possibly be pronounced at the beginning of the next syllable'; and they give examples like *pote-stas*, *no-ster*, *a-mnis*, *ma-gno*, *a-gmen*. The same method is followed in those inscriptions which indicate the syllables by dots, e.g., *CIL.* VI, 77 T·AN·NI·VS·HE·DY·PNVS, 11682 VI·XIT·AN·NIS, as well as by contractions, where the initial letters of the syllable are used, like *MĠ* (*magnus*), *OMB* (*omnibus*), *PP*

ment is based entirely upon the phonetic evidence afforded by Latin versification, but reaches the same conclusions that are reached in the present paper, and expresses the physiological facts of ancient Roman utterance (pp. 57-71) with great lucidity and with a fullness for which there is here no room. (My own condensed statement of the way in which I have been in the habit of putting the argument will be found under (2), p. 266, and in the brief table on the final page.)

(*propter*); though on inscriptions we often find *s* taken with the preceding syllable in words like CAE·LES·TI (VI, 77), SES·TV·LE·IVS (IX, 4028), with which we may compare misspellings like *disscente* (vide § 130). Occasionally a grammarian urges the advisability of regarding the etymological formation of compounds like *abs-temius*, *o-bliviscor*; but such remarks only show that the natural pronunciation of these words was *ab-stemius*, *o-bliviscor*, just as we in natural utterance disregard the formation of phrases like 'at all,' 'at home,' and pronounce 'a-tall,' 'a-tome.'"

The criticisms which have been brought against this doctrine have been fragmentary, and have left some points quite untouched; so that even the present preliminary paper will, I trust, set the matter in a clearer and juster light, beside contributing some new evidence.

The evidence presented in Seelmann's treatment may be grouped under three heads: (1) the teachings of the Roman grammarians; (2) the supposed correspondence of modern Romance pronunciation with these teachings; (3) syllabification in inscriptions. These we will take up in turn.

(1) The statements of the Roman grammarians are generally regarded as unequivocally in favor of the received doctrine. The few who reject them commonly say that they were borrowed from the Greek grammarians, and that consequently, while correctly representing Greek pronunciation, they are no evidence for the pronunciation of Latin.¹ My own conception is that the particular statements of the Roman grammarians on which the received doctrine is founded represented neither the facts of Greek pronunciation nor the facts of Roman pronunciation,² but had their origin in a mere practical rule, — admirably simple and easy of application, — devised by some Greek grammarian for the division of words *in writing*, when one

¹ Such seems to be the conception of Professor Bennett, e.g., who (p. 31 of the Appendix) justifies skepticism with regard to the correctness of these rules for Latin by referring to "the irresponsible borrowing in the case of the testimony of the grammarians concerning the pronunciation of *z*."

² The actual facts of versification, in Greek as well as in Latin, are impossible to reconcile with these statements. The argument given on pp. 266 ff. for Latin applies exactly to Greek.

was near the end of a line and had room for a part of a word only; that this rule was adopted bodily by the Roman grammarians; that the Roman grammarians mostly, in discussing the matter, were not thinking of pronunciation at all, though, if *asked* how they pronounced, would doubtless (like the modern Italians spoken of on p. 258 below) have answered, "As we write"; that, nevertheless, a few of them did think of it, probably drawing the false inference, natural enough to any one except a trained phonetist, that, as writing and pronunciation conformed in most respects in Latin, so also they conformed in this.

To justify the position that the Roman grammarians were in general not dealing with syllabification in speech, but simply with syllabification in writing, I must, under the necessary limits of space in this paper, content myself with the citing of a few passages, choosing those that seem most important in Seelmann's exhibit.

Quintilian, i. 7. 7, says, "It is a common question whether in writing prepositions one ought to follow the sound belonging to the combination, or the sound which belongs to the parts as separated, as, e.g., when I say *optinuit*: for theory (*ratio*) calls for a *b* as the second letter, whereas the ear hears *p*; or as when, e.g., I say *immunis*, for the letter which (etymological) fact demands (*quod veritas exigit*) is overpowered by the *m* of the succeeding syllable and becomes *m* itself." Then Quintilian immediately goes on to say (and here is where Seelmann begins to quote), "in the division of syllables, too, there is a matter to observe, namely, whether to join the first consonant between vowels to the preceding or to the following syllable. For *haruspex*, because its second part is from *spectando*, will give (*dabit*) its *s* to the third syllable; while *abstemius*, because the word comes from *abstinentia temeti*, will leave the *s* to the first syllable." Now it is evident that, in the passage about *immunis*, Quintilian is not dealing with the question of pronunciation, or even with a question of spelling under an implied understanding that spelling and speech must conform to each other; for, if he had been so dealing, he would have said, not "it is a common question whether," but "there *can be no possible* question whether one should write *immunis* or *immunis*, for the sound of the second letter is that of *m*," or words to that effect. In the light of Quintilian's introduc-

tion, it would be clear, even if not evident in itself, that in the second part of the passage he does not mean to say that there is a question whether we ought, on etymological grounds, to write *haru-spex* and *abs-temius*, and (a very ridiculous proposition) *to make our pronunciation conform*, — but only that there is a question how we ought to divide these words in writing. Syllabification as a matter of pronunciation is not in his mind at all.

The second passage to be quoted is the longest and apparently the most decisive one employed by Seelmann, namely, Servius in *Donatum*, K. IV, p. 427, 20. I again translate:

“When we inquire what consonants go together in writing (*quae consonantes in scribendo sibi cohaereant*), or with which syllable they are to be reckoned (*cui syllabae inputentur*), the preceding or the following, the doubt is resolved by comparing with other words. If, for example, we say *aspice* (*ut puta si dicamus aspice*) and are in doubt whether *s* and *p* ought to be separated and *s* given (*danda*) to the preceding syllable and *p* to the following, we know that this cannot be (*hoc fieri non posse*), and that we ought to give both consonants to the following syllable only, for the reason that words occur which begin with these two consonants, for instance *spica*. In the same way we ought in the case of *amnis* to put *m* and *n* with the following syllable in writing (*sequenti syllabae dare in scribendo*), since words are found that begin with these consonants, as for instance *Mnestheus*. In the case of *attulit* we cannot put two *t*'s with the following syllable, because no word is found that begins with two *t*'s. And we shall observe the same rule in the case of other consonants.” At this point the text is corrupt, the words “we ought clearly to understand” (*plane scire debemus*) not being followed by the infinitive construction which is expected; but the rest is intelligible: . . . “combinations of consonants, not only those that belong to Latin syllables but those also that belong to Greek, excepting, of course, the letters *bd*, which never pass over into Latin in a combination such as is found in $\beta\delta\epsilon\lambda\lambda\alpha$. For in writing *abditur* we cannot put *a* in one syllable and *b* and *d* in the following one.”

Is Servius talking here about speech or about writing? Does his phrase *ut puta si dicamus aspice* mean “in pronouncing *aspice*,” or “in the case of the word *aspice*”? This can be settled partly by the

general nature of his tests, partly by the rest of his phraseology. As for the former, one needs only to substitute English words for Latin to see how little the whole matter has to do with the actualities of speech. If, for example, we were trying to determine with which syllable the *s* in "aspirate" and the *th* in "athlete" are actually pronounced, the decision would not in the least turn upon the question whether there exist words like "spiral," beginning with *sp*, and borrowed words like "thlipsis," beginning with *th*. The sentences about *aspice* and *omnis* are enough of themselves to indicate that Servius is thinking only of syllabification in writing. One hardly needs his express words "*in scribendo*" used both before and after the *ut puta si dicamus*, to make this evident; but, if one does need them, there they are. What it is hard to understand is how so destructive a statement can ever have been employed in constructing the doctrine for which it is cited.

Another passage quoted by Seelmann is equally explicit. Caesellius, K. VII, p. 206, 1, says: "Is *obliviscor* a compound or a simple word? A compound, for its simple form may be seen if you examine ancient monuments:¹ for there exist upon them the forms *livisci* and *livitus* which latter by elision gives us our *oblitus*. Getting this clearly in mind, anybody will readily understand that in writing the division should be *ob* and *liviscor* (*planissime quivis intellet in scriptura verbi huius divisionem ob et liviscor*)." It is evident that questions of speech in any language are not to be settled by investigating forms on ancient monuments. One does not need the express words "*in scriptura*" to see that Caesellius is talking about writing, not about speech; but, if one does need them, there again they are!

Two other passages, equally clear, may be briefly cited: e.g., Caper, *Orthogr.*, K. VII, p. 96, 9, *pronomina nostrum ac vestrum si in scriptura dividenda sunt, s littera posteriori syllabae applicari debet. Sic, si maiestas scribis, stas in diductione vocis esse debet, non tas* (vocis here is simply "the word," as frequently); *Orthogr. Bern.*, K. Suppl., p. 300, 4, *apostolus si necesse est syllabam dividi, non o et s, sed s et t iunctum esse debet.*

¹ It is a matter of indifference to the argument whether the reading of B be adopted or not, namely, *in antiquis nominibus et monumentis*.

These are fair specimens. It seems clear, then, that in general the grammarians who wrote about the division of syllables were not thinking of phonetics at all, but only of writing.

On the other hand, I differ from Havet, who doubts (see footnote on p. 260) whether any ancient grammarian has anywhere spoken of the phonetic division of syllables. I find references to phonetic division in Priscian and Bede, and, by implication, in the Greek Herodian, whose rules, probably meant for Greek only, were evidently discussed by the Romans as applying to Latin.

Priscian, K. II, p. 45, 4, says, "if the preceding syllable ends in a consonant, the following one must necessarily begin with a consonant, as e.g. in *artus, ille, arduus*,—unless the word is a compound, like *abeo, adeo, pereo*" (the common rule being that prepositions in composition should be separated from the rest of the word). "Herodian, however, in his treatise on Orthography, lays down the doctrine that it is more logical and more telling in effect upon the ear¹ (*rationabilius esse sonoriusque*) in point of actual utterance (*quantum ad ipsam vocis prolationem*²) to observe the same rule for compounds as for uncompounded words, in dividing letters between syllables. In answer, on the other hand, the objection is made that, according to this *oblatus, oblatus, obruo, abrado*, and the like, if the *b* passes into the second syllable, as in uncompounded words, ought to have the first syllable common in verse, so that it might appear as short; but such a thing never happens. Further, words like *circumeo* and *circumago* would not suffer an elision of the *m* in pronunciation (*in pronuntiatione*), nor, in words like *perhibeo, exhibeo, inhumatus, anhelio, inhibeo, adhuc, abhinc*, would the vowel with which the second syllable begins be aspirated if the consonant that ends the first syllable of the preposition passed over to it, as in *istic, istaec, istuc* (*quomodo in 'istic,' 'istaec,' 'istuc.'*)".³

¹ I can attach no other meaning to the word *sonorius*; but, at any rate, it has in some way to do with actual speech.

² The phrase means of course merely utterance, not a prolongation of sound.

³ In what he says about *istic*, etc., Priscian is referring to the explanation which he gives, in K. II, p. 589, 13, that these words are made up of *iste + hic*, etc.; and he means that the *t* which his etymology assigns to the first part of the compound is pronounced with the second part. His remark accordingly does not touch the question of the place of the *s* in pronunciation.

On the above passage the following comments are to be made. First, Herodian, though evidently dealing mainly with writing in the book from which it is taken (Priscian says "in his treatise upon Orthography"), was thinking of speech as well when he used the word *sonorius*, and Priscian was necessarily doing the same thing when he quoted the word. Secondly, in giving his argument against Herodian, Priscian clearly still has actual pronunciation in mind, since he refers, in the same connection, to the *non*-pronunciation of *m* in *circumeo* and *circumago*.

Bede's phraseology is still more explicit. He says (K. VII, p. 273, 7), *fructum cum dicis sive scribis, c secundae syllabae iungis*; (K. VII, p. 279, 19) *maiestas cum scribis aut dicis, s secundae syllabae complicari debet*; (K. VII, p. 289, 28) *sollemne cum dicis aut scribis, m sequenti syllabae conectis*.

While, then, the grammarians who have been cited as dealing with the subject were in general only thinking of division in writing, it ought not to be held that none of them ever had phonetic division in mind.

Bede, however, it should be said before we pass on, does the case for phonetic division more harm than good; first (*a*), because the general character of his other expressions on the subject shows that it was syllabification in writing, not in speech, that was mainly in his mind; and, secondly (*b*), in betraying that he is borrowing from earlier sources, and drawing an inference about which these sources said nothing.

(*a*) The other expressions referred to are the following: "Aegyptum cum *in scriptura* dividere vis, p sequenti syllabae iungis," K. VII, p. 263, 22; "conspectus cum *in scriptura* dividendum est, c sequenti syllabae iungis," K. VII, p. 268, 20; "columna cum *scripto* dividendum est, m sequenti syllabae nectis," K. VII, p. 268, 25; "defunctus cum *scripto* dividitur, c sequenti syllabae iungenda," K. VII, p. 270, 18; "praegnantem cum *scripto* dividis, g secundae syllabae nectis . . . ; "propter, *in divisione scribendi*, p secundae syllabae iungis," K. VII, p. 286, 3.

(*b*) As for the second point, Seelmann, apparently without recognizing the damage done to his own doctrine, himself points out that the coincidences between Bede and Albinus imply that they were

both borrowing from an earlier source. A specimen instance is: *praegnantem cum scripto dividis, adnectis g secundae syllabae, et alia eiusmodi, ut pignus, dignus* (Albinus, K. VII, p. 307, 1); *praegnantem cum scripto dividis, g secundae syllabae nectis: pignus et pignus similiter et cetera huiusmodi*" (Bede, K. VII, p. 286, 3). One can even go back farther than this, and show, in the case of Bede of the seventh and eighth centuries and Capser of the second, either a borrowing of the former from the latter, or a borrowing of the former from the same source from which the latter borrowed. Where Capser in the passage quoted above says *si maiestas scribis*, Bede says *maiestas cum scribis aut dicis*. Bede's thrice-repeated phrase *cum scribis aut dicis, cum dicis sive scribis*, etc., is consequently, while worth little as evidence in itself (Bede was not born until 674), of considerable importance as marking by contrast the very general absence of any evidence in the earlier writers that *they* were thinking of pronunciation.

(2) Much stress is laid by the advocates of the received doctrine on the coincidence of the statements of Roman grammarians with the facts of Romance pronunciation of to-day. If, for the moment, this coincidence be granted, I confess I should still, for reasons to be given below, find it hard to accept the doctrine. I should be much more inclined to suspect that the Romance languages had in this regard departed from Roman usage. Such a thing would be no more remarkable than the admitted change from quantitative to accentual versification. But the actual state of affairs, so far as concerns the combinations of consonants in question, is not one which will justify the word coincidence.

It is the verdict of the phonetists that the Italians say, e.g., *ba-sta, fre-sco, capi-sco, te-nyi-co*, and the like. Now I am well aware of the danger of venturing to express doubt where a phonetist like Storm has given his decision. Yet to my ear the division in daily speech is generally *bas-ta, fres-co, capis-co, tec-ni-co*, and the like. I have recently tested with care the pronunciation of about twenty-five Italians, mostly Romans, but in part Florentines, and representing all walks in life. In nearly every case the division in speech in words of this kind has clearly seemed to me to be between the consonants, *until the purpose of my test was understood*. The moment

that was known, the syllables, provided the person could read and write, were strongly separated, and the division became *ba-sta, fre-sco, te-chni-co*, etc.¹ In many cases the explanation was volunteered that the "rule" was to divide in this way; and to my statement that the actual pronunciation seemed otherwise, and that the rule was probably only for writing, the answer was (except in four of these cases) that the division in writing and the division in pronunciation were the same. Now we have here, I imagine, a state of things very much like that in ancient Rome. There stand in the Italian grammars, I find, certain rules, corresponding to the rules of the ancient grammarians, and probably directly descended from them. Books and newspapers follow these rules. Concerning, as they do, one of the first things taken up in the grammars, they are known to all people of any education, and underlie their consciousness. I found, in making my tests, that a tobacconist and a keeper of lodgings, who were of the twenty-five, were as ready to cite them as was the university professor to whom I had previously gone. Knowing these rules, an Italian who is asked where the division comes or who is for any reason conscious of making a division, gives it as he has learned it, and as he sees it constantly occurring in print.² Very likely an ancient Roman, if asked the question "how do you divide in pronouncing *technicus*," would have answered "*te-chni-cus*," and would have referred you to Capre or somebody else, according to his day and generation.

I suspect, therefore, that those who have made the tests have not been careful to leave the persons upon whom they experimented in ignorance of the nature of the question.³

¹ Except in two cases, the pronunciation of *tecnico* was actually very nearly *tengnico*. This fact is interesting in connection with the question whether, as Brugmann and others think, *gn* in Latin had the sound of *ngn*.

² My landlady in Florence, being set to pronounce a group of words, seemed to myself and another witness distinctly to be saying *ques-to*, and the like; but, when I asked her how she divided the syllables, she said equally distinctly, *que-sto*, etc., and to my question "*perchè divide così?*" made answer "*perchè scrivendo si divide così!*"

³ The tests referred to above were all made with repeated pronunciation of the words employed. The test from listening to public speaking is, of course, very unsatisfactory; yet I ought to note one case which was in opposition to my other

Further, there is an additional reason why one might easily go astray. The final vowel in Italian is given with much less energy than any other vowel. The preceding consonant shares this weakness. Accordingly, in a word like *questo*, the last consonant is about on the same grade of feebleness with the *s* which belongs (*me iudice*) to the dying expiration of the first syllable. And this parity, or approach to parity, of the two consonants in point of vigor, and the feebleness of both of them as compared with the preceding vowel at the moment when it is first struck, will easily make the two consonants seem to go together and to belong where the second unquestionably does belong. The same state of things also exists, though in a lesser degree, where the accent is upon the antepenult.

The only method of proof would be through the application of an instrument like that of the Abbé Rousselot, the power of which, in portraying the elements of a given word to the eye through the movement of a dry pen upon a paper blackened with soot, is so great that almost anything might be expected of it, provided the persons upon whom the experiment was made were kept in complete ignorance of the question to be answered, and were not made to pronounce so slowly that their grammatical consciousness would be set to working. Unhappily, however, there is no such instrument in Rome, or, so far as I can learn, in Italy. The University of Chicago possesses one, and at a later time I shall hope, through the kindness of a colleague, to have the test made upon Italians recently arrived in America. Meanwhile the question of Italian usage must be left unsettled, or, since the evidence as a whole will presently be seen to be sufficient in any case, may be answered as Storm has answered it.

experiences. One orator, who had the habit of varying his delivery by speaking very slowly, said clearly at one point "*non ba-sta*," with long-drawn emphasis. The same orator at other times, in more rapid utterance, seemed clearly to say *es-pos-to*, and the like. In view of my general experiences, I am led to believe that in slow and emphatic utterance he was governed by a grammatical sub-consciousness which in ordinary utterance was wanting. I may, of course, be at fault here, as I may have been in some of the express tests which I made. Yet I should find it extremely difficult to believe that there were not unmistakable cases of the pronunciations *cos-ta*, *es-pos-ta*, *fres-co*, *tec-ni-co*, and the like. I am forced to expect that instruments of precision will show either that the pronunciation is regularly *fres-co*, and the like, or that usage varies.

For, whatever be the case in Italian, it is not the same in other languages. Seelmann himself, on page 150, grants *es-tar, es-celente, nues-tro* for Spanish, so that the evidence begins to be divided against itself. For French, following Sachs, Seelmann gives *e-sprit, e-spérer*, etc. But, on the other hand, Havet,¹ in an article in the *Revue Celtique* for April, 1895, has shown that the character of the vowels in certain words in Old French proves that the consonant in question belonged to the same syllable with the previous vowel in Latin pronunciation. His argument is, briefly, as follows: *lepor* gives *lièvre*, *canis* gives *chien*, *caput* gives *chief*, *capra* gives *chièvre*, etc. Where, then, the first syllable ends with a vowel (as all agree that it did in these Latin words), Old French shows a diphthong. But no diphthong appears in, e.g., the descendants of *costa* and *rupta*. The division was therefore not *co-sta, ru-pta*, but *cos-ta, rup-ta*. Even if the case, then, is as Seelmann claims in Italian, it is different in French, and, in part, in Spanish; the evidence from the Romance languages, being thus divided against itself, has consequently no weight, but leaves the scale to be turned according as other evidence shall be put into the balance.

The evidence under the first two out of the three counts into which we have divided Seelmann's argument accordingly gives nothing to justify his view.

(3) We come next to the evidence to be found in inscriptions, which, so far as I know, was first pointed out by Seelmann.

¹ Havet's note is à propos of an article by Whitley Stokes in the *Academy* for March 2, 1895, No. 1191, on the syllabification which he has found in an Irish manuscript of alliterative poetry. An example is *Pergen-finus tendmin*, which Whitley Stokes says agrees with Latin syllabification. In the same way, the word *Lucretia* alliterates with *c*. On the other hand, *sp, ct, st* alliterate with *p* and *t*, as in *Anas-tasius toedlich*; and this he notes as differing from the Latin method. Havet answers that it differs from the method of division in writing, but not from "la division phonétique, dont (he adds) je doute qu'un ancien ait jamais parlé." He does not examine individually the passages from Latin authors, but proceeds to give briefly the argument from versification, and the argument from Old French recounted above.

While I am in complete accord with Havet's general conviction, and even sympathize with the impatient tone with which he passes by the supposed evidence of the grammarians, he seems to me, as I have already said, to have made too strong a statement in the sentence quoted.

Seelmann holds that the division of words between lines is entirely untrustworthy, and cites such cases as F||ELICIS, F||RATER, and PARE||NTI (*CIL.* VI, 13614). (To this point we shall return later.) He finds, however, in a small number of inscriptions, punctuation between syllables as well as between words, and cites these inscriptions in support of his view. I give his first example as a specimen (*CIL.* VI, 77):

T·AN·NI·V̇S·HE·DY·PNVS
DO·MI·NAĖ·CAE·LES·TĪ·
DONVM·DEDIT·IV̇S
SVS·A·NV·MI·NAE
·EIVS·

In every case cited the point precedes the single consonant, and precedes the combinations *pr* and *tr*. It also in every case separates the consonants in the groups *ll*, *nn*, *ss*, *tt*, *lc*, *np*, *ng*, *ns*, *nt*, *rc*, *rn*, *rt*, and separates *n* from *br* in the groups *nbr*. Thus far the evidence is in accord with what is agreed upon by everybody. The point at issue is reached when we find combinations like *ct* (one example), *sc* (two examples), *st* (seven examples), *pn* (one example), *pt* (one example), *mpt* (one example),—all these being in inscriptions in Roman letters),—and *NKT*, corresponding to *nct* (one example, in a Latin epitaph in Greek letters).

These combinations occur fourteen times in Seelmann's inscriptions. Supposing now we were to find that, in the large majority of cases, the two consonants followed the point, but that in a small minority, say two or three, the point separated them, what inference should we draw? Necessarily the inference that, while theoretical syllabification, taught in the schools in exercises in writing and followed by the copyists of manuscripts, put the two consonants into the following syllable, actual pronunciation put the first of the two consonants with the preceding vowel, the result being that the tradition of writing was, in these few instances, broken in upon. How much stronger is the case, then, when the count is given; namely, four examples in favor of Seelmann's view and ten against it!

The four in his favor are *mpt*, *nct* (NKT), *pn*, and *ct*, each with one example. I will not stop to urge, with regard to the first two, that the ear might easily be deceived in combinations of three letters beginning with a nasal. As regards *pn*, it is not a particularly fortunate instance for Seelmann, since the break upon traditional syllabification, founded largely on Greek usage, is least likely to have taken place in the case of a purely Greek combination (the instance is the proper name HE·DY·PNVS). As regards *ct*, the example cited, namely, IN·VI·CITE (*CIL.* VI, 80), really conveys, in the insertion of the *i* between the *c* and the *t*, very strong evidence against Seelmann's theory. It is evident that the stone-cutter, though following traditional syllabification, really felt a clear separation in pronunciation between the *c* and the *t*; which is as much as to say that he pronounced the *c* with the preceding vowel. Our count ought accordingly to be so revised as to read three cases for Seelmann and eleven against him.¹

As the matter now stands, then, the evidence from inscriptions though he does not himself state the fact, is opposed to Seelmann's view, in particular with regard to *st*. Moreover, he still has left one difficulty, not yet mentioned, but obvious enough, namely, the difficulty of accounting, upon this view, for the facts of Roman versification. He is therefore obliged at two points to weaken his own case, though apparently without realizing the harm which he is doing.

(a) On pp. 144, 145 he says that in imperial times the tendency was to pronounce with the preceding vowel an *s* followed by a consonant. Together with evidence from the grammarians he very justly cites such spellings as *disscente*, *iusta*, *Vesta*. But this is really a damaging admission, not a defense. As for the chronological limitation, he gives no evidence for it except established Roman theory, which, as seen above, has to do with writing, not speech, or, at any rate, on the best claims that could possibly be set up for it,

¹ It is singular that Seelmann was able to print his page of examples without recognizing that they made heavily against his case; and it is remarkable, too, that, after once admitting a doubt, Professor Bennett (*Appendix*, p. 32) should have seen only that exceptions to Seelmann's rule occur in his examples, instead of recognizing that his examples, so far as they go, prove the very opposite of his rule, and that the true "exceptions" are the few cases which are in his favor.

confuses the two. Moreover, Catullus's *nulla spes*, and Ennius's *stabilita scamna*, to be discussed below (p. 267), will be found upon examination to contradict this limitation. Such early spellings also as *extrad*, *proxsumeis*, *saxsum*, point to a pronunciation in which a part of the *x* sound goes with the first vowel.

(b) On pp. 107-108 he assumes, for poetry, an artificial separation of groups which in daily speech could not be separated. *A-gmen*, *fa-ctum*, *se-ptem* became, he suggests, *a-g...men*, *fa-c...tum*, *se-p...tem*. This position is untenable. If it be true that in daily speech the pronunciation was *se-ptem*, etc., then a clear conclusion follows: unless, (as is incredible with this division) there was in daily speech a perceptible pause after the explosion of the *p*, — which would really make the word a trisyllable with one syllable composed of nothing but a consonant, namely, *se-p-tem*, — then the first part of the spoken word must have been at least *nearer* that amount of length which is called short than that amount of length which is called long. But if this were so, then such a syllable would always appear in verse as short, not as long, or, at any rate, there would be fluctuation in quantity, — which never is the case in classical poetry in pure Latin words. Compare (2), p. 266.

But the matter of the evidence from inscriptions cannot be allowed to rest here. Seelmann does not say or imply that he has made a count in the *Corpus*, though, for the purposes of a book of such a scope and range as his, this might well have been done. I shall presently make this count for the inscriptions found on Italian soil, having been prevented, up to the moment when it is necessary to go to press, by other demands of the work of the American School of Classical Studies in Rome. Meanwhile I will provisionally add to Seelmann's list the examples on which I have happened in general work upon inscriptions of the City and its neighborhood, together with others, likewise from Roman inscriptions (namely those lying between nos. 24321 and 29680), which Mr. Walter Dennison, Fellow of the School, has been good enough to get for me through a methodical reading of vol. VI, part iv, fasc. i, of the *Corpus* (from PLOTIVS down to the end of the Tituli Sepulcrales), and two examples afforded by Hübner's list in the *Exempla*, p. lxxvii. The examples are nearly all from sepulchral inscriptions. Interpunctua-

tion, being opposed to the best usage, is of course far less likely to occur in state inscriptions, or inscriptions in honor of important men. But, on the other hand, these humbler inscriptions reflect actual pronunciation more justly, since the humbler class of stone-cutters employed upon them are the very class who would be most likely to be governed by their ears, and least likely to know, or knowing, to care for, the rules of the professors.

The following list gives both Seelmann's examples and the additions, the former being placed first, and further distinguished by being underlined. The doubled bar indicates divisions between lines.

HE·DY·PNVS, VI, 77.

RE·DEM·PTO, IX, 1520.

ΞAN·KTΩ, De Rossi 11.

SANC·||TISSI MAE, VI, 26510.¹

PV·BLICIA, VI, 25120.²

PV·BLICIAE, VI, 25127.

OB·LATVM, IX, 5439.

IP·SE, VI, 15546.

OP·TI·MO, IX, 1520.

OP·TI·MO, VI, 12288.

RVP·TA, VI, 15546.

O·PTI||MAE, VI, 15799.

SEP·TI·MI·O, VI, 26260.

OP·TI·ME, VI, 26353.

IN·VI·CITE, VI, 80.

OC·TA·BI·A||NO, VI, 14560.

E·PIC·TE·SIS, VI, 16898.

OC·TAVIA, VI, 23357.³

VIC·TORI·NVS, VI, 25928.

PRO·TO·CTES, VI, 28093.

VIC·TO·RI, VI, 28905.

COS·MAE, VI, 26345.

SO·MNO, VI, 11951.

SEM·NE, VI, 26146.

A||LVM·NAE, VI, 28093.

SEM·NO, XIV, 852.

A·LVM·ne,⁴ XIV, 1481.

PRS·CVS, VI, 11682.⁵

ARES·CVSA, VI, 13596.

¹ SANC·T·O, VI, 3689, is invalidated by the second point.

² I pass without discussion the difficult case of the mute and liquid *bl*, crediting the two examples to Seelmann.

³ The value of the evidence of OC·TAVIA is lessened by the fact that it is immediately followed by the false QVI·ET·A, and of SO·MNO by the fact that it is immediately followed by AE||TERN·ALI. It seems best, however, to give both. Any reader who disapproves can subtract one from each side.

⁴ The last two letters are a sure restoration.

⁵ For PRIS·CVS.

CRES·CENTI, V, 16567.
 CRES·CEN·TI, VI, 16569.
 CRES·CES, VI, 26353.¹
CAELES·TI, VI, 77.
BLAS·T||E·NI, VI, 11682.
SES·TV·LEI·VS, IX, 4028.
SES·TV·LE·IO, IX, 4028.
A·MET||YS·TO, IX, 4028.
IVS·TI·NA, IX, 4028.
AVGV||S·TA·LES, X, 2194.
 FAVS·TE, VI, 12866.
 CAS·TI·NI·VS, VI, 14560.
 CAS·TI·NI·O, VI, 14560.
 STA·TV·IS·TIS, VI, 15546.

POTVIS·TIS, VI, 15546.
 EGIS·TIS, VI, 15546.
 INIVS·TA, VI, 15546.
 EGES·TAS, VI, 15546.
 PIS·TES,² VI, 15546.
 HOS·TILIAE, VI, 19574.
 ADRAS·TVS, VI, 21617.
 FAVS·||TINAE, VI, 24612.
 POS·||TERIS·QVE, VI, 27977.
 POS·TERIS||QVE, IX, 3437.
 RES·TV·TAE, VI, 28427.
 VE·NVS·TA, XIV, 1648.
 BLAS·TE·NIS, XIV, 1731.
 POS·TE, XIV, 1731.

If the count at the present stage be taken, it will be found, with every possible concession made to Seelmann's side, to stand as follows: For *pn*, 1 to 0 in favor of the received doctrine; for *mpt*, 1 to 0 in favor of it; for *nct*, an even 1 to 1; for *bl* (not in compounds), 2 to 0 in favor of it; for *bl* (in compounds), 1 to 0 against it; for *ps*, 1 to 0 against it; for *pt*, 5 to 1 against it; for *ct*, 5 to 2 against it (IN·VI·CITE being counted in these 2); for *sm*, 1 to 0 against it; for *mn*, 4 to 1 against it; for *sc*, 5 to 0 against it; for *st*, 25 to 0 against it. Granting Seelmann, then, the case of *ct* mentioned above (which really is strongly against his view), the count thus far stands 9 for him and 48 against him. Comment does not seem to be called for.

As for the division between lines, it is quite true, as Seelmann says, that all kinds of irregularities occur. It does not, however, seem to be true that this is the case with the majority of inscriptions. A preliminary count which Mr. Dennison has made of about 500

¹ CRES·C·ENS, VI, 16577, is too faulty to count.

² The Corpus gives also PIS·TE in line 9, and NAS·CI in line 12; but in the inscription itself (Galleria Chiaramonti in the Vatican) I find PISTE and NASCI.

inscriptions shows that the large majority conform to rule in the cases about which all are agreed, while the large majority are against the rule in the cases under dispute. If, as is probable, the same results shall be given by the complete count spoken of above, they will constitute a weighty argument against the received doctrine.

Having thus examined Seelmann's argument, we are now ready to present the case as a whole in brief form, and to draw the necessary conclusion.

(1) The rules of the grammarians put *ct*, *pt*, *cm*, *chm*, *chn*, *mn*, and the like on one and the same footing. Now the Romans of the third century before Christ, so far from being capable of pronouncing such combinations as *cm* and *chn* in one syllable, were not even capable of pronouncing them in contact in *two* syllables, as is shown by words like *Alcumena*, *drachuma*, *techina*, etc.¹ They did in time learn to pronounce these combinations with no perceptible vowel sound after the explosion of the first consonant; but it is very improbable that they learned habitually to begin a syllable with them. Remnants of the old difficulty appear as late as Varro's time; witness his *guminasium*, *R.R.* i. 55. 4. If Varro did not even say *gum-nasium*, it is very unlikely that he was in the habit of saying *o-mnes*. On the other hand, it was possible for a poet who was steeped in Greek, and founded his metres upon Greek models, to invite his readers to pronounce on occasion as the Greeks were able to do on occasion, and so, e.g., to make the first syllable of *Tecmessa* short, as in Horace's *forma captivæ dominum Tecmessæ* (where the pronunciation was probably *Te-messæ*). An occasional variation of this sort only strengthens the case of the other side for pure Latin words, in which such a phenomenon is never found.

(2) The first syllable of *esse* (to select a typical example), is everywhere long, though the vowel is known to be short. This must mean that the first *s* was distinctly pronounced (necessarily with the preceding vowel), and, under these circumstances of obstruction of utterance before the following *s*, *was so dwelt upon as to occupy an amount of time roughly equal to that occupied in the utterance of a short vowel*. But the case must have been similar with, e.g., the first

¹ Compare also such later spellings as *ARIADINE*, *CIL.* VI, 21398.

syllable of *asper*, which everywhere in poetry has the same length as the first syllable of *assis*. What the length of the syllable in question would have been if the *s* had gone in pronunciation with the same expiratory effort as the *p*, is shown by what is found when, in poetry, a word ends with a vowel and the next word begins with *sp*. The syllable in question is regularly short. On the other hand, such occasional phenomena as *nulla spes*, Catull. 64, 186 (— — —), *stabilita scamna*, Enn. ap. Cic. *Div.* i. 48. 107 (∪∪ — — ∪), can be accounted for only by supposing that, in these cases, the *s* was uttered in closer relation than usual with the preceding vowel, *as if it formed a part of the same word with it*, — in other words, only by supposing that, in ordinary pronunciation within the limits of a word, the first of two consonants (not a mute and a liquid) belonged to the same expiratory effort with the preceding vowel. And it is only upon this theory, too, that the fluctuating length in the case of mute and liquid can be accounted for (ordinarily, e.g., *pa-tri*; in verse either *pa-tri* or, with the first consonant pronounced as obstructed, *pat-ri*, at the poet's convenience). This theory alone, too, makes intelligible the fact, pointed out by Priscian in opposition to Herodian in the passage quoted on p. 255, that in a word like *oblatus*, *obruo*, etc., the first syllable is always long.¹ *Obruo* with a long first syllable and *fabro*

¹ Professor Bennett, Grammar § 4, 4, lays down the rule, "But compounds are separated into their component parts; as *per-it*, *ab-radit*."

In the Appendix, p. 32, he uses Priscian's argument from *ablatus* and *abrado* to show that in such words the mute must have been joined with the preceding vowel. Then, a little later, he says, "As regards the rule laid down in the Grammar (§ 4, 4), to the effect that prepositional compounds are separated into their component parts, the evidence seems altogether against this. The division *per-ro*, *inter-ea*, gives us a closed (i.e. long) syllable, whence it would appear that the actual division in such cases was *pe-ro*, *inte-rea*, exactly as in *ge-ro*, *te-ro*; i.e. compounds were treated precisely like other words."

The last sentence, which contradicts his own conclusion about *ab-latus* and *ab-rado* quoted above, of course does not express Professor Bennett's meaning, which must be that compounds are treated like other words when the second part begins with a vowel. I call attention to the passage, however, because it contains a conception which has evidently been thought out, and which seems to me likely to mislead, namely the conception that a closed syllable, i.e. a syllable ending in a consonant, is necessarily long. The first syllable is closed in the English word "many," yet it is distinctly short. The first syllable of "battle"

with a short stand in a perfectly reasonable relation to each other, provided the former was pronounced with a conscious separation of the parts, which brought with it the separation of the mute from the liquid. (Note the corroborative example OB·LATVM above, which I have verified from the original in the Galleria Lapidaria of the Vatican.) But, if it be granted, as it must be, that in *ob-ruo* the length of the first syllable is due to the fact that, in addition to a short vowel, it contains a consonant pronounced in clear separation from the following consonant, then the same cannot be denied in the case of *omnis*, *asper*, and the rest.

(3) The same side receives some corroboration from a source which, so far as I have noticed, no one had pointed out in this connection, namely, Priscian's scansion of the verses of Vergil which form the subject of his *Partitiones XII Versuum Aeneidos*. The verses in which combinations that concern us occur are divided by him as follows:

Conticu ere om nes in tenti que ora te nebant

(K. III, 478, 22).

Turnus ut infrac tos ad verso Marte La tinos

(K. III, 512, 16 P).

Ut bel li si gnum Lau renti Turnus ab arce

(K. III, 496, 3).

(pronounced *batl*) is short even though the second syllable begins with a consonant. The last syllable of Latin adjectives in *us* is closed if it happens to end a verse, as e.g. *amarus* in a hexameter. Yet one does not believe that in such cases the syllable was long. The first syllable of *pereo* would be short, no matter whether the *r* belongs to it or not. There is no magic in "closure." It requires something more than that to make a syllable with a short vowel long, namely a perceptible dwelling upon the closing consonant; i.e. a continuation in the case of continuous sounds (e.g. *n*), and a perceptible pause between the moment of contact and the moment of opening, — in technical phrase, between implosion and explosion, — in the case of so-called momentary sounds (e.g. *p*). Now modern European languages (Italian, within a certain limited range, being excepted) do not so dwell upon consonants. In the English word "incidentally," e.g. (pronounced *incidentally*) every syllable is short, in spite of the consonants. In Latin, as is also the case in other languages, the pronunciation of a consonant that opened a syllable was rapid, and so was, in daily speech, the pronunciation of the easily tripping combination made by a mute and a liquid; but in Latin, as is not the case in modern languages in general, an obstructed consonant, i.e. a consonant standing before another (the two not being a mute and a liquid), *was* perceptibly dwelt upon, occupying about as much time as a short vowel itself.

In the first two, though the Roman theory of syllabification would make the divisions *o mnes* and *infra ctos*, the scanning clearly indicates that to the ear the first consonant was felt to belong to the same impulse (syllable) with the preceding vowel. In the third verse, it might look at first blush as if this evidence were neutralized through the division *si gnum*. But if it be true, as Brugmann and others think, that the pronunciation of Latin *gn* was like that of *ngn* in "sing now," then we should expect a fluctuation in the division. To one person it would seem that, since the *g* had this sound only in combination with the *n*, to write *sig-num* would be to suggest a false pronunciation; while to another it would seem that the *g*, which really stands for a sound separable from that of the *n*, should be written with the syllable in which it was pronounced. In any case, however, and upon any view, the evidence of the three verses taken together is strongly adverse to the received theory. As has been pointed out once before, it is easy to account for the following of the rules of the professors for syllabification in writing, even though actual speech was at variance with them; while, on the other hand, it is very difficult to account for the violation both of these rules and of the actual usage of Roman speech.

(4) The evidence thus far accumulated from inscriptions is on the same side, and, though incomplete, is so respectable in quantity as to make it certain that, when it is completed, its character will not be reversed.¹

(5) The statements of the grammarians seem, in general, to have to do with syllabification in writing, not with syllabification in speech; and the strongest phrase which identifies the two comes from a very

¹ As for manuscripts, it is commonly believed that the division of syllables found in them is in harmony with the teachings of the grammarians. This, if it be a fact, would be of little more weight than such a fact, e.g., as that the present writer, who believes these rules had nothing to do with actual speech, is in the habit of conforming to them punctiliously in copying Latin or reading proof. The very object of the rules was to provide a clear method to follow "*in scribendo*," and nothing could be more natural than that the scribes should accept gratefully what was so happily laid down for them. On the other hand, violations of the rules would be significant. The earlier the manuscript, of course, the more its evidence would weigh. At a later time, I hope to present some definite facts. At present, I can only say that violations do occur, and are not infrequent.

late writer, who, by comparison with other writers, is found to be adding his own inferences to earlier statements which dealt purely with syllabification in writing.

(6) The testimony of the Romance languages is divided against itself.

This evidence, taken as a whole, leads to a clear inference. We are obliged to conclude that the first of *any* group of consonants,¹ not a mute and a liquid, belonged in actual Roman speech to the same expiratory effort with the preceding vowel, and was so clearly and fully pronounced before the obstructing consonant that to our modern ears it would have seemed distinctly to be dwelt upon; and that it is in consequence of this physiological fact of utterance that we find length in such a case, although the vowel be short. In my teaching I have been in the habit of using the following formula, which aims both at exactness and at simplicity: *a syllable made up of a short vowel and an obstructed consonant (the first of any group of consonants except a mute and a liquid) is long.*

The general results reached in this paper may, for pedagogical purposes, be represented to the eye in a brief table, in which the elements that count appreciably to the ear are marked, the others being left unmarked. To the latter class belong single consonants standing between vowels, mutes followed by liquids, and initial consonants following obstructed consonants; for, in the passage from one vowel-position to another, the consonantal contact and withdrawal, or approach and withdrawal, as the case may be, occupies so small an interval as to seem to add nothing to the length of the syllable to which it belongs. (The words in brackets, being inserted only to give a context to the final syllable, are left unmarked.)

The unit is the length of a short vowel, or its approximate equal, the length of an obstructed consonant.

ǣ-nūs [ista],

ǣñ-nūs [iste],

ǣǣ-nū-lūs [iste], = ā-nū-lūs [iste],

ǣš-pēr [odor],

¹ For the present, I leave without discussion the question of the place of the second consonant in groups like *nct* and *mpt*.

ǣp-tǣ [dies],

ǣ-prǣ [saeva] (in daily speech),

ǣp-rǣ [saeva] (at will, in classical poetry).

The case of obstruction of a consonant at the end of a word may be represented thus :

ǣñ-nũš [totus].

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